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 Summary 
 
 
Disclosing a Value System in a Living Will could be in Your Best 
Interests 
 
Whilst doctors are recognised for being expert in medical matters they are nevertheless 
generally required by law to obtain the consent of a competent adult patient prior to 
administering a medical treatment.1  The need for consent underpins the right of a 
competent adult patient to refuse treatment, even life preserving treatment.  Accordingly, 
bodily inviolability is a fundamental principle of law and violation of it, even for 
benevolent reasons, is prima facie punishable.   Instead of which a competent patient has 
a right to self-determine what shall happen to their own body.  In this way the subjective 
decision-making standards and methods of a competent patient inform, and are made 
determinative, of any decision to accept or reject a medical treatment. 
 
It is against this general background that the comments of Lord Goff in the case of Bland 
should be considered.  There he suggested that the best interests test should comprise of 
something more than purely professional appraisal of a person’s medical welfare.2  To 
confine the test in this way, he said, would be inconsistent with the primacy given to the 
principle of self-determination and would ‘downgrade the status of the incompetent 
person by placing a lesser value on [their] intrinsic worth and vitality’.3   
 
So as the title to this thesis suggests I am primarily concerned with legal provisions 
governing medical treatment decision-making processes in respect of formerly competent 
adult patients.  More specifically it questions whether the values, beliefs and preferences 
of members of this patient group should be more favourably promoted, i.e. used and 
made determinative, in medical treatment decision-making processes concerning them 
based on contemporary understanding and application of the moral principle of 
autonomy.  Naturally this depends on whether a person’s value system can be accurately 
ascertained, recorded and protected to ensure that it is most fully promoted and respected 
in the future should a loss of decision-making capacity leave them unable to determine 
matters contemporaneously.   
 
Accordingly, the premise underlying this thesis is that the autonomous values, beliefs and 
preferences of a formerly competent person should be ascertained and recorded so that 
they can be understood and used by others to determine whether, and if so what, medical 
                                                 
1
 The term generally has been used to denote the fact that the inviolability of persons is a fundamental 
principle of law and in a medical context this means that the administration of a medical treatment is 
dependent on some form of legal authority.  As the primacy of the moral principle of autonomy is 
established in law doctors must obtain legal consent prior to administering a medical treatment.   However, 
there are circumstances where the law remains paternalistic and medical treatment can be administered on 
the basis of an alternative legal authority, for example, the Mental Health Act 2007.  
2
 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland  [1993] 1 All ER 821 HL 
3
 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland  [1993] 1 All ER 821 HL 
treatment is in the actual best interests of the patient.  Essentially bodily integrity would 
be safeguarded if a surrogate decision-maker was able to determine what the patient 
would decide if they were competent to make that choice.  A situation that is most 
desirable if we are not to downgrade the moral status of this particular group of 
incompetent patients.   
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Introduction 
 
This thesis sets out to answer the question of whether the values or value system of a 
competent person, that have been disclosed in a living will, could play a role in medical 
treatment decision-making processes concerning them under the Mental Capacity Act 
2005.1   
 
Aims of the Investigation2 
• To explore the goals of medicine as well as the key ethical principles of the 
medical profession to draw attention to the obligations that are significant to 
treatment decision-making processes 
• To examine the moral principle of autonomy to establish the context in which a 
person is respected as an autonomous moral agent with the right to self-
determination and to its significance in relation to the question of what a good life 
is or should entail 
• To investigate the general legal framework for the provision of a medical 
treatment in respect of a capable patient to determine whether autonomy is the 
primary principle of medical law and if it is to consider whether patient values are 
also respected in law 
• To inquire into the law in respect of the incapable patient to see what approach is 
taken to safeguarding the autonomy and welfare interests of formerly competent 
patients 
• To research the nature and scope of an advance decision to refuse a medical 
treatment since these are an exception to the principle that a doctor must act in the 
best interests of a mentally incapacitated patient 
• To analyse the concept of values and of a value system to see how these can be 
articulated so as to inform the assessment of best interests and how they might be 
incorporated into advance decisions 
• To inquire into the usefulness and effectiveness of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 
in promoting autonomy when someone has disclosed a value system in a living 
will with a view to suggesting ways in which the law might be made to work 
better if the MCA is found wanting in this regard 
 
Research Context  
My research question seeks to address a social issue that directly or indirectly affects 
many members of society.  It arises out of the fact that persons wish to survive and to 
lead a good or flourishing life and trust that medical science will, when necessary and 
appropriate, help them in that endeavour.  We are fortunate to live in an era where death 
results far less frequently from serious injury or illness due to advances in medical 
                                                 
1
 In this regard I wish to thank Professor Michael Gunn, who acted as director of studies during the first 
year of my study, for inspiring me to undertake this project.      
2
 In this regard I wish to thank Ms Kay Wheat for assisting me to develop a structure that helped me to 
focus more precisely on the theme of this work.  
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science and this is obviously beneficial for those whose health is subsequently fully 
restored.  However, contemporary medicine cannot always be relied upon to produce 
such a positive outcome and in cases where mental health has been unduly compromised 
doctors may continue to care for a patient in their best interests.  Another consequence of 
our era is that people are living for longer.  This has precipitated a proportionate rise in 
the incidence of diseases such as dementia and once a victim’s decision-making capacity 
has been irretrievably compromised by this disease, their future health and welfare needs 
will also be determined by reference to the best interests test.  Accordingly, an increasing 
number of people are, or at risk of being, prevented from exercising their right to self-
determine what shall happen to them in a medical context.   
 
The irony is that this is taking place at a time when the primacy of autonomy and the 
right to self-determination have become more firmly established in medical law.3  Certain 
significant influences contribute to this being so.  Our law is intimately concerned with 
human welfare and morality and as statutory and common law provisions tend to support 
the view that we are all equal before the law it is important that the law should not be 
structured in such a way as to deny moral equality.  Unfortunately, there is no definitive 
way to settle questions about human welfare.4  Each person is a unique individual and as 
society is inherently pluralistic no consensus of opinion has formed around which goods 
and social practices we should adopt and why.  If the law is to remain neutral in the face 
of competing and conflicting ideas about what a good life for humans should entail then 
one of its primary functions in regulating human conduct should be to recognise and 
protect certain basic liberties and freedoms of all persons.5   
 
In this regard the fundamental principle of bodily inviolability is adopted in law to reflect 
the special significance6 and importance members of society attribute to the human body 
and life.7  Primacy is however accorded to the principle of autonomy.8   Philosophical 
reflections as to the value of autonomy relate particular facts about humans and their 
nature to the view that human life has special significance.  The dominant view is that 
humans have an intellect that gives them the capacity to think, to reason and to be 
rational and because they can be trusted to make decisions and act on their own behalf in 
accordance with a reasoned set of principles or laws they should have freedom to pursue 
a life of their own choosing.9  Nevertheless, they like other creatures also receive 
information from their senses.  Human beings are therefore confronted by a mixture of 
rational and non-rational impulses.  However, the will, which is essentially autonomous, 
                                                 
3
 See, for example, Chester v Afshar 2004 WL 2289136 
4
 For example, Mill and Bentham both considered that the principle of utility was the primary principle of 
morality but differed in their views about how the principle should be used to maximise human happiness 
5
 Dworkin Ronald, Justice in Robes, 2006, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Rawls and the 
Law, p.253 
6
 There is general agreement that human life can be distinguished from all other life forms on the basis of 
the intellect.  It therefore follows that this is the source of many of the concepts and ideas we use to uphold 
the notion that human life has special significance and importance, for example, dignity and morality and 
as each human life deserves to be respected as something special each of us should always be treated as an 
end and should never be treated merely as the means to the end of any other.    
7
 Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1 HL 
8
 Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1 HL 
9
 See Immanuel Kant 
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links these two aspects of them and it can be mobilised to override their more basic 
instincts.10   Persons should therefore be treated as autonomous creatures of moral worth 
and dignity. 
 
Therefore, the principle of autonomy is an important principle of law because it 
establishes the idea that person’s value being in control of their own person and life.11  A 
good life is in other words one where persons have freedom to pursue whatever is of 
value to them, i.e. a good life is one that is self-constructed.  Accordingly, philosophical 
reflections on the value of autonomy support the view that mankind is better off when 
individuals are respected as sovereign masters12 who willingly accept personal 
responsibility for their decisions and actions.13   
 
Consequently, one of the ways that we show our respect for persons, in relation to 
medical treatment decision-making processes, is to allow them to self-determine, in 
accordance with their own values, beliefs and preferences, the matter of whether to 
accept or reject an offer of medical treatment, including cases where treatment may 
preserve life.  In this way respect for autonomy is allowed to triumph over the sanctity 
principle; the desire to survive is a potent force within most rational persons but when 
good physical and/or mental health has been irretrievably compromised, it may not, on 
every occasion, be entirely irrational for some people to view an earlier death as being 
preferable to a continued life of intolerable mental or physical pain, indignity and 
restricted freedom.14 
 
This is reflected in law as the general rule is that a doctor who administers a medical 
treatment without obtaining their patient’s consent commits a battery.15  This fact should 
be weighed against another.  The underlying objective of medicine is to benefit the 
patient and physicians are people who possess skills and expertise in the practice of 
medicine.  Moreover, medical professionals are ethically and legally regulated to act in 
the best interests of their patients.  They are in other words bound to practice medicine 
beneficently and yet in law this is an insufficient justification for divesting persons of 
their basic liberties and freedoms or right to autonomy.  Consequently, the law preserves 
the right of a doctor to determine, as medical expert, the form of treatment the patient 
should receive in their medical best interests but it is quite clear that beneficence should 
not be allowed to override autonomy when it comes to accepting or rejecting an offer of 
medical treatment.  This is to reflect the fact that persons confer value on a wide variety 
of goods and as such it is impossible to define well-being solely in terms related to 
medical well-being.  And when welfare is considered more broadly doctors are in no 
                                                 
10
 When the will operates freely and independently persons are more inclined to act rationally on the basis 
of reasoned deliberation rather than on the basis of sense perception alone  
11
 Bodily security is an essential pre-requisite to individual exercises of self-determination 
12
 According to Kant persons should always be treated as an end and never solely as the means to the end of 
any other 
13
 Most moral and legal philosophers support, or at least do not detract from this view, see Kant, Mill, 
Bentham, Dworkin and Raz 
14
 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland  [1993] 1 All ER 821 HL; Re B (Consent to Treatment: Capacity) [2002] 
EWHC 429 (Fam) 
15
 Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1 HL 
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better position than anyone else to know whether what is in someone’s medical best 
interests will also be in their actual best interests all things considered. 
 
To that end consent must be legally valid if it is to provide physicians with a defence to 
the crime or tort of battery.  As autonomy is the primary value governing treatment 
decision-making processes doctors are required to ensure that patients have the requisite 
level of capacity to make the decision they purport to make and in this regard all adults 
are presumed competent to make decisions and act on their own behalf.16  In cases of 
doubt a doctor will seek to determine whether someone is suffering from an impairment 
or disturbance of the mind or brain17 that would prevent them from understanding18 and 
retaining19 relevant information so that it can be used20 to make a decision which they can 
communicate.21  The decision of the patient must also be the decision of the patient and 
here it is important that the patient reached their decision about what to do voluntarily in 
that it was their own will that had been expressed on the matter and not that of some other 
interested party.22  Finally, all medical treatments carry with them potential benefits and 
harms that may or may not materialise in a particular instance.  Consequently, in order 
for consent to be legally valid it should be informed also so that the purpose of the law, 
the inviolability of persons, is not frustrated but fulfilled.23  In order to escape liability for 
the intentional tort of battery24 doctors are required to inform their patients of the nature 
and purpose of medical treatment(s) and to inform them of the consequences of 
exercising their right of choice one way rather than another.25  Doctors are also required 
to inform their patients of the risks inherent in treatment and to answer any questions they 
may field honestly and candidly.  Thus part of the reason why the patient’s right to self-
determination is legally protected is to enable them to arrive at a treatment decision 
having considered which harms they would wish to avoid and which risks they may be 
willing to assume in order to restore their personal sense of well-being.  The question of 
whether the patient received sufficient information for their needs, i.e. to protect their 
own welfare and other interests, including that pertaining to risks which may or may not 
materialise, is thought to be a matter that should properly be considered in accordance 
with the standards proposed by the unintentional tort of negligence.26  This is despite the 
fact that the way in which someone exercises judgment may be heavily influenced by 
what they learn about the nature and severity of harms that may ensue from their decision 
when these may pose some threat to their basic liberties and freedom of action in the 
future.   
 
                                                 
16
 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s.1(2) 
17
 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s.2(1) 
18
 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s.3(1)(a) 
19
 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s.3(1)(b) 
20
 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s.3(1)(c) 
21
 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s.3(1)(d) 
22
 Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 649 CA 
23
 Chester v Afshar 2004 WL 2289136 
24
 The standard of disclosure to escape liability for battery is restrictive in the sense that information about 
risks, which may or may not arise, do not have to be given 
25
 Chatterton v Gerson [1981] QB 432 
26
 Chester v Afshar 2004 WL 2289136 
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Self-evidently, the law’s requirement for consent chiefly resides in the right of a 
competent patient to be maintained inviolate and free from bodily harm.  Accordingly, 
the right to refuse necessary and appropriate medical treatment, even life-preserving 
treatment, is an essential element of autonomy.  Moreover, the law determines that 
personal welfare and interests are best safeguarded by the subjective decision-making 
standards and methods of patients and therefore not only are their values, beliefs and 
preferences of paramount importance to decision-making processes concerning them but 
so too is their subjective evaluation of the benefits and burdens of the medical treatment 
they have been offered.  Autonomy is then an important concept in the context of medical 
treatment decision-making because it allows patients to protect their own body27 and 
welfare interests.  It also serves to counter medical paternalism.   
 
However, because the right to bodily inviolability is obtained through the right to self-
determination it is open to question whether the right to autonomy is necessarily 
contemporary.  The principle of inviolability is non-discriminatory and therefore every 
person has a right to be maintained inviolate and free from harm which means that every 
person should have the right to self-determine what happens to their body.  However, the 
patient’s right to self-determination flows from legal capacity.  An issue in relation to 
mentally incapacitated patients is whether they too enjoy a similar right to medical 
treatment or to the withholding or withdrawal of necessary and appropriate medical 
treatment as do competent patients to consent to, or to refuse to consent to, medical 
treatment.   
 
In Re F, for instance, Lord Bridge thought it axiomatic that in cases of medical necessity 
treatment which is necessary and appropriate to preserve the life, health or well-being of 
an incompetent patient may lawfully be administered without their consent provided that 
a doctor has acted in the patient’s best interests.28  The incompetency of the patient 
should not in other words be used as an excuse to deny vulnerable persons their basic 
right to medical care and treatment.  Whilst, in the case of Bland, Lord Goff suggested 
that to subject an incompetent patient to a medical treatment based purely on professional 
opinion of what was in their medical best interests would not only be inconsistent with 
the importance we attach to autonomy and to the right of self-determination but it would 
also downgrade the status of the incompetent person by placing a lesser value on their 
intrinsic worth and vitality.29 
 
What should happen then when a person suffers a loss of decision-making capacity?  Is 
the patient’s right to autonomy greater in these circumstances than their right to 
beneficence or to the state’s interest in the preservation and sanctity of human life?30  
Should a person in a persistent vegetative state who will never regain cognition and 
whose vital processes are being maintained by a mechanical respirator and nasogastric 
                                                 
27
 Through the act of giving or withholding their consent 
28
 Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1 HL, p.52 
29
 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland  [1993] 1 All ER 821 HL 
30
 Mental Capacity Act 2005; Airedale NHS Trust v Bland  [1993] 1 All ER 821 HL; In the matter of Karen 
Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10 Supreme Court  
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tube be required to accept bodily invasions of this nature and frequency?31  Or is the right 
to bodily integrity so fundamental that the right to autonomy should not be disregarded 
solely on the basis that their condition prevents them from exercising their right of 
choice?32  If so, how is moral equality to be achieved?  Upon what principle can 
autonomy best be protected, advanced and vindicated?   
 
Conversely, what scope should be given to autonomy within the context of treatment 
decision-making on behalf of incompetent patients?  Is there a danger, in a political 
democracy, that in respecting autonomy certain other important principles might fall into 
decline through misuse or become redundant through unthinking adherence to particular 
ideas about goods and social practices?  For example, should a competent person be able 
to decide what happens to their incompetent self at some future point in time?  Also, 
given the importance we attach to the sanctity principle and to the preservation of life 
how should the withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures, which will hasten the death of 
the patient, be regarded?33  Finally, if we are not to abandon people to their autonomy 
isn’t there a need for society not only to be just but to show that it is just also? 
 
These various thoughts and comments stimulated my interest in the situation of formerly 
competent patients.  More specifically I wished to examine legal provisions governing 
the doctor-patient relationship in respect of this patient group to determine whether their 
rights are coterminous with those of a competent patient and if not whether there was 
scope to improve upon current law. 
 
Research Design and Methodology 
This study is ultimately concerned with protecting and promoting the autonomy of 
formerly competent patients.  As I wished to make suggestions for how the law might be 
made to work better in this regard it was possible for me to conduct a comparative study 
by seeking counsel from legal systems in alternative jurisdictions.  The USA being 
foremost amongst them based on its long standing history of recognising and protecting 
the basic rights and freedoms of citizens constitutionally.  There the Patient Self-
Determination Act 1990, which is a federal law, seeks to promote patient autonomy but 
also to reduce costs associated with unwanted medical care.  This statute requires hospital 
staff to inform patients of treatment options including the right to refuse treatment and by 
extension of right to die information and their advance directive options.   
  
Allied to which most States implement legislative provisions of their own - Natural Death 
Acts.34  For example, Idaho and California have both implemented legislation that sets 
out the procedures to be followed for limitation of treatment, including life-sustaining 
treatment when a patient is terminally ill or suffers from an irreversible condition.  Issues 
surround the definition given to 'terminally ill' etc.  They also establish documentation to 
                                                 
31
 Ibid   
32
 Ibid  
33
 Ibid  
34
 Parallels can be drawn with Europe, I think, where the European Parliament issue Directives which 
require member states to achieve a particular legislative result without stipulating the means for doing so.  
Essentially state legislators have discretion to decide how to implement Directives.  
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cover specific health situations.  These can be equated to a traditional advance decision 
except that completion of one of these establishes clear and convincing evidence of the 
patient's wishes, i.e. the advance directive is valid and applicable.  Beyond that these 
statutes generally seem to encourage the appointment of a surrogate decision-maker, who 
must not be the patient's doctor, to make decisions on their behalf in good faith and in 
accordance with their former wishes under the principle of substituted judgment.  Use of 
the best interests principle is reserved for those cases where the wishes of the patient are 
unknown.  Of course an issue with this is that an increasing number of people will not 
have anyone that they can or may wish to appoint into that role.  In those cases it is at 
least arguable that the law has been structured in such a way as to deny moral equality. 
 
I was, however, more interested in conducting a theoretical study because I wished to 
examine the philosophical foundations of medical law to see how this particular area of 
law was derived as a prelude to examining the relationship between moral philosophy 
and law in relation to competent patients.  The next question that had to be addressed was 
whether, and if so how, considerations that should apply to a competent patient are 
applied in a situation where a patient has suffered a loss of decision-making capacity.  
Essentially, I examine the legal frameworks that apply to medical treatment decision-
making processes in respect of competent and incompetent patients to see how the law 
works in practice so that I could form a view that was both valid and reliable about why it 
might fail to deliver what it promises in a particular instance or might not work as well as 
intended.   
 
As with all things ethical questions concerning the application of moral standards and 
ideas about what is right and wrong human conduct become refined and modified over 
time to take account of contemporary conditions possibly not envisaged by the likes of 
Kant and Mill.  The contribution of medical science and technology for example to 
human welfare is outstanding but we must also learn how best to live with the 
consequences of its successes and limitations when these give rise to new moral 
dilemmas that are a source of considerable debate amongst members of society.  In this 
regard contemporary moral and legal philosophers build on the work of their 
predecessors, whilst retaining its basic structure, to shine a light on the various factors 
that should be considered by those who attempt to find solutions to current ethical issues 
and I wished to draw on a valid and reliable body of knowledge that offered relevant, 
related and contrasting ideas about the value of autonomy so that I could make 
suggestions for how the law might be made to work better. 
 
Since persons are moral subjects35 a close connection exists between moral and legal 
systems, both are essentially concerned with human welfare and therefore with right and 
wrong human conduct.  It was therefore possible for me to engage in classic legal 
scholarship which typically involves the synthesis, evaluation and critical analysis of key 
publications that are relevant to my area of study.  The fact that data has been collected 
from some of the most distinguished academics in the field should ensure that my 
findings are valid and reliable.  As data has been collected from a variety of sources to 
reflect alternative perspectives on the value of autonomy it is also possible to claim that 
                                                 
35
 The way we treat one another is derivative of our ideas about the significance of the human body and life 
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the selection process was conducted objectively and with a view to reducing the 
incidence of biased interpretations and research outcomes.   
 
Results 
Legislation suggests that it is not uncommon for persons to worry about what might 
happen to them if they are no longer capable of making their own decisions.  And based 
on the fact that a surrogate must act in their best interests their primary concern must be 
that in so doing they may not be loyal to them or to their wishes when they are 
themselves helpless to act.  However, legislators are equally aware that a doctor’s self-
proclaimed mission or purpose in life is to heal and/or care for the sick.  They are also 
minded that medical professionals are required to make decisions and act in difficult 
situations when under pressure and that it is unreasonable to expect them to carry out 
their obligations fearing that they may be litigated against whichever way they decide 
things.   
 
Accordingly, the issue of who decides and of how they decide what should happen to 
patients who suffer a loss of decision-making capacity has been debated since 1990 and 
the case of Re F, culminating in the recent enactment of the MCA.  This conversation, 
concerning the doctor-patient relationship, was taking place at a time when the collective 
will sought constitutional protection of individual rights as a way to promote the various 
fundamental freedoms and liberty interests of all persons.36   It was therefore apparent 
that an increased emphasis on patient autonomy in personal decision-making and respect 
for individual wishes based on values was upon us.  The Act is an attempt to 
acknowledge this and to incorporate this perspective into law.     
 
Initiatives that aimed to make respect for autonomy overriding in this context required 
the legislature to encourage competent patients to take steps in advance of a time when 
they might suffer from a loss of decision-making capacity and when decisions concerning 
their welfare might have to be made.  Hence we have legal recognition of living wills or 
advance decisions.  And, as priority is accorded to the advance decision of a competent 
patient, over what others may consider is in their best interests, the concept of precedent 
autonomy has become established within the legislative framework. 
 
This means that paternalist intervention is preceded by the need to respect someone by 
means of giving them what they previously wanted.  Essentially the legislature is saying 
that past decisions are important indicators of what the patient would want now when 
they are incompetent and unable to form a view contemporaneously.  Treating someone 
in this way is the best way we have of respecting their autonomy and right to self-
determination in the present.  The problem is that, the concept, as currently defined and 
used under the MCA is given a fairly narrow window of opportunity to fulfil its purpose 
of empowering patients and of requiring others to respect their right to self-determination 
with regard to their own body and life. 
 
                                                 
36
 For example, the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998 
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However, it would seem possible to breathe new life into the concept of precedent 
autonomy if the values, beliefs and preferences that underpinned the decisions of the 
patient could be identified, expressed and preserved, for future use, in a living will.  The 
idea in disclosing ones values or value system in this way is that it would be regarded as a 
relevant written statement of the patient that could be used to inform a best interests 
treatment decision but it could just as well be used to inform a capacity assessment.  
Accordingly, an advantage in disclosing one’s values over conventional advance 
decisions is that it might conceivably be incorporated into an advance decision or could 
be used by others to inform a wider range of treatment decision-making processes under 
the MCA based upon the contents of the patient’s living will.    
 
The problem is that although the MCA could support such an approach to decision-
making I fear that a doctor as surrogate decision-maker might be inclined to prioritise the 
current wishes and feelings of a sentient but incompetent patient, which are by their very 
nature experientially valid, over the autonomously chosen critical interests of their former 
competent self.  In doing so they would apply the test of best interests test in a way that 
suggests the right to autonomy is necessarily contemporary.  As such I argue that the 
MCA is in need of reform if a values-based approach to decisions taken on behalf of 
formerly competent patients is to work well and be prioritised.  In this respect I draw 
upon the work of Pellegrino and Thomasma, amongst others, to propose that if 
beneficence is not to triumph over autonomy that a fiduciary principle is needed to 
underpin the nature of a doctor’s duty at both stage one and stage two of a treatment 
decision-making process to indicate where loyalty should lie in respect of formerly 
competent persons. 
 
To state the case in support of a values-based approach to decision-making I draw on the 
work and theoretical perspectives of Kant, Mill, Raz, Dworkin and Beauchamp and 
Childress, amongst others.  My purpose in doing so is to ensure that a competent person’s 
legally protected right to choose or reject medical treatment is safeguarded, not lost or 
diminished by virtue of subsequent physical or mental incapacity or incompetence.37   
 
Summary Overview and Structured Analysis of Chapters 
The focus of the dissertation is informed by the circumstances in which the law sanctions 
the medical treatment of adult patients who lack the capacity to consent to that treatment.  
The law respects patients’ right to self-determination, but nevertheless will permit 
treatment of a patient who is incapable of consenting in broadly two sets of 
circumstances: first, when the patient has previously (when capable) articulated an 
advance decision specifying circumstances in which s/he would not wish to be treated, 
and, secondly, when there is no such advance decision but the proposed form of treatment 
is in the best interests of the patient.   
 
The law’s respect for self-determination is underpinned by the ethical principle of the 
right of capable adults to autonomous decision-making, and therefore in the case of 
patients without capacity, the law has to devise ways of according a similar sort of 
                                                 
37
 Re Guardianship of Estelle M. Browning, 568 So.2d 4, para. 7 
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respect to those patients.  Given that, normally, the key players in assessing the scope of 
the advance decision or in assessing best interests will be doctors, attention to doctors’ 
ethical obligations may be a significant factor in this assessment.  In consequence, it is 
necessary to examine the ethical underpinnings of both the doctors’ obligations and the 
rights of patients.  One of the ways in which patients’ rights can be respected is to respect 
their values.  These can be articulated through an advance decision, and in the absence of 
such a decision, by reference to those values in deciding what is in their best interests.  
How such values can be ascertained and expressed forms the main focus of the 
dissertation, together with a consideration of the adequacy of the current legal framework 
in accommodating this.  
 
Chapter One – Key Ethical Principles of the Medical Profession 
The medical objective is to preserve the life, health and well-being of patients and as 
most rational human beings wish to survive and to live a good or flourishing life no 
obvious conflict of ends exists.  However, the goals of medicine are not always 
compatible with one another and this fact is established by examining the use of life 
sustaining technologies and treatment in cases where the patient has entered into a 
persistent vegetative state.  These patients will be subjected to ongoing physically 
invasive treatment and care to sustain their life when medical evidence establishes that 
they are insentient because an injury to the brain has totally and irretrievably 
compromised their cognitive capacity.   
 
It is against this general background that the traditional moral responsibilities of medical 
professionals are examined.  In this regard Hippocrates determined that doctors, as 
medical experts, should use their skill and judgment for the benefit of patients. 
Hippocrates thereby recognised the fiduciary nature of the doctor-patient relationship but 
permitted doctors to adopt a paternalist approach to decision-making and in so doing 
denied patient autonomy.  First they should determine the form of medical treatment that 
the patient should receive prior to determining, in accordance with the moral principles of 
non-maleficence (do no harm) and beneficence (do good), whether that treatment should 
be administered, withheld or withdrawn in the patient’s best interests.   
 
As the framework for decision, i.e. identifying and reflecting on moral problems, is 
insufficiently fleshed out for practical application the ethical underpinnings of these 
principles are explored to gain relevant insight into those factors considered by doctors 
and also into how they discharge their various moral obligations when making treatment 
decisions for and on behalf of their patients.38  This leads me to question whether these 
obligations, which are not always compatible with each other, amount to a form of 
paternalism that conflicts with the principle of autonomy.  Ultimately I conclude that the 
framework proposed by Hippocrates is inadequate for determining questions that have to 
do with human life, death and quality of life. 
 
Chapter Two – The Ethical Principle of Autonomy 
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 Beauchamp, Tom L., Childress, James F., Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 2001, Fifth Edition, Oxford 
University Press, p.15/6 
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Based on the notion that persons have an intellect and therefore have the capacity to 
think, to reason and to be rational, Kant proposed that persons should be respected as 
autonomous creatures of moral worth and dignity.  Essentially, he was saying that subject 
to certain constraints, persons should have freedom to be self-governing and should not 
be directed or governed externally.  Therefore, persons should have freedom, of body and 
mind, to live their life in accordance with laws of their own making.   
 
Accordingly this chapter seeks to examine the moral principle of autonomy to show (1) 
that autonomy is synonymous with the idea of self-rule and therefore the values, beliefs 
and preferences of individuals are relevant to questions about what a good life for them is 
or should entail (2) how the right to self-determination is derived from a particular 
conception of persons and their capacities (3) how the doctor-patient relationship is now 
informed by the principle of autonomy and as persons normatively considered should be 
respected as bearers of rights doctors are required to be appropriately beneficent to ensure 
that values are referable to human nature and ultimately to the nature of a particular 
person. 
 
Chapter Three – The Law and the Capable Patient 
Since the law is equally concerned with morality and human welfare this chapter seeks to 
ascertain whether autonomy is the primary principle of medical law.  To this end the 
general legal framework for the provision of a medical treatment in respect of a capable 
patient is examined.   
 
This chapter will show (1) that all persons enjoy a right to bodily inviolability that is 
protected by the tort/crime of battery and to be maintained free from bodily harm which 
is protected by the tort of negligence also but makes consent a defence to either claim.  
The need for consent resides in the right of an adult patient who suffers from no mental 
incapacity to self-determine the matter of whether to consent or to refuse to consent to a 
medical treatment, including life preserving treatment, in accordance with their own 
values, beliefs and preferences, thereby establishing the primacy of the moral principle of 
autonomy in law (2) what must happen in order for consent to be legally valid, i.e. a 
patient must be competent to decide or have capacity that is commensurate with the 
decision they purport to make, be provided with information relevant to their decision 
and must give their consent voluntarily (3) that the requirement for consent primarily 
resides in the right of an adult patient who suffers from no mental incapacity to be 
maintained inviolate thus the right to refuse necessary and appropriate medical treatment 
is an important part of what it means to respect patient autonomy. 
 
Chapter Four – The Law and the Incapable Patient 
As every person enjoys a legally protected right to bodily inviolability all persons have a 
right to be maintained inviolate and free from bodily harm.  Plus this fundamental right is 
derived from the right to self-determination which means that every person ought to have 
the right to self-determine, in accordance with their own values, beliefs and preferences, 
what should happen to their own body.  However, when decision-making capacity is lost 
the MCA requires a third party, and in relation to a medical necessity this will usually be 
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a member of the medical profession, to make treatment decisions and act on behalf of the 
patient in their best interests. 
 
A difficulty for legislators is that the law seeks to protect patients who are not capable of 
making a decision about treatment from the consequences of not being given treatment.  
However, they must also find a way to balance the patient’s right to beneficence against 
maintaining respect for autonomous decision making.  In other words is necessity and 
best interests equivalent to consent or do formerly competent patients enjoy a similar 
right to medical treatment or to the withholding or withdrawal of necessary and 
appropriate medical treatment as do competent patients to consent to, or, to refuse to 
consent to, an offer of medical treatment?   
 
The focus in this chapter is therefore on the MCA, its provisions and any relevant 
common law commentary on these in terms of who is empowered to make decisions, 
who else may be involved in that process and the structure, standards and criteria that 
apply to surrogate decision-making processes and finally with whether, and if so on what 
basis, decision-makers are made accountable to patients for their decisions.  As a prelude 
to all of that there is also an examination of the parens patriae jurisdiction of the court, 
which is no longer part of the law.  The jurisdiction, which permitted courts to intervene 
in the affairs of incompetents, has been traced to a medieval statute De Prerogativa Regis 
1324.  This statute is interesting in distinguishing between formerly and never competent 
persons adopting a fiduciary decision-making standard in respect of the former though 
not the latter out of respect for the fact that they previously had the capacity for self-
determination.  It is introduced at this stage as it is intended to make reference to this later 
in the dissertation in consideration of best interests. 
 
Chapter Five – Advance Decisions 
As persons value being in control of their body, life and life plan the law makes provision 
for a competent person to refuse a specified medical treatment for a time in the future 
when they may lack the capacity to decide whether to consent or to refuse to consent to it 
contemporaneously.  Founded upon the right to bodily inviolability advance decisions 
seek to limit unnecessary or unwarranted intervention in the lives of others by 
maximising decision-making capacity.  The implication is that an advance decision of a 
patient that is both legally valid and applicable will be treated in the same way as if they 
had refused the treatment contemporaneously and is an exception to the principle that 
doctors must act in the best interests of their incompetent patients.   
 
However it has been suggested that in a civil society compassion for the plight of one’s 
fellow man should be overriding not autonomy.  Therefore, in this chapter I first set out 
to consider whether (1) the prior wishes and feelings of a competent person should be 
binding later on when they are incompetent by exploring Dworkin’s ideas about, inter 
alia, the integrity view of autonomy and contrasting these with those of Dresser who uses 
personal identity theory to challenge the authority of precedent autonomy (2) it is 
possible for persons to predict their preferences accurately and to then articulate them 
with the requisite degree of specificity.   
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This leads in to a review of the MCA in relation to advance decisions.  As one is treated 
as though the patient had made the decision on the spot the general requirements of 
capacity, information and voluntariness apply.  Next emphasis is placed on the fact that 
advance refusals are recognised to illustrate that the MCA does not intend autonomy to 
override a doctor’s professional obligation to determine the form of treatment that it is in 
their patient’s best interests to receive.  Thereafter the patient’s right to decide cannot 
simply be ignored.  Attention therefore turns to how someone can decide on the 
existence, validity and applicability of an advance decision.  The point is that if a 
healthcare professional concludes that an advance decision does not exist they may act in 
the patient’s best interests alternatively if they conclude that it is not valid and/or 
applicable but that it is an expression of the person’s previous wishes they must then 
consider what is set out in the advance decision when working out the person’s best 
interests. 
 
Eventually I conclude that some consideration should be given to developing a central 
registry if advance decision-making is to have any utility at all.  Nevertheless validity and 
applicability are difficult standards to meet in seeming to require a patient to be very 
competent and/or to record a decision in conjunction with a medical professional close to 
the time that it will come into effect.   
 
Chapter Six – Patients’ Values and Value Systems 
Given the fact that all persons rely on their values, beliefs and preferences to guide them 
when deciding whether to consent or to refuse to consent to a medical treatment this 
chapter is concerned with how those values, that were the source of a decision, can be 
ascertained and expressed.  The idea is that a third party should be able to understand the 
values that the patient would consider so that they can use them, or apply facts to values, 
to make a decision that is broadly consistent with the one the patient would have made if 
they were competent to decide.   
 
Disclosing one’s values or value system is obviously beneficial in situations where more 
than one treatment decision is needed or where someone is deemed incompetent to decide 
for an extended period of time, such as might happen to those with dementia.  However, 
if beneficence is not to override autonomy it is also necessary to consider how a value 
system might be incorporated into an advance decision.  In this regard statutory and 
common law provisions suggest that in order for priority to be accorded to a value system 
one would have to be clearly established and applicable in the circumstances arising for 
decision.  Moreover, the integrity with which personal decisions have been made to 
accord with one’s values, beliefs and preferences would seem to be an important factor in 
establishing its reliability and credibility, i.e. has the patient evinced a settled and 
continuing intention to honour their values, beliefs and preferences if these are to be 
regarded as being determinative of what should happen to them in the future when they 
are no longer competent to express a view.  Consequently, there is a second element to 
this chapter that is concerned with suggesting ways in which someone can construct their 
value system to make it functional, coherent and an inherently clear, convincing and 
reliable source of information about the personal value of their own life.   
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Chapter six is rounded off with a discussion that focuses on whether some limit should be 
imposed on autonomy, and therefore by definition on respect for the values of 
individuals, on public policy grounds. 
 
Chapter Seven – How useful is the MCA in Promoting Autonomy through Advance 
Decision-Making and Decisions made in Patients’ Best Interests? 
The self-confessed mission of the MCA is to empower patients to make their own 
decisions and if not to place mentally incapacitated patients at the centre of decision-
making processes concerning them.  In this regard the MCA determines that the values, 
beliefs and preferences of a competent person, which can be clearly and reliably 
ascertained and understood by others, can play a role in medical treatment decisions.    
 
My focus in this chapter is to therefore establish whether the MCA will support the use of 
a statement of values that has been constructed by a competent patient to distinguish 
whatever is critically or intrinsically valuable, which is synonymous with their reason for 
being or their life’s purpose, from what is merely experientially or instrumentally valid.  
This question is posed in relation to three discreet aspects of decision-making under the 
Act, namely, capacity assessments, advance decisions and best interests decision-making.   
 
An underlying objective of this work is to appraise whether, despite protestations to the 
contrary, the right to autonomy is in fact contemporary because regulation of the doctor-
patient relationship under the MCA suggests that at various points beneficence will be in 
conflict with autonomy.  The second part of this chapter is concerned with what should 
happen if the right to autonomy is not to be contemporary and with whether reform of the 
MCA will be necessary to accommodate the changes that are proposed.   
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Chapter One 
 
 
Key Ethical Principles of the Medical Profession 
 
This thesis is concerned with medical treatment decision-making on behalf of mentally 
incapacitated patients.  In particular the issue being considered is whether the values of a 
competent person, when they are understood by others, can play a role in medical 
treatment decision-making under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 at a time when that 
person is no longer judged capable of making decisions on their own behalf.  That inquiry 
proceeds, in this chapter and the next, in ethics.  The purpose in both is to legitimate the 
proposition, implicit in the research question, that the values, beliefs and preferences of 
patients are morally relevant to decision-making processes about whether to administer, 
withhold or withdraw medical treatment, including life preserving treatment.   
 
Emphasis in this chapter is placed on the two most traditional and fundamental ethical 
principles of medicine, non-maleficence and beneficence.  Argument will proceed to 
show why, in modern medicine, these represent an inadequate framework for analysis 
and decision about what ought to be done in the best interests of the patient.  The chapter 
will be rounded off by a discussion that considers whether these obligations give rise to a 
form of medical paternalism that would conflict with the requirements of the moral 
principle of autonomy. 
 
The Goals of Medicine 
 
The goals of medicine can be stated in a variety of ways.  Lord Bridge has referred to the 
administration of curative or prophylactic treatment which is appropriate to the patient’s 
existing condition of disease, injury or bodily malfunction or susceptibility to such 
condition in the future.1  In accordance with Sir Thomas Bingham MR the objects of 
medical care were to prevent the occurrence of illness, injury or deformity, to cure illness 
when it does occur, where illness cannot be cured to prevent or retard deterioration of the 
                                                 
1
 Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1 HL, Lord Bridge, p.52 
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patient’s condition and to relieve pain and suffering in body and mind.2  Lord Goff was 
most succinct in summarising the medical purpose as action that is taken to preserve the 
life, health or well-being of another.3 
 
Howsoever stated, the important point is that these are the ends that doctors are required 
to pursue in the best interests of patients.     
 
Conflicting Goals of Medicine 
A problem with the goals of medicine is that they are not always compatible with one 
another.  Now Hippocrates advocated that medicine should be practiced in accordance 
with an overriding philosophy that placed mankind in harmony with nature as the 
following extract reveals: 
 
“Healing up to Hippocrates’ time involved talking, praying and blatant 
shamanism; and Hippocrates was vehemently against all that.  Occasionally, 
doctors would be hired to end a life, with or without the patient’s consent; but 
Hippocrates based his healing on a natural philosophy that placed humankind in 
harmony with nature rather than in control of it; he based his interventions on 
observation, practicality, proof, and the constant self-warning not to do harm to the 
patient.  His science was dedicated firmly to the patient’s welfare.  The physician 
sought honour though doing right by the sick person.  No longer could the 
physician be hired to poison someone or to become a purposeful agent of death.  
He eschewed words as therapeutic, calling medicine the silent art.  His written 
descriptions of some of his cases are masterpieces in clinical observation and 
deduction.  He was thus the father of scientific medicine.”4 
 
Although medical objectives have remained largely unaltered since the time of 
Hippocrates in another important respect medicine has changed quite radically.  In more 
recent times, advances in medical science and technology have altered the face and 
capacity of contemporary medicine.  For example, technological developments such as 
respirators and ventilators are relied upon to substitute for the work of the heart and lungs 
just as a kidney machine can act as an artificial kidney.  Each of these innovations can be 
relied upon to preserve life.  Prosthetic devices may not actually preserve life but 
                                                 
2
 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] 1 All ER 821 
3
 Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1 HL, Lord Goff, p.74 
4
 Bulger, Roger J., On Hippocrates, Thomas Jefferson and Max Weber: The Bureaucratic, Technologic 
Imperatives and the Future of the Healing Tradition in a Voluntary Society, The Tanner Lectures on 
Human Values, March 87, p.75 
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improved functionality must surely contribute to patient health and well-being.  Yet more 
recently brain-computer technologies5 benefit patients who suffer with severe movement 
disorders or paralysis following a stroke or accident.6  Provided the recipient has a 
functioning central nervous system an implant that is inserted in the brain receives neural 
messages that it translates and relays to a computer which helps the patient to 
communicate with others.  Further developments, using this form of technology, are 
anticipated to emerge in the not too distant future that will lead to an even greater sense 
of independence for this patient group.7  So whilst the prospects may be thrilling for those 
that await them the rest of society might simply marvel at the sort of possibilities now 
contemplated by medical science. 
 
So medical science has moved us to a stage where contemporary medicine can offer an 
extensive and effective range of beneficial treatments to prevent,8 sometimes cure9 and 
even control the progress or ill-effects of disease and injury.10  Indeed such is the success 
of medical science that more recent developments demonstrate an ability to improve upon 
that which nature had already determined and to maximise human potential to live a full 
and active life.11  These developments are consistent with the medical objective which is 
to preserve the life, health and well-being of the patient. 
 
However, the news is not all in one direction for medical science has increasingly placed 
physicians in a position to alter and control human life and not simply to cure or palliate 
the symptoms of sickness and disease.12  For example, medical scientific and 
technological innovations enable physicians to intervene and control events at the end of 
                                                 
5
 Otherwise referred to as ‘Braingate’ technologies 
6
 Wolpe, Paul R, Ethical and Social Challenges of Brain-Computer Interfaces, American Medical 
Association, Journal of Ethics, Virtual Mentor, Feb 07, Volume 9, no.2, 128-131  
7
 For example, being able to switch on a light or the t.v. or perhaps to open and close curtains or to switch 
the heating system on and off 
8
 For example, immunisation programmes.  Diagnostic methods such as blood or saliva tests and scanners 
can also be targeted to detect early signs of health abnormalities  
9
 For example, modern surgical procedures and methods have improved the skill and efficiency of surgeons 
just as drugs such as antibiotics clear infections  
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 For example, treatment such as kidney dialysis also there are a wide range of drugs that are not curative 
but which nevertheless aim to control the progress or symptoms of disease, such as chemotherapy or 
statins, and to thereby improve health and personal well-being  
11
 For example, organ transplantation, infertility treatment, genetic and anti-aging treatment 
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 Anderson, Emily E., What we Talk About when we Talk about Goals, American Medical Association, 
Journal of Ethics, Virtual Mentor, Jun 07, Volume 9, no.6, 407-409, p.408 
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life.  These are to be distinguished from the more conventional form of cardiopulmonary 
resuscitation that has been practiced for many years in hospitals, emergency response 
units and by those who have been trained in first-aid in the work environment, for 
example, which aims to re-start a non-beating heart following cardiac arrest.  Although 
intervention in these circumstances might be life-saving it can be categorised as an 
advanced form of first-aid because it involves mouth to mouth ventilation and chest 
compressions which continue for a relatively short period to see whether the heart can be 
revived and if so whether it has the further capacity to provide life support.  To that 
extent we can say that the capacity to control or to influence events at the end of life has 
been with us for some considerable time.   
 
The difference is that in contemporary medicine more advanced life support technologies 
are relied upon to revive a non-beating heart, and more importantly in this context, to 
support and sustain life.  A ventilator breathes air into the lungs which oxygenates the 
blood, sustains the heartbeat and keeps vital organs alive,13 whilst a nasogastric tube can 
be inserted to administer drugs as well as to feed patients artificially and mechanically 
with nutrition and hydration.14  Consequently, human life can be artificially preserved 
and sustained for many years.  However, the use of life saving and sustaining 
technologies such as respirators, ventilators and nasogastric tubes becomes contentious 
when life is artificially prolonged without any obvious benefit to the future health and 
well-being of a patient in a persistent vegetative state, for example, which challenges the 
view that we should seek to preserve or prolong life in all circumstances. 
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 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] 1 All ER 821, Lord Browne-Wilkinson 
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Has medical science precipitated the elevation of the goal of preserving life? 
Lord Keith has previously stated that: 
 
“The object of medical treatment and care is to benefit the patient.  It may do so by 
taking steps to prevent the occurrence of illness, or, if an illness does occur, by 
taking steps towards curing it.  Where an illness or the effects of an injury cannot 
be cured, then efforts are directed towards preventing deterioration or relieving 
pain and suffering”.15   
 
In some circumstances therefore the first imperative may be to prevent a person from 
dying and we have seen that physicians have the means at their disposal to do so, and as 
persons generally value life and view death as the ultimate harm there is an incentive to 
seek the survival of the patient.  However, a presumption in favour of life can lead to a 
situation where more aggressive forms of medical intervention will secure the survival of 
some patients with brain damage.16   This illustrates the point that it will not always be 
possible for doctors to save the life, health and well-being of their patients.  Instead a 
physician will be required to choose which goal should be pursued in their patient’s best 
interests.  
 
Identifying the Legitimate Medical Goal 
When taken as a whole the goals of medicine appears to have been informed by 
mankind’s natural fear of death, disease and suffering.  However, they have not been 
accounted for in any great detail and therefore the goals lack clarity.17  Furthermore, there 
is no unifying theory to render the goals a coherent whole or that can bring each specific 
element into a state of coherence. 18   In the absence of either a fully specified set of goals 
or an overriding or unifying theory the goals can be shown to be internally inconsistent 
raising dilemmas about which goal should be pursued in the best interests of the patient.   
 
This is not a trivial matter because as we have already seen decisions taken at one time 
have consequences that can only be known retrospectively and will on some occasions 
prove to have devastating effects such as happens when the goal of preserving life 
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conflicts with that of safeguarding the health and/or well-being interests of an individual 
patient.  The difficulty for physicians is that they are trained to achieve professional 
competence in the diagnosis and treatment of illness and disease.  Undue reliance on a 
scientific theory that places mankind in harmony with nature is unsatisfactory because it 
presents too narrow a view of what it means to live a worthwhile life.  How then should a 
physician determine whether quantity or quality of life is more important?  Or, to put the 
matter another way, what approach might be taken to deciding what ought to happen in 
the overall best interests of an individual patient? 
 
Medical Ethics 
 
The purpose of ethical discourse is to determine what one ought to do or aim at when 
confronted with a moral problem.19   Typically reliance is placed on a set of ultimate 
ends, values or principles that are relevant to the evaluation of the problem and a method 
or rational procedure for determining from those values what should be done or what one 
has most reason to do.20  Consequently a moral conclusion is derived from a process of 
specifying, weighting and balancing the various factors under consideration which is 
what anybody might do to resolve a personal issue; they list possible courses of action 
then consider the pluses and minuses of each option to see which course of action to 
pursue on balance.21    
 
In relation to medical ethics we typically think of the Hippocratic Oath because it was the 
first code of its kind that established a core set of values, customs and practices to help 
physicians determine what the legitimate goal of medicine should be or what it would be 
ethical for them to do in the prevailing circumstances.22  Several transcripts of the Oath 
exist and when consulted each varies a little from another but all are to similar effect in 
requiring physicians to: 
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“Follow that system of regimen which, according to my ability and judgment to, I 
consider for the benefit of my patients and abstain from whatever is deleterious and 
mischievous.  I will give no deadly medicine to any one if asked, nor suggest any 
such counsel; and in like manner I will not give to a woman a pessary to produce 
abortion.  With purity and with holiness I will pass my life and practice my art.  I 
will not cut persons labouring under the stone, but will leave this to be done by men 
who are practitioners of this work.  Into whatever houses I enter, I will go into them 
for the benefit of the sick, and will abstain from every voluntary act of mischief and 
corruption; and, further, from the seduction of females or males, of freemen and 
slaves.  Whatever, in connection with my professional service, or not in connection 
with it, I see or hear, in the life of men, which ought not to be spoken of abroad, I 
will not divulge, as reckoning that all such should be kept secret.  While I continue 
to keep this Oath unviolated, may it be granted to me to enjoy life and the practice 
of the art, respected by all men, in all times.  But should I trespass and violate this 
Oath, may the reverse be my lot”.23 
 
 
Essentially Hippocrates sought to regulate the doctor-patient relationship to instil in the 
wider community the requisite level of trust in members of the medical profession and 
confidence in the art and practice of scientific medicine.  This was achieved by 
establishing a unifying moral code for the practice of medicine that would be binding on 
all physicians.  More specifically, the moral principles of non-maleficence and 
beneficence functioned as relevant guidelines for ethical medical practice whilst a series 
of requirements, imperatives or rules established the particular nature of the moral 
obligation that was owed to the patient.  In particular, the Oath requires physicians to 
benefit the sick and to abstain from acts that were likely to cause harm or which may lead 
to the death of the patient.  Moreover, doctors are instructed to use their ability and 
judgment for the benefit of patients.  Therefore the view embedded in medical ethics, at 
that time, was that medicine should be practiced paternalistically.  Accordingly, 
Hippocrates determined that decisions that have to do with life, death and quality of life 
should be taken by someone who is expert in medical matters but who is not directly 
affected by the decision. 
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The Ethical Principle of Non-Maleficence 
 
The principle of non-maleficence places physicians under an obligation to abstain from 
acts that are likely to cause harm, and in particular those which might lead to the death of 
the patient.  However, the principle does not specify what constitutes harm or which acts 
are to be avoided.  In this regard it is possible that the principle of non-maleficence could 
be construed to be consistent with the impersonal but universal rules and norms of the 
common moral system.  This would ensure that a more comprehensive range of harms 
could be considered alongside death including the prospect of a patient experiencing 
pain, disability, loss of pleasure, and loss of freedom.24   
 
In these circumstances the harm that is to be avoided would be determined by an external 
assessor who must rely on the rather indeterminate nature and scope of the common 
morality for guidance on a matter that the principle of autonomy claims should be 
determined by the personal values, beliefs and preferences of the particular patient in the 
context arising for decision.  This is potentially problematic when persons differ in their 
assessment of what constitutes harm.  For example, it might cause me a great deal of 
anxiety to be thrust into the Australian outback with only a penknife and billycan to 
depend on for my survival but Ray Mears adapts very well to the austerity of the bush 
and with a similar set of resources positively thrives on the peace and challenges that 
await him there.  Persons similarly differ in estimating the likelihood of particular harms 
arising.  So whereas my mind might be overtaken by fears about encountering venomous 
snakes and spiders when contemplating a visit to the bush Ray Mears can put the 
likelihood of that particular risk arising into perspective and this allows him to make a 
rational, on balance, judgment about the benefits and burdens of spending time in the 
outback regions of Australia. 
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The Sanctity of Human Life 
 
It is suggested in the Oath that the obligation not to actively cause a patient’s death is 
categorical.  The view that it is morally objectionable to kill can be traced to the sanctity 
of life principle which is synonymous with the idea that human life has special value and 
should therefore be treated as sacred.  In view of the advances that have been made in 
medical science a matter of particular concern is whether there is any basis for moral 
absolutism in respect of the sanctity principle that would require doctors to seek to 
preserve life in any and all circumstances.  In other words does respect for the sanctity 
principle lead to situations where preserving life becomes an ultimate value?  This matter 
will be considered through two opposing perspectives; one theological the other secular. 
 
Sanctity Principle: Traditional Western Theological Perspective  
Christian faiths take the view that human life is a gift from God which is to be preserved 
and cherished due to its having been created in the image and likeness of God.25  In this 
tradition human life is given and taken away again according to God’s sovereign will and 
it is inviolable because of its inherent moral worth or value and dignity.26   
 
Human dignity, which is founded on the concept of ‘Imago Dei’,27 is fundamental to the 
religious perspective.28    The ideal of dignity that is proposed is based on the notion that 
human beings are like God because they too have an intellect and this is what 
distinguishes them from all other living things.  This suggests that humans have capacity 
for moral decision-making and the ability to rule over creation as ‘created co-creators’ 
and as stewards of the gifts of God.29  Accordingly, the source of human pride and self-
respect is here tied to a particular ideal of what it means to live a good life and the 
concept of moral accountability is introduced to deal with those whose enthusiasm might 
wane for leading their life in conformity with God’s moral laws. 
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In summary therefore the religious perspective could be taken to infer that mortals are 
prohibited from assuming control or intervening in matters that are subject to divine 
command and intervention; a position that would create a considerable difficulty in 
modern medical practice.  On the other hand human dignity resides in the intellect and as 
created co-creators it could be argued that our mandate is merely to respect every human 
being as an equal and inherently valuable member of society, which the moral principle 
of autonomy encourages us to do.   
 
Secular Perspective: Intrinsic Value  
Although the sanctity principle has religious origins not all persons share the same 
religious outlook which inclines moral philosophers to use secular concepts to justify 
the special value we attach to human life.  Value theorists use the term ‘intrinsic 
value’ to identify things that are intrinsically valuable either in themselves or for their 
own sake or as an end itself.30   Things that have intrinsic value have an inherent 
quality that we think special and we recognise that by treating them differently.31  
Accordingly, things that have intrinsic value are distinguished from other things that 
we value in purely instrumental terms or as a means to an end.  Something that is 
instrumentally valuable is valued merely in terms of its usefulness in helping us to get 
what we want.32  Ronald Dworkin claims that money and medicine are examples of 
things that are instrumentally valuable.  He states that ‘no one thinks that money has 
value beyond its power to purchase things that people want or need, or that medicine 
has value beyond its ability to cure’.33       
 
Is human life instrumentally or intrinsically valuable?   
Dworkin states that it is both.  He says that most of us believe that human life has 
intrinsic value34 but that we might also treat the value of someone’s life as instrumental 
when we measure it in terms of how much his being alive serves the interests of others.35  
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If Dworkin is right when he says that human life has intrinsic value what account of the 
concept would support that view?   
 
To be in concert with the theological perspective a version is needed that supports the 
idea that human life is valuable apart from the circumstances into which it enters, or the 
wholes to which it belongs.36  The intrinsic value of human life must be found in virtue of 
what it is and not in virtue of its connections or relations to other things.37  In other words 
we are searching for an account of intrinsic value that would support the view that human 
life is valuable just in itself.38   
 
Dworkin states that something is intrinsically valuable if ‘its value is independent of what 
people happen to enjoy or want or need or what is good for them’.  Dworkin’s definition 
aims to persuade us that what is intrinsically valuable must also be objectively valuable.  
Jerrold Levinson similarly describes intrinsic value in objective terms when referring to 
self-contained value.39  He states that something has self-contained value if it would be 
valuable even were there nothing in the world but it, or if it would be judged good, or 
something that ought to exist, entirely on its own.40  Shelly Kagan is on the other hand a 
little more circumspect when it comes to the value that an object has in itself.  He states 
that: “[i]f the object’s intrinsic value is had independently of all other objects, that value 
cannot depend at all upon any of the relational properties of the object; rather its 
intrinsic value must depend upon the intrinsic properties of the object alone.  However, 
he questions whether anything does have intrinsic value in this sense.41  Darwin, on the 
other hand, might argue that human life has intrinsic value on the basis that mankind had 
evolved as the greatest achievement of the natural world. 
 
Levinson posts an alternative viewpoint which he calls persistent value.  Something 
has persistent value if it remains valuable, and to just the same degree, regardless of 
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the situation in which it is embedded or the context in which it is viewed.  Persistent 
value is thus roughly the same as unconditional value, or the value something 
possesses irrespective of, and unaffected by, situating, framing or contextualisation.  
George Moore is to similar effect stating that:  
 
“To say that a kind of value is intrinsic means merely that the question whether a 
thing possesses it, and in what degree it possesses it, depends solely on the intrinsic 
nature of the thing in question. … The definition involves notions which I do not 
know how to define exactly … I mean to say two different things at the same time.  I 
mean to say (1) that it is impossible for what is strictly one and the same thing to 
possess that kind of value at one time, or in one set of circumstances, and not to 
possess it at another; and equally impossible for it to possess it in one degree at 
one time, or in one set of circumstances, and to possess it in a different degree at 
another or in a different set … (2) The second part of what is meant is that if a 
given thing possesses any kind of intrinsic value in a certain degree, then not only 
must that same thing possess it, under all circumstances, in the same degree but 
also anything exactly like it, must, under all circumstances, possess it in exactly the 
same degree.  Or to put it in the corresponding negative form: it is impossible that 
of two exactly similar things one should possess it and the other not, or that one 
should possess it in one degree, and the other in a different one”.42 
 
This account of intrinsic value seeks to reinforce the idea that all human life is equally 
valuable which resembles the theological perspective.   
 
What gives Human Life its Intrinsic, Innate, Value?   
What notion of human life is presupposed by intrinsic value that it should be morally 
objectionable to kill, for example?43  Perhaps the first point to make is that influencing 
circumstances such as sex, age, culture, education and so on are of secondary 
importance.  Consequently, the value of experience is not a source of intrinsic value.  
Jerrold Levinson explains the matter this way: 
 
“The value of an experience taken by itself, in other words, is subordinate to the 
value that it contributes to a broader whole, the life into which it enters and of 
which it is a part.  The value attaching to a whole life is not the sum of the values of 
its parts assessed in isolation, for a life … is an organic unity, a series of internally 
connected, mutually qualifying episodes, whose value depends not only on the value 
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of the episodes that make it up, but on their order of occurrence and their relations 
to one another.  It is thus a whole life being a certain complex way, and not its 
component experiences having certain characters that is the real bearer of intrinsic 
value. 
 
…Although experiences widely construed, are a significant part of a life, they are 
not the whole of it.  As underlined by Nagel, not all of a life is experiential.  Certain 
aspects of a life, such as the faithfulness of one’s spouse, the state of one’s 
reputation, or one’s degree of privacy in one’s home, may lie outside what one has 
experience or knowledge of, and other aspects of one’s life, such as one’s 
intellectual legacy, the realisation of one’s projects, or the flourishing of one’s 
children, may outrun one’s lifetime entirely.  Yet these non experiential aspects of a 
life being a certain way, for instance, one’s good name not being tarnished after 
one’s death, one’s not being spied on by hidden surveillance cameras during 
private acts, or one’s daughter achieving success after one is gone, contribute 
importantly to the intrinsic value of that life.  As Nagel puts it, ‘a man’s life 
includes much that does not take place within the boundaries of his body and mind, 
and what happens to him can include much that does not take place within the 
boundaries of his life.  The notion of a human life, in other words, cannot be 
entirely recuperated as the notion of a series of experiences, even if such a series 
forms the core of such a life, because some ways a life is are not experiential in any 
sense”.
44
 
 
Consequently, it is lives being a certain way that is the proper subject of intrinsic value. 
Moreover, that something must be a non-arbitrary feature or characteristic of humans, or 
of human nature, that is not inconvenienced by the fact that as co-creators each one of us 
is, as it were, made to be just that little bit different. 
 
However, Jeremy Bentham, the founder of the utilitarian movement, dismissed traditional 
ideas about morality and the importance of human life within it by appearing to displace 
the significance of the human intellect.  He argued that an act should be judged morally 
right or wrong in accordance with its propensity to produce pleasure or pain45 and 
therefore the ability to reason was secondary to the ability to suffer.46  Consequently, he 
argued in favour of a moral system that would maximise happiness and on this basis mere 
sentience or conscious existence was the fundamental moral criterion for inclusion and 
consideration under his proposed utilitarian scheme.  Accordingly, all creatures that could 
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experience suffering and pleasure would be treated as moral equals and any moral 
decision would require the interests of all sentient beings affected by that decision to be 
taken equally into account.47  Theoretically, the general utility of ongoing veterinary care 
for a lame yearling stallion with excellent bloodlines could be compared to that of giving 
an esteemed octogenarian scientist a hip operation.  The morally correct choice is the one 
that would create the greatest happiness for the greatest number.     
 
Another approach is to take the view that humans are more important morally speaking 
than other animals for reasons that are independent of considerations of pain and 
pleasure.48  Natural rights theorists, for example, argue that human life should be 
distinguished from all other life forms as having unique moral importance and therefore 
all living and innocent human beings are moral equals in having equal natural rights 
including an equal right to life.49  The term ‘natural’ is used to convey the idea that all 
humans enter life with certain basic moral rights that should not be denied.50    
 
Who acquires the natural right to life and isn’t the rather straightforward idea about being 
a member of the human species too simplistic?  Indeed, incorporation of the term ‘human 
being’ has proved to be quite divisive.51  One obstacle lies in determining the point at 
which human life acquires its unique moral importance.52  If we adopt the view of the 
Roman Catholic Church, that humans have an integrated body, mind and spirit, then all 
innocent human beings acquire an equal right to life from the beginning to the end of 
their lives.53  This is because humans start their lives with a soul, the morally crucial gift 
that places human life above all other life forms.  However, there is some disagreement 
about when exactly ensoulment takes place, from fertilisation to the development of the 
primitive streak, in a developing embryo and as the soul is immaterial it is a matter 
                                                 
47
 Ibid, p.47/8 
48
 Ibid, p.44 
49
 Ibid, p.43/4 
50
 The Columbia Encyclopedia, Sixth Edition, 2001-07 
51
 Gillon, Raanan, Philosophical Medical Ethics, 1986, John Wiley and Sons, p.8 
52
 Ibid, p.44/5 
53
 Ibid, p.44/5 
 29
beyond proof.54  Consequently the debate continues to rage on in relation to the morality 
of abortion.55 
 
An alternative position is to hold that all viable innocent human beings acquire natural 
rights.56  The question is whether viability is a justifiable criterion for differentiating 
between humans that can be killed and those that cannot. 57  At issue is the fact that 
medical technology has made it possible to preserve the life of many more infants that are 
born prematurely.58  As medical science may yet move to a stage where a fetus may 
customarily be incubated outside of the womb viability59 would appear to be an 
inadequate premise on which to differentiate between humans that acquire rights and 
those that do not.60  
 
In the search for an innate characteristic or quality in humans, that grounds the scope of 
our moral obligations and that is relevant to ideas about moral equality, sentience would 
after all seem to confer some moral importance.61  That said simple sentience or self-
awareness is insufficient as a justification for differentiating between the moral status of 
humans and animals as Bentham argued.  But within the class of sentient beings some 
argue that there is a morally more important subclass that possesses the special attributes 
grounding the unique moral importance due to people, including their right to life.62   
 
The identification of that subset is no less problematic but most philosophers tend to 
focus on some aspect of personhood as the morally relevant differentiating concept.63  
Kant determined that rational willing agency was the essential characteristic of persons 
and therefore the relevant moral criterion for distinguishing between entities that were 
                                                 
54
 Ibid, p.44/5 
55
 Ibid, p.44/5 
56
 Ibid, p.43 
57
 Ibid, p.46 
58
 Ibid, p.49/50 
59
 Viability is a technical term and its meaning will change over time 
60
 Gillon, Raanan, Philosophical Medical Ethics, 1986, John Wiley and Sons, p.47/8 
61
 Ibid, p.43 
62
 Ibid, p.43 
63
 Ibid, p.46 
 30
owed moral obligations and those that were not. 64  Perhaps inspired by the biblical notion 
‘Imago Dei’ Kant suggests that as co-creators humans had an intellect and the capacity to 
think for themselves.   However, he saw that this might incline persons to think only of 
themselves and to seek to prioritise their own interests.  God, by contrast, loves all his 
children equally and thus has a good will towards all mankind.  Kant arguably picks this 
up and determines that only a fully autonomous agent with a good will would 
contemplate moral imperatives65 in categorical terms66 thus leaving the will with no 
discretion but to obey the moral law.  On this basis Kant argued that autonomous persons 
should have freedom to self-determine their own life path and to rule over the rest of 
creation as a moral legislator in a kingdom of ends.67 
 
Nevertheless, there are situations in which persons cannot be considered autonomous 
agents when, for example, they are drunk or have taken hallucinogenic drugs.  So must 
one’s capacity to be a rational willing agent persist in order to be considered a moral 
agent and moral equal?  Moreover, if human life is distinguished as something special on 
the basis of some functional feature of them then not all human beings will be treated as 
persons.  About this Raanan Gillon explains that: 
 
“One of the consequences of adopting … the Kantian criteria for personhood is 
that not all living human beings are persons.  Embryos, fetuses, very young infants, 
and humans with severely damaged or severely defective brains may be [un]able to 
think, and if the Kantian requirement of rational agency is to be met many older 
children and some adults will fail to fall into the net of personhood.  Yet the idea 
that a single living human being starts its existence not being a person, develops 
into a person, and then at some stage may stop being a person while remaining a 
living human being seems to be intuitively plausible both as an account of what 
happens and also as a basis for at least some sorts of important moral distinction… 
 
Quite apart, however, from producing conflicting moral intuitions of this sort, the 
idea that living human beings can be persons at some stages of their lives and not 
at others produces many other sorts of philosophical difficulty, especially problems 
clustering around the concept of identity… 
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Indeed there are undoubtedly grave problems associated with any of these theories 
about what properties ground a right to life, and the problems are manifested 
particularly clearly in consideration of the moral standing of very young human 
beings, of live but brain dead, and live but permanently unconscious, human 
beings, and of animals of varying attributes.  Although such issues have received 
considerable philosophical attention fairly recently, the subject still represents a 
lacuna in ethics as a whole and medical ethics in particular”. 68 
 
 
In the absence of any real agreement about which biological features or characteristics of 
humans or their nature are morally relevant to the concept of intrinsic value secularists 
have some difficulty in asserting moral absolutism in respect of the sanctity principle.  
Consequently, the sanctity principle should be interpreted presumptively which is 
consistent with the idea that people can choose to refuse life preserving medical 
treatment.   
 
Can the Principle of Non-Malefience be interpreted consistently with the 
Requirements of the Sanctity Principle? 
The principle of non-maleficence insists that physicians must not do an act that will cause 
death just as they should not engage in activities that might be considered immoral or that 
cast a shadow over their moral purity.  Essentially Hippocrates was mindful about doctors 
becoming the agents of death.  He therefore sought to moderate their activities as a check 
against profligacy or perhaps to engender caution in relation to processes that are not 
readily reversible as future freedom of choice will have been forever restricted.69  
Accordingly, clinicians must not practice euthanasia and of course assisting a patient to 
commit suicide remains a crime.70  Both acts are prohibited by the principle of non-
maleficence.  On the other hand, the principle of non-maleficence is contentious in 
differentiating between killing and letting die.   
 
Acts and Omissions, Killing and Letting Die71 
The acts and omission doctrine says that, in certain contexts, failure to perform an act, 
with certain foreseen bad consequences of that failure, is morally less bad than to perform 
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a different act which has the identical foreseen bad consequences. 72  Crucially, killing is 
rejected though it is sometimes morally permissible to allow a patient to die.73  Therefore, 
the doctrine permits a doctor to withhold lifesaving treatment in the knowledge that the 
omission will probably lead to an earlier death.74 
 
So the question is does it make an ethical difference whether an agent, in this case a 
doctor, actively intervenes to bring about death as opposed to merely omitting to do an 
act that would preserve life and prevent death?  Is there a moral difference between an act 
and an omission and if so what information explains the difference?  Is it worse to kill 
someone than not to save their life or are there circumstances whereby the distinction is 
morally insignificant?75  Clearly theological thought anticipates that some form of divine 
non-intervention will take place somewhere along the line otherwise the ultimate human 
destiny, of reunion with God, could not be fulfilled.    
 
Is Culpability Key to Determining Acceptability of the Acts and Omissions Distinction? 
Glover contends that the doctrine appeals to our intuitions about these things and that our 
intuitive response to killing differs from our response to not striving to keep alive.76  He 
argues that we distinguish between duties and those good acts that go beyond the call of 
duty and recognise that if we were to abandon the doctrine, we might also have to 
abandon our present distinction between acts or moral duty and supererogation.77  His 
argument is that a common moral system applies to all people in all places in prohibiting 
harmful activity but that we can have no similar obligation to benefit all people in all 
places because we could never fulfil such an obligation.   
 
Nevertheless, Glover does contemplate situations where omissions can be blameworthy, 
such as when a doctor omits to provide medical treatment that will keep a person healthy 
for years to come because of the expense of the drug.  Here, Glover suggests that many 
people would want to say that this is not a mere omission, but a positive act of 
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withholding the medicine.78  Consequently, he goes on to say that supporters of the act 
and omissions doctrine must explain which act and omissions are culpable and not simply 
insist that anything culpable must be counted as an act rather than an omission.79 
 
Gillon’s argument is preferred.  He claims that the difference between killing and letting 
die is not itself morally relevant80 and influenced by the special moral obligation doctors 
owe to their patients81 he states that, ‘although this [the acts and omission doctrine] may 
be a plausible defence for people who do not have particular obligations to help patients, 
that, indeed is the primary purpose of medicine.  Thus it would be absurd for a doctor to 
try to justify an omission to provide lifesaving treatment for his patient on the grounds 
that he had no moral obligation to help his patient’.82 
 
The problem, he contends, is that the doctrine does not itself explain what makes the 
moral difference between actions that result in undesirable consequences and inactions 
that have the same consequences.83  On the basis that an omission is by definition not 
simply any inaction but a morally culpable inaction Gillon states that there must be some 
additional moral information given before any particular inaction can be classified as an 
omission.84   
 
What information is needed to decide whether a doctor’s action or omission had led to a 
patient’s death so that we could be more certain about whether a killing or letting die had 
occurred?85  One proposal is to base the morally intuitive difference between killing and 
letting die on considerations of harm and benefit to the patient.  A failure to provide life 
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saving treatment would then have to be justified on the basis that it would not benefit the 
patient and would probably harm them.86  However, Gillon states that whilst ‘assessment 
of harm and benefit are essential to all medical interventions it is not equivalent to 
deciding whether it is the doctors action or omission that has led to the patient’s death, 
that is deciding whether killing or letting die has occurred. 87 
 
Another possible approach is to link ideas about what is good to omissions, an omission 
would on this account be defined by a failure, not just to do any good, but only the good 
that one ought to do.88  The problem with this account, according to Gillon, is that no 
omission would be morally acceptable, because by definition all omissions would be 
morally unacceptable.89  Indeed Gillon concludes that the widespread intuition that there 
is a morally important distinction between acts and omissions should be rejected.90   
 
Should one’s Motive in acting be Relevant to Moral Assessment?  
On the basis that good and bad are to an extent illusory there is a danger in treating 
omissions as passive euthanasia rather than defining euthanasia in relation to purpose.  
Remember that a doctor must not, in considering whether treatment is in the best interests 
of their patient be motivated to bring about their death.   This conclusion about the acts 
and omissions distinction is potentially problematic for patients who are in a persistent 
vegetative state as they are no longer in a position to refuse medical treatment.  Their 
problem is, to an extent, exacerbated by the fact that there is no general agreement about 
what is the source of intrinsic value as indeed there is no consistent view about what is 
valuable in human life which possibly accounts for the paramountcy of the moral 
principle of autonomy in contemporary medical ethics and law.  Remember that a doctor 
must respect the right of a competent patient to make decisions, in this case to refuse a 
medical treatment, even life-preserving treatment, in conformity with their own value 
system.   If then the doctor-patient relationship was more appropriately defined to reflect 
the special commitments that arise under it then an individual’s purpose would be key to 
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determining the acceptability of an act or omission which is an idea that a contemporary 
application of Kantian philosophy would of course support.91  Consequently, moral 
judgment would no longer be passed on the basis of a single act taken in isolation but 
would depend on preceding considerations, including pre-existing moral obligations and 
the understanding and intention with which the person acted.92  Not only would the 
consequences of an action be relevant but, and on the basis that good and bad are, to an 
extent, illusory, the agent’s motive or beliefs and intentions about what they did, at both 
stage one and stage two of a treatment decision, would also be relevant to moral 
assessment.93  So in coming to a conclusion about whether an act or omission had 
occurred decision-makers would have to consider that at stage one a doctor would, for 
example, consider whether treatment might be futile or subject to constraints, whilst at 
the second stage the focus would be on whether the patient would find treatment 
intolerable or undignified perhaps because it was experientially though not critically 
beneficial to them.   
 
A problem associated with moral evaluations that depend on finding out what the real 
facts of the matter may have been is that it can be difficult to be certain about what a 
person’s intention in acting actually was.94  Here again the way in which the doctor-
patient relationship is defined may be crucial to moral assessment.  For example, when a 
doctor acts in a fiduciary capacity additional duties are imposed to reflect a higher 
standard of moral accountability.  Pertinent to the present discussion is the fact that 
decision-making processes should be transparent so that the grounds on which decisions 
are being made are disclosed and made explicit. 
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Preliminary Summary 
To summarise the medical objective is to preserve the life, health and well-being of 
patients.  However, the goals of medicine are not always compatible with one another and 
this point was illustrated by drawing attention to the situation of a patient in a persistent 
vegetative state.  The illustration served double duty because it also helped to establish 
the point that decisions concerning medical treatment are often made on behalf of 
patients who are no longer competent to determine the matter for themselves.  In these 
circumstances a third party must decide what action to take in the best interests of a 
mentally incompetent patient.   
 
The Hippocratic Oath restricts ethical analysis of what action should be taken in a 
patient’s best interests to the moral principles of non-maleficence and beneficence.  The 
principle of non-maleficence places physicians under a moral obligation to not cause 
harm or to engage in activity that will lead to the death of the patient.  This latter 
requirement can be traced to the sanctity principle and the question was raised as to 
whether this foundational principle placed physicians under an absolute obligation of 
non-maleficence.  Whilst deference to an almighty God raises arguments within the 
Christian outlook that might support such a view, secularists, do on the other hand, 
encounter problems in determining where intrinsic value lies which suggests that for 
them, at least, the sanctity principle should be interpreted presumptively.    
 
This is particularly relevant to end of life issues and to the use of life preserving and 
maintaining technologies which sometimes raise important questions about the benefits 
and burdens of continued medical intervention.  Whilst a doctor is prohibited from 
causing death the principle of non-maleficence distinguishes between killing and letting 
die.  This is an important feature of the principle when one considers that an incompetent 
patient is no longer capable of refusing medical treatment.  However, the acts and 
omissions doctrine has been condemned for its failure to explain what makes the moral 
difference between killing and letting die.     
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Reconciling the Norms of the Common Moral System 
If the existence of a common morality can be demonstrated by widespread agreement 
on most moral matters and the point of a common moral system is to lessen the 
amount of harm or evil that is suffered generally95 how do we reconcile those thoughts 
with another equally relevant moral consideration; the idea that the range of harms that 
form the basis of the common moral system are not just different in kind they are ones 
that rational persons can and do rank differently.96  For example, some people might 
be willing to endure post-operative pain, discomfort and immobility in exchange for 
the possibility that later on they will have greater freedom of movement in their hips.  
Just as all persons who endure surgical procedures forsake some temporary loss of 
freedom in order to avoid a greater detriment to personal health and well-being.   
 
Consequently, there is no objective way to rank the various harms that will resolve all 
controversies97 and no one knows how others perceive quality of life issues.  
Nevertheless the Oath suggests that doctor’s should determine what is in a patient’s 
best interests by weighing the objective values associated with the principle of non-
maleficence against another set of subjective considerations which are introduced and 
upheld by the principle of beneficence to see whether, and if so how, what is 
objectively valuable would contribute to the good or welfare of the patient. 
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The Ethical Principle of Beneficence 
 
The principle of beneficence asserts that persons have a moral obligation to do good for 
others and in medicine that obligation translates into a requirement to benefit or to 
contribute to the welfare of patients.98  But in requiring positive action toward a 
beneficial end the primacy of the principle is disputed.99  This is in part because there is 
no specific moral rule that can tell a doctor what good is and therefore which actions will 
constitute doing good on behalf of the patient.100  Yet the goals of medicine suggest that 
beneficence entails an obligation to promote the life, health and well-being of the patient.  
Of course most persons wish to survive and therefore value life but a majority of them 
will also wish to have a good life.101  Each person is though an individual with a unique 
character or personality and this means that all patients are likely to interpret their good 
in different ways, a point that tends to expose a fundamental difference between 
competent and mentally incompetent patients because those who fall within the latter 
patient group may no longer be capable of expressing a view that will be considered in 
any meaningful sense.  This is potentially problematic when doctors will have 
encountered patients, or else stories about patients, who have competently refused 
beneficial life-saving treatment that could restore health but would be detrimental to their 
personal sense of well-being.102   
 
Similarly, we might ask what scope should be given to beneficence as some limit must be 
placed on the obligation to act for the benefit of others.  In medicine that limitation is 
generally introduced as a matter governed by the availability of resources.103  
Consequently, we will now examine those concerns about the primacy and scope of the 
principle. 
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Ethical Justification 
Beneficence refers to an action that is done to benefit another or that promotes the good 
of another or others.104  It is to be distinguished from benevolence which refers to a 
character trait of being disposed to act for the benefit of another.105  Accordingly the 
ethical justification for the principle of beneficence is related to human nature that 
persons wish not only to survive but also to lead a good life,  the word ‘good’ is not here 
used to convey the notion of a life that is especially virtuous or moral but one that is 
satisfying to the individual whose life it is.   
 
Hill explains why the principle of beneficence is significant:   
 
“Virtually all people include engaging in enjoyable activities among their ends, 
and so it is a reasonable presumption,  in most cases, that helping others to engage 
in enjoyable activities is a prime example of the sort of thing the moral principle of 
beneficence guides us to do.  What beneficence directly requires that one promote 
(to some degree) is the realisation of the permissible ends of others, whatever these 
chosen ends may be.  Enjoyable activities and other more particular ends become 
morally important (when not excluded by other principles) because these are what 
people choose to go for, not because the activities, or the pleasant experiences they 
bring, have an objective ‘intrinsic value’.   
 
Beneficence merely illustrates how personal ends can have indirect moral 
significance as one attempts to work out specific applications of general moral 
principles”. 106 
 
Rosamund Rhodes is to similar effect in claiming that: 
 
“The ‘do no harm’ principle … is [in part], an expression of medicine’s fiduciary 
responsibility … Some consequences of a medical intervention are beneficial, 
others, however, are harmful.  It is always important for physicians to assess and 
compare both sorts of consequences and their likelihood in determining a course of 
treatment.  Nevertheless, because what we call ‘good’ is highly subjective, for the 
most part, the ethics of medicine also requires incorporating the perspective of the 
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patient and accepting the patient’s view of the good or the patient’s rankings of 
goods”.107 
 
 
Examining the Relationship between Non-Maleficence and Beneficence 
The moral principle of non-maleficence is grounded in a particular fact of human nature; 
that humans have a natural desire to survive.  In accordance with that principle doctors 
have an obligation to prevent or to not cause harm to their patients.  These rules of 
conduct or moral prescriptions are though sometimes referred to as the moral minimum, 
i.e. what is essential for the preservation of human life.  Moreover, a series of negative 
prohibitions, i.e. thou shalt nots, are relatively speaking, morally undemanding. 
 
Persons, however, wish not only to survive but desire also to lead a good life.  In concert 
with this objective the Oath commits medical practitioners to an obligation of 
beneficence. 
 
Does the Obligation of Non-Maleficence assume Priority? 
The principle of non-maleficence instructs physicians to abstain from acts that are likely 
to cause harm, and in particular those which might lead to the death of the patient.  As 
doctors also owe their patients an obligation to do good a question frequently raised in 
connection with the principle of non-maleficence is whether it is synonymous with the 
maxim primum non nocere – above all, or first, do no harm.108  This is because a rigorous 
interpretation of the maxim would make the avoidance of harm the most important 
medical consideration of all.109  The consequences for patients, of such an interpretation, 
would indeed be extreme because the principle appears to suggest that if it is not possible 
to do good without also doing harm then it is better to take no action at all.110  
Accordingly we begin by examining whether the obligation of non-maleficence assumes 
priority. 111     
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Difficulties Posed by the Maxim Primum non Nocere 
What is entailed in achieving the ends of medicine when a doctor must weigh in the 
balance the possibility of taking beneficent action, and thereby doing some good, against 
the principle of non-maleficence when it is interpreted in accordance with the maxim 
Primum non Nocere?  The important point to bear in mind is that the doctor must, 
according to this maxim, ensure that in doing good no harm would be caused.   
 
In essence even where treatment offers potential benefits to longevity, health and well-
being there could be little, and in some instances no, prospect of it being administered.  If 
only because administering treatment would require a doctor to interfere with the 
physical integrity of the patient and the simple act of touching is deemed harm enough to 
constitute a battery.112  Future harms may be contemplated as a reasonably foreseeable 
outcome of the administration of a medical treatment when, for example, a sample of 
blood is taken for testing or where a broken leg is set inside a plaster cast.  Just as more 
serious physical harms or violations can be foreseen to arise from the vast majority of 
surgical procedures. 
 
Patients are often exposed to other more latent forms of harm in medicine.  These are the 
inherent risks associated with particular procedures and treatments.  Most of us are by 
now familiar with the concept as even over the counter preparations, such as tablets for 
pain relief, are provided with information about possible risks and side-effects, including 
contra indications for use as well as guidance about when to seek medical advice should 
any of the risks on the list materialise.     
 
However, a problem in relation to medical risks is that the information pertaining to them 
is impersonal and is often presented as a statistical probability, or of the chance, or odds, 
of the risk materialising at all.  Essentially information about a population risk is silent 
about whether or not the risk, that one is being cautioned about, will occur in any 
particular individual at this particular time.  Just as it does not allude to whether some 
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feature of the patient or characteristic of the doctor or institution in which the procedure 
is practiced increases the chances of the risk occurring.   
 
Of course drugs are licensed for use by the Medicines and Healthcare Regulatory 
Products Agency following clinical trials.  Consequently, serious adverse advents 
resulting from the use of pharmacological preparations has, for the most part been 
eliminated, provided the drug is prescribed in accordance with its licence for use.  
Although a drug that is prescribed on the basis of an incorrect diagnosis could be adverse 
to the life, health and well-being of the patient. 
 
But as risk is inherent in almost all forms of medical treatment as well as in medical 
procedures it would seem that a strict interpretation of the maxim primum non nocere 
would prevent clinicians from doing any good at all because even the best actions would 
carry with them the prospect of some harmful results materialising.113  Therefore to 
construe the principle of non-maleficence consistently with the maxim Primum non 
Nocere would not only render the medical profession inert it would also stunt medical 
progress which is contrary to the interests of patients now and in the future. 
 
Is Beneficence Equivalent to Non-Maleficence? 
The symbolic value of the Oath when put into an historical context is that it does in a 
sense represent the baptism of medical science in setting out the conditions that should 
govern the application of human knowledge about disease and its causes and effects in 
the interests of all humanity.  When viewed from this perspective it could be argued that 
the obligation to do good or to confer benefits served to restrict unethical and 
experimental medical practices and similarly cautions those who might be inclined to 
treat the disease and not the patient particularly at the end of life.  And on that assumption 
beneficence is not equivalent to non-maleficence in seeming to demand something more 
positive that could be weighed in the balance against actual and potential harms of 
treatment or non-treatment.  Moreover, it appears that the obligation of beneficence is an 
overriding requirement because in the absence of a prophylactic justification for 
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administering a treatment one is equally committed by the principle of non-maleficence 
to refrain from doing any harm for sometimes it is better to take no action at all when the 
risk is that further harm will be caused in the absence of any positive compensatory 
justification.114  This restriction, Hippocrates must have thought, would at the very least 
differentiate practitioners of medical science from priests, shamans and magicians who at 
that time were similarly concerned with healing and human welfare but whose practices 
could not be objectively validated in terms of their therapeutic or beneficial effects.115  In 
any event, Hippocrates enjoined others like him to instil trust and confidence in the moral 
integrity of medical professionals and therefore in the practice of scientific medicine.  But 
above all else, Hippocrates determined that medicine should have a moral base and that 
beneficence, or the obligation to do some actual ‘good’, should be the master value.116 
 
So in relation to the question whether beneficence is equivalent to non-maleficence 
Beauchamp and Childress have explained that whilst no sharp break exists on the 
continuum from not inflicting harm to providing benefit, principles of beneficence 
potentially demand more than the principle of non-maleficence because agents must take 
positive steps to help others, not merely refrain from harmful acts.117   
 
Accordingly, it is through the process of weighting and then balancing the benefits and 
burdens of a medical treatment or treatments that a physician is able to determine which 
form of treatment is most likely to benefit their patient.  This is because physicians are 
not only morally bound to avoid causing harm to their patients but are equally committed 
to pursuing that course of action that is most likely to contribute to their welfare.118 
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Beneficence: Distinguishing Moral Duty from Supererogatory Acts 
The principle of beneficence claims that persons have a moral obligation to do good, or to 
make a positive contribution to the welfare of others.  However, we distinguish between 
moral duties and those good acts that go beyond the call of duty.119 Amongst members of 
society an obvious example of an act of general beneficence is to donate a sum of money 
to charity.  Many more might choose instead to donate their time, knowledge and skill for 
the benefit of others as lifeboat crews of the Royal National Lifeboat Institution do; 
volunteers do in addition put their own life and well-being at risk in attempting to help 
another.  Yet others commit considerable emotional resources to personal acts of 
beneficence.  Consider foster parents or a chaplain who works at the local hospice or for 
that matter a person who donates a kidney to help a loved one.  It is also apparent that 
those who donate their money, time or resources in this way are often esteemed members 
of society.  Indeed those who have during their lifetime selflessly committed themselves 
to promoting the good of others are more likely to be distinguished from their peers on 
the basis of such altruism through the honours system, for example.  For members of 
society have determined that those who are motivated to be genuinely beneficent, i.e. to 
abandon self-interest for the sake of doing good for others, deserve to be publicly 
recognised for achieving a standard of moral excellence.   
 
Nevertheless, general beneficence, or the contribution that ordinary members of society 
should make to the good of others, would appear to be a personal rather than a moral 
issue, i.e. nice to do but not wrong to omit.120  You may remember Jonathan Glover who 
argued that a common moral system applies to all people in all places in prohibiting 
harmful activity but that we can have no similar obligation to benefit all people in all 
places because we could never fulfil such an obligation.   
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Therefore, we are obligated to follow some rules of beneficence impartially such as 
requiring efforts to rescue strangers in circumstances that pose minimal risk to ourselves 
many acts of beneficence are not obligatory.121  Otherwise only exceptionally, as 
indicated above, may circumstances eliminate the discretion allowed by general 
beneficence.122  Obligations of specific beneficence can arise from special moral 
relations, such as exist in families between parent and child for example, or from special 
commitments or promises of the type made by husband and wife, and roles with attendant 
responsibilities, e.g. trustee and beneficiary or solicitor and client.123  However, the 
essential point is that persons can be placed under a specific obligation to act for the 
benefit of another as a consequence of the nature of the relationship that exists between 
the parties.124 
 
So whereas we are morally required to exhibit impartial adherence to rules of non-
maleficence we are morally permitted to be partial in helping or benefiting those with 
whom we have special relationships and we are commonly not required to help or benefit 
those with whom we have no such special relationship.125  Accordingly failing to act non-
maleficently toward a party is prima facie immoral as well as illegal whereas failing to 
act beneficently is very often not immoral or illegal.126  Although Beauchamp and 
Childress argue that the principle of beneficence establishes an obligation to help others 
further their important and legitimate interests which perhaps explains why we are 
required to rescue strangers.127 
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In summary then, and with some exceptions, persons have only a limited obligation of 
beneficence toward others128 although a personal commitment to be or to cultivate 
benevolence is undoubtedly a virtue in that it is an aspect of an individual’s character that 
is morally commendable.129 
 
The Oath: Doctors have Special Self-Imposed Supererogatory Moral Obligations to 
their Patients 
Although the extent to which beneficence is morally obligatory is debated doctors have 
special, self imposed, supererogatory moral obligations to their patients, that is moral 
obligations that are over and above the ordinary moral obligations we all have to each 
other. 130  In accordance with the Hippocratic Oath, physicians pledge that they will come  
for the benefit of the sick according to their ability and judgment and will keep patients 
from harm and injustice.131   
 
Does this mean that doctors are required to place the interests of their patients before 
their own?   
About this Gillon states that: 
 
“Whatever the case in general ethics, it is undoubtedly true that members of the 
medical profession undertake to place the interests of their patients before their 
own in many circumstances.  This undertaking differentiates them from, for 
instance, merchants, who, while they may also on occasion put their clients’ 
interests first, will do so (qua merchants) only to further their own longer term 
interests, for example, when it is good for business to put themselves out for their 
clients.  Although an element of self-interest undoubtedly exists in the practice of 
medicine … the medical profession none the less conceives itself, and is conceived 
by society, as having a duty of beneficence to the sick in general and to its patients 
in particular”.132 
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One example of an occasion whereby a doctor undertakes to place the interests of their 
patient before their own lies in treating people with infectious diseases.  Another notable 
example is that doctors may, even when out and about in their social time, be called upon 
to administer medical aid to a person in distress.  Gillon presumes that the source of this 
additional moral obligation of beneficence taken on by doctors is a certain feeling of 
benevolence, good will or sympathy towards the sick.133  At least he considers that there 
cannot be many who do not at least start off their medical careers with a desire to commit 
their working lives to helping the sick.134   
 
Gillon’s uncertainty on the subject prompts me to consider what is the source of the 
moral obligation to be beneficent?  Morality is an institution that aspires to raise the bar, 
as it were, of human conduct.  Clearly, not so far that its demands place unreasonable 
burdens on the majority of persons, but as informal rules of conduct are prescriptive and 
are not merely descriptive of what people actually do the intention must surely be to exalt 
persons, having due regard for their capacities and frailties, through maxims that give 
human life dignity.   
 
In accordance with this view the principle of beneficence gives life to the biblical 
principle ‘thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself’.  This means that human life should be 
conducted in a spirit of love and generosity towards others on the basis that love is one of 
the primary characteristics of God.135  And in accordance with the concept ‘Imago Dei’ 
God has similarly endowed us with the capacity to love.136  However, in contrast to 
human love which is usually based on feelings and emotions God’s love for us is spirit 
led and unconditional.137  This means that we do not have to be especially lovable and 
neither do we have to make him feel good to be recipients of it.138   Furthermore, God 
demonstrated his love for all mankind by sacrificing his only son to us and Jesus in turn 
sacrificed his life for our sin and so one of the ways that love is defined in biblical texts is 
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through benevolent acts of giving.139  Consequently, Christians who believe that love for 
all has supreme value will presumably desire to become as one with God’s divine nature 
and to this end should strive to be patient, kind, truthful, unselfish, trusting, believing, 
hopeful and enduring and not simply jealous, boastful, arrogant, rude, selfish or angry.140   
 
Nevertheless, some secular moral philosophers are less optimistic that humans can act 
altruistically as Hill explains:141   
 
“Beliefs vary about what we can do for others, and these beliefs tend to influence in 
various ways views about what we should do for others. 
 
Some believe that altruistic conduct is impossible, and thus conclude that there is 
no moral obligation to be altruistic.  Moral arguments for accepting other-
regarding principles, on this view, must appeal at some point to self-interest.  
Hobbes is often though to be a prime example.  By nature, he held, we always act 
for the sake of some good for ourselves.  What is called ‘compassion’, he tells us, is 
really one’s ‘grief for the calamity of another that ariseth from the imagination that 
a like calamity may befall oneself’, and the laws of nature that prescribe 
accommodation and forbid hatred are derivative from the primary law directing 
one to further one’s own interests. 
 
Others hold, less radically, that though concern for others for their own sake is 
occasionally possible, due to human nature such other regarding concerns can only 
be rare, unstable, and restricted in scope (e.g., to family, friends and associates).  If 
one assumes that altruistic acts must be motivated by altruistic feelings, then the 
belief that altruistic feelings are severely limited tends to undermine belief in a 
general obligation to act for the sake of others.  It seems pointless, and even 
dangerous, to expect people to act for selfless regard for others if, because of 
human nature, such motives are uncommon, unreliable, and narrowly focused…    
‘Ought’ in this context implies ‘can’, and … if most people are similarly lacking, 
then it seems doubtful that having and acting on the motive can be a basic moral 
obligation even for the few who have the capacity for it. 
 
Many who agree that altruistic feelings are in fact rare in our world may 
nevertheless believe that this is an ideal motive, within human capacities, and that 
we are obligated to cultivate it.  What our observations show, they may argue, is 
that people do not (often) act from altruistic feelings, but not that they cannot.  
Various explanations may be given for the fact that most do not develop and act 
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from their capacity for this ideal motive.  The failure may be attributed, for 
example, to pervasive problems that, according to some theological and social 
theories, can eventually be overcome or transcended.. 
 
If pressed with the objection that it is foolish and dangerous to expect people to act 
on motives that are in fact quite uncommon, idealists may reply in different ways.  
Some Christians may say that love for all, even though rare, has a supreme value 
and that one should have faith that God will prevent or compensate for the 
disasters that seem predictable when one trusts that people can be more loving 
than evidence shows them capable of being.  Some revolutionary idealists, 
confronted with the same objection, may reply that indeed we should not count on 
most people, as currently conditioned, to act from anything less than selfish 
motives, but after the revolution, they may argue, radically altered social 
conditions will mould new personalities in which other-regarding motives 
dominate. 
 
Another common view is that compassion and general benevolence are not only 
possible in rare circumstances but are powerful and pervasive features of human 
nature.  This belief about human psychology can also influence moral views.  For 
example, the belief makes it easier to affirm utilitarianism as a theory of moral 
obligation, for it sets aside the alleged problem that human beings cannot 
consciously strive for the greatest happiness for all without ulterior motives.  
Believing that general benevolence is a powerful natural motive would also make it 
more reasonable for utilitarians (and others) to believe that we need not and so 
(given costs) should not resort to state coercion, manipulation, and indoctrination 
to maintain a decent social order.   
 
The Kantian position, by contrast, is that, once we see the reasons for doing so, we 
can guide our conduct by a limited principle of beneficence, no matter how warm 
or cold our feeling towards others may run.  That we can do so, at least in normal 
circumstances, is not refuted by empirical evidence and is presupposed in our 
conception of ourselves as moral agents”.142 
 
It is against this general philosophical outlook that we return to consider the Hippocratic 
Oath.  Hippocrates was presumably mindful that doctors had, through their education and 
training, acquired special knowledge, of medical science, and skills in the practice of 
medicine.  In the knowledge that the purpose of all living things is to survive and the 
desire of living things is to live a good life he recognised that doctors were uniquely 
placed to benefit others.  Consequently, Hippocrates determined that medical 
professionals should not use their knowledge and skills merely to further self-interest just 
as they should not be used partially to benefit or to further the interests of a particular 
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person or group.  Rather, it is at least arguable, that he enjoined doctors to an obligation 
of beneficence in the belief that professional knowledge and skills ought to be used for 
the good of all patients regardless of their personal feelings toward them.143 
 
Maximising Human Welfare – The Primary Obligation is to Maximise Human 
Health? 
Is a doctor’s obligation to benefit their patient overriding?  The simple answer is no.  
Medical science has now progressed from its more humble origins of seeking to preserve 
life with what we may now regard as relatively ineffective treatments.  This was a time 
when health and ill-health were each defined in relation to the presence or absence of 
disease and when the doctor’s bedside manner was all important to patient wellbeing. 
Scientific progress has therefore transformed medical practice for the benefit of patients 
however transformation does not take place in a vacuum for the success of modern 
medicine has altered medical practice in other noteworthy ways that are also relevant to 
patient care and well-being.  The National Health Service operates under conditions in 
which it is funded out of public money where resources are finite and demand for 
services always outstrips supply.  Consequently, a major issue for doctors in the delivery 
of healthcare is now how they should allocate those scarce resources to preserve the life, 
health and well-being of patients. 
 
The principle of utility144 places value in achieving the greatest good for the greatest 
number and dictates that resources are maximised when doctors use their expert 
knowledge to form a diagnosis and give treatment advice.  This is entirely consistent with 
the role doctors have been trained to perform and ensures that decisions governing the 
way in which medical problems are understood are taken by the person best equipped to 
appreciate the consequences of their decision-making and action on the available 
resources.  Consequently, the obligation to confer benefits is constrained by other ethical 
considerations such as the need to weigh the cost of a medical treatment against its 
beneficial effects.145   Similarly in a system where resources are finite doctors are also 
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required to ensure a just distribution of available resources and in this way also the needs 
of ‘my patients’ compete with the needs of others in society.146 
 
So in contemporary medicine doctors have a moral obligation to benefit their patient’s 
health and to some extent the health of others.147  In other words there will be times when 
moral obligations to others will supersede a doctor’s duty to his or her patient.  
Essentially a doctor must act to maximise human welfare generally which is consistent 
with medicine’s goal, rationale and justification.148  Nevertheless, modern ethical 
considerations must be upheld alongside professional ethical values which can be traced 
back to Hippocratic times. 
 
Maximising the Welfare of an Individual Patient 
As the Oath instructs doctors to use their ability and judgment for the benefit of patients 
the view embedded in medical ethics, more traditionally construed, was that matters 
concerning the life, health and welfare interests of patients should be determined by a 
doctor, someone other than the person directly affected by the decision.  The question is 
on what basis can a doctor make a reasoned judgment about what action to take in the 
best interests of a patient when the principle of beneficence is dependent for its content 
on how ‘good’ is defined?149   
 
There is a gap that has to be filled and as good health is a feature of well-being it is 
possible that a doctor can do no better than to defer to a general moral theory of what the 
source of human welfare or good is and to interpret the principle of beneficence in 
conformity with it. 
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Utilitarian Good 
Utilitarian theorists rely on a single principle and a single dimension of value as 
foundational to all moral decision-making.150  They take the principle of utility to 
promote the greatest happiness or good.151  Accordingly utilitarians focus on the 
consequences of actions and in particular their contribution to human welfare.152  
Therefore, the method for arriving at a decision about which action to take appears 
similarly uncomplicated.   
 
Furthermore, the absence of an omniscient God who can foresee the total consequences 
of all actions153 is compensated for in the utilitarian standard of right conduct by 
requiring decision-makers to be strictly impartial in the way that a disinterested or 
benevolent spectator would be.154  Utilitarians, like Hippocrates, therefore consider that a 
third party should be able to determine what course of action will benefit or contribute to 
the welfare of others.  This is because the principle of utility is intended to engender 
selfless decision-making based on biblical principles or common moral rules such as ‘do 
as you would be done by’ and ‘love your neighbour as thyself’.155    
 
What Contributes to Human Happiness? 
Mill claimed that the principle of utility was in unison with facts of human nature in 
recognising that pleasure and freedom from pain are the only things desirable as ends and 
that whatever is desired is valued either for the inherent pleasure it brings or as a means 
to promoting pleasure and prevention of pain.156  A problem for doctors is that the words 
pleasure and pain have to be interpreted and then given meaning in a medical setting.  For 
example, a person who likes to play football might choose not to have their shoulder 
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pinned, following dislocation, mid-season.  An equally common phenomenon in 
medicine is that many patients are willing to delay gratification and may even be 
prepared to endure certain hardships on the way to recovery such as happens with cancer 
patients who receive chemotherapy.  These examples, illustrate how the particular ends of 
an individual can influence medical treatment decision-making processes.   
 
Consequently, doctors must first reflect on all possible options for action.157  Second, 
determine all of the foreseeable benefits and harms that would result from each course of 
action.158  Third, seek to identify the patient’s wishes, preferences and concerns, try to 
determine which are relevant and what weight these should assume prior to reaching a 
decision that should on balance produce more pleasure than pain for the patient after the 
costs have been taken into account.159   
 
Such assessments are difficult to make for any person.  How many of us when faced with 
a choice do not later reflect on what we elected to do and think that we would choose to 
do something different if we had our time again?  What reason supports the view that 
doctors find the task any easier than the rest of us.160  A doctor might be undecided about 
which body of medical opinion to follow.161  Although one would hope that medical 
technical knowledge should in the end be helpful in alleviating that particular problem.  
Medical competence cannot however be relied upon to provide guidance about what is a 
good life for the patient.  Consequently, there is reason to question the notion that a 
doctor, as technical expert, is in any better position to make such assessments than a 
patient who is, or may be, ignorant about medical matters.162 
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Well-Being 
Thomas Scanlon provides insight into the uses and limitations of any general theory of 
well-being:163   
 
“Any plausible theory of well-being would have to recognise at least the following 
fixed points.  First, certain experiential states (such as various forms of satisfaction 
and enjoyment) contribute to well-being, but well-being is not determined solely by 
the quality of experience.  Second, well-being depends to a large extent on a 
person’s degree of success in achieving his or her main ends in life, provided that 
these are worth pursuing.  This component of well-being reflects the fact that the 
life of a rational creature is something that is to be lived in an active sense – that is 
to say, shaped by his or her choices and reactions – and that well-being is therefore 
in large part a matter of how well this is done – of how well the ends are selected 
and how successfully they are pursued.  Third, many goods that contribute to a 
person’s well-being depend on the person’s aims but go beyond the good of success 
in achieving those aims.  These include such things as friendship, other valuable 
personal relations, and the achievement of various forms of excellence, such as in 
art or science... 
 
But this list of fixed points does not amount to a theory of well-being.  Such a 
theory would go beyond this list by doing such things as the following.  It might 
provide a more unified account of what well-being is, on the basis of which one 
could see why diverse things I have listed as contributing to well-being in fact do 
so.  It might also provide a clearer account of the boundary of the concept – the 
line between contributions to one’s well-being and things one has reason to pursue 
for other reasons.  Finally, such a theory might provide a standard for making 
more exact comparisons of well-being – for deciding when, on balance, a person’s 
well-being has been increased and by how much. 
 
I doubt that we are likely to find a theory of well-being of this kind.  It does not 
seem likely, for example, that we will find a general theory telling us how much 
weight to assign to the different elements of well-being I have listed: how much to 
enjoyment, how much to success in one’s aims, and so on...  Plausible answers 
would depend on the particular goals that a person has and on the circumstances 
in which he or she was placed...   It does seem that there are answers to such 
questions, but I do not think that they are likely to be delivered by anything that 
could be called a general theory.  Even if there were such a theory, moreover, it 
would need to be not just a theory of well-being, but a more general account of 
what is valuable and worthwhile.164 
                                                 
163
 Scanlon, Thomas M. Jr., The Status of Well-Being, 1996, The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, p.96 
164
 Ibid, p.117-9 
 55
How is Well-being to be Assessed? 
A narrowly defined concept of well-being might focus on a single good such as health.165 
What is in one’s best interests would in these circumstances be equated with what is in a 
person’s medical best interests and would tend to prioritise medical scientific data as well 
as medical expertise and experience over the personal wishes and experiences of the 
patient.   
 
Welfare, so construed, would however tend to displace the idea that persons know best 
what is good for them and a conflict with autonomy would exist.  Kant cautioned us 
against treating persons merely as the means to an end, including that of good health.166  
Persons are instead to be treated as rational beings with autonomy.167  An autonomous 
person is someone who is bound to no higher authority, with a power to govern 
themselves in accordance with their own constitution, without needing the approval of 
any higher authority.168  Therefore an autonomous agent identifies with the idea that 
moral, and non-moral, requirements are not externally imposed169 but internally 
determined.170  To act in a way that is contrary to their beliefs, values and preferences 
causes them to experience inner conflict which is detrimental to their personal sense of 
well-being.171   
 
Human welfare, according to Kant, should not therefore be assessed solely in terms of 
whether or not a person is in good health.  As if to confirm Kant’s viewpoint Julian 
Savulescu has also written that:  
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“Our well-being includes much more than our health.  Indeed, arguably, health is 
an instrumental good which facilitates our engagement in worthwhile activity that 
we desire and which gives us pleasure.  Cancer is bad because it stops us from 
completing our projects, seeing our children grow, doing what we planned with our 
partner, and so on.  A symptom less disease, which does not affect length or quality 
of life, is of no practical importance.  Whereas doctors may be concerned to 
promote health, patients may be concerned to promote their well-being more 
globally conceived’.172 
 
When welfare is assessed in accordance with a wider range of goods there is no disputing 
that a patient is in the best position to know what is good for them. 
 
Which Factors are Morally Relevant? 
If our notions of personhood are informed by the Kantian concept of autonomy what can 
safely be assumed about any particular individual?  Do persons similarly share a 
commitment to particular human values that is mirrored by the goals of medicine?  
People often remark that the only certainty in life is death.  A statement of fact that is 
hardly attention grabbing.  The sentiment that lies beneath the statement is though quite 
interesting.  For, in depicting death as an inescapable event that is a feature of every life, 
death is, somewhat ironically, cast as one of life’s great levellers.  It’s going to happen to 
all of us.  Yet little is known about it except that it marks the permanent ending of 
material existence.  Only this much can we be sure of.  Nevertheless this common thread 
in human experience is significant in fixing knowledge about a phenomenon that is 
familiar to all mankind.  So we believe that death is the natural enemy of man and that 
understanding forms a necessary platform for persons to unite in valuing life and in 
seeking to prevent death.173  Death is as it were the only universal experience we have in 
life. 
 
To determine what is beneficial medical treatment requires us to go further.  We must 
have knowledge about what people truly value in life.  This is problematic when life 
presents itself in an unsystematic and incomplete package.  The life that we have 
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provides us with an opportunity to participate in a greater whole which offers no 
consistent foothold in human experience.  Instead we are born onto the same planet but 
enter different worlds which are beset with irregularities and inconsistencies that have the 
power within them to divide humans.  Whether as a consequence of the geographical 
space we occupy which might speak to religious beliefs, culture and ethnicity or to the 
circumstances we are born into and reflected in education, socialisation and experience.  
The timing of our birth is no less relevant in pointing to a person of a particular era and 
age.  Just as the anatomy we are born with determines gender and polarises the sexes.  
This view of life is compounded by mankind’s limited lifespan which serves to re-
enforce our fragmented knowledge and experience of the world and its people.  
Consequently, the conditions necessary for a unified view of what is beneficial in life 
appear to be absent.  
 
Essentially, all nation states and persons are similar in nature and will to that extent have 
values in common.  They are also inherently autonomous and this means that the 
societies we live in and the people we live amongst are to that extent unique.  Each is, as 
it were, built to be just that little bit different from another and therefore we should 
anticipate some diversity in the values that will inform a particular life based on a range 
of factors.174 
 
How the Ethical Decision-Making Standards associated with the Principle of 
Autonomy are relevant to a Morally Desirable Outcome  
When well-being is broadly construed it becomes tied to the issue of what a good life is.  
This is because a sense of well-being is what we will have when we are contented or, 
better still, happy with our lot in life.  More generally the concept is associated with 
pleasure and the absence of pain;175 pleasure generally induces that feeling of 
contentment whereas pain threatens to override or overwhelm most psychological states.  
This much we know.  The problem is that controversy surrounds the issue of what will 
lead to the greatest amount of pleasure and conversely what will produce pain.  The route 
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to happiness is, as it were, not always entirely clear because there is no general agreement 
about what good is in this context or about how it should be pursued and evaluated.  
 
For example, Utilitarians typically believe that good resides in states of affairs that are 
known to benefit mankind and take the principle of utility, which is considered the 
fundamental principle of all morality, to promote the greatest amount of human happiness 
for the greatest number.176  Good is here evaluated as an objective property that is fixed 
by human nature.177  Likeminded people do though differ about how to produce the 
desired consequences.178   
 
Mill, for example, put forward an ideal or qualitative view of happiness and insisted that 
in estimating all things some pleasures are more desirable and more valuable than others 
irrespective of the quantity of pleasure yielded.179  He recognised that people saw value 
in different things but nevertheless thought that the intrinsic goodness of various things 
could be objectively measured so that comparisons could be drawn in the march toward 
pleasures being ranked in hierarchical terms.  This enabled him to think that whatever 
would be capable of generating the greatest quality of pleasure for the greatest number 
could be determined externally by someone unaffected by the consequences of the 
decision.    
 
By contrast, Jeremy Bentham, who was Mill’s mentor in his formative years, thought that 
the principle of utility should be pursued quantitatively.  A quantitative approach 
demanded that in estimating intrinsic goodness the consequences of a course of action 
should be calculated not just qualitatively but also in terms of the quantity of pleasure it 
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produced.180  Bentham claimed that by multiplying intensity by duration, it would be 
possible to calculate the quantity of pleasure a given pleasant experience contains.181   
So whereas Mill appears to consider that one sort of pleasure, let’s say buying a new item 
of clothing, could be compared to another form of pleasure such as attending a football 
match or reading a book, the intrinsic value of each being measured and compared in 
hierarchical terms for the quality of pleasure generated, Bentham thought that the longer 
a pleasure lasts and the more intense the experience, the better it was182 and in construing 
the greatest good decision-makers would be required to think about and understand the 
force and true value of any pleasure and pain.183   
  
Whilst we see that Mill and Bentham were each committed to the value of maximising 
human welfare or happiness they each held different views about how to pursue it and 
clearly differed in their methods of calculating or estimating human pleasure (and equally 
pain).  Many others have speculated about what is the true source of human happiness by 
asking what a good life for humans is but many different visions of reality exist and one 
may be no less valid than another in this regard.     
 
So perhaps the best we can say is that the pursuit of a good life is the guiding force in the 
lives of all rational persons who have an interest in personal well-being.  However, 
happiness, if that is the ultimate end of human life, is a somewhat elusive creature that so 
often fails to respond to any form of command or expectation that is placed upon it. 
 
The Kantian principle of autonomy is important in this respect in upholding the notion 
that the good life is best self-constructed because it allows each of us the freedom to 
determine, within certain confines, what our good is and if we feel bound by that 
understanding to therefore shape our life around those personally held beliefs, values and 
preferences.  Indeed John Stuart Mill agrees because he has said that: 
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“The only freedom which deserves the name is that of pursuing our own good in 
our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs or impede 
their efforts to obtain it.  Each is the proper guardian of his own health, whether 
bodily or mental and spiritual.  Mankind are greater gainers by suffering each 
other to live as seems good to themselves than by compelling each to live as seems 
good to the rest”.184 
 
This statement suggests that individuals should have freedom from external constraints to 
pursue a life of their own choosing.185  In other words persons and the autonomous 
choices they make should, in general and whenever possible, be respected.  This indicates 
that diversity in the decision-making preferences of patients is to be expected and should 
not be suppressed by, for example, medical paternalism. Hence the obligations associated 
with the doctrine of informed consent have developed over time to emphasise a legal 
requirement that patients should be placed in position to make an informed choice about 
whether to accept or reject medical treatment.186 As a consequence the doctor’s duty to 
disclose information has increasingly been tailored towards what the patient must know 
in order that they may safeguard their welfare and other interests, including that of 
maintaining bodily integrity. 
 
Should a more paternalistic approach be taken towards the mental incapacitated?   
The first point to make is that a patient may be considered incapable for any one of a 
number of reasons.  Minors naturally fall into this category as time and experience have 
not combined sufficiently to induce maturity and wisdom.  Alternatively, a knock on the 
head may render someone temporarily unconscious, or it could be that an elderly 
formerly competent person is suffering from dementia in which case capacity may 
fluctuate or be lost forever.  And in some instances persons are incompetent but sentient 
whilst in exceptional circumstances the patient will be permanently insentient such as 
happens with those who enter a persistent vegetative state.    
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It is only natural that persons should want to protect those who are incapable of making 
treatment decisions themselves.  In some situations there may be no option other than to 
adopt a paternalistic approach toward the incapable patient.  This may be because the 
patient was never competent to register a choice or the wishes of the patient are unknown 
and are not reasonably ascertainable.  Either way, necessary and appropriate treatment 
should, in these circumstances, be administered in their best interests for any alternative 
would be unthinkably immoral and therefore inhuman.     
 
What is the role of the principle of autonomy in respect of formerly competent adult 
patients?  Does the principle of autonomy continue to protect the right to choose what 
shall happen to one’s body in a medical context?   
In the Court of Appeal, Hoffmann LJ stated that to adopt a paternalist view, and deny that 
autonomy can be allowed to prevail, in such situations whilst appearing attractive can 
also have disturbing implications.187  Do we insist upon patients accepting life-saving 
treatment which is contrary to their strongly held religious beliefs, for example?188  He 
added that the principle of self-determination says that a person should be allowed to 
choose for themselves and that, if they are unable to express a choice we should try our 
honest best to do what we think they would have chosen.189 
 
A similar view was expressed in the House of Lords by Lord Goff.  He stated that: 
  
‘To presume that the incompetent person must always be subjected to what many 
rational and intelligent persons may decline is to downgrade the status of the 
incompetent person by placing a lesser value on his intrinsic human worth and 
vitality’.190 
 
Therefore, if we are not to downgrade the moral status of mentally incapacitated patients 
then it is important that we should remain consistent between competent and incompetent 
patients.  This means that decisions taken on behalf of a formerly competent patient 
should be made to accord with their former wishes even where a doctor or others do not 
consider it to be in their best interests to do so, such as when treatment and care that may 
restore health and prolong life would, if competence were notionally restored, be refused.  
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To this extent, the principle of the sanctity of life yields to the principle of self-
determination and the doctor’s duty to act in the best interests of his patient must likewise 
be qualified.191 
 
Dworkin writes compellingly on the subject that persons do not want to live or end their 
lives out of character.192  He states that: 
 
“Whether it is in someone’s best interests that his life end in one way rather than 
another depends on so much else that is special about him, about the shape and 
character of his life and his own sense of his integrity and critical interests, that no 
uniform collective decision can possibly hope to serve everyone even decently.  So 
we have that reason of beneficence as well as reasons of autonomy why the state 
should not impose some uniform general view by way of sovereign law but should 
encourage people to make provision for their future care themselves, as best they 
can, and why if they have made no provision the law should so far as possible leave 
decisions in the hands of their relatives or other people close to them whose sense 
of their best interests, shaped by intimate knowledge or everything that makes up 
where their best interests lie, is likely to be much sounder than some universal, 
theoretical, abstract judgment born in the stony halls where interest groups 
manoeuvre and political deals are done”.193  
 
When welfare is assessed in accordance with a wider range of goods there is no disputing 
that a patient is in the best position to know what is good for them. 
 
Conclusion: What is the moral standing of the Oath in contemporary medicine? 
 
Although the principles of non-maleficence and beneficence continue to play a central 
role in medical ethics today it is a matter of personal choice whether a doctor swears 
allegiance to the Oath.  For this ancient Code now suffers from the obvious criticism that 
it is outdated.  Medical science has progressed from its humble origins to a position 
where contemporary medicine can, by contrast, offer a more extensive and effective 
range of preventative194 and curative treatments195 as well as metering out a collection of 
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fairly comprehensive treatments that are capable of staving off the ill effects of poor 
health.196  Indeed such is the success of medical science that it has properly entered into 
an era where treatment can be specifically tailored towards maximising human 
potential.197  However, the National Health Service is publicly funded and operates on the 
basis of finite resources.  And as demand for services always outstrips supply a basic 
function of medical ethics is to consider what the just allocation of a scare resource is.  
Another question of some moral importance in modern medicine is who should decide on 
the merits or otherwise of medical treatment, should it be the doctor who possesses expert 
knowledge in the field of medicine or should it be the patient who is for the most part 
relatively ignorant on the matter they seek expert advice about but who must bear the 
consequences of any decision.  Respect for the principle of autonomy would accord 
primacy to the views of the patient.  The Oath, by contrast, instructs doctors to use their 
ability and judgment for the benefit of patients.  Therefore the view embedded in medical 
ethics, at that time, was that decisions that have to do with life, death and quality of life 
could be decided externally by someone other than the person affected by the decision.  
Paternalism was accepted in medical practice at that time.  Consequently, the Oath is now 
best regarded as a symbolic source of moral authority regarding what it is appropriate and 
inappropriate for medicine to do in the name of preserving the life, health and well-being 
of patients in the 21st century.198 
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Chapter Two 
 
 
The Ethical Principle of Autonomy 
 
Immanuel Kant contended that persons should be respected as autonomous creatures of 
moral worth and dignity based on their capacity to reason and to be rational.1  These, he 
argued, are the essential characteristics of persons which enable them to think, decide and 
act autonomously and in accordance with rational principles or laws which distinguishes 
them from all other creatures.2  Therefore, persons should have freedom, of mind and 
body, to live their life in accordance with laws of their own making.3   
 
Accordingly, Kant emphasises the supremacy of the principle of autonomy in the moral 
life which he grounds in a particular conception of persons and their capacities to explain 
why they should have freedom to be self-governing and should not be directed or 
governed externally as the utilitarian theorists Bentham and Mill had proposed.4  Indeed 
Kant sought to constrain the scope and effect of utilitarian theory, perhaps fearing that 
there would be circumstances whereupon it would continue to have some bite, by 
claiming that in the moral life it is imperative that persons should always be treated at the 
same time as an end and never solely as the means to the end of any other.5  Neither 
though did Kant advocate autonomy unconstrained.6  He put forward a fairly demanding 
theory of right conduct based on the Categorical Imperative which required persons to 
consider whether the principle on which they acted could be univeralised, i.e. am I acting 
solely out of self-interest.7  Consequently, it is inherent in Kant’s theory that persons have 
duties to themselves and others when making decisions and acting autonomously.8  Of 
necessity therefore persons should not think and act on the basis of mere calculation 
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alone rather the motive in choosing is an important element of such processes and in this 
respect Kant determines that only a good will has moral worth.9  This is because only a 
person with a good will intends to think and act in accordance with the moral law and 
with what duty commands of them.  Thus decisions and actions should be taken or done 
in a spirit of good will to all mankind.10 
 
Hill, a contemporary Kantian philosopher, stresses why respect for persons is 
fundamental to Kant’s idea of human dignity.  He states that: 
 
“Although Kant himself is often criticised for lapses into dogmatic rigourism, his 
principle of respect for persons is the product of his deep dissatisfaction with 
dogmatic, uncritical and pseudo-scientific moral theories that would impose their 
parochial norms on a world of richly diverse people who are capable of critical 
reflection and making their own choices.  Respect for persons, Kant realised 
presupposes a practical conception of persons that must be normatively grounded, 
systematically developed, and responsive to a realistic (but not cynical) view of the 
human predicament.  It must not merely reflect the substantive norms of particular 
communities or traditions, for it is needed as a framework for guiding moral reform 
within cultures and mediating conflicts among them”.11 
 
To respect someone, in Kantian terms, is to respect them as an autonomous moral agent, 
indeed as an equal in moral matters, and therefore also as someone who has dominion 
over their own life and life plan insofar as this does not interfere with the equal rights and 
interests of others.12  So to the degree that Maslow argued that humans were as 
predictable as all other creatures, in that they are motivated, or psychologically disposed, 
to satisfy their personal need of shelter, safety, care and only after these arrangements had 
been sorted out did they become concerned about personal development and eventually 
self-actualisation13, we can see in human life that within the hierarchy of needs there is 
considerable scope for diversity amongst and between individuals.  Consequently, if 
someone thinks that a good life consists in living on a barge, for example, then we do not 
generally seek to persuade them that they have more reason to live on land in a 
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traditionally constructed dwelling because it offers a greater measure of safety and 
security in the long term.  Similarly, if a person with a degree in engineering is 
committed to the idea of spending their working life as a train driver we do not inquire 
over what factors they considered prior to arriving at their decision.  Instead we respect 
their choice, even though it may not be ours, because we recognise that each person is a 
unique individual which is reflected in their beliefs, values and preferences and therefore 
in the way that they deliberate about things, including matters related to life, death and 
quality of life.  What scope would have been given to personal freedom if it were 
otherwise?  About this John Harris states that: 
 
“Persons are capable of valuing their own lives.  [There are] a vast variety of 
different reasons that people have for valuing their lives, and the different ways in 
which they think it important to organise their lives and the societies in which they 
live.  Many of these differences stem from, or are expressive of, moral differences 
between people and are thus likely to remain important.  It was the very 
intractability of these differences that made it seem unlikely that any agreement 
could be reached on a list of the things that made life valuable, and which made it 
seem more promising to concentrate on the fact that persons would be the sort of 
beings who had their own reasons or purposes for life, rather than on the content of 
those reasons or purposes. 
 
The recognition of the fact that we are likely to differ, and to go on differing, from 
one another as to what is important and valuable about life, and that this ability is 
itself part of the peculiar value that people’s lives usually have, occupies a special 
place in moral theory.  Those who accept that all the many differences between 
people, important as they are, do not of themselves make the life of one person 
more valuable, more worthy of preservation, than the life of any other, exhibit the 
basic attitude of their fellows which is often called ‘respect for persons’, and which 
is the starting point of morality. 
 
It is the starting point because it involves recognising that other people matter and 
so also that how they live their lives, and the quality of their lives, matters as well.  
It is precisely because they are so important that what they believe is so important, 
and it is because both they and their beliefs are so important that morality matters 
so much.  There would be little reason even to get as far as disagreeing with others 
morally, unless it was accepted that they and their beliefs mattered”.14 
 
So manifestations in the moral life that have the potential to erode or eclipse personal 
freedom will to a similar degree undermine the principle of respect for persons as 
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autonomous agents who are the primary source of moral and non-moral values, i.e. 
legitimate determinants of what is valuable in human life as well as what is personally 
valuable to them as valuers.   
 
Accordingly, respect for persons entails the notion that each person should be respected 
as an autonomous moral agent and equal with a life of their own.  Therefore, the 
subjectively held values and interests of individuals should be regarded by others as a 
legitimate source of authority about decisions and actions affecting them provided that 
these do not cause others harm or interfere with their equal right to live a life of their own 
choosing.  Consequently, we will be considering what respect is presumptively due to 
persons and the circumstances under which it can be forteited or lost.   
 
What is Autonomy? 
 
In brief autonomy refers to a right or state of self-government or self-rule.15  The word 
‘autonomy’ originally referred to the self-governance of independent city states. 16   
Autonomy therefore defined those states that had a power to govern themselves in 
accordance with their own constitution.17  They were not in other words bound to a 
higher authority and so did not need to seek direction from any further jurisdiction or 
power.18  Thus the individual constitution of each unique state became the most relevant 
source of information about and authority of dominions.19  
 
The term later became extended and applied to persons.20   Consequently, a person who 
has the capacity to think, decide and act freely and independently is autonomous.21  By 
parity of reasoning autonomy of thought is related to the intellectual capacity to think for 
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oneself which involves making decisions, believing things, having preferences and 
making moral assessments.22  In order to act on the basis of personal deliberations 
persons must also have autonomy of the will.23  Essentially this means that persons must 
have freedom to decide to do things on the basis of their own deliberations.24  Perhaps we 
are all more familiar with the phrase ‘willpower’ and generally this term is used 
whenever a person exerts their will over their inclination and in so doing they are 
exercising their autonomous will or in religious terms we can say that personal willpower 
is the omnipotent force within each one of us.25  Having thought and decided what to do 
autonomy of action is primarily concerned with the extent to which persons are willing to 
act or back their own judgments.  So, in relation to autonomy of action it is necessary to 
distinguish between having the freedom to do as one pleases such as happens when the 
inclination is dominant and acting autonomously which may also be doing as one pleases 
but on the basis of thought and reasoning.26   
 
The Principle of Respect for Autonomy 
Kantian philosophy is based on the premise that what exists in the world divides into two 
realms, the noumenal and the phenomenal worlds.27  In the former what exists is 
intelligible to persons because things are represented as they are and therefore it can be 
governed by reason.28  The phenomenal world, by contrast, is concerned with the way 
things appear and it is governed by sense perception.29  Each of them, Kant judged, works 
according to universal laws but whereas a rational being can act autonomously according 
to their idea of laws a non-rational being is acted on, and their behaviour is heteronymous 
because it is determined by outside causes.30  Think of a skittish horse that is concerned 
about a discarded crisp packet in the hedge row.  Human beings are, by contrast, a 
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mixture of the rational and non-rational but it is their will that links these two aspects of 
them and which enables persons to use their reason to produce effects on the non-rational 
world including the non-rational aspects of themselves.31   
 
“Autonomy of the will is the property of the will by which it is a law to itself.  The 
principle of autonomy is, therefore: to choose only in such a way that the maxims of 
your choice are also included as universal laws in the same volition”.32  
 
Essentially Kant is saying that an autonomous will is the essential characteristic of 
persons who should therefore have freedom to self-determine their own life path.33  They 
will recognise that in the real world persons must co-exist alongside other autonomous 
agents who like them are similarly interested in their own survival and in having an 
opportunity to lead a flourishing life.  As a secure and stable community life is essential 
to individual exercises of autonomy reason will persuade them that their ability to survive 
and flourish will be seriously compromised in human communities that would adopt the 
rules of the jungle.34  To this end reason will direct them to develop informal rules of 
conduct or a moral system that should apply to all persons, in all places at all times.  So 
persons with an autonomous will choose to follow impartial moral principles of action, or 
in Kantian terms, Categorical Imperatives ‘act only on that maxim through which you can 
at the same time will that it should become a universal law’, that engenders equal respect 
for the life and welfare of all persons as a way to promote harmonious co-existence 
amongst a group of individuals who exhibit divergent moral beliefs, values and 
interests.35 
 
As reason is being used to identify the need for objective moral laws persons are able to 
recognise the perspective from which moral judgments are made to a point where moral 
requirements are no longer deemed to be externally imposed, for example, by divine 
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commands.36  Instead persons with an autonomous will are both author of and subject to 
moral laws.37  As such an autonomous person cannot act in any way contrary to their 
moral beliefs without inner conflict and self-disapproval.38  And as the will is rational,39 
i.e. that persons can determine moral requirements through reasoning from a basic moral 
perspective, an autonomous individual can be relied upon to self-legislate in accord with 
moral laws just as if they were a legislator in a kingdom of ends.40 
 
So in contrast to many other moral philosophers Immanuel Kant dared persons to think 
for themselves.  There was, according to him, no need of a God or any other external 
authority to inform us about the moral life since we have a mind and the ability to think, 
to reason and therefore to be rational, the distinguishing feature of persons, and as such it 
was within us all to think and act in accordance with Categorical Imperatives or universal 
laws of reason.  It was on this basis that Kant deemed that persons should be both subject 
to moral laws and authors of them and as such morality should be self-constructed 
without the aid of a God or any other external authority.41  Indeed it has been suggested 
that Kant recognised that it was possible for persons to escape moral obligation if they 
did not care or did not believe in God, i.e. because something subjective within a person 
would release them from their moral obligations thereby letting them off the hook.  Kant 
therefore constructed a moral system that no one can escape and so when we act we must 
act on reasons that everyone can accept, i.e. a universal reason that can be applied to all 
people at all times without contradiction.42    
 
Kant’s ethics must therefore be classed as a theory that places what is right prior to what 
is good.43  This is because it does not start with assumptions about what the end of human 
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life is, i.e. that happiness, preference satisfaction or any other substantive ends are 
intrinsically valuable, objective good or agent-neutral reasons to act as utilitarian theory 
does.44  Instead, principles of right and duty or Categorical Imperatives are determined by 
rational reflection from a point of view that counts each agent as equally authoritative 
regarding moral principles and equally free to set and pursue individual ends within the 
limits set by these moral principles of action.45   
 
In a sense Kantian moral theory encompasses many of the ideas and precepts found in 
traditional religious texts so it is a sort of divine theory without the aid of the divine.  The 
important point, however, is that it permits of no external authority that is independent of 
our own reason.46  The authority of moral principles is, as it were, the authority of our 
own reason, our best judgments, all things considered, as to what we ought to do.47  
Therefore, we respect the principle of autonomy when we respect persons, as moral 
agents with freedom to make decisions or to register choices that do not harm the 
interests of others or infringe upon their moral rights.48   
 
Kantian ethics are then aspirational in the sense that he determined that human life has 
moral worth on the basis of some functional feature of persons, i.e. the intellect, which is 
why humans have freedom to develop a life as seems good to them and then said with 
freedom comes responsibility, to others, which imposes some limitation on self-interest.  
Too much freedom, as with a hedonistic lifestyle, can at any rate be dangerous or at least 
counterproductive to human survival and well-being or the desire to lead a flourishing 
life in tending to ignite self-destructive tendencies in humans.49  But Kant did not stop at 
the idea that human life has moral worth he also considered the idea of dignity and to that 
end viewed persons as free rational agents capable of abstracting from personal 
differences and therefore jointly legislating in a kingdom of ends the moral principles that 
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constitute the basic moral framework within which they are free to set ends of their 
own.50  To acknowledge the dignity of persons is then, according to Kant, to treat them as 
‘sovereigns’ both in constituting general moral principles and in determining their own 
non-moral good.51  Consequently, what is a good life for individuals is not determined by 
intrinsic values, such as happiness or pleasure and the absence of pain, but by the free 
choice of the individuals themselves.52 
 
Mill on Autonomy 
It is also true that Kant put forward a demanding concept of duty which would in all 
likelihood place too great a burden on the intellect.  This is based on the argument that 
persons are expected to be able to determine their moral duty from the Categorical 
Imperative and its various formulations.  The pre-conditions of duty are widely held 
beliefs, most obviously the inviolability of persons, the sanctity of human life and justice 
or acting well toward others.53  However, it is a feature of contemporary life that society 
is not morally homogenous.  In a pluralistic society value diversity is the norm which 
presents obvious problems for those who would seek to do what is right.  Remember that 
when Mill wrote his utilitarian theory he thought that only persons with an educated mind 
would have the capacity to determine what action would produce the greatest good.54   
 
However, Mill, the great utilitarian thinker, also argued in favour of the moral obligation 
to respect people’s autonomy on the utilitarian grounds that such respect would maximise 
human welfare.55  On what basis could Mill have reconciled such apparently divergent 
ideas about moral philosophy?  Gillon who quotes the philosopher John Gray offers the 
following explanation: 
 
“In the first place, Mill’s “absolutism” is only apparent, for he builds in the 
qualification that respect for an individual’s autonomy governs absolutely provided 
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that this does not harm others or deprive others of beneficial acts “which he may 
rightfully be compelled to perform”.  In the second place, Mill may be interpreted 
as arguing that the principle of utility (maximising overall welfare) entails this 
respect for autonomy, for the welfare to be maximised is “in the largest sense 
grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive being”.  Given that 
human happiness (in the broad Aristotelian sense of eudaemonia or flourishing) is 
constituted to a large extent in the exercise of people’s autonomy and the people’s 
autonomous requirements are so very different, indeed unique, it follows that 
respect for their autonomy will be at any rate a major obligation if the utilitarian 
objective of maximising welfare is to be achieved”.56 
 
So it seems that both philosophers are agreed that we should respect autonomy in the 
interests of social harmony.  However, Kant intended persons to legislate according to 
values inherent in their own constitution.  This means that each person is entitled to a life 
in which the subjectively held values, beliefs and preferences, of a particular individual, 
which do not infringe the interests of others, should be respected in matters related to 
personal welfare and for sustaining respect for more objective or universal moral laws 
that are concerned with protecting human welfare more generally.57  Consequently, Kant 
claimed that respect for the autonomy of others was a necessary feature of rational 
agency itself and thus of any rational agent whereas Mill (subsequently) argued that 
respect for the autonomy of others was required to maximise overall human welfare 
provided such respect did not harm others.58   
 
The principle, both seem to be saying, enables us to order relationships between 
individuals and between those in a position of authority and the individuals they preside 
over.59  Nevertheless, in relation to decisions concerning medical treatment it is only at 
stage two where the patient chooses whether to consent to an offer of treatment or to 
refuse to consent that respect for the principle of autonomy is made relevant to the 
decision-making process.  At stage one a physician will determine what treatment should 
be offered to patients having had due consideration for the consequences of their choice 
on the general human welfare utilising the principles of utility and justice.  This is despite 
the fact that just as many contemporary philosophers have criticised Kant’s ideas about 
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duty60 others have sought to challenge Mill’s viewpoint that anyone can calculate with 
any degree of certainty what action will produce the greatest amount of good.61 
 
The Doctor-Patient Relationship: Incorporating Respect for the Ethical Principle of 
Autonomy 
 
Perhaps the first point to make is that respect for autonomy does not mean that doctors 
are released from their professional obligations of non-maleficence, which is a standard 
obligation all people share, and beneficence, which gives the doctor-patient relationship 
its special significance.62  Rather, doctors, like the rest of us, must also have regard for 
another standard moral obligation which is to respect the autonomy of others.63     
 
Similarly, respect for patient autonomy does not mean that a patient can insist upon a 
particular form of treatment.  The obligation of non-maleficence ensures that a terminally 
ill patient who suffers intolerable pain, for instance, cannot insist upon a doctor taking 
action that will release them from that burden but will also be the direct cause of their 
death, i.e. doctors are prohibited from killing their patients.  Furthermore, doctors must be 
just as well as beneficent and so they must have regard for the medical welfare of all 
patients when deciding what treatment ought to be offered to an individual patient.   
 
Essentially, the obligation to respect patient autonomy means that a doctor must be 
appropriately beneficent.  Medical beneficence should therefore only be exercised to the 
extent that the patient wants or allows.64  Primacy is, in other words, accorded to patient 
autonomy as opposed to  medical paternalism and this means that a patient’s wishes, 
rather than a doctor’s, should be treated as paramount in relation to a decision to accept 
or reject an offer of medical treatment.  As such doctors are morally required, in common 
with the rest of us, to respect the principle of bodily inviolability, which protects all 
persons against non-consensual physical interference, and have a general duty to obtain 
their patient’s consent to a medical treatment as this most obviously demonstrates their 
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willingness or agreement to proceed with what the doctor proposes to do.65  
Correspondingly, if the patient does not want to be helped or does not wish to consent to 
the form of treatment that is being offered to them then doctors must also respect their 
patient’s decision to refuse treatment and to be instead maintained inviolate.66    
 
The requirement that a doctor should obtain their patient’s consent to a medical treatment 
therefore fulfils several functions.  Most obviously the need for consent ensures that 
doctors respect their patients’ bodily integrity which re-enforces the notion that the 
human body and life has special or symbolic value which explains why it is inviolable.  
As it is open to persons to exercise their autonomy by consenting to medical intervention 
and to thereby relinquish their right to inviolability it is important that a person’s 
autonomy is respected.  In this regard Gillon claims that any consent to a medical 
intervention should bear the hallmarks of a voluntary, uncoerced decision, made by a 
sufficiently competent or autonomous person on the basis of adequate information and 
deliberation, to accept rather than reject some proposed course of action that will affect 
the patient.67   
 
Decision-Making Capacity 
As respect for the principle of autonomy is predicated on some functional feature of 
persons, i.e. the intellect, it is obvious that the right to self-determination, to make 
medical treatment decisions in accordance with one’s own values, beliefs and 
preferences, depends on whether a person has capacity to think and act autonomously.   
 
How much autonomy is sufficient for a person to be respected as an autonomous 
agent? 
Mill, for instance, appears to have argued that respect for autonomy was required in so 
far as the people thus respected possessed a fairly basic level of maturity, or as he put it, a 
capability of being improved by free discussion.68  Kant, contrastingly, placed emphasis 
on the fact that humans can reason and be rational and because rational agents necessarily 
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have wills they are necessarily ends in themselves unlike entities that do not have wills 
and are at most mere means to an end. 69  In other words persons who have an 
autonomous will think and act on their own behalf and therefore in accordance with their 
own constitution, or values, beliefs and preferences, rather than merely following what 
others think and do.   
 
Kantian philosophy therefore guides us to treat human life as both objectively and 
subjectively valuable.  It is objectively valuable because it is part of our nature to reason 
and be rational.  It is also subjectively valuable because rational agents have freedom to 
develop a life plan and as such Kant argues that the particular nature of the individual 
concerned, as reflected in their values, beliefs and preferences, ought to be morally 
relevant to decision-making processes that concern them, i.e. it is incompatible with 
respect for autonomy to treat persons as the means to any end other than what is inherent 
in their own constitution.70  Hence it is a categorical imperative that one must always act 
in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of 
any other, never simply as a means but always at the same time as an end.71     
 
So whilst there is a presumption that all persons will have the requisite level of decision-
making capacity, i.e. because the intellect is a functional feature of all persons self-
evidently not all persons will be considered autonomous in the sense that Mill or Kant 
prescribes.  Infants and children certainly and most teenagers are likely to be 
insufficiently mature to be considered fully competent to be in control of their life in all 
situations, particularly when a fundamental interest such as life and health are at stake.  
Although, it is probably worth making the point that it is a feature of contemporary 
society that adults are encouraged, if not required in some circumstances, to respect the 
growing maturity and autonomy of members of the younger generation.72  This trend is 
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generally positive in placing less emphasis on the notion that at some arbitrary point in 
time, customarily one’s eighteenth birthday, some form of miraculous intervention takes 
place and overnight the person that existed yesterday is today rendered sufficiently 
competent to be considered autonomous to direct their own life.  Similarly, how many 
older folk turn to someone much younger in their family for help and advice when using 
computers and other technological gadgetry?  My point, then, is that if a presumption in 
favour of decision-making capacity is no longer justified on the basis of maturity alone 
one assumes that greater emphasis should and is now being placed on the developing 
character and personality of the youngster which is consistent with what Kant appears to 
be suggesting.   
 
Therefore Kant may be taken to mean that emphasis should be placed on whether or not 
someone has capacity to be autonomous in that specific sense, i.e. to think and act in 
accordance with one’s own constitution, rather than the more formal sense of being 
deemed competent on the basis of one’s state of maturity which is what Mill appears to 
be hinting at.     
 
Assessing Competence to Decide Autonomously 
As previously mentioned there is a presumption that all adults will be competent to make 
decisions on their own behalf.  The danger is that we might just be tempted to say that the 
person is competent to decide when a person’s decision conforms to another’s idea of 
what it would be reasonable for them to decide in the circumstances and  to question that 
capacity whenever a decision stands out either because it does not conform to another’s 
reasonable expectations or because it is contrary to what most reasonable persons would 
decide in the circumstances, such as when a person refuses life-preserving medical 
treatment that would restore them to full health..   
 
Of course doctors are, to an extent, in an unenviable position for on the one hand they are 
concerned with the life, health and well-being of their patients, which are of fundamental 
interest of all persons, though however fundamental these considerations may be respect 
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for patient autonomy determines they must be balanced against the person’s right to self-
determination.  It is within that context that Gert et al have, for example, talked about the 
reasons why the principle of autonomy has ‘caught on so tenaciously’ stating that: 
 
“One is that Kantian ethics was experiencing a renaissance and that his notion of 
autonomy was central to his account of morality.  A second is that the society 
became increasingly aware that the medical profession was so markedly 
paternalistic that patient self-determination was almost nonexistent.  A third was 
that the increase in medical technology resulted in several rational alternative 
treatments.  A fourth was the aging of the population and the resulting increase in 
chronic diseases that could not be cured, only managed… A fifth, the increase in 
medical technology that could keep extremely sick people alive for a long time, 
together with an aging population that often had a rational desire not to be kept 
alive, even made it rational to refuse life prolonging treatment.  So the emphasis on 
autonomy became the banner under which patients rallied to gain more control 
over their own health care.  Allowing the patient to decide, what, if any, treatment 
he would receive became the main issue, and thus momentum and conviction, 
rather than conceptual clarity or theoretical soundness perpetuated the emphasis 
on autonomy”.73 
 
Clearly there is a need for conceptual clarity about what is most relevant to consider 
when determining that a person has or does not have decision-making capacity to make 
the decision they purport to make.  Otherwise there is a risk that a doctor might override 
one’s autonomous choice thereby depriving persons of their freedom to decide.  Equally, 
and in the absence of any real notion of what they are aiming at, how might a doctor be 
expected to promote one’s ability to decide autonomously in cases of fluctuating 
decision-making capacity, such as might be experienced by those in the early stages of 
dementia.   
 
What is it Relevant to Assess? 
According to Kant a person with an autonomous will should think and act in accordance 
with a particular set of rules, maxims or categorical imperatives.  The humanity formula 
guides us that human life is both objectively and subjectively valuable.  In relation to the 
latter notion it is clear that people have goals or ends and preferences which are most 
often expressed as values, beliefs and preferences, and these will inevitably vary from 
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person to person.74  An equally prominent notion in Kantian thought is that we must 
respect individual rights and views about how best to live where to do so poses no serious 
harm to the equal rights and interests of others.75   
 
Picking up on this and another Kantian theme, i.e. the notion that persons have certain 
duties to themselves, Kagan suggests that it might be relevant when assessing 
competence to include the notion that in order to be considered autonomous persons must 
always seek to maximise or prioritise self-interest?  This is what he has to say: 
 
“It might be, for example, that autonomy is only exercised if the person giving 
consent has at least minimal competence at evaluating the alternatives; or it might 
be that an autonomous choice must be at least minimally rational.  Evaluating 
these claims would require a more careful investigation of the nature of autonomy 
… But if anything like this is right, then not all consent will be morally relevant.  
And this issue may be important for settling the possibility of duties to oneself.  
Normally perhaps it is morally permissible for me to act toward myself in any way 
that I choose, including harming myself.  For in the normal case, this will simply be 
living my life the way I want to, and will pose no threat to my own autonomy.  But 
in certain cases, my consent may not suffice to make my act permissible.  This 
might be especially so for actions that would destroy my autonomy, leaving me 
unable to control my life in the future.  For example, it might be forbidden to sell 
myself into slavery or to take drugs that would leave me insane.  In short, if 
morality is to adequately reflect our autonomy this might actually require certain 
duties to oneself, and not merely duties to others”.76 
 
Kagan’s final point might be relevant to the type of situation where a terminally ill cancer 
patient might be expected to forgo pain relief that might induce a state of 
unconsciousness, for example.  Whether or not the desire to be free of pain in these 
circumstances maximises self-interest could be debated.  So too could it be argued that 
the desire is not autonomously willed because pain, particularly intense pain, overwhelms 
the volition and therefore one is rendered heteronymous, i.e. an agent who is the means to 
an end of an external authority over the will. 
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In relation to defects in reasoning John Harris draws attention to the way in which a 
particular bias might undermine autonomy.  He states that: 
 
“There are a number of ways in which an individual’s processes of reasoning may 
be defective in ways that vitiate, or partially vitiate, the choices which they purport 
to justify or explain.  First, some examples.  Someone who smokes cigarettes 
because, there is no harm in it, or who believes that it is safe to drive home after an 
evenings drinking because I can take my drink, is if they genuinely believe what 
they say and act on the basis of that belief, operating under a substantial defect in 
reasoning.  The same defects are characteristic of prejudices of all kinds.  Where 
people allow received opinion or gut reaction to form the basis of their values, or 
when they form opinions based on manifestly implausible facts their autonomy is 
undermined…  
Three main rules for avoiding the sorts of defects in reasoning that can undermine 
autonomy might be formulated as follows: 
 
1. That there should be no mere parroting or blind acceptance of the views of 
others or of one’s own society.  This involves some active attempt to establish 
one’s own views and to discover their truth or validity for oneself. 
2. That where my choices are based on my reasons for them, that these reasons 
should not be vitiated by something like blind prejudice.  And where the choices 
are based on some factual premise or claim, that there be a commensurate 
relationship between the strength of the evidence for those facts and the strength 
of the beliefs they support. 
3. Where my choice is based on an inference from facts or propositions, that the 
inference should be valid…   
 
We should be clear that defects in reasoning will only damage autonomy where the 
defects undermine or tend to undermine the agent’s capacity to make choices.  Bad 
reasoning will always have this tendency, of course, but we must remember that 
some stated reasons are merely rationalisations and are known by the agent 
himself to be non-operative.  Also, some genuine choices may be ‘mere caprice’ 
and none the less genuine for that”. 77 
 
How then does a doctor determine whether their patient, who now expresses a desire to 
refuse treatment, is operating under some defect in their reasoning about treatment and its 
likely effects without unduly compromising their freedom to choose and decide in 
accordance with their own constitution other than on the basis that their decision is not 
the decision that a reasonable person would make?  Take for instance a person who is 
afraid of snakes, is it their rational will that is being exercised when they decide not to go 
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into the snake house at the zoo or when they do go in to have a peek or can whatever 
decision they make be attributed to a particular prejudice or bias that is operating on them 
at the time?  About this Koehler and Harvey state that: 
 
“Biases are often used to describe deviations from a norm but, in another more 
neutral sense, they can simply indicate a tendency to slant in one way rather than 
another.  For instance, the term ‘positivity bias’ has been used to describe a 
preponderance of positive over negative evaluations in person perception and, 
more generally, in everyday language.  This does not in itself indicate any errors of 
judgment, unless we believe that, in reality, positive and negative events should 
balance each other out.  On the other hand the concept of a ‘desirability bias’ 
implies a tendency to assign exaggerated probability estimates to desired outcomes, 
not because of the amount of supporting evidence, but simply because we want 
them to come true.  Such biases can be regarded as systematic, suboptimal 
judgments, sometimes labelled ‘errors’ or even ‘fallacies’… 
 
In studies of logical tasks, [it has been suggested] that many errors of deductive 
reasoning can be explained on the basis of a more general ‘matching bias’, namely 
the tendency to endorse conclusions that are linguistically compatible with the 
premises.  Similarly, ‘confirmation bias’ in hypothesis testing can be conceived as 
a general strategy for testing hypotheses through verification rather than 
falsification procedures either by searching for positive instances rather than 
negative ones, or by finding observed confirmations more compelling than 
disconfirmations.  It has alternatively been described as a general outcome of these 
and similar mechanisms (e.g. matching), reflecting the fact that hypotheses, for 
whatever reason, appear to be more easily retained than rejected. 
 
The concept of a bias in the latter sense, namely as a systematic deviation from a 
norm (or as an inclination towards one judgment rather than another), does not in 
itself imply one specific kind of explanation.  Biases can be the result of cognitive 
limitations, processing strategies, perceptual organising principles, an egocentric 
perspective, specific motivations (e.g. ‘self-serving biases’ in social psychology), 
affects, and cognitive styles… The general approach has been to regard biases as a 
more or less regular by product of some more general principles of judgment”…78 
 
Ronald Dworkin seems to suggest that decision-making capacity should be assessed in 
accordance with the degree to which a person’s wishes or preferences are coterminous 
with or are expressive of the particular personality or constitution of an individual 
decision-maker for he states that: 
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“Competence is sometimes used in a task specific sense, to refer to the ability to 
grasp and manipulate information bearing on a given problem.  Competence in 
that sense varies sometimes greatly even among ordinary competent people; I may 
be more competent than you at making some decisions and less competent at 
others.  The medical literature points out, properly, that competence in this task 
specific sense is relative to the character and complexity of the decision in 
question.  A patient who is not competent to administer his complex business affairs 
may nevertheless be able to grasp and appreciate information bearing on whether 
he should remain at home or enter an institution, for example… Competence in the 
sense in which it is presupposed by the right to autonomy means the general ability 
to act out of genuine preference or character of conviction or a sense of self”.79 
 
So the first point to make is that it is the ability to think for oneself about the information 
or facts that are relevant to a medical treatment and how these should be considered when 
weighed against one’s personal values that matters.  Accordingly, a functional rather than 
an outcome based test for capacity should be most relevant to an assessment of whether 
or not someone has capacity to think and act autonomously.  This is because decision-
making is not an entirely neutral process as a person’s worldview or attitude and 
approach is engaged and will be reflected in the way that ones values, beliefs and 
preferences are applied in practice.  So there is scope for persons, similarly situated, to 
differ in deciding what should happen.  Perhaps an example will help to make the point.  
Imagine that a group of co-workers in an office are organising a trip out to a local 
restaurant.  Consider the conversation that ensues whilst they are all thinking about what 
to order from the menu: 
 
 
Skeptic – I doubt whether I will enjoy any of the dishes listed on this menu 
Objectivist – I’ll have what everyone else is having 
Relativist – Can we split the bill according to what each person has ordered? 
Absolutist – This is the only restaurant in this city serving decent food at affordable 
prices and therefore it is the only restaurant that I will ever eat out at 
Subjectivist – The set menu is good, I agree, but please can I see the al la carte 
menu before I make my decision 
 
Each is essentially pre-occupied with their own way of looking at things and this is what 
is being reflected in their attitudes and priorities when deciding what to eat.  There is no 
indication that one is less rational than another if they are being true to themselves.   
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Is the subjectivist too fussy?  The subjectivist is not intending to be a difficult or 
awkward customer it is just that they want to decide in the light of all reasonably 
available information.  They cannot be sure about what motivates others as it is possible 
to interpret human conduct in many different ways.  Therefore, the subjectivist protects 
against falling victim to the values of others by taking responsibility for making their own 
decisions in accordance with their own values.   This is what Kant is getting at, as that 
way there can be no recriminations later on. 
 
Now let us assume that the co-workers are reunited back at the office where the topic of 
conversation concerns the award of an annual bonus for sales performance: 
 
Skeptic – I’ve done alright – it’s a jungle out there and only the fittest survive – he 
who dares wins, that’s my motto 
Objectivist – Go out and grab it, I say, or someone else will 
Relativist – People sell to me, I sell to them.  It’s what makes the world go round, 
everyone does it and it’s all the same.  An eye for an eye and tooth for a tooth that 
is what tests or pushes the boundaries of what is acceptable sales practice 
Absolutist – I’m going to suggest a flat rate bonus scheme for all 
Subjectivist – I’m thinking of leaving because after I have explained the 
product/service, in detail, relatively few people tend to want it or can afford it 
 
In this example we see that the subjectivist ensures that the interests of others are not 
compromised which is consistent and coherent with the notion of assuming personal 
responsibility for oneself since one is neither seeking to compromise or interfere with the 
interests of others.  Instead of which they are supported, with appropriate information, to 
reach a decision in the light of relevant facts.  In other words respect for the autonomy of 
others is inconsistent with the idea of imposing, by one means or another, one’s personal 
values and beliefs onto any other.  Consider religion and how we respond to Jehovah’s 
Witnesses who knock on the door and seek to persuade us around to their world view.  
The views of the evolutionist Richard Dawkin might also be regarded by creationists as 
being equally offensive because in pointing to the evidence that God did not create the 
earth and all of its creatures he asserts that it is preposterous that anyone should continue 
to believe in God and live a life that is informed by religious values and beliefs. 
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Must Decisions be Rational? 
When we respect the autonomy of others we recognise that human life is subjectively, as 
well as objectively, valuable.80  So whilst it is consistent with our notion of personhood to 
presume that all persons can reason and be rational the principle of autonomy also calls 
upon us to acknowledge each person as a unique individual with a life that has personal 
value.81   It is consistent with that notion that a test for decision-making capacity should 
focus on whether or not a person suffers from some form of cognitive impairment or 
disturbance that prevents them from being able to reason and be rational in relation to a 
matter that calls for a decision to be made.82   This two-stage test is important because it 
establishes that a presumption operates in favour of decision-making capacity that should 
not be undermined simply because someone makes an unwise decision.83   
 
Therefore, persons must be able to comprehend or understand, retain and use information 
that is relevant to their decision.  However, the outcome of a decision-making process or 
the choice or decision that is made should not have to conform to what a third party 
might expect you to decide in the light of the available information.  Otherwise, the 
danger is that decision-making capacity would be objectively rather than subjectively 
appraised, which could have the effect of ushering us all into a state of conformity, and 
would bring forward the possibility that medical paternalism would again override patient 
autonomy.  Although it has been said that the manner in which such a decision is made as 
well as possibly the timing of it might be significant to a finding of a lack of decision-
making capacity.84  
 
Consequently, although Kantian ethics are supported by a particular conception of 
persons it would appear that a decision does not have to be rational to be respected which 
opens up the possibility that human emotion and intuition need not automatically be 
excluded from the decision-making process.  The point it seems is that the ability to 
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reason and to be rational should not be unduly compromised or overwhelmed by the 
human senses.  To that extent we are allowed to love someone enough to donate one of 
our kidneys, or bone marrow, to them, even when to do so poses some future risk to our 
own health and longevity.85  For example, a donor who subsequently suffered from 
cancer might not necessarily be able to tolerate chemotherapy so well with only one 
kidney.   
 
A decision that is informed by human intuition poses a more significant challenge to 
rational decision-making particularly when the manner and timing of its calling foretells 
something that cannot be known empirically or by reason alone.  Yet such feelings or 
instincts are not easily disregarded by those that have them when they have been 
validated over time to be accurate.  So whereas personal willpower can be equated to 
religious ideas about God’s omnipotence, the intuition can possibly be equated with 
religious ideas about omniscience, i.e. that little bit of God within us all that heralds a 
form of foreknowledge or that allows us to perceive the imperceptible.  Information 
gleaned from the subconscious, during sleep, may be no less relevant to some individual 
decision-makers either, which could account for why people sometimes choose to ‘sleep 
on things’. 
 
Clearly, Kant intended that reason should remove sentiment in moral matters, such as 
whether it is just or in the public interest to provide a particular medical treatment, but it 
is less clear that sentiment should not have a role to play in matters related to the 
subjective value a life has for the person whose life it is, although there remains the 
danger that in some instances our sentiments will be acted upon or that we may be 
manipulated into a particular decision or course of action or perhaps we might just 
misinterpret what our instincts are telling us.86   
 
Information 
If respect for autonomy is to supersede medical paternalism doctors must provide their 
patients with sufficient information to help them to make an informed choice about 
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whether or not to accept an offer of medical treatment.  Commenting on the role of 
information in relation to autonomous decision-making John Harris has stated that: 
 
“Where beliefs or choices are based on false or incomplete information, or depend 
on such information at any crucial point, they will to that extent be less 
autonomous.  So that where the agent is misinformed, or only told part of the truth, 
or where he is kept in total ignorance, his capacity to make the best choices he can 
will be undermined.  This can happen of course by others deliberately deceiving 
him, for whatever motives, or knowingly giving only partial information, or it can 
happen by negligence or sheer mischance.  It may of course also be the agent’s 
own information gathering (or lack of it) that is at fault.  And finally we should not 
rule out the possibility of the agent failing to understand, or understand the 
significance of, the information he obtains.  Here too there is room for negligence, 
or deliberate obfuscation on the part of those supplying the information, and also 
for an unhappy and unwitting gulf between the medium of the message and the 
agent’s ability to comprehend it”.87 
 
Therefore, it is clear that the need for information is part of what it means to respect 
patient autonomy or more specifically the patient’s right to self-determination, i.e. to 
make decisions, including medical ones, that accord with their wider interest in living a 
life that seems good to them.  To this end it is important that information about medical 
treatment, in particular any risks of it, is tailored to meet the subjective needs of a 
particular patient rather than objectively assessed by a doctor to be material to what a 
reasonable person would want to know in the situation of the patient.  Clearly, patients 
should not be given so much information that it cannot reasonably be processed by them 
in the time available.  Similarly, autonomy would be undermined if information were 
given in a form that could not be readily understood by the patient.  This might happen if 
the doctor used overly technical terms since there would be an attempt to baffle the 
patient with science.   
 
What other information might be relevant to a medical treatment decision?  In particular 
should the patient be given any information about their doctor?  I ask this question 
because it occurs to me that whilst a doctor will not labour over the benefit and burdens 
of a prescribed medication there is a reason for this in that the manufacturer provides 
information about the risks and side effects of it.  Plus the doctor has access to one’s 
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medical notes which presumably act as a catalyst for why a certain medication ought not 
to be prescribed.   
 
Where, however, the doctor is a surgeon who intends to act upon a patient by performing 
an invasive surgical procedure is it reasonable, in these circumstances, for the physician 
to be required to provide patients with information about those risks and side effects that 
may be incurred as a consequence of them performing the said procedure.  Certainly 
Gillon appears to think along these lines as he has commented that amongst doctors’ 
specific prima facie obligations it is reasonable to include: 
 
“The provision of information about doctor’s interests, qualifications, attitudes and 
moral stances to patients and potential patients as well as making it as easy as 
possible for patients to have a real choice of doctor”.88   
 
With regard to his latter point it seems reasonable to argue that in order for a patient to 
exercise their right of choice meaningfully, they require information about the doctors 
experience and success rate, as well as perhaps about how success is being measured, in 
performing the procedure the patient is consulting them about, at the very least.  I do 
however confess to feeling apprehensive about this idea not because there is anything 
wrong with it per se it is just that in practice it may well not be in the best interests of 
patients or the medical professions.  The danger is that it will induce unhealthy 
competition between practitioners which will in turn lead to a less sincere relationship 
between doctor and patient.  Moreover, the practice would seem to come perilously close 
to being undignified and it is no one’s interests to encounter that sort of thing.   
 
On the other hand, in order to make an informed decision people need to gather or be 
given information that is relevant to the choice that is facing them.  The question then, if 
autonomy not medical beneficence is to be overriding, is whether the patient must always 
make an informed decision?  We probably all know of someone who prefers not to hear 
unpleasant information particularly if it interferes unduly with their life plan or that 
affronts their identity or concept of themselves or possibly someone they care for.  They 
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would choose instead, to sweep such information under the carpet rather than dealing 
with it head on.  In medicine it is possible to imagine that this might happen quite often in 
circumstances where people already burdened by illness, dependence and vulnerability 
might feel unable to cope with further disappointments.  An otherwise healthy woman, 
disappointed at the results of IVF treatment, for example, might find it helpful to cling to 
the belief that she will become pregnant one day.   So do clinicians have a special 
dispensation from telling the truth to their patients, and if so why and in what 
circumstances?89  In this regard Roger Higgs argues that the importance that Kant 
attaches to reason has implications for medical practice in relation to the moral 
requirement for honest communication or truth telling and giving reasons.  He states that: 
 
“There can be no doubt that deceiving people will in some sense always diminish 
them.  To treat people as an end in themselves, rather than as means to someone 
else’s end, must mean that their own views of those ends – in the sense of aim and 
purpose – must be paramount when it comes to decisions about things that are 
theirs and that matter to them.  If they are able to make choices for themselves in 
matters of their own welfare, if they are in other words autonomous people, they 
must be allowed to do so.  Specifically, if there is a difficult decision to be made 
about treatment, the final arbiter must be that person to be treated, the patient.  No 
one could make such a decision without being appropriately informed about the 
options, and their consequences, and the reasons for and against each, so the 
professional must give that person as accurate a picture as can be given, on which 
she can make her decision.  Anything less means that the professional is set up as 
more powerful than the patient, and indeed more of a person than the patient: if the 
patient’s choice is abrogated, she is reduced to a means to the physician’s (perhaps 
perfectly laudable) ends.  The choices might even include whether or not to 
continue as a patient at all.  It is hard to see how an autonomous person’s choice 
could possibly be respected in health care unless they were told the truth about 
their condition”.90 
 
Kagan has also considered this matter but stresses what autonomy protects and therefore 
what is lost if a patient chooses not to take control of their own life.  He states that: 
 
“One basic idea of autonomy is to have the various aspects of one’s life under 
one’s control … I can deliberate concerning how I want particular aspects of my 
life to go, choose amongst various alternatives and act so as to make my life the 
                                                 
89
 Higgs, Roger, in The Blackwell Guide to Medical Ethics, Edited by Rhodes, Rosamond, Francis, Leslie 
P., Silvers Anita, 2007, Blackwell Publishing, Chapter 5, p.88 
90
 Higgs, Roger, in The Blackwell Guide to Medical Ethics, Edited by Rhodes, Rosamond, Francis, Leslie 
P., Silvers Anita, 2007, Blackwell Publishing, Chapter 5, p.92 
 89
way I want it to be in that regard.  But lies misinform me about how my life is going 
and what my options are; they distort my sense of what I can achieve and what 
needs attending to.  The suggestion then is that being lied to interferes with my 
autonomy, by reducing my control over my own life.  Accordingly lying to someone 
is wrong because it violates their autonomy”.91    
 
It is fair to say that medical professionals have entered into an emotionally demanding 
profession.  Consequently there is scope for arguing that there will be occasions where 
physicians might wish to spare their patients bad news for this very reason.  None of us 
enjoy disappointing others the more so when it involves some fundamental interest of 
persons.   This might lead to doctors justifying their approach to information sharing on 
the basis of what is proposed by their professional ethical code.  Accordingly information 
that a doctor deemed was likely to do more harm than good would not be passed on to 
their patient based on some sort of professional privilege and as such medical paternalism 
not patient autonomy would be overriding.  However, we also know that hard messages 
can be conveyed in an atmosphere of respect and compassion.  Moreover, the evidence 
suggests that when people are denied access to significant information about themselves 
or their loved ones and only later find out about it they tend to feel somewhat aggrieved 
and disrespected.92   
 
Of course there will be those who think that a doctor is in the best position to judge what 
should be done.  They presumably do equate what is in their medical interests with what 
is in their overall best interests and perhaps in these circumstances there is no affront to 
autonomy if they have reason to want to defer to an expert, or at least someone of greater 
experience, in medical matters.  Others though might simply be deferential out of respect 
for their physician and a traditional understanding of their role as a professional whose 
mission in life is to care for the sick and disabled, a role that is today perhaps more 
appropriately assigned to practitioners in the hospice movement.  Consequently, to think 
and act on the basis of such a belief is not consistent with exercising their autonomy but 
with something else that is subjective within them, particularly if, for instance, the 
opinion of a nurse would not be regarded with an equal degree of reverential respect.   
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Treatment Refusals and the Duty to Respect Autonomy 
Whilst good health will most probably be valued by all on the basis that poor health tends 
to compromise the freedom we all enjoy there will be times where different people in the 
same situation might reasonably make different choices.  Crucially, not all persons will 
prioritise health over other interests in all circumstances.  As Gillon has written there are 
many competing interests in a person’s life, including ones own and those of loved ones, 
the interests of those to whom we have special obligations and as persons are not entirely 
self-interested it is possible that anyone may choose to consider the wider interests of 
others in their community.93   
 
Even amongst those who would prioritise health over other interests and values persons 
might differ in their views about the benefits and burdens of a proposed medical 
treatment just as they might differ in estimating the likelihood of those various benefits  
and burdens materialising for subjective reasons.  Must a doctor always respect a 
competent refusal of beneficial medical treatment, including that which is life-
preserving?  On this matter Robert Veatch has written that: 
 
“Some patients may decline certain benefits that have been offered them.  Consider 
a terminally ill cancer patient who is told that a long and expensive course of 
chemotherapy has a modest chance of success.  This treatment would involve 
considerable burdens on family members.  Some people may conclude that it is 
indeed in their interests to receive the therapy, but nevertheless they do not choose 
to accept the offer because it conflicts with the interests of certain other family 
members (by consuming resources or imposing care-giving burdens)…    Treating 
in the face of a refusal of treatment is not only a violation of patient autonomy; it is 
also a violation of the reasonable ethic of permitting people to make self-sacrifice 
in order to express their loyalty to the familial community of which they are 
members. 
 
…  But what of cases in which the patient, perhaps through confusion or error, 
chooses to decline a beneficial treatment for other reasons beyond these?  Many 
who defend patient autonomy to refuse consent to treatment do so because they 
believe that the patient may know his own interests better than the physician.  We 
have seen … how hard it is for the physician to claim that he or she knows the 
patients interests better than the patient does. 
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But that is not always the case…  The duty to respect autonomy has its real bite 
when there is good reason to believe that the patient really can be helped by 
violating his or her autonomy.  Those committed to autonomy including anyone 
standing in the tradition of liberal philosophy will insist that the physician has a 
duty not to benefit the patient in these cases”.94 
 
Veatch appears to be saying that good communication is the key to an effective doctor-
patient relationship which Gillon emphasises in his more integrated account of the 
doctor’s duty to respect autonomy, and in particular an autonomous refusal of beneficial 
treatment, that is preferred simply because in respecting patient autonomy the moral 
integrity of the medical profession is also preserved, i.e. a doctor is not made a means to 
the ends of the patient but is respected as a medical expert and as someone who continues 
to honour their professional obligations of non-maleficence and beneficence.  Anyway he 
put things in these terms: 
 
“In most cases … of a doctor’s dealings with patients not only is there an 
independent moral presumption that he must respect their autonomy but, even if he 
is interested only in doing them good, he must generally respect their autonomy in 
order to do so. 
 
If one wants to do good for a patient one generally needs to find out what he or she 
actually wants one to do.  Often this does not need much inquiry.  Doctors, 
however, are often too ready to assume that they can tell what the patient wants, or 
even what is best for the patient, without asking.  In even the simplest of 
interactions patients in similar circumstances want different things from their 
doctors  The doctor who ‘knows’ what the patient wants without asking him is quite 
likely to get it wrong. 
 
Sometimes it is true that the patient’s wants and needs may be in conflict…  
Conversely, he may want not to have what will benefit him…In each case the duty 
of beneficence requires at least discovery of what the patient does want and an 
explanation of why a different course of action would probably (for almost all such 
assessments are probabilistic) benefit him more.   Such respect, even if an 
independent priority to respect for autonomy is rejected, is required by beneficence 
simply because the patient is more likely to do what the doctor considers to be 
medically optimal if the doctor explains why the patient’s own preference is less 
likely to be beneficial.  Conversely, the doctor is more likely to make a truly 
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beneficial proposal if he knows and takes into account the patient’s own 
preferences”.95 
 
Good, honest and open communication should ensure that treatment will be competently 
refused rather than resulting from the patient being misinformed or due to some 
misunderstanding or error.  In other words respect for autonomy should not be used as an 
excuse to release doctors from their professional obligation to act in the best interests of 
patients when health is a fundamental concern of humans and when doctors are in a 
privileged position to assist patients to understand both the potential and limitations of a 
specialist subject, i.e. medical science. 
 
Gillon summarises all that has been said in this section very well.   He has commented 
that: 
 
“In summary the principle of respect for autonomy asks the doctor to have at the 
back of his mind the question, would the patient, if he could consider it, wish me to 
do what I am doing or intend to do?  If not, how can I justify it?  Usually the best 
way to answer the first question is to ask the person concerned”.96 
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Voluntariness 
Here we must have regard for Kant’s instruction ‘so act that you use humanity, whether 
in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, 
never merely as a means’, once more.97  We are by now familiar with the notion that we 
respect persons by treating them as ends in themselves rather than as simply the means to 
the end of any other.  In relation to decision-making in general and to voluntariness more 
specifically we are concerned with whether the patient’s will, which is essentially 
autonomous, remains under their control and in this context Kant’s imperative amounts to 
a fairly strong moral injunction against coercion and deception involving as they do an 
attempt to take other people’s decisions out of their own hands, by manipulating their 
wills perhaps for personal gain or ends.98 
 
So, there will be cases in which it is appropriate for a doctor to consider whether the 
decision to consent, or to refuse to consent, to a medical treatment is really the decision 
of the patient.  Crucially, the doctor must determine whether their will is operating freely 
and independently, i.e. without being under the control of another’s influence, or whether 
it has been overborne or operated on in a way that violates or that eclipses autonomy in 
some significant way.99 
 
Thus voluntariness in acting, as with information and capacity, can be considered from 
many angles.100   The widest of which might incorporate the importance of being an 
effective legislator in a kingdom of ends, or in common parlance in exercising one’s will 
in a democracy to influence ideas about what is just, good, bad, right and wrong about the 
current state of health care.  For instance, Beauchamp and Childress have written that 
‘control of another person is necessarily an influence, but not all influences are 
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controlling’.101   However, we must remember that in determining what treatment should 
be offered to patients doctors are required, amongst other things, to be just as well as 
beneficent and to ensure that the help that is given is not bought at too high a price.102  
Therefore, Kant, if not Mill, might see the potential for the personal convictions of 
medical professionals to remain hidden from view at the first stage of a treatment 
decision-making process but which might ultimately have a controlling influence over the 
decisions of patients.  A state of affairs that is incompatible with the principle of respect 
for persons.  Consequently, it is essential that all material and relevant facts about 
treatment, various treatment options as well as how these are relevant to the patient and 
their health should be disclosed and not edited or obscured from view by doctors if we 
are to exercise our autonomy freely and independently because in healthcare exercising 
one’s autonomy amounts to so much more than freely and independently deciding 
whether to accept or reject an offer of medical treatment. 
 
Defects in control might also be attributable to conditions, rather than another’s 
influence, such as debilitating disease, psychiatric disorders, and drug addiction because 
these tend to undermine or diminish autonomy.103   John Harris, for example, 
differentiates between genuine preferences which are expressive of the ability to control 
one’s will and addictions or obsessions which he claims only ‘sometimes’ reflect the 
exercise of an impaired will.104 
 
As humans, in common with most animals, are pleasure seeking creatures it is quite 
natural to be drawn to activities that are the source of it.  However, in relation to a real 
addiction or obsession, as with all things in life a balance has to be struck between the 
benefits and risks of a particular activity.  Therefore, it is at least questionable whether 
someone is in control of their life and themselves if they continued with activities, simply 
because they are addicted or obsessed, that tended to undermine respect for them  as a 
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person of moral worth and dignity and with it their authority as an autonomous agent.   In 
other words addictions and obsessions of any kind are counterproductive to being in 
control.  Consequently, it is possible that in relation to conditions that undermine or 
diminish autonomy that paternalistic intervention could on occasion be legitimated by the 
need to promote or restore autonomy.105  This might be a particularly relevant 
consideration when the background condition is illness because suffering, which is again 
a personal matter, can certainly signify an impending destruction of the person as Cassell 
points out.106   
 
What is entailed in overbearing the will of the patient? 
More general forms of influence include coercion, persuasion and manipulation.107  
Coercion, according to Beauchamp and Childress, occurs when a person intentionally 
uses a credible and severe threat of harm or force to control others that displaces a 
person’s self-directedness.108  Gert et al, define coercion more objectively.  They state 
that coercion involves a threat of sufficient evil or harm that it would be unreasonable to 
expect any rational man in that situation not to act on it.109   
 
As terms such as ‘credible’ and ‘sufficient’ have not been defined these will have to be 
interpreted in a particular context.  However, it does appear that Gert et al wished to draw 
a clear distinction between coercion and lesser forms of pressure, such as persuasion, and 
in so doing sought to eliminate the possibility of persons who are inclined to surrender 
their will too easily, i.e. anything for a quiet life, from claiming that they were coerced 
into making their decision to consent or to refuse a medical treatment.   Whilst this may 
be a concern Beauchamp and Childress do, in referring to a person’s self-directedness, 
appear to draw a link between the particular personality or character of the coerced agent 
and the threat that influenced them.  For instance, we have already noted that the ability 
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to reason and to exercise one’s will can be compromised when debilitating conditions of 
illness and disease take hold.   Consequently, if the will is lacking it must be that much 
more difficult to withstand pressures created by others that are in a position to dominate 
and do indeed force home their advantage at a particular moment in time when a person 
might reasonably be feeling a greater sense of vulnerability.  The problem I fear is that in 
practice it might be quite difficult to recognise a coerced consent or refusal of a patient in 
the absence of any knowledge about them and their values because of the many factors 
that are likely to be operating at any one time, i.e. how does anyone determine what was 
causally responsible for the decision in the absence of such information other than to 
simply challenge the decision of the patient on the ground that it does not correspond to 
that of a reasonable patient perhaps.    
 
Persuasion can be contrasted with coercion because a person who is persuaded believes 
in something through the merit of the reasons advanced by another.110  So whilst coercion 
violates autonomy, reasonable persuasion does not.  However, it is interesting to note that 
Beauchamp and Childress distinguish appeals to reason from appeals to emotions whilst 
recognising that in healthcare it might be difficult to separate emotional responses from 
cognitive ones.111   
 
Thinking back to our discussion earlier on you may remember that Kant intended that 
reason should remove sentiment in moral matters but that it was less clear that sentiment 
should not have a role to play in matters related to the subjective value a life has for the 
person whose life it is.  The difficulty this poses is that persons are exposed to the danger 
that their sentiments may be acted upon or that we may be manipulated into a particular 
decision or course of action.112  Your reason or capacity to make a decision for yourself, 
would if this should occur, be treated as if it were merely an instrument for another’s use 
which violates the respect persons are owed. 113  Therefore, it might be relevant to 
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consider whether what someone says or perhaps does is determined by what they think 
will work to get the result they want. 114 
 
Yet again it would seem that personal knowledge of the patient and their values might 
provide relevant insight into whether it is their reason or their emotions that have been 
operated on.  Think of a person who values peace and harmony and whose will is in a 
weakened state having been fatigued by illness and suffering.  Consider also the 
possibility that an underlying conflict of interests or wills exists between them and their 
significant other.  No words may actually be exchanged instead a current inability to 
tolerate the discomforts associated with discordant rhythms115 might actually be all it 
takes to persuade them as to the merits of another’s point of view.   
 
Finally, let us consider manipulation.  According to Beauchamp and Childress 
manipulation is a generic term that can be applied to forms of influence that are not 
persuasive or coercive.116  So the essence of manipulation, they say, is swaying people to 
do what the manipulator wants by manipulating information, for instance, to alter a 
person’s understanding of a situation, thing or person even and to thereby motivate them 
to do what the agent of influence intends.117    
 
Of course doctors are in a particularly powerful position to influence the views of their 
patients because they possess special knowledge, skills and training in medical science 
and its wider application in medical practice.   This is in essence what justified and 
indeed promulgated paternalism as the dominant culture within medicine, i.e. the doctor 
knows best what is good for you.  However, as respect for patient autonomy replaced 
paternalism in medicine the obligation to embark on a process of demystification of a 
specialist subject became apparent as this would enable patients to decide in the light of 
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all relevant and material information what form of treatment would be in their actual best 
interests.    
 
Nevertheless, doctors are still in a position to influence the views of their patients and this 
is why the use of therapeutic privilege, for example, is so controversial because just as a 
doctor might, exceptionally, have very good reasons for withholding information from 
their patients they might also use the privilege to manipulate patients into consenting to, 
what is in their view, a medically desirable procedure.118  The problem is that information 
can be manipulated in various other ways that are virtually impossible to eliminate unless 
medical professionals are committed to honouring their moral obligations as Beauchamp 
and Childress have pointed out:   
 
“The manner in which a health care professional presents information – by tone of 
voice, by forceful gesture, and by framing information positively (we succeed most 
of the time with this therapy) rather than negatively (we fail with this therapy in 
35% of the cases) – can also manipulate a patient’s perception and response, and 
thereby affect understanding and voluntariness. 
 
Nevertheless, one can easily inflate the threat of control by manipulation beyond its 
actual significance in health care.  We typically make decisions in a context of 
competing influences, such as personal desires, familial constraints, legal 
obligations, and institutional pressures.  These influences need not be controlling 
to a substantial degree.  From the perspective of decision-making by patients and 
subjects, we need only establish general criteria for the point at which autonomous 
choice is imperilled, while recognising that in many cases no sharp boundary 
separates controlling and non-controlling influences”.119   
 
Perhaps Beauchamp and Childress are right about the threat of control by manipulation of 
information in medicine.  Although in this context it is difficult to discount the viewpoint 
of Joseph Raz who has argued that human values can have some sort of historical and 
social justification as well as or in place of philosophical justification.120  And on the 
basis that values depend on culture once a cultural value has come into existence it can be 
sustained, revived, and applied independently of particular social practices; but the right 
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kinds of social practices are necessary for making evaluation of specific cultural values in 
the first place.121  In response Korsgaard has pointed out that when values are derived 
from the social practices of some historical community that we are unable to establish 
what they value simply by appealing to the social fact that they are valued by members of 
the community.122  Consequently, the concern is that unless we are able to trace values to 
their actual source there is no certain way of knowing whether we are entitled to rely on 
them in philosophical reflection and practical deliberation.123  So in relation to 
paternalistic manipulation of treatment information, at both stage one and two of a 
treatment decision-making process, Korsgaard appears to be saying that there is no 
certain way of knowing which of the many factors the doctor considered was overriding 
and therefore we cannot know whether this was on reflection a good or bad instance of 
paternalistic practice.     
 
Perhaps the final word should go to Gillon who states that: 
 
“It is uncontroversial to assert that the principle of respect for autonomy has had 
little mileage for most of medicine’s long history except, perhaps, when patients 
have been doctors’ social equals or superiors (Plato alluded to this distinction 
when he differentiated between the doctor-slave patient relationship, in which the 
patient did what the doctor told him to do without discussion and that was the end 
of the matter, and the doctor-rich citizen relationship, in which explanation and 
discussion were the norm).  The medical sociologist Dr Ann Cartwright is not alone 
when she says she likes her doctor to treat her ‘as an equal’, but this is by no 
means a medical norm. 
 
The implications for the doctor-patient relationship of taking the principle of 
respect for autonomy seriously are legion.  Among the more important are the 
following prima facie duties: to give the patient at least what he or she considers to 
be adequate information, and often more if the doctor knows that more information 
will probably be appreciated and relevant to good decision-making; not to lie to or 
otherwise deceive the patient (unless he or she deliberately chooses such 
deception); and to allow the patient to have at least strategic control over which 
course of action to pursue – that is, the doctor may advise, but the patient is then 
given the opportunity to decide whether to accept that advice.  If this principle is 
taken seriously, a patient’s rejection of medical advice should not lead to a 
shrugging of the shoulders, a cooling of attitude, and ‘if you can’t trust my advice, 
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perhaps you’d better find another doctor’.  What should follow instead is a genuine 
attempt to understand the patient’s reasons (or other motives) for rejecting the 
advice and search for the next best option. 
 
One of the keys to respect for autonomy is good communication, and thus respect 
for patients’ autonomy requires doctors to acquire and maintain skill in 
communicating with them – not just in telling but also in understanding”.124 
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Chapter Three 
 
 
The Law and the Capable Patient 
 
In previous chapters we focused on medical ethical principles and sought to determine 
from what source these were derived so that we could better understand their purpose and 
aim in decision-making processes concerning the health and welfare of persons.  The law, 
like ethics, is equally concerned with human welfare and morality or what is right and 
wrong human conduct and in this chapter we will examine those principles, rules, and 
conventions that inform medical law and practice in respect of the capable patient. 
 
 
The General Legal Framework for the Provision of a Medical Treatment 
 
It is a fundamental principle of law that every person’s body is inviolate.  Consequently 
any touching of another person, however slight, can amount to a battery in the absence of 
a valid consent.1   The principle of inviolability is interpreted broadly to ensure that every 
person has a right to be maintained inviolate and free from physical interference.  
Moreover, in prohibiting the first stages of physical violence every person is protected 
against any form of physical harm also.2 
 
Hence the general legal framework for healthcare delivery and in particular the 
administration of a medical treatment is informed by the law of battery because it is a 
recurring feature of medical practice that doctors will interfere with the bodily integrity 
of their patients.  Moreover, the nature of medical practice suggests that in many 
instances some harm will be caused.  Of course no actual bodily harm will be caused 
when a stethoscope is placed on the chest to hear a heart beat.  On the other hand some 
physical harm can be anticipated to arise from the administration of a medical treatment 
or procedure, at least initially.  Surgery is the most obvious example of a physically 
invasive procedure which results in actual bodily harm. 
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However, the law of battery makes consent a defence to the infliction of bodily harm in 
the course of some lawful activities.3   Here we should bear in mind the fact that medicine 
is a lawful activity that one can consent to on account of the fact that although harm is an 
anticipated feature of medical endeavour the overall objective is to benefit patients, i.e. 
physicians are required to administer curative or prophylactic treatments which they 
believe are appropriate to the patient’s existing condition of disease, injury or 
malfunction or susceptibility to such a condition in the future.4   Medical treatment and 
procedures should then most often lead to beneficial outcomes such as when a surgeon 
removes a burst appendix or troublesome tonsils.  The initial discomfort associated with 
the administration of a vaccination eventually subsides and provides medium to long term 
benefits.  Similarly, some drugs can induce severe side effects that are initially 
problematic but which later return the patient to health.5    
 
It is therefore plain that the need for consent is to ensure that a competent patient has 
freedom to choose whether to accept an offer of medical treatment or to reject it because 
they prefer instead to be maintained inviolate.  So in law the question of who should 
decide about the benefits and burdens of a medical treatment or procedure, i.e. should it 
be the doctor, who is motivated by the principles of non-maleficence and beneficence to 
exercise judgment and act only in the best interests of a patient, or should it be the patient 
who is relatively ignorant about disease, its progress, about treatment(s) and of what the 
possible consequences of any choice might be for their future health and well-being, has 
been decided in favour of the patient.   
 
Accordingly, we can say that the law bases its view on the invasion of physical integrity 
on the strong moral conviction that everyone6 has the right of self-determination with 
regard to their body. 7  This is the point that Justice Cardozo makes when he states that: 
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“Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what 
shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without 
his patient’s consent commits an assault”.8    
 
Andrew Grubb adds a little gloss to this familiar statement of law: 
 
“The law relating to consent is of central importance in medical law.  Under the 
common law, the legality of a medical treatment or procedure will largely turn 
upon whether the patient has given a valid consent to it.  Treatment without consent 
may amount to the tort of battery or the crime of assault.  Consent, or more 
accurately the need for it, is the legal reflection of the ethical principle of respect 
for autonomy.  In this particular context, this notion might be better expressed as 
respect for a person’s bodily integrity stemming from a right of self-determination.  
It is a fundamental principle now long established, that every person’s body is 
inviolable”.9 
 
To summarise, the principle of inviolability is upheld by the law of battery to protect all 
persons against non-consensual physical contacts.  Consequently, a doctor who 
administers a medical treatment to a capable patient in the absence of a legally valid 
consent will commit the tort of battery or the crime of assault.10  A legally valid consent 
is then a defence to an activity that would otherwise be unlawful.  The need for consent 
reflects the primacy the law accords to the moral principle of autonomy through which 
patients exercise their right to self-determine what shall happen to their body in a medical 
context.  Thus a competent patient has freedom to choose whether to accept or reject an 
offer of medical treatment and to exercise judgment in accordance with their own values, 
beliefs and preferences.   
                                                                                                                                                 
must arise from the need to act beneficently to protect and promote the legitimate interests of the vulnerable 
person 
7
 Mason J.K., McCall Smith, R.A., Laurie, G.T., Law and Medical Ethics, 2002, Sixth Edition, 
Butterworths, para 10.6 
8
 Schloendorff v Society of New York Hospital (1914) 211 N.Y. 125, p.129 
9
 Grubb, A., Principles of Medical Law, 2004, Second Edition, Oxford University Press, para. 3.01 
10
 The basis of a civil law suit for a battery is that a person’s right to bodily security has been violated by a 
touching which may have caused them harm.  In respect of civil actions for a battery the remedy sought is 
damages, however awards will be nominal in cases where there has been an invasion of a right in the 
absence of any actual bodily harm whereas in criminal cases the court has a wider range of penalties to 
choose from including imprisonment 
 104
 
The Law of Battery 
The law of battery charts the circumstances under which bodily interference with another 
person’s person will be unlawful.  Consequently, it is important in establishing the scope 
of the right to self-determine what shall happen to one’s own body in a medical setting.  
For example, is a doctor required to obtain consent to conduct a physical examination of 
a patient or to perform a minor procedure such as to take a sample of blood?  We might 
equally consider whether it might be detrimental to patient care if consent were required 
to justify an empathetic response. 
 
The Scope of the Right to Freedom from Physical Interference and Harm 
In Re F Lord Goff stated that the effect of the principle of inviolability is to protect 
everybody not only against physical injury but against any form of physical 
molestation.11  Therefore, is it possible that any intentional touching of another person 
that does not cause harm will constitute a battery?  Berg et al explain that: 
 
“A battery occurs when one person engages in conduct that is intended to, and 
does, cause harmful physical contact with another person, as when, for example, a 
person throws a punch in a barroom brawl or hits someone with a rock.  Less 
obviously, a battery is also committed by contact, or touching, that is offensive, but 
not necessarily harmful, at least not in the sense of causing bodily injury.  Spitting 
can be a battery.  Contact with another person is ordinarily considered offensive if 
it occurs without the consent of the person being touched.  Thus, a physician who 
fails to obtain a patient’s consent to a medical procedure that involves a touching 
of the patient commits the tort of battery even though the medical procedure may 
have helped rather than hurt the patient.  This is because the right of bodily 
integrity is the legally protected interest, and thus the patient can be wronged even 
if not physically harmed”.12 
 
 
Is Hostility a Necessary Ingredient of a Battery? 
As an intentional tort the original purpose of the law of battery was to curb or capture 
aggressive and unpleasant behaviour that was intended to cause injury or harm to others 
from fist or sword fights or bar room brawls.13   The conduct of medical professionals 
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stands in stark contrast to that of bar room brawlers in being informed by the principles of 
non-maleficence and beneficence.  These create a moral obligation to act only in the best 
interests of patients.  Consequently, the question arises whether hostility or any other 
adverse mental state is rightfully a necessary ingredient of a battery?  However, in Re F 
Lord Goff confirmed that the motive of the aggressor is not a necessary ingredient of a 
battery because the offence is triggered by any intentional touching of another’s body in 
the absence of a lawful excuse.14  Does this rule out emotional responses that might be 
attributed to sympathy, for example? 
 
Exceptions to the General Rule 
Clearly not all cases of physical interference without consent are unlawful.  For instance, 
paternalist intervention is permitted to allow parents to chastise their children and police 
officers, as well as citizens, may make a lawful arrest as well as take action to prevent 
crime and so on.15  A further general exception is created to allow for the vicissitudes of 
everyday life, i.e. those types of physical contacts that are generally acceptable in the 
ordinary conduct of everyday life.16  So a doctor who inadvertently bumps into a patient 
in the corridor does not commit a battery.  Therefore, it is also assumed that the law does 
not intend to immunise medical professionals against the effects of the news they deliver.  
Accordingly, physical contacts that are derived from the human capacity to empathise 
with the situation of a fellow human being should not be prohibited by the law of battery.  
After all no one suggests to a business man that he should obtain consent prior to shaking 
the hand of a contemporary. 
 
Criminal Liability for Assault 
It is possible that a doctor who intentionally touches a patient without consent could be 
charged with the criminal offence of assault.17  However, it is unlikely that charges would 
be pressed under the criminal law unless it could also be shown that the doctor acted 
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maliciously or was grossly negligent in withholding information.18  The law does not as it 
were intend to make criminals of medical professionals. 
 
 
Consent 
 
English courts have unreservedly accepted that a patient’s body is inviolable such that 
any physically invasive medical treatment or procedure, however trivial, is unlawful 
unless authorised by consent or other lawful authority.  The question then is whether 
consent is always necessary and if it is whether it is also a sufficient condition for a 
patient to be treated? 
 
The Need for Physical Contact 
A battery is only committed if there is a touching.19  Consequently, a patient who agreed 
to take a drug orally, having been totally misled as to the nature of the drug, could not sue 
in battery because the claim would be based on the notion that the patient did not consent 
to the touching.20  They might pursue an action in negligence whereupon the argument 
would be that although there was an apparent consent the doctor had acted negligently in 
failing to provide a sufficient amount of information or had made some sort of 
misrepresentation concerning the treatment. 21  So whereas the approach in battery is to 
protect the patient’s right to bodily integrity when making a decision about medical 
treatment, attention in negligence is on ensuring that doctors follow a responsible body of 
medical opinion when disclosing treatment information. 22 
 
Limits to Consent   
Here it is important to keep in mind that consent is a defence to an activity that would 
otherwise be regarded as a battery on the grounds of unlawful bodily interference.  There 
is no absolute right to self-determination as we shall see and therefore consent works 
more as a shield than a sword. 
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Consent is a necessary though not sufficient condition for a patient to be treated 
A patient cannot compel a doctor or NHS Trust to provide treatment of their own 
choosing.   This is primarily because doctors cannot be forced to provide a treatment that 
is not clinically indicated to be in the best interests of the patient or which cannot be 
provided because of limited resources.23  Neither can patients rely on the courts to force a 
doctor or NHS Trust to treat a patient in a manner contrary to their wishes.24  Andrew 
Grubb establishes three reasons for this.  As a matter of policy, the court will not make an 
order compelling a doctor to treat a patient in a manner contrary to his clinical judgment25 
and professional26 duty.27  Also it would be impracticable and uncertain for the court to 
enforce a mandatory order in this context.28  Finally, the courts are most reluctant to enter 
into investigations about the proper allocation of resources within the health service.29 
 
Requirements for Consent to be Legally Valid 
 
Consent must be legally valid and in this respect the law requires, inter alia, that a patient 
must have capacity to make the particular treatment decision under consideration, must 
give their consent freely, that is their will should not be overborne, and the patient must 
have received information about the nature and purpose of medical treatment, at the very 
least.   
 
Decision-Making Capacity 
The legal requirement is that persons should have mental capacity or be competent to 
self-determine the matter of what shall happen to their body in a medical context.30   
Capacity is the term used to indicate that a patient must have the ability to understand 
treatment information in order to arrive at a decision to consent or to reject an offer of 
treatment.   Understanding is demonstrated when a patient is able to comprehend 
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treatment information,31 retain it32 and then use or process that information33 prior to 
arriving at a decision to consent or to reject an offer of treatment that they can 
communicate.34 
 
The Ability to Understand 
All adults are presumed to have the ability to understand treatment information.35  No 
rebuttable presumption exists in relation to minors as here the law is more paternalistic, 
particularly toward those under the age of 16.36  Consequently, the consent or refusal of a 
person in this age group will only exceptionally justify a doctor in administering or 
withholding appropriate and necessary medical treatment.37  In relation to adults the 
question of whether or not a patient has decision-making capacity has been made a 
question of fact.38  That is to say the law adopts a functional rather than an outcome39 
based test for decision-making capacity.  Incapacity has therefore been linked to an 
impairment or disturbance in the functioning of the mind or brain, whether temporarily or 
more permanently, that prevents someone from understanding information that is relevant 
to the decision they are being asked to make.40  That is the sole basis for determining that 
a person suffers from a lack of decision-making capacity and then only after a doctor has 
taken all reasonably practicable steps to help the patient to make sense of relevant 
treatment information.41   
 
Outcome Test 
An outcome approach would focus on the decision itself and in particular its 
consequences for the welfare of the patient; indeed the stalking ground of an outcome 
based test of capacity would be treatment refusals since it is unlikely that a doctor would 
seek to question a patient’s judgment in consenting to their offer of treatment.  Such an 
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approach does however conflict with respect for the principle of autonomy, and in 
particular the right to make decisions, in accordance with one’s own unique set of values, 
beliefs and preferences, that must be respected by others.  Consequently, the law is very 
clear that a person must not to be treated as unable to make a decision merely because 
they make an unwise decision.42  Accordingly, capacity should not be measured by 
whether the decision appears unwise to others as the patient’s right of choice to consent, 
or to refuse to consent to, medical treatment exists notwithstanding that the reasons for 
making the choice are rational, irrational, unknown or even non-existent.43  This as an 
example of legal neutrality or to put the matter another way in a pluralistic society a 
specific purpose of the principle of autonomy is to accommodate and mediate reasonable 
differences in the beliefs, values and preferences of citizens.   
 
Functional Test 
Consistent with the right to self-determination a functional approach to capacity focuses 
on whether an impairment or disturbance in the functioning of a person’s mind or brain44 
has rendered them unable to make a particular decision.45  Therefore, a person has 
capacity to consent to or to refuse to consent to a medical intervention when they are able 
to understand,46 retain,47 and use or process,48 information that is relevant to their 
decision in order to arrive at a choice that they can communicate.49  The aim of a 
functional based approach to capacity is to safeguard persons against the consequences of 
making a non-autonomous decision by placing emphasis on the way in which the 
decision was made rather than on the decision itself.  The problem is that it is difficult to 
refute the possibility that questions regarding decision-making capacity will tend to arise 
when a patient refuses to consent to a medical treatment that is intended to preserve the 
life, health and/or well-being of the patient.  
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Refusals 
Whilst the law specifically outlaws an outcome test of decision-making capacity it has 
been said that a greater level of capacity may be required to refuse a medical treatment 
that is needed to preserve the life, health or well-being of the patient.50  This does not 
mean that the patient is required to display greater reasoning powers rather they should be 
able to understand more information the more serious their decision and for that reason 
the decision-making process will be subject to greater scrutiny in such circumstances.51  
Whether this is consistent with what happens in others areas of one’s personal life is open 
to debate.  Take for example someone who wants to buy a property with a mortgage that 
will exceed the normal lending limit based on their income.  There is little doubt that 
their mortgage application would be scrutinised more closely by the lender, particularly if 
they were self-employed because of the increased level of risk assumed in the transaction.  
On the other hand persons seem to be able to obtain a permit to keep a licensed weapon 
on their premises without having to submit to any form of psychological test. 
 
The Ability to Understand What 
The law has the dilemma that its requirements should not be sufficiently onerous as to 
exclude a majority of persons from the right to choose whether to accept or reject an offer 
of medical treatment.  So, in order that a doctor’s touching does not constitute a battery 
the law merely requires a patient to understand the nature and purpose of the proposed 
treatment or procedure52 and, as a competent patient must also use and weigh treatment 
information in the balance, to comprehend the likely consequences of deciding to 
exercise their right of choice one way rather than another. 
 
Information 
Obtaining patient consent prior to administering a medical treatment will protect medical 
professionals from liability for unlawful touching, i.e. a battery, if that consent is real.53  
Given the context making an informed choice about whether to accept or to refuse 
treatment, and to thereby maintain bodily integrity, would seem to be of the utmost 
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importance.  Consequently, we will now examine the issue of what information doctors 
are required to disclose to patients in order for their consent to be regarded in law as real.   
 
The Historical Development of a Law of Informed Consent 
If a patient is to exercise the right to self-determination meaningfully, that is in 
accordance with their own values, beliefs and preferences, it would seem essential that a 
doctor, as expert in matters of health, should be placed under a legal duty to provide 
information that is tailored to meet the needs of each individual patient.  
 
Evidence suggests, however, that the contrary was true, as the customs and practices of 
the medical profession initially informed the law: 
 
“Early medical practice codes did not speak of consent- it was more likely that a 
physician would conceal his actions from the patient than seek his or her consent to 
treatment.  However, patient consent is not completely a modern legal creation.  
Historically, the notion that physicians must inform patients about what will be 
done to them has its origins in English eighteenth-century law.  In the 1767 case of 
Slater v Baker and Stapleton54, the court held that because the professional custom 
among surgeons was to obtain consent from their patients before beginning 
treatment, it was only fair to impose liability on a physician who failed to meet this 
standard of care. 
 
“It appears from the evidence of the surgeons that it was improper to disunite 
the [partially healed fracture] without consent; this is the usage and law of 
surgeons: then it was ignorance and unskillfulness in that very particular, to 
do contrary to the rule of the profession, what no surgeon ought to have 
done.” 
 
Not only was it customary for the surgeon to obtain the patient’s consent, the court 
observed, but “indeed it is reasonable that a patient should be told what is about to 
be done to him that he may take courage and put himself in such a situation as to 
enable him to undergo the operation”.  Thus, one rationale for the custom was that 
physicians needed patients’ cooperation if surgery were to be performed without 
the use of an anaesthetic, as was then necessary.  The court’s observation 
regarding the role of communication shows a pragmatic or consequentialist 
justification for informed consent, rather than one focused on information 
disclosure as a good in itself or on a patient’s right to control what happens to his 
body.  In line with this justification, there is a good deal of evidence to suggest that 
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physicians historically saw the requirements for consent as minimal, requiring that 
little or no information be disclosed before permission to proceed was obtained.”55 
 
What emerges from this passage is that the sole purpose of disclosing information was to 
inform the patient of the nature and purpose of treatment in order to aid the medical 
objective.  This is perhaps unsurprising when nowhere within the original formulation of 
the Oath does it refer to providing patients with information necessary to inform their 
choice about whether to consent to or to refuse to consent to medical intervention, rather 
it refers to the doctor using his ‘ability and judgment’ in the care of his patients.   
 
Accordingly, the medical profession was the legally recognised source of what the patient 
should be told.56  Clearly one’s perspective is to a very great extent responsible for 
governing personal conduct and it is here apparent that medical paternalism prevailed 
over respect for the principle of autonomy and all that it entails.  On the other hand, this 
was a time when the restorative capacity of a patient’s own constitution may have been 
the most important aid to recovery since medical practice would have been far less 
sophisticated with fewer options for treatment and more brutal techniques employed to 
restore patient health and well-being.  Nevertheless, ‘old habits die hard’.  Practices once 
established prove difficult to change.  Part of the reason why parents chastise children for 
disagreeable behaviour is to cultivate within them an understanding of the undesirable 
consequences that ensue from inconsiderate conduct.  It also provides an opportunity to 
introduce the idea that virtue lies in the development of self-discipline because it has the 
ability to rule over inclination and the harmful tendencies that it can ignite.  It is in 
developing this capacity that we acquire dignity as a human being which engenders 
notions of self-respect and respect for others.   
 
How then has the judiciary, in fulfilling its role in the public supervision of the medical 
profession, exercised its authority to elevate the customs and practices of the medical 
profession in relation to patient autonomy?  For any claim to uphold the principle of 
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bodily inviolability will sound a little hollow unless the law is developed around and 
dominated by the principle of self-determination.57   
 
 
Battery Theory of Law58 
The basis of a claim in battery is that consent is not real because it was not informed and 
as a consequence a legally protected right to freedom from physical interference and 
harm has been violated.59  This suggests that a battery is substantiated by any failure of a 
physician to obtain the informed consent of their patient in relation to the nature and 
purpose of a treatment or procedure, associated risks and possible consequences for 
health and well-being.60  Accordingly, a physician who failed to give the patient adequate 
information would offend the legal principle because the patient’s permission to proceed 
would not amount to consent.  Thus the patient could recover damages for the offence 
and presumably for any harm that occurred as well.61 
 
The problem is that although a battery theory of law goes more precisely to an 
infringement of patient autonomy whenever patients are deprived of material information 
Emily Jackson has stated that: 
 
“Judges have tended to confine the use of battery to the extremely rare case in 
which the patient was not told about the nature of the treatment they received.  
Provided the patient was informed in broad terms about the proposed treatment 
and agreed to it, her consent will be effective and no action in battery will lie”. 62  
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Crucially a complete lack of consent is actionable as a battery and it has been determined 
that a physician will escape liability whenever a patient is informed as to the nature and 
purpose of a medical treatment or procedure.63  Disclosures in relation to risks inherent in 
medical treatment, which may or may not materialise, are considered by way of the law 
of negligence, a non-intentional tort, in spite of the fact that the harms envisaged may be 
material to the way in which a patient exercises their right to self-determination.  An 
issue of particular relevance in this context is that non-disclosure of such risks would 
effectively deny patients the opportunity to refuse medical treatment and to exercise their 
right to maintain bodily integrity.   
 
To summarise, the duty to obtain a patient’s consent is protected by the tort of battery, 
however the duty to ensure that a patient has been given enough information (whatever 
that might mean) is part of the doctor’s ordinary duty of care to act in the best interests of 
their patients, meaning that a failure to offer sufficient information might ground an 
action in negligence.64  So has a professional privilege to withhold treatment information 
been maintained in law? 
 
Negligence Theory of Law65 
The law of negligence is concerned with prudence and imposes a general requirement 
that persons act or refrain from acting in ways that one could reasonably foresee might 
cause harm to others.66  Therefore, negligence, like battery, has a role to play in 
underpinning the legal right to freedom from bodily interference and harm.  In law a 
physician has a professional and legal duty to exercise reasonable care and skill when 
treating patients whether that involves examination, assessment, diagnosis, advising on 
the need for treatment, providing information about alternative forms of treatment, 
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carrying out treatment, post-operative care and, most importantly in this context, 
providing information about risks.67 
 
The Bolam test is used to determine whether a doctor has acted in breach of his duty.68  It 
asks whether a doctor has acted in accordance with a responsible and competent body of 
medical professional opinion or with a practice that is accepted as proper within the 
profession with regard to the duty of care.  The standard of care is thus determined by the 
medical profession; the reasonable doctor standard. 
 
 
Informed Consent69 - The Duty to Provide Information about Risks70  
In Sidaway the majority in the House of Lords approved the Bolam standard and in 
condoning ‘professional privilege’71 the reasonable doctor standard became the standard 
of the prudent doctor. Lord Diplock said that: 
 
“When it comes to warning about risks, the kind of training and experience that a 
judge will have undergone at the Bar makes it natural for him to say (correctly) it 
is my right to decide whether any particular thing is done to my body, and I want to 
be fully informed of any risks that may be involved of which I am not already aware 
from my general knowledge as a highly educated man of experience, so that I may 
form my own judgment as to whether to refuse the advised treatment or not. 
 
No doubt if the patient in fact manifested this attitude by means of questioning, the 
doctor would tell him whatever it was the patient wanted to know; but we are 
concerned here with volunteering unsought information about risks of the proposed 
treatment failing to achieve the result sought or making the patient’s physical or 
mental condition worse rather than better.  The only effect that mention of risks can 
have on the patient’s mind, if it has any at all, can be in the direction of deterring 
the patient from undergoing the treatment which in the expert opinion of the doctor 
it is in the patient’s interest to undergo.  To decide what risks the existence of 
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which a patient should be voluntarily warned and the terms in which such warning, 
if any, should be given, having regard to the effect that the warning may have, is as 
much an exercise of professional skill and judgment as any other part of the 
doctor’s comprehensive duty of care to the individual patient, and expert medical 
evidence on this matter should be treated in just the same way”.72 
 
Lord Scarman, dissenting from majority opinion, was drawn to the reasoning in the 
judgment of the U.S. case of Canterbury v Spence73 which favoured an alternative, 
prudent patient, approach which more closely equates the need for information and the 
right to decide upon its materiality, with the patient’s right of self-determination.  
Reflecting on the views of the majority Lord Scarman said that: 
 
“The implications of this view of the law are disturbing.  It leaves the 
determination of a legal duty to the judgment of doctors.  Responsible medical 
judgment may, indeed, provide the law with an acceptable standard in determining 
whether a doctor in diagnosis or treatment has complied with his duty.  But is it 
right that medical judgment should determine whether there exists a duty to warn 
of risk and its scope?  It would be a strange conclusion if the courts should be led 
to conclude that our law, which undoubtedly recognises a right in the patient to 
decide whether he will accept or reject the treatment proposed, should permit the 
doctors to determine whether and in what circumstances a duty arises requiring the 
doctor to warn his patient of the risks inherent in the treatment which he proposes. 
 
The right of self-determination – the description applied by some to what is no 
more and no less than the right of a patient to determine for himself whether he will 
or will not accept the doctor’s advice – is vividly illustrated where the treatment 
recommended is surgery.  A doctor who operates without the consent of his patient 
is, save in cases of emergency or mental disability, guilty of the civil wrong of 
trespass to the person: he is also guilty of the criminal offence of assault.  The 
existence of the patient’s right to make his own decision, which may be seen as a 
basic human right protected by the common law, is the reason why a doctrine 
embodying a right of the patient to be informed of risks of surgical treatment has 
been developed in some jurisdictions in the U.S.A. and has found favour with the 
Supreme Court of Canada.  Known as the ‘doctrine of informed consent’, it 
amounts to this: where there is a ‘real’ or a ‘material’ risk inherent in the 
proposed operation (however competently and skilfully performed) the question 
whether and to what extent a patient should be warned before he gives his consent 
is to be answered not by reference to medical practice but by accepting as a matter 
of law that, subject to all proper exceptions (of which the court, not the profession, 
is the judge), a patient has a right to be informed of the risks inherent in the 
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treatment which is proposed.  The profession, it is said, should not be judge in its 
own cause: or, less emotively but more correctly, the courts should not allow 
medical opinion as to what is best for the patient to override the patient’s right to 
decide for himself whether he will submit to the treatment offered him”.74 
 
On this view doctors would be invited to consider firstly, what were the nature of the 
risks of the treatment they proposed to carry out and secondly, whether a patient would 
be likely to consider that the risk(s) identified were of any material consequence to them.  
Essentially Lord Scarman was arguing that patients should be the arbiter of what 
constitutes a material risk.  However, as judgment about what would be material to a 
patient remained a question of medical opinion risk could only be assessed objectively 
from the standpoint of a reasonable patient.  Nonetheless, a ‘prudent patient’ standard 
would have the effect of disempowering the medical profession as an objective test could 
be applied by the court independently of any medical opinion or practice.75 
 
Some years later the Bolam test was modified by the decision of the House of Lords in 
the case of Bolitho.76  There it was decided that even if the Bolam test were satisfied it 
was still open to the court to find that the requisite standard of care had not been met in 
cases where professional opinion did not prove to be capable of withstanding the logical 
analysis of the court.  In those cases the judge would be entitled to hold that the body of 
opinion was not reasonable or responsible.  Disclosure of risk did though appear to be 
specifically excluded from the judgment of Lord Browne-Wilkinson when he said that 
‘the assessment of medical risks and benefits is a matter of clinical judgment which a 
judge would not normally be able to make without expert [medical] evidence’.77   
 
The scope of the doctor’s duty, in relation to disclosure of information, was again 
discussed by the House of Lords in Chester v Afshar.78  Essentially custom and practice, 
within the medical profession, continued to inform the law of what information, in 
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relation to risks, was sufficiently material to a treatment decision that it should be 
disclosed to a patient.  However, the court recognised the growing significance of patient 
autonomy in relation to medical treatment decision-making and on this occasion the 
majority79 were minded to more closely equate the need for information, and the right to 
decide upon its materiality, with the patient’s right to self-determination. 
 
A novelty of this case which involved the non-disclosure of a small80 but, in material 
terms, significant inherent81 risk of surgery82 was that it could not also be shown that the 
patient, upon receiving the appropriate warning, would never have undergone surgery 
and therefore even if the risk fell within the scope of the duty to disclose the all or 
nothing ‘but for’ test of causation would eliminate liability for damage that occurred out 
of a failure to disclose information about a small, though materially significant, inherent 
risk of surgery.83  If a lack of informed consent was remediable as a battery rather than as 
negligence the patient would have a right to recover damages for the inadequate 
disclosure alone, even if not physically injured by the physician’s treatment.  This is 
because the patient is wronged by a failure to obtain consent or the deprivation of the 
right of personal choice which is sometimes called a dignity harm.84  In contrast, the right 
vindicated under negligence theory is the right to be free from bodily injury caused by 
substandard medical practice.  If the negligence causes no bodily injury to the patient, no 
remediable wrong is considered to have occurred.85  
 
If the patient’s right to self-determination was to be vindicated in this case the court 
would need to find some way around the standards that ordinarily apply in negligence 
particularly that established by the ordinary rule of causation.  This demanded that a 
standard should be set by law for physicians rather than one which physicians may or 
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may not impose on themselves.86  In speaking of the scope of the duty to inform Lord 
Hope reasoned that the right to make the final decision and the duty of the doctor to 
inform the patient if the treatment may have special disadvantages or dangers go hand in 
hand.  Thus the duty is owed to enable the patient to make their own decision about 
whether or not to undergo the course of surgery that had been proposed.87  Lord Hope 
thought about what the patient might have done if adequately informed of the inherent 
risk.88  One suggestion was that the patient would have delayed their decision in order to 
mull over the benefits and burdens of treatment and non-treatment and to seek a second 
opinion on the matter.  This argument raised the possibility that the patient would not 
have consented to undergo surgery at the particular point in time in which it took place.89  
The point however was to illustrate the choices that remained open to the patient and to 
highlight the fact that the right to choose ‘was for her to take, and for her alone’.90  On 
this Lord Hope said that, ‘the function of the law is to protect the patient’s right to 
choose.  If it is to fulfil that function it must ensure that the duty to inform is respected by 
the doctor.  It will fail to do this if an appropriate remedy cannot be given if the duty is 
breached and the very risk that the patient should have been told about occurs and she 
suffers injury’.91 
 
Consequently, if the court were to give full effect to the patient’s right of self-
determination it was then necessary to consider how causation could be established 
when the patient would not have refused absolutely to undergo surgery if told of the 
risks but would merely have postponed any decision until later.92  The concern was 
that the patient had not made an informed choice about whether to undergo the 
treatment because the doctor had failed to act in accordance with his underlying moral 
responsibility to disclose information pertaining to risks.93  Did justice require the 
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normal approach to causation to be modified on policy grounds?  About this Lord 
Hope stated that: 
 
“I start with the proposition that the law which imposed the duty to warn on the 
doctor has as its heart the right of the patient to make an informed choice as to 
whether, and if so when and by whom, to be operated on.  Patients may have, and 
are entitled to have, different views about these matters.  All sorts of factors may be 
at work here – the patient’s hopes and fears and personal circumstances, the 
nature of the condition that has to be treated and, above all, the patient’s own 
views about whether the risk is worth running for the benefits that may come if the 
operation is carried out.  For some the choice may be easy – simply to agree or to 
decline the operation.  But for many the choice will be a difficult one, requiring 
time to think, to take advice, and to weigh up the alternatives.94 
 
To leave the patient who would find the decision difficult without a remedy, as the 
normal approach to causation would indicate, would render the duty useless in the 
cases where it may be needed most.  This would discriminate against those who 
cannot honestly say that they would have declined the operation once and for all if 
they had been warned.  I would find that result unacceptable.  The function of the 
law is to enable rights to be vindicated and to provide remedies when duties have 
been breached.  Unless this is done the duty is a hollow one, stripped of all 
practical force and devoid of all content.  It will have lost its ability to protect the 
patient and thus to fulfil the only purpose which brought it into existence.  On 
policy grounds therefore I would hold that the test of causation is satisfied in this 
case”.
95
 
 
Informed Consent: The (In) Significance of Chester v Afshar 
To what extent does the judgment in Chester v Afshar safeguard patient autonomy?  If 
the right to maintain bodily integrity is not to lose its significance as an essential pre-
requisite to individual exercises of self-determination then it is crucial that there should 
be no room for conflict between the doctor’s duty and the patient’s right to be informed.  
Elaborating on this matter Lord Hope stated that, ‘the imbalance between doctor and 
patient is due to the patient’s lack of information.  It is the function of the law to redress 
the imbalance by providing patients with the right to be given that information, or more 
accurately imposing a duty on doctors to provide it’.96  Consequently, the right to make 
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the final decision and the duty of the doctor to inform the patient of the benefits and 
burdens of treatment go hand in hand.97 
 
Significantly, a legal standard of disclosure had been established that was unaffected in 
its scope by a professional privilege to withhold information that might alarm a patient.98  
This suggests that in the future courts will not be content to accept the explanation that 
patients tend to give disproportionate weight to such information and would as a 
consequence refuse to consent to, what would in all probability turn out to be, highly 
beneficial treatment.  Appearances therefore suggest that, other than very exceptionally, 
professional privilege will no longer justify medical paternalism.  Time has, it seems, 
been called on standards of disclosure that were once accepted as proper. 
 
Summary: The Aim of Protecting and Enhancing Patient Self-Determination 
Berg et al have stated that: 
 
‘The predominance of negligence theory appears to have been based largely on 
judicial reluctance to stigmatise physicians with the label of having committed a 
battery, thereby lumping them into the same category as barroom brawlers, rather 
than on any clear analysis of the different effects of one option or the other’.99 
 
Should the law be used to manage clinician behaviour?  Stephen Wear thinks not.  He 
believes that only those physicians who are committed to the enterprise of respecting 
patient self-determination will succeed in doing so.  He states that: 
 
“The law can neither accurately calibrate nor sufficiently motivate the necessary 
behaviours by itself.  It can at most mandate minimal requirements.  Such minimal 
requirements then need ethical supplementation and support, lacking which they 
tend to produce ineffective information disclosure rituals as many feel has been the 
actual result, when clinicians hyper-inform patients to the point of information 
overload to guard against a charge of inadequate disclosure. 
 
Our focus should regard the ethical character and opportunities of informed 
consent, not how it was flawed in cases where negative outcomes also occurred.  
Part of the problem with the legal doctrine is that informed consent thus comes to 
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be perceived by both patients and physicians as involving threats to which the 
physician must respond not as a vehicle for respecting and promoting patient self-
determination and enhancing the patient-physician dialogue.  Equally, the sort of 
guidance and standards that a court might offer in evaluating a suit for damages is 
not necessarily going to be the same as if it were asked to speak to how informed 
consent could best protect and enhance patient self-determination”.100 
 
Academic comment that informed the judgment of Lord Hope in Chester v Afshar is to 
similar effect: 
 
“Part of the imbalance between doctor and patient is due to the patient’s lack of 
information, and, on one view, it is the function of the law to redress the imbalance 
by providing patients with the ‘right’ to be given that information, or perhaps more 
accurately imposing a duty on doctors to provide it… the law cannot play a direct 
role in setting out detailed rules by way of guidance to doctors, but that it can have 
a powerful symbolic and galvanising role and that this is its major strength”.101   
 
Lord Hope considered that litigation on informed consent could provide a stimulus to the 
broader debate about the nature of the doctor-patient relationship.102  But whether suits in 
negligence can be regarded as the most appropriate vehicle to stimulate such a debate is 
open to question when the financial implications of a course of action, unattractive as 
they are, combine so unappealingly with the human costs involved in the enterprise, in 
terms of the uncertainties that prevail and the delays that ensue.  Consequently, there is 
reason to claim that litigation on informed consent is an inappropriate vehicle for micro 
managing the behaviour of clinicians. 
 
A battery theory of law may fair no better in facilitating respect for informed consent 
amongst clinicians who would choose to drown patients in technical information that 
could not be adequately processed within the time allowed.  Judicious use of language 
can also lead to misunderstanding and confusion as to its significance amongst the 
uninitiated a position that is compounded by a general reluctance to challenge respected 
members of the medical profession.  It’s a little like the psychology engendered by road 
speed cameras, once one is aware of their presence it is possible to adapt behaviour to 
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accommodate its demands whilst otherwise pleasing oneself, even within the speed 
restriction zone. 
 
Concluding Comments 
It is possible to conclude or to read into the case of Chester that we might now be in an 
era where use of ‘but for’ analysis is no longer required and hence we have as good a 
protection of informedness under negligence as we would get under battery.103  However, 
I remain unconvinced.  The point is that Chester does not propose to eliminate the 
distinction between these torts and as negligence is an unintentional tort it is apparent that 
liability for the unintended consequences of one’s actions will continue to be subjected to 
some form of limiting principle in order to contain the cost of a mistake.   
 
Perhaps then the ‘happy ending’ of a more substantive right to truly informed consent for 
patients does rely upon further ethical supplementation of the iterative process between 
law and professional guidance that is capable of manifesting and sustaining a change in 
approach, if not the basic attitude of medical professionals, to this particular moral issue.  
The problem is that moral principles, rules and ethical conventions are limited by the fact 
that these are not legally enforceable were they ever to be disregarded in an individual 
case.  So we return to consider what is the function of the law and in this case it is to 
redress an imbalance in knowledge between doctors and their patients which can be 
resolved by re-defining the relationship to take account of its fiduciary nature.  This 
should eliminate the potential for any conflict in the interests of the respective parties to 
arise in terms of determining what information the patient should be told as part of the 
process of obtaining their consent to a medical treatment.   
 
Voluntariness 
Consent must be given voluntarily and freely.104  The issue here then is whether the 
decision, to consent, or to refuse to consent, is really the decision of the patient.  Has the 
patient exercised their own will freely and independently in choosing or was their will 
overborne.  So whereas the law of capacity is concerned with whether the will is subject 
                                                 
103
 This was proposed by my internal and external examiners 
104
 Grubb, A., Principles of Medical Law, 2004, Second Edition, Oxford University Press, para. 3.166 
 124
to some form of internal limitation,105 voluntariness is, contrastingly, concerned with 
external constraints that overbear the will, or to be more precise the effects of undue 
influence or coercion.106  What circumstances have been found to give rise to undue 
influence? 
 
Particular Relationships 
When considering the effects of outside influence Lord Donaldson has remarked that 
the relationship of the persuader to the patient can be of crucial importance.107   
 
Perhaps then it could be argued that a doctor, as expert in medical matters, stands in a 
position to unduly influence or coerce a patient because of the inherent inequality in their 
positions.  As stated earlier the principles of non-maleficence and beneficence are a 
primary source of influence in medical training and would tend to foster paternalistic 
attitudes at both stage one and two of a treatment decision-making process on the basis of 
a doctor’s superior knowledge and experience in medical matters.  Paternalistic 
tendencies might also be strengthened by patients who generally regard doctors as 
professional people of status for whom they have great respect whereas mentally 
incapacitated patients are vulnerable simply because their own values, beliefs and 
preferences may not be fully respected in situations where these come into conflict with 
those of their carers, i.e. the potential to override the patient’s values exists when a 
patient is no longer competent to speak on their own behalf and to have their views 
respected by others. 
 
Undue influence 
Here the concern is that a person may have succumbed to some form of external pressure 
that has overpowered the will without having also convinced their judgment.108  
Essentially what is said or done does not carry any personal conviction because what is 
expressed is the product of a will that may have been preyed upon. 109   
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The problem lies in determining which pressures and their effects should be regarded as 
having invalidated consent.  Threats that act on a person’s fears or hopes clearly exert an 
undue influence.110  Moral commands might be similarly regarded when asserted and 
then responded to for the sake of peace and quiet, or for peace of mind or to escape social 
discomfort.111  And in this regard it has been said that of all influences religious influence 
is the most dangerous and the most powerful such that the courts will go to some length 
to protect persons against it.112   
 
Enthusiasm is, on the other hand, not ordinarily to be treated as having an undue 
influence, unless it is the product of external influence.113    
 
Coercion and Shared or Collaborative Decision-Making 
Coercion most commonly arises when one person seeks to apply pressure by force, 
perhaps through violence or confinement or maybe even tone and framing of information, 
and if done successfully the coercion will been seen to have had an undue influence on 
the other.114   
 
Consequently, coercion takes many forms and on some occasions very little pressure may 
be required for it to have an undue influence.115  It is at least possible therefore that a 
doctor’s recommendations regarding treatment could be regarded as coercive in some 
circumstances.   
 
Persuasion Distinguished from Undue Influence 
Not all influences are unlawful and in particular mere persuasion, which appeals to the 
affections, or which seeks to invoke a sense of gratitude or pity is permitted. 116 
                                                 
110
 Ibid 
111
 Ibid 
112
 Ibid, p.119 
113
 Ibid 
114
 Ibid 
115
 Ibid 
116
 Ibid, p.118 
 126
 
Summary 
In order for consent to be legally valid it must be given voluntarily and freely.  Crucially 
a patient’s decision to accept or reject medical treatment should not bare the hallmarks of 
undue influence.117  This requires that a decision to consent to or to refuse to consent to, 
medical treatment is made in accordance with the values, beliefs and preferences of the 
actual patient and not those of a third party. 
 
Certain relationships stand out for possible scrutiny because there is an awareness that 
one party may be in a dominant position in this regard to the other; parent and child, 
husband and wife, religious advisor and parishioner are amongst some of the most 
obvious examples.  Whilst the law states that any external influence that overbears the 
will invalidates consent some influences are deemed to be stronger than others; ‘influence 
may be subtle, insidious, pervasive and where religious beliefs are involved especially 
powerful’. 118 
 
Can it be argued that the law of consent is equally subtle, insidious and pervasive in 
determining that a patient has capacity to make a decision notwithstanding that the 
reasons for making the choice are rational, irrational, unknown or even non-existent in 
the knowledge that a cause or motive for exercising judgment one way rather than 
another may later be questioned.  Or to put the matter another way it is at least arguable 
that the subjectively held beliefs, values and preferences of patients that are seemingly 
accommodated by the law of capacity can, in certain circumstances, be subjected to the 
subjective scrutiny of others in relation to the issue of whether consent was in fact given 
voluntarily.  
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Refusals of Consent 
 
Lord Donaldson has stated that: 
 
“An adult patient who … suffers from no mental incapacity has an absolute right to 
choose whether to consent to medical treatment, to refuse it or to choose one rather 
than another of the treatments being offered … This right of choice is not limited to 
decisions which others might regard as sensible.  It exists notwithstanding that the 
reasons for making the choice are rational, irrational, unknown or even non-
existent”.119 
 
Butler-Sloss LJ has also commented that: 
 
“A man or woman of full age and sound understanding may choose to reject 
medical advice and medical or surgical treatment either partially or in its entirety.  
A decision to refuse medical treatment by a patient capable of making the decision 
does not have to be sensible, rational or well considered”. 120 
 
Whilst Staughton LJ confirms that: 
 
“An adult whose mental capacity is unimpaired has the right to decide for herself 
whether she will or will not receive medical or surgical treatment, even in 
circumstances where she is likely or even certain to die in the absence of 
treatment”. 121 
 
It is therefore plain that in ordinary circumstances an adult patient who suffers from no 
mental incapacity may self-determine the matter of whether to accept or reject an offer of 
medical treatment.122  In a situation where consent to treatment is necessary, a refusal by 
a competent adult patient acts as a veto to the prohibited treatment.123  A decision to act 
in the face of such a refusal would be unlawful amounting to a battery. 124   
 
The refusal will be total when a person refuses any offer of treatment but it can also be 
partial such as when a Jehovah’s Witness refuses a blood transfusion.  In either case the 
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refusal is legally effective to prevent the prohibited treatment even though the doctor’s 
intention will be to benefit the patient.  In this way the principle of autonomy trumps the 
principle of beneficence as the patient’s right to self-determination triumphs over or 
outweighs paternalistic medical intervention. 
 
Sanctity Principle 
Does respect for the sanctity principle lead to situations where preserving life becomes an 
ultimate value?  In other words does respect for the sanctity principle lead to moral 
absolutism?  This question is significant in respect of end of life decision-making because 
it tends to uphold the view that all human life is equally valuable and should not be 
intentionally destroyed.125 
 
Nature of the Treatment - Preserving Life 
However, a treatment refusal is legally effective to prevent the prohibited treatment even 
if the patient may or will certainly die.  Consequently, a patient who is competent to 
decide may refuse any treatment including life-saving or preserving medical treatments, 
such as a blood transfusion,126 artificial ventilation127 and even artificial feeding.128   In 
this way the principle of the sanctity of human life similarly yields to the right of self-
determination which preserves an autonomous choice.  
 
Countervailing State Interest in the Preservation of Life 
However, Stauch et al ask whether it might be argued that there is a countervailing State 
interest, as opposed to private acts of paternalism which justify overriding a patient’s 
refusal of certain forms of treatment?129  In this regard it has been said that: 
 
“The State’s interest in preserving life may be seen as embracing two separate but 
related concerns: an interest in preserving the life of the particular patient, and an 
interest in preserving the sanctity of life. 
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While both of these State interests in life are certainly strong, in themselves they 
will usually not foreclose a competent person from declining life-sustaining 
medical treatment for himself.  This is because the life that the State is seeking to 
protect in such a situation is the life of the same person who has competently 
decided to forgo the medical intervention; it is not some other actual or potential 
life that cannot adequately protect itself”.130 
 
Neither is a refusal of life-saving or preserving treatment viewed as an attempt to commit 
suicide.131  This is because ‘refusing medical treatment merely allows the disease to take 
its natural course; if death were eventually to occur it would be the result, primarily, of 
the underlying disease, and not the result of a self-inflicted injury’.132 
 
Thus the right to self-determination, which includes the right to refuse life-preserving 
treatment, will normally outweigh the interest of the State in promoting the sanctity of 
life.133  And in relation to treatment decision-making at the end of life this can be 
significant: ‘the choice the law makes is to reassure people that the courts do have full 
respect for human life, but that they do not pursue the principle to the point at which it 
has become almost empty of any real content and when it involves the sacrifice of other 
important values such as human dignity and freedom of choice’.134   
 
Conclusion 
 
The fundamental principle of bodily inviolability is upheld by the law of battery to 
protect everybody against non-consensual physical contacts.135  And as even the mere 
touching of another without consent is capable of amounting to a battery it is clear that 
the law’s requirement for consent resides in the right to be maintained inviolate.136   
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Crucially the right to maintain bodily inviolability is a common law right and there is a 
correlative duty not to interfere with that right.137  Consent is though a defence to activity 
that would ordinarily constitute a battery.  Doctors, who have no special immunity in 
law,138 must therefore obtain their patient’s consent prior to administering medical 
treatment if they wish to avoid liability from suit.139 
 
However, consent must also be legally valid and as patients control what happens to their 
bodies through the act of giving or withholding consent it is clear that respect for a 
person’s bodily integrity stems from the right of self-determination.140  To this end a 
medical professional is required to establish, by way of an established set of criteria, that 
the decision to accept or reject treatment has been taken in accordance with the patient’s 
own values, beliefs and preferences. 
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Chapter Four 
 
 
The Law and the Incompetent Patient 
 
The fundamental principle of bodily inviolability is upheld by the law of battery to 
protect all persons against non-consensual physical contacts.  Thus all persons enjoy a 
legally protected right to bodily security and therefore to be maintained inviolate and free 
from bodily harm.   
 
The non-discriminatory nature of the principle of bodily inviolability suggests that 
everybody should have the right to self-determination with regard to their own body.1   
An issue in relation to a mentally incapacitated patient is whether they too enjoy a similar 
right to medical treatment or to the withholding or withdrawal of necessary and 
appropriate medical treatment as do competent patients to consent to, or, to refuse to 
consent to, medical treatment.  This is because these patients, unlike their competent 
counterparts, are deemed incapable of exercising their right to self-determine, in 
accordance with their own beliefs, values and preferences, what shall happen to their 
body in a medical context.  A third party, usually a doctor, will instead seek to determine 
the matter for them.  So if the right to maintain bodily integrity is not to lose its 
significance we must ask what approach is taken in law to safeguard the welfare and 
autonomous interests of formerly competent adult patients. 
 
Ethical Considerations: Autonomy and the Significance of  
the  
Individual Ethical Voice vs Paternalism 
 
There are two reasons why autonomy is an important concept in relation to healthcare 
and treatment; autonomy not only allows patients to protect their own sense of well-being 
or happiness but also serves as a counter to medical paternalism.2   
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Arguments against paternalism tend to focus on the dangers that can arise whenever a 
person or group is in a position to exercise power and authority over others.  In relation to 
physicians that idea tends to lead to discussion of events during the twentieth century 
which called into question the trustworthiness of the medical profession when it was 
discovered that some individual members had engaged in eugenic practices3 which they 
sought to justify by claiming that it would lead to an improvement in the human gene 
pool and ultimately therefore of the human race.4  This example illustrates what can 
happen when doctors have too much discretion over the exercise of their professional 
powers and/or act as agents of the state rather than the patient as beneficence may then be 
construed almost exclusively in terms of a particular conception of the common good and 
an opportunity will exist for hidden values to be manifest in the decisions of doctors 
about what form of treatment is in the best interests of the patient.5 
 
Advances in medical science have further emphasised the need for a patient centred 
medical decision-making model.6  About this Berg et al state that: 
 
“Technological advances in medicine created treatment options that allowed 
physicians to keep patients alive even when they had few chances of recovery and 
very poor quality of life.  Patients who did not want to be dependent on ventilators 
or dialysis presented the possibility that medicine’s capabilities could clash with 
patients’ deeply held values.  What individual patients asserted against medical 
paternalism was, in essence, that health was not the only value of importance to 
them.  Patients whose vision of a good life included a death unencumbered by 
technology found that their vision of their own well-being clashed with the ‘do 
everything’ mandate of acute care medicine.  Many physicians were themselves 
increasingly uncomfortable with the path charted by their perceived professional 
mandate to promote health and preserve life at all costs.  It was growing less clear 
that doing ‘what is best for the patient,” the paternalistic mandate, entailed 
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aggressive medical intervention.  Asking what the patient wanted provided a way 
out of this dilemma”.7 
 
The Legal Framework for Making Decisions and Acting on behalf of Mentally 
Incompetent Adults 
 
As a prelude to our discussion about the MCA we should start off by considering how 
things might be in the absence of any guidance or information of any kind.  One obvious 
problem that springs to my mind is that any surrogate decision-maker would have a free 
hand to decide matters in accordance with their own values and preferences if they felt 
able to decide matters at all.  What might that be like?  It is possible that the unscrupulous 
would take advantage of a vulnerable person.  The indecisive would be rendered inert, 
exhausted from all that conjecturing. Whereas the well-intentioned busy-body or the over 
zealous would happily seize the opportunity to take matters into their own hands and 
direct affairs according to their own values and perceptions.  Aging punk rockers might 
seek wisdom in the words of Malcolm McLaren whilst other worldly folk might look for 
inspiration in a ‘sign’.  Defensive creatures would be too busy covering their own back to 
do any good.  The easily offended would be too put out to focus on anything but 
themselves and the overly sensitive couldn’t possibly cope with the responsibility.  Those 
who are important would delegate responsibility to someone else unless of course it was 
an executive decision that had to be made.  And no matter what goes on around self-
centred types it’s always all about them. 
 
However, mayhem can be brought into order and in this regard the Mental Capacity Act 
2005 (MCA) establishes the legal framework for acting and making decisions on behalf 
of someone who is no longer competent to make their own decisions.8  Significantly, the 
2005 Act brought together, improved upon and then formalised the preceding judge made 
or common law in respect of persons who lack capacity.  As a consequence the common 
law remains relevant to the task of interpreting the provisions of the MCA. 
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So what we have is a framework9 that maps out who is empowered to make decisions on 
behalf of a person that has lost decision-making capacity and who else should10 or may 
be involved in that process.11  This is supported by further statutory provisions that 
provide guidance about how a surrogate decision-maker should approach their decision-
making responsibilities.12  These measures have the effect of instituting a formalised 
decision-making structure with decision-making criteria to regulate the decision-making 
process which together establish the nature of the legal obligation a surrogate decision-
maker owes to the incompetent person.  As the pre-conditions of duty have been 
constituted it is plain that in law mentally disabled persons, like their competent 
counterparts, are intended to have a claim over the decisions and actions of surrogate 
decision-makers.13 
 
In this regard the Act embodies a set of principles that must be applied by surrogates to 
first establish that a patient lacks the requisite capacity to decide themselves. Crucially, 
the MCA maintains the presumption that a person must be assumed to have capacity to 
make their own decisions unless it is established that they lack capacity.14  This means 
that a capacity assessment by a potential decision-maker should only be undertaken if 
there is evidence to suggest that the presumption might be rebutted.15  In this respect a 
person is not to be treated as unable to make a decision merely because they make an 
unwise decision.16  Moreover, a person must not be treated as unable to make a decision 
unless all practicable steps to help them to do so have been taken without success.17 
 
Accordingly, the MCA invites those it empowers to tread a difficult path as they must 
balance the need to protect those in need of medical treatment and/or care but are 
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incapable of giving or withholding their consent to it with maintaining respect for an 
individual’s right to make their own decisions.18 
 
Incapacity 
 
For the purposes of the MCA, a person lacks capacity in relation to the matter in question 
if at the material time they are unable to make a decision because of an impairment or 
disturbance in the functioning of the mind or brain19 which may be of a temporary or 
more permanent nature.20  Consequently, anyone assessing capacity must use the two-
stage test.  At the first stage it is necessary to consider whether a person has an 
impairment or disturbance that affects the way their mind or brain works, and if so at the 
second stage to consider whether that impairment or disturbance means that they are 
unable to make a specific decision at the time it needs to be made.21 
 
The statutory test therefore focuses on a person’s ability to understand information and 
apply it to their situation in order to make a decision.22  For the purposes of the Act a 
person is unable to make a decision for themselves if they are unable;23 to understand 
information that is relevant to the decision in hand;24 to retain that information;25 to use it 
or weigh it as part of the process of making the decision;26 or to communicate their 
decision.27     
 
The Law Adopts a Functional not Outcome Based Approach to Decision-Making 
Capacity 
Consistent with the foregoing the Act adopts a functional, not outcome or status based, 
approach to decision-making capacity.  As a consequence doctors and carers are 
cautioned that a lack of decision-making capacity cannot be established merely by 
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reference to a person’s age or appearance28 or the simple fact that they suffer from a 
particular condition, for example some sort of mental illness, which would indicate that 
the law adopted a status-based approach to capacity.  On its own therefore  an aspect of 
personal behaviour, such as might be exhibited by those who suffer from an obsessive 
compulsive disorder or who engage in self-harming practices,29 should not  lead to 
unjustified assumptions being made about someone’s capacity to decide.30 
 
It is also consistent with aims of a functional test for capacity that a fresh capacity 
assessment should be undertaken for each and every decision that a person might be 
required to make and at a time when the decision in question needs to be made.31  You 
might recall the decision in The Estate of Park32 which recognised that a person can be 
capable of deciding to marry but not to make a will.33  Potential decision-makers should 
not therefore think that just because a person lacks the ability to make one decision that 
they lack the ability to make any decision particularly when what has to be decided is of a 
more minor nature as less information or perhaps more accurately less complex 
information has to be processed to arrive at a choice.34  Although at least one 
commentator considers that assessments in the case of routine decisions, such as what 
clothes a person should wear or food they should eat, if they happen at all, are most likely 
to be fairly superficial.35  Nevertheless, the approach is consistent with respect for the 
principle of autonomy and might be particularly relevant to those who require ongoing 
treatment and care and are confined within an institutionalised setting. 
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An outcome based approach to decision-making capacity does by contrast conflict with 
respect for the principle of autonomy in tending to focus on the consequences for 
someone of their decision.  Accordingly, the freedom to make a decision in accordance 
with one’s own constitution or value system could be undermined by the need to usher 
non-compliant individuals into a state of conformity with a consensus viewpoint or with 
the views of the potential decision-maker.36  Instead the principle of autonomy permits 
each of us to develop our individuality or character and personality and to make decisions 
in conformity with it.37  The potential for diversity in the decisions of persons similarly 
situated is to be expected and is precisely what a functional based test for capacity allows 
for.  This is confirmed in the Mental Capacity Act Code of Practice which states that: 
 
“Everybody has their own values, beliefs, preferences and attitudes.  A person 
should not be assumed to lack capacity to make a decision just because other 
people think their decision is unwise.  This applies even if family members, friends, 
or healthcare or social care staff are unhappy with a decision…  There may be 
cause for concern if somebody repeatedly makes unwise decisions that put them at 
significant risk of harm or exploitation or makes a particular unwise decision that 
is obviously irrational or out of character.  These things do not necessarily mean 
that somebody lacks capacity.  But there might be need for further investigation, 
taking into account the person’s past decisions and choices.  For example, have 
they developed a medical condition or disorder that is affecting their capacity to 
make particular decisions?  Are they easily influenced by undue pressure? Or do 
they need more information to help them understand the consequences of the 
decision they are making?”38   
 
A functional approach to decision-making capacity was also emphasised at common law 
as Lord Donaldson has previously stated that: 
 
“The patient’s right of choice exists whether the reasons for making that choice are 
rational, irrational, unknown or even non-existent.  That his choice is contrary to 
what is to be expected of the vast majority of adults is only relevant if there are 
other reasons for doubting his capacity to decide”.39 
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The rejection of the outcome approach was emphasised in Masterman-Lister v Jewell 
where Wright J. said that:  
 
“In principle, legal capacity depends on understanding rather than wisdom: the 
quality of the decision is irrelevant as long as the person understands what he is 
deciding”.40 
 
Whilst in Masterman-Lister v Brutton & Co Chadwick L.J. said: 
 
“English law requires that a person must have the necessary mental capacity if he 
is to do a legally effective act or to make a legally effective decision for himself.  
The authorities are unanimous in support of two broad propositions.  First, that the 
mental capacity required by the law is capacity in relation to the transaction which 
is to be effected.  Second, that what is required is the capacity to understand the 
nature of that transaction when it is explained”.41 
 
Finally, in Sheffield City Council v E Munby J. said: 
 
“The general rule of English law, whatever the context, is that the test of capacity 
is the ability (whether or not one chooses to exercise it) to understand the nature 
and quality of the transaction”.42 
 
Assessing Patient Capacity to Decide 
Contrary to what a functional approach to capacity prescribes a patient’s decision, in 
particular its consequences for longevity, health and well-being, and the manner in which 
it is made, might in practice be the only reason one has to question a person’s capacity to 
decide.  In Re T, for example, Lord Donaldson said that ‘doctors faced with a refusal of 
treatment have to give very careful thought and detailed consideration to the patients’ 
capacity to decide’.43  This gives rise to an obvious concern that a doctor will say a 
patient is competent to give their consent to treatment when the patient is compliant with 
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medical expert opinion and conversely to claim that the patient is not competent to decide 
if they raise objections or refuse a necessary and appropriate treatment or procedure.44   
 
Moreover, the person who is required to assess an individual’s capacity to decide will be 
the person who has the power to make the decision in respect of, or to act on behalf of the 
patient in question.45  So that will be either a doctor or a carer depending on whether the 
decision in hand is a day-to-day matter or one concerning the health and welfare of the 
patient.46   Whilst the MCA institutes safeguards to protect the interests of all concerned a 
formal procedure for the assessment of capacity has not been established and no statutory 
form confirming incapacity needs to be completed.47  Neither is there a requirement to 
involve or obtain a second opinion from a particular professional such as a psychologist 
or a psychiatrist, in the assessment48 although there is nothing to prevent a doctor or carer 
from obtaining a second opinion from another professional, particularly for complex 
decisions.49   
 
Nonetheless the decision of a doctor or carer may be challenged and in this situation the 
decision-maker would need to show that they had reasonable grounds for believing that 
the person lacked the capacity to make a particular decision at the time when it needed to 
be made.50  Such consideration are reflected in the thoughts of Lord Donaldson in Re T 
who made references to the fact that doctors have to give very careful thought and 
detailed consideration to the patient’s capacity because if a person is not capable of 
making a decision Re F determines that a doctor is required to make decision in the 
patient’s best interests.51  If however, a doctor, as the potential decision-maker, is in any 
doubt about whether a patient lacks capacity to make the decision in question he or she is 
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permitted to resolve any doubts in accordance with the civil standard, i.e. based on a 
balance of probabilities.52  Whilst these two considerations appear somewhat incongruous 
this is an example of the balance that is struck between beneficence and autonomy, or 
protection and self-determination.   
 
Although where the decision was finely balanced and the situation was non-urgent a 
doctor should, as a matter of principle, seek to delay treatment for as long as possible or 
at least until all practicable steps had been taken to assist the patient to make their own 
decision.53  Practical guidance and information is contained within the Code of Practice 
about what can be done to improve a patient’s ability to satisfy a capacity test and to 
therefore make their own decision.54   Potential decision-makers are encouraged to 
connect with patients more effectively by using simple language or alternative 
communication techniques such as sign language or pictures and structuring information 
in a way that aids understanding.55  Another suggestion is to engage the services of a 
relative or someone else who is more familiar with the patient, as they might be able to 
elicit a decision from them where others have failed to do so. 56  Of course it remains 
important that the decision is arrived at voluntarily and so anyone who seeks to support 
the patient to make a decision should take care not to unduly influence or pressurise them 
into making a decision they would not otherwise have made.57 
 
However, the underlying significance of this provision is that physical interference in the 
absence of consent ordinarily constitutes a battery.  Consent is the concept that gives rise 
to respect for the principle of autonomy and so developing a person’s capacity is part of 
what it means to show respect for that principle.58  Consequently, this provision aims to 
prevent unnecessary intervention in the lives of patients.59  Moreover, there is research to 
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show that this type of action can yield positive results in some instances.60  Gunn et al, 
for example, have demonstrated that the skills of some amongst a group of patients who 
appeared to be incapable of making a decision to have a blood test could be maximised to 
a point where they were competent to make the decision to have a blood test 
themselves.61   
 
On the other hand this group of researchers could not exclude the possibility that 
potential decision-makers may be required to exercise their judgment, when making an 
assessment of capacity, based on an overall impression of the person.62   Whilst the MCA 
rejects a status based approach to capacity assessment the reality is that it might be quite 
difficult to eliminate personal feelings from the judgments of potential decision-makers 
which is potentially problematic because it places too much emphasis on something that 
is subjective within them.  For example, it is a fact of life that people have quite different 
ideas about who they like and why and in the early stages of contact this also has to do 
with impressions that are created, since there is little else to base our opinions on.  Yet we 
all know that it is true of many married couples that when they first met neither party 
may initially have made a spectacular impression on the other.  Consequently, their 
decision to marry must have been formed on the basis of something more substantial 
following a period of getting to know one another rather better. 
 
What Information must the Patient Understand? 
The adoption of a functional rather than an outcome or status based test for capacity 
suggests that the law requires a competent process, i.e. informed decisions, rather than a 
competent outcome, i.e. a responsible decision.  Consequently, a person can have 
capacity to make some decisions but not others and this will in part depend on the amount 
or complexity of the information that is relevant to the transaction and that the patient 
must be able to understand.   
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In relation to a medical treatment or procedure, and in order for any resulting consent to 
be real, case law determines that a patient must understand information that is presented 
in broad terms pertaining to the nature and purpose of the particular form of treatment 
that is being proposed63 and of each treatment where a choice of treatments are open to 
them and finally the likely consequences of treatment and non-treatment or of accepting 
or refusing treatment.64     
 
A doctor must also inform the patient of the advantages and disadvantages of treatment 
and describe how different people experience different reactions or side effects to 
treatment. 65  In this regard disclosures as to risks was initially treated as a matter of 
clinical judgment that was directed by the Bolam66 principle, i.e. a practice accepted as 
proper by a responsible body of medical opinion.67  The case of Sidaway modified that 
situation somewhat by taking into consideration circumstances in which the disclosure of 
a particular risk might be so obviously necessary, or material, to an informed choice on 
the part of the patient that no reasonably prudent doctor would fail to mention it.68  A 
doctor’s privilege in deciding about the relevance or materiality of treatment information 
was however dealt a distinct blow in the case of Chester v Afshar when Lord Hope 
reasoned that the right to make the final decision and the duty of the doctor to inform the 
patient of special disadvantages or dangers of treatment go hand in hand.  Consequently, 
a standard had been set by law for physicians rather than one which physicians may or 
may not impose on themselves.69  Professional paternalism related to treatment 
disclosures was effectively laid to rest as the doctor’s duty to inform had been tailored to 
meet the needs of individual patients.70   
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It is therefore clear that in law a functional approach to capacity demands that the patient 
must be able to understand relevant treatment information so that it can be applied to 
their own situation, in particular its significance and potential effects with regard to their 
existing values, beliefs and preferences.71  Understanding is demonstrated in other words 
by someone who is able to apply facts to values as part of the decision-making process.  
The problem is that the Act cannot state what information will be relevant in each case 
and so it becomes a matter that is left to the discretion of the doctor.  In this respect it is 
important to note that in accordance with the MCA information must be tailored to an 
individual’s needs and abilities.72  So whilst it is important that a person has access to all 
the information they need to make an informed decision that information can presumably 
be presented in broad terms to aid their understanding of it whereupon there is a danger 
that its true meaning and significance might get lost in translation.73  This of course 
means that if the patient fails to understand the true significance of the information they 
are being given then they may also fail to apply it meaningfully to their own situation.  
Moreover, the standard with regard to disclosure appears once again to be determined by 
members of the medical profession.  Although, the Code of Practice does emphasise the 
importance of providing information that is factual bearing in mind the decision must be 
that of the patient not the doctor.74  There is also the ever present danger that a medical 
professional will manipulate the situation to gain patient consent or to determine where 
treatment is refused that the patient is incompetent to decide and must therefore be treated 
in their best interests.  However, if respect for autonomy, not beneficence, is the primary 
value in healthcare ethics and law then no gap should exist between what the patient 
needs to understand taking into consideration their values, beliefs and preferences and the 
doctor’s duty to provide that information and where necessary assistance to aid their 
actual understanding of it.   
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What Key Abilities are involved in a Functional Approach to Decision-Making? 
Consistent with a functional approach to capacity the Code of Practice informs us that 
what matters is that a patient should have the ability to carry out the processes involved in 
making a decision. 75  As a person is unable to make a decision if they cannot, understand 
information about the decision to be made, retain that information in their mind, use or 
weigh that information as part of the decision-making process or communicate their 
decision four specific abilities should be assessed: the ability to understand information 
about treatment; the ability to appreciate how that information applies to their situation; 
the ability to reason with that information; and the ability to make a choice and express 
it.76   
 
Understanding 
As patients are not expected to demonstrate their ability to arrive at a choice that is 
actually wise, prudent or competent when assessed in the light of their actual values, 
beliefs and preferences, i.e. the outcome of the deliberative process is not what is being 
tested for or assessed, appearances suggest that there is no need for a patient to 
demonstrate actual understanding of the treatment information.77   
 
However, according to the Code of practice there is a difference between unwise 
decisions, which a person has the right to make, and decisions based on a lack of 
understanding of risks or the inability to weigh up the information about a decision.78   
In respect of the latter the Code confirms that a decision of the patient can form part of a 
capacity assessment, particularly if someone repeatedly makes decisions that put them at 
risk or result in harm to them or someone else.79  This results in a situation where patients 
must actually understand the information that is relevant to their decision.80   
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So we arrive at the somewhat confusing situation whereby a general understanding of the 
information a patient must be told for a physician to escape liability for the intentional 
tort of battery will suffice, i.e. the patient must be told in broad terms the nature and 
purpose of medical treatment and of the likely consequences of accepting or refusing 
treatment,81 whereas patients must actually understand information pertaining to risks and 
side effects that form part of the doctors duty in negligence.  The problem is that the 
relationship between information and how it relates to any individual patient and in 
particular their values is co-dependent and so it is somewhat disingenuous to maintain a 
distinction between what the patient must be told in battery and negligence, i.e. no real 
divide exists.  For instance, a battery theory of law seeks to maintain a position whereby 
its requirements will be satisfied by medical knowledge, i.e. diagnosis and prognosis, 
whereas it has been determined that in negligence a doctor must also know something 
more about the patient and in particular their values, beliefs and preferences because 
patients must understand how information about risks relates to their own situation.  
Whilst the judgment in Chester v Afshar maintains the distinction between battery and 
negligence its strength lies in recognising that the same degree or level of knowledge and 
understanding that is relevant in negligence is pertinent in battery also because the patient 
must appreciate what the likely consequences will be for them of accepting or refusing 
treatment.  Crucially, the patient must understand what the possible benefits and harms of 
treatment are in order to fully appreciate what the consequences for them may be if they 
should decide one way rather than another. 
 
Retaining Information 
According to the Code of Practice a patient must be able to hold information in their 
mind long enough to use it to make an effective decision.82  The latter points suggests 
that a person’s memory should work sufficiently well to enable them to make a decision 
in conformity with existing values or to at least appreciate that their current decision 
entails a departure from them.   
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Using or Weighing Information  
Sometimes a condition, which may or may not be of a psychiatric nature, can interfere 
with a person’s ability to understand information.83  It is also the case that sometimes 
people can understand treatment information but an impairment or disturbance, such as a 
compulsive disorder or phobia, prevents them from using or weighing it.  For example a 
person with anorexia nervosa may understand treatment information about the 
consequences of not eating but their compulsion not to eat might be too strong for them 
to ignore.84  In Banks v Goodfellow, for instance, Lord Cockburn C.J. remarked that, ‘one 
object may be so forced upon the attention of the invalid as to shut out all others that 
might require consideration’.85   
 
So potential decision-makers are invited to consider whether the patient has the capacity 
to apply facts to values and through a process of reasoning and deliberation arrive at a 
decision that suits them best, i.e. does the patient have a general understanding of their 
condition and treatment; can they apply that information to their situation, i.e. how their 
life will be affected by their medical condition if untreated, and how their future life 
prospects may be improved by treatment, together with the possible risks to them of 
treatment, and is the patients’ decision consistent with the facts and values of this case.86  
Dan Brock has written about this process and states that: 
 
“Besides the capacity to understand relevant information, decision-making 
competence requires the capacity to use that information in a process of reasoning 
and deliberation.  That process largely consists of “if/then” reasoning – if I choose 
this, then these will be the consequences.  Also required is the capacity to entertain 
at once or serially, and to compare the consequences of, alternative choices or 
courses of action.  These are capacities that ordinary people regularly exercise in 
going about their everyday lives, and so they will be available for medical decision-
making unless special circumstances impair them. 
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Finally, patients require values, preferences, plans and purposes for their lives that 
they can use to evaluate the desirability of the consequences of alternative 
treatments, including the alternative of no treatment, and to select the one that will 
be best for them.  This is not to say that people must already possess articulated 
values with determinative relative weights that could then be applied in a 
straightforward and mechanical way to yield a decision about treatment.  Serious 
medical choices often confront patients with new and difficult choices that go 
beyond their previous experiences.  What is then necessary is the capacity to decide 
what value to place on various alternative consequences and outcomes so as to be 
able to reach a decision about a course of action.  This too is a capacity that 
ordinary people also exercise in non-medical circumstances when they are faced 
with new and unfamiliar choices.  It is important to distinguish this third capacity 
to have and apply values because some accounts of competence require only 
capacities for understanding and reasoning.  These accounts are defective, 
however, because a patient’s values can be impaired as well.  Perhaps the most 
important example is when severe depression distorts patients’ values so that they 
no longer care about the harm, even including death,that may come to them without 
treatment.  There may be no failure in their understanding or reasoning about this 
outcome, but they ‘no longer care’ about the harm that will come to them.  Here, 
mental illness that distorts what they value from what it would otherwise be can 
result in incompetence to decide about treatment”.87 
 
Consequently, a seemingly irrational or incoherent choice may trigger a capacity 
assessment or might at least alert a physician to assess decision-making capacity more 
carefully.  This is despite the fact that the outcome of the decision-making process is not 
part of what is being measured and therefore patients are permitted to make an unwise 
decision.  Several factors might explain the decision, for example it may be due to a 
change in mental status although some changes in mental status might only be temporary 
in which case it is possible that treatment could be delayed until such time as the patient 
is able to make their own decision.88  Alternatively necessary and appropriate treatment 
might be refused for unknown or irrational reasons and the patient may not be willing to 
discuss their decision.  Although there will be cases where patients refuse treatment for 
unusual or idiosyncratic reasons which are not irrational when examined in more detail.89   
It might also be the case that a risky treatment or procedure is accepted too readily  
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without apparent consideration of the associated risks and benefits which would suggest 
that the patient had failed to adequately process treatment information as well as how it 
applied to their values and thus to their current situation in the time available.90  Finally, a 
patient might be known to have a condition, such as a learning disability or an 
acknowledged fear or discomfort of institutional settings or perhaps even 
disproportionate respect for members of the medical profession, that places them at risk 
of impaired decision-making which might also lead some patients to consent to treatment 
without apparent consideration.91   
 
In all such situations a doctor’s task is to understand the patient’s reasoning and how they 
arrived at their decision.  They will therefore be interested in what the patient understands 
about their medical condition and of the proposed treatment and why it has been accepted 
or rejected in order that any misunderstandings can be corrected.92  This form of 
approach may also throw light on the fact that the patient has made a choice that is 
consistent with their values and should be respected even though it may not be the choice 
that most other persons would make, for example a Jehovah’s Witness who is critically ill 
and refuses a blood transfusion that would return them to full health.93   In other cases 
serious impairments in the patient’s decision-making may be uncovered that resist 
correction by way of further explanation and there could be many reasons for this, for 
example the patient may be gripped by fear about undergoing treatment or a procedure.94  
The question will then be whether the patient’s decision-making is sufficiently impaired 
for them to be judged incompetent to decide.95  This raises an analogous question about 
how much uncertainty in the patient’s decision-making is compatible with affirming their 
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competence to decide. 96  At issue is the fact that the patient either retains or loses the 
right to make decisions about treatment.97   
 
Brock argues that we need a principled answer to this question so that competence 
determinations do not depend in an arbitrary way on the preferences, values and 
idiosyncrasies of different evaluators, i.e. in this situation I would do this or in these 
circumstances most of my patients choose to accept the treatment that I propose.98  He 
therefore reflects on what principal values or interests are at stake for the patient in 
whether they retain or lose decisional authority and determines that patient’s have an 
interest in autonomy and in their well-being.99   
 
With regard to the patient’s interests in self-determination Brock states that: 
 
“This is the interest of people in making significant decisions about their lives for 
themselves according to their own values or conception of a good life.  It is 
important to understand that this interests does not depend on an assumption that 
individuals will always make the decision that is best for them, according to either 
their own or anyone else’s conception of what is best for them… We want to make 
our own decisions because that is the way we exercise some measure of control 
over and take responsibility for our lives, even recognising that we will not always 
make the best decision”.100 
 
On the question of well-being Brock focuses on the harm principle and the fact that most 
people have a natural wish to avoid anything that is likely to have a harmful impact on 
well-being.  He says that: 
 
“In some cases patients’ refusal of their physicians’ treatment recommendations 
could have a great and harmful impact on their well-being, including in some cases 
leading to their preventable death.  Sometimes not refusing all treatment but 
insisting on a far from optimal treatment can also have serious adverse effects on 
patients’ well-being.  Individuals’ reasonable and near universal concern for their 
own well-being supports steps to protect it when their seriously impaired decision-
making capacities result in a treatment choice that would be seriously harmful to 
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them.  This is not an imposition that most patients would not want, though they may 
be resisting it at the time.  Most patients would want others to act to protect their 
well-being if their decision-making is seriously impaired and has resulted in a 
choice likely to be seriously harmful”.101 
 
Of course Brock acknowledges that in most instances no conflict will exist between 
expressing a treatment choice that is in accord with a patients’ well-being and respecting 
their self-determination.102  On those occasions, he argues, the patient’s decisional 
authority and treatment choice should be respected.103  But when the patient’s decision-
making capacities are seriously impaired resulting in a harmful choice these two values 
will be in conflict and must be balanced.104  Although here Brock concedes that it is not 
possible to state precisely how they should be balanced or traded off because the matter 
remains ethically controversial due to the fact that different people attach different weight 
or importance to their own self-determination and well-being.105  In essence therefore 
potential decision-makers or evaluators should seek to avoid two possible mistakes; on 
the one hand, failing to adequately respect the patient’s self-determination when the 
patient has sufficient decision-making capacity and on the other hand failing to protect 
the patient’s well-being when the patient’s seriously impaired decision-making capacity 
has led to a seriously harmful choice.106 
 
Fluctuating Capacity 
Conditions like manic depression can mean that a person has capacity to make decisions 
on some occasions and not at others.107  Temporary factors such as acute illness or severe 
pain may also affect some people’s ability to make decisions.  Other examples include 
the effects of distress or even medication.108  The question is whether these are factors 
that might escape the attention of someone assessing another’s ability to make a decision.  
In relation to the effects of medication Baroness Finlay of Llandaff has previously stated 
that: 
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“If I can give you two specific and very common instances, one where patients have 
been anxious, which is understandable because they are facing dying, and where 
the benzodiazepine group of drugs such as Midazolam are used to remove the 
churning drive of anxiety without sedating the patient so they can still function but 
they are relived in part of this desperate feeling of anxiety, butterflies and churning 
inside.  With some of these patients you can have a conversation and they appear to 
understand everything that is said and have recall.  The following day they have no 
recall whatsoever of that conversation.  It may have been a few hours later in some 
patients.  Another situation which arises is where patients’ calcium goes up and 
that occurs in about ten per cent of all cancer patients.  They become confused.  
That is a gradual onset and the outset is difficult to diagnose.  They may appear to 
be arguing rationally but when their calcium level has been brought down and is 
treated they then are behaving differently and they have no recall of that previous 
conversation to the direction that they were trying to give in expressing what they 
wanted.  Also they may completely change their mind which is a terribly important 
situation for a clinician.  The difficulty is in judging whether they have capacity or 
not because at any one point in time the conversation appears to be logical and 
consequential.  There are lots of other situations which arise, particularly with 
patients on steroids, where the steroids may have created a very mild steroid 
psychosis which can be difficult to diagnose and just presents as emotional 
immobility.  Again their thinking and perception is distorted”.109 
 
A Formal Capacity Assessment Tool:110 Potential Decision-Makers should have 
regard to the Values of the Patient in Deciding111 
The Code of Practice in support of the MCA confirms that anyone who believes that a 
person lacks capacity should be able to prove their case112 by giving reasons and 
providing objective evidence in support of their belief.113  A decision to restrict autonomy 
therefore requires a clear and convincing assessment that a patient’s decision regarding 
care was non-autonomous necessitating beneficent intervention to prevent unintended, 
irreparable harm to them.114  However, harm is difficult to define in this context because 
what is deemed harmful varies from one person and set of circumstances to another.115  
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Plus people differ in estimating the likely harm that will ensue from their decisions and 
actions and if autonomy not harm is the dominant consideration then it is important that 
potential decision-makers should have at the forefront of their mind the patient’s right to 
refuse necessary and appropriate treatment, including life-preserving treatment.116   
 
If harm were to become the dominant principal there is a danger that what is in one’s 
medical best interests would become the overriding consideration when what we seek to 
establish is whether there is a lack of congruity with the patient’s values not those of the 
doctor.  Therefore, is there an argument for establishing some sort of link between 
decision-making capacity and competence in terms of arriving at a decision that is 
consistent with what has gone before and an expectation that a seemingly inconsistent 
response can be appreciated and explained, for example, my diet consists of a lot of fresh 
fruit but now that I am older I find that too much acid tends to create problems with 
digestion.  If so one way of balancing respect for autonomy with the need to act 
beneficently is to emphasise how the subjective nature of the particular patient is likely to 
influence their decisions about personal welfare which is an idea that more recent case 
law tends to support.     
 
For example, in Re B117 there is a reference to the significance of distinguishing between 
capacity and best interests in the context of consent to treatment118 and in this regard 
Butler-Sloss P. stated that: 
 
“If there are difficulties in deciding whether the patient has sufficient mental 
capacity particularly if the refusal may have grave consequences for the patient, it 
is most important that those considering the issue should not confuse the question 
of mental capacity with the nature of the decision made by the patient, however 
grave the consequences.  The view of the patient may reflect a difference in values 
rather than an absence of competence and the assessment of capacity should be 
approached with this firmly in mind.  The doctors must not allow their emotional 
reaction to or strong disagreement with the decision of the patient to cloud their 
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judgment in answering the primary question whether the patient has the mental 
capacity to make the decision”.119 
 
In Masterman-Lister v Jewell Wright J. said: 
 
“Although the opinions of skilled and experienced medical practitioners are a very 
important element in the evidence to be considered by the court, that element has to 
be considered in conjunction with any other evidence that there may be about the 
manner in which the subject of the enquiry actually has conducted his everyday life 
and affairs”.120 
 
Finally, in Lindsay v Wood Stanley Burnton J. said: 
 
“When considering the question of capacity, psychiatrists and psychologists will 
normally wish to take into account all aspects of the personality and behaviour of 
the person in question, including vulnerability to exploitation.  However, 
vulnerability to exploitation does not of itself lead to the conclusion that there is a 
lack of capacity.  Many people who have full capacity are vulnerable to 
exploitation, or more so than most other people.  Many people make rash and 
irresponsible decisions, but are of full capacity.  The issue is whether the person 
concerned has the mental capacity to make a rational decision”.121 
 
These decisions are a reflection of the priority that is accorded to autonomy in law and 
more specifically to the right to make decisions in accordance with one’s own value 
system even when the decision will have consequences for one’s own life, health and 
well-being. Therefore is seems reasonable to argue that a finding for or against decision-
making capacity should be based on whether the patient is able to understand, use and 
weigh treatment information in the balance and can comprehend the likely consequences 
of deciding to exercise the right of choice one way rather than another in the light of their 
own values, beliefs and preferences.   
 
However, whilst there will be clear cases of patient incompetence, such as when a person 
is unconscious or in a persistent vegetative state, on what basis should a doctor decide in 
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other instances of borderline or fluctuating competence whether the patient is competent 
or incompetent to make their own decisions in the absence of any knowledge and 
understanding of the patient and their values, beliefs and preferences other than on the 
basis of medical knowledge and clinical experience?  In other words knowledge of the 
patient and their values should mark the designated starting point for a discussion on 
capacity because an absence of such knowledge will potentially leave doctors unsure of 
what they are aiming for when assessing whether the patient is competent to decide.  
Moreover, different doctors might come to different conclusions about the patient’s 
ability to decide.  Therefore, the patient’s own value system introduces coherence where 
currently there is none in deciding whether the patient is competent to decide.   
 
The Power to Decide and Act on behalf of Persons who Lack Decision-Making 
Capacity 
 
As a person who lacks decision-making capacity is not capable of making decisions and 
acting autonomously they are prevented from consenting to or refusing to consent to a 
medical treatment and instead someone else must make decisions and act on behalf of the 
patient.122  This is because the mentally incapacitated patient is deemed to be incapable of 
further their own welfare and other interests.  On the other hand English courts have 
unreservedly accepted that a patient’s body is inviolable such that any physically invasive 
medical treatment or procedure, however trivial, is unlawful unless authorised by consent 
or other lawful authority.123  So on what authority is medical intervention justified and in 
particular is it possible to consent to treatment for and on behalf of a mentally 
incapacitated patient? 
 
Next of Kin: No Automatic Power to Consent 
Contrary to popular belief family members have no legal right to consent to medical 
treatment on behalf of their mentally incapacitated relative.124  Nevertheless, the courts 
have stated that medical practitioners should consult relatives and friends prior to 
administering treatment when the interests of the patient will not suffer from any ensuing 
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delay.125  This is desirable for two reasons.  First, because it may reveal that the patient 
has made an anticipatory choice which would be binding on the practitioner if it was 
valid and applicable in the circumstances giving rise to decision.126  Alternatively 
information may be revealed as to the personal wishes of the patient and the choice they 
would have made if in a position to decide and these are factors that a physician would be 
bound to take into account in deciding what is in the best interests of the patient.127 
 
Indeed some academics have suggested that whilst the doctor’s position in such a case is 
not easy, because of the many factors they must consider, the involvement of friends and 
family in the decision-making process could be of value in diminishing the likelihood of 
a patient feeling aggrieved at the invasion of their bodily integrity.128 
 
LPA’s: Conferring Power and Authority to Consent 
Alternatively persons can create a lasting power of attorney (LPA) to formally appoint 
and confer authority on a specific other(s) to make welfare, including health, decisions on 
their behalf.129  Whilst a strict set of formalities must be observed or complied with in 
creating an LPA130 it does mean that the appointed person or donee may either consent  
or refuse to consent to medical treatment on behalf of the donor unless their rights in this 
respect are restricted because the donor has capacity to make the particular healthcare 
decision,131 or has since made a legally valid and applicable advance decision to refuse 
the proposed medical treatment,132 or the decision concerns life-preserving treatment 
which an attorney has no power to accept or reject on behalf of the donor unless the LPA 
specifically authorises this.133   The donor can of course restrict the powers of the 
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attorney either by specifying the powers that the donee is granted or by specifying the 
types of decisions that the donee is not empowered to make.134 
 
Selecting a Surrogate Decision-Maker 
Obviously people differ in their reasons for making certain arrangements and so it is 
often dangerous to make assumptions and generalisations about what prompted or 
motivated them to do so.  However, that is precisely what I am now about to do.  It seems 
to me that the factor influencing anyone that would go to the trouble and expense of 
creating a lasting power of attorney is a strong desire to appoint someone they trust to 
make decisions in accordance with their pre-existing values, beliefs and preferences.  
This must surely be the case as they were not content to leave matters in the hands of a 
stranger, albeit someone, such as a doctor, who is professionally and legally required to 
make decisions and act in their best interests.135   
 
The primary concern could not therefore have been to choose someone who cares about 
their well-being per se as Brock has suggested.  A preferable view is that the attorney, 
who will most likely be a close relative or friend of the patient and will therefore be both 
familiar with and to them, will, most importantly, also be someone who is familiar with 
their personal values and attitudes to life or more specifically to what constitutes a good 
life for them and death also and can to that extent be relied upon to care enough about 
their personal sense of well-being to make decisions in conformity with them.136  
Arguably therefore, the donor seeks to appoint someone they trust to uphold their former 
autonomous wishes in decisions concerning them.   
 
What this suggests, is that when there are doubts about whether a patient’s partially or 
questionably competent preferences should be respected, physicians should be guided by 
the patient’s previous values and beliefs and not simply by the patient’s best medical 
interests as those might be understood from a medical perspective and in creating an LPA 
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an attorney has been cast into the role of providing the relevant insight.137  So in this 
situation diminished competence does not eliminate obligations based on respect for a 
patient’s autonomy as expressed in their history of values and beliefs.138 
 
Predicting Preferences 
Will the attorney be able to accurately predict what the patient would have wanted?  The 
evidence is mixed.  Fagerlin and Schneider, for example, have reported that although we 
might hope that intimates already know the patient’s mind, so that only modest demands 
need be made on their interpreting skills, many studies show that when surrogates are 
asked to predict what treatment the patient would choose that approximately 70 per cent 
of the predictions were correct.139  These authors do not find these results particularly 
inspiring when considered in the context of life and death decision-making.140   
 
Brock provides an explanation for why surrogate decision-makers might find it difficult 
to predict the patient’s preferences: 
 
“Since surrogates will usually be a close family member or friend of the patient, 
their job will be to use their knowledge of the patient to attempt to decide what the 
patient would have wanted in the circumstances.  Sometimes this will be relatively 
clear as a result of previous explicit discussions with the patient about the patient’s 
treatment wishes, although these too will usually have been relatively general and 
so require some interpretation by the surrogate for the decision at hand.  In other 
cases, in the absence of explicit prior discussions, surrogates will have to use their 
general knowledge of the patient’s values and desires to make a judgment about 
what the patient would likely have wanted.  In either case, surrogates will often 
have to make judgments in the face of some uncertainty about what the patient 
would have wanted”.141 
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Mixed Values 
Laurence McCullough focuses on the problem that all too often surrogate decision-
makers mix their own values with those of the patient and this leads to uncertainty in the 
decision-making process, this is what he has to say: 
 
“Recognition of the importance of the patient’s value history helps to clarify the 
role of family members in the case of patients with diminished competence: they 
become an important source for helping the physician to construct the required 
value history.  Because family members mix their own values and beliefs with the 
patient’s values histories, the physician might be uncertain how to proceed in light 
of requests of family members for or against diagnostic and treatment 
interventions.  In these circumstances, the physician should help family members to 
distinguish their own values and beliefs from those of the patient, by having them 
focus on what the patient would want. 
 
Determining a patient’s value history post hoc will frequently be a difficult matter.  
As a consequence, the best way to base diagnostic and treatment decisions on a 
patient’s value history is to develop that history in advance of the patient’s decline 
to a condition of diminished or partial competence”.142 
 
There is also the issue of whether the donee will at some stage begin to relate to their 
family member or friend as an incompetent person who has needs and desires that 
conflict with those of their previous competent self.  In many respects this would be an 
entirely natural thing to happen if they cared about them and continued to have a 
relationship of sorts with the patient.  On the other hand it is not unknown for persons to 
desert a sinking ship so to speak.  Richard Jones, for example, has noted the comment of 
the House of Lords Select Committee on Medical Ethics that personal relationships are 
not immutable.143  So at either extreme there may be some difficulty in ensuring the 
continued objectivity of the proxy decision-maker (even when acting in good faith).144 
 
Conflict of Interests 
This, like most others, is potentially a difficult area.  There is some evidence that in 
respect of LPA’s for property and affairs that financial abuse will arise in a small 
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proportion of cases.145  Potential conflicts can also arise between the attorney and patient 
in respect of welfare matters.146  For example, a decision to place the patient in a care 
home might have the effect of reducing the potential inheritance of the donee.147  We 
have also observed in previous chapters that people are capable of behaving altruistically 
and will therefore consider or promote the interests of others, in particular family, friends 
and close associates, above their own self-interests when it comes to making decisions 
including those concerning their own health and welfare.148  In this regard Brock has 
remarked that it should not always be assumed that surrogates should never give weight 
to their own interests, since in some cases there may be good reason to believe that the 
patient selected this surrogate in order for them to be able to do just that.149   
 
Monitoring 
Certain formalities must be complied with in order for an attorney to be permitted to 
make decisions on behalf of another when they are no longer competent to manage their 
own affairs.  In particular an LPA must be registered at the office of the Public 
Guardian.150  Whereupon it becomes a function of that office to oversee the role of the 
donee and where necessary to investigate any complaints about the way in which they are 
discharging their powers and authority.151  If a serious complaint was lodged or if the 
Public Guardian had misgivings about the conduct of the attorney they can report the 
matter to the court152 and the court could give directions regarding how the LPA should 
be used.   Alternatively they could decide, if sufficiently concerned about the welfare of 
the patient, to revoke the LPA.153   
 
What Duties does an Attorney have? 
The MCA imposes certain duties that apply to anybody who is required to make 
decisions and to take action on behalf of a mentally incapacitated person or patient.   
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More specifically an attorney must follow the Act’s statutory principles;154 make 
decisions in the donor’s best interests;155 have regard to the guidance contained in the 
Code of Practice;156 act within the scope of the authority the LPA provides for157 and in 
certain circumstances to comply with any directions, or decisions, the Court of Protection 
might make,158 such as producing records or specific information or documentation.159  
Finally, an attorney cannot usually delegate their authority to someone else unless 
specifically authorised by the donor.160 
 
Fiduciary Duty 
An attorney appointed under an LPA acts as the chosen agent of the donor.161  Under the 
law of agency an act of an agent that is done within the scope of their authority is binding 
on the principal which in this case will be the donor.162  As such an attorney’s role carries 
with it a great deal of power.163  Therefore, a donee is bound by a number of common law 
duties towards the donor when they act as their agent.164  Amongst other things a donee 
must act with due care and skill and in good faith when making decisions.  Acting in 
good faith means that an attorney should act with honesty and integrity at all times.165  
This means that an attorney must try to ensure that their decisions do not go against a 
decision the donor made while they still had capacity.166  One assumes therefore that an 
attorney should be required to respect the value system of a donor that was disclosed in a 
living will, for instance.  In this way the pre-existing values, beliefs and preferences of 
the patient are made relevant to decisions concerning them. 
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Additionally, an attorney must not permit their own interests to conflict with those of the 
donor, i.e. they must not take advantage of their position and in particular must not 
benefit themselves but benefit the donor.167  Neither must an attorney allow any other 
influences to affect their decisions or the way in which they act.168  This could mean that 
an attorney should not be influenced by the values and preferences of the incompetent 
where these would conflict with their former autonomously held values.  More 
importantly, these features spell out the special nature of the relationship that exists 
between the parties and also explains why it is treated as a fiduciary relationship in 
law.169     
 
What Standard should the Surrogate Apply in Making Decisions? 
Here the Act is somewhat anomalous in adopting the standard of best interests170 in 
preference to that of substituted judgment which would require an attorney to make the 
decision the donor would make if competence was notionally restored.171  Is the 
difference between these two standards more imagined than real?  Well, to decide what is 
in someone’s best interests decision-makers must have regard to the statutory principles 
and welfare checklist.  In this regard they must consider, so far as is reasonably possible, 
the patient’s past and present wishes and feelings, and in particular any relevant written 
statement they may have made at a time when they had decision-making capacity;172 the 
beliefs and values that would be likely to influence their decision if they had capacity173 
and any other factors that they would be likely to consider if able to do so.174  An attorney 
must also take into account, if it is practicable and appropriate to consult them, the views 
of anyone the person has named as someone to be consulted on the matter in question or 
on matters of that kind,175 anyone engaged in caring for the person or who is interested in 
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their welfare,176 i.e. medical professionals, any other donee of an LPA177 and finally any 
deputy appointed by the court.178   
 
Taking these factors into account a best interests decision is likely to differ from one 
based on, or that was more closely approximated to the standards and practices upheld by 
substituted judgment.  This is because best interests fails to incorporate a method for 
deciding.  As a consequence the standard does not apportion any particular weight to the 
pre-existing autonomous wishes, values and beliefs of formerly competent patients.  
Moreover, the designated decision-maker, in this case the attorney, must consult 
significant others in order to obtain their views, including those of the doctor who 
recommended the treatment currently under consideration.  However, regard must be had 
for the principle of the least restrictive option which could be construed as an organising 
principle.179  Essentially decision-makers are encouraged to consider what other options 
for treatment exist that are as effective as the one proposed in a way that is less restrictive 
of the patient’s (future) rights and freedom of action and so non-treatment is an option.180  
As I have previously commented this provision has a warm glow about it because it is 
both thoughtful and thought provoking as it reminds decision-makers, if a reminder were 
needed, to place the patient at the heart of the decision-making process.181  Of course 
cynics might argue that this principle has been couched in terms that seek to persuade an 
ambivalent attorney round to a consensus viewpoint, i.e. well we could try this, regarding 
treatment or non-treatment on the grounds that their decision will least offend against the 
donor’s rights and interests which is a pretty powerful argument when faced with 
indecision and one that might help soothe a troubled conscience.  Yet aside from all of 
that the provision, though well-intentioned, fails to state exactly whose rights and 
interests are being promoted.  Is it those of the incompetent or their former competent 
self?  As these could be quite different things bearing in mind the former has a right to 
beneficence through which their current wishes and feelings deserve respect whilst the 
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latter has a right to self-determine matters in accordance with their former values, beliefs 
and preferences.  If, as seems likely, these are in conflict the standard does not enlighten 
us about how they should be balanced?  So as the law stands a person who wanted to 
ensure that health and welfare decisions were taken in accordance with their former 
values has two options.  They can either attempt to make an advance treatment decision 
or impose any conditions or restrictions onto the decision-making process and to make 
these known in the LPA as the attorney must comply with these.182   
 
A Doctor’s Right to Challenge 
Doctors and donees are both required to work in the patient’s best interests.  The attorney 
should be given information about the nature of the treatment that is being proposed and 
its consequences for the patient.  Essentially, the attorney is given the information that the 
patient would have received if competent to decide.183  However, ‘best interests’ is open 
to interpretation simply because the test is not fully defined and does not incorporate a 
method for deciding.  This might lead to differences in the factors that were considered 
by the parties.184  Differences could also emerge from the way in which certain factors 
under consideration have been weighted or ranked during the decision-making process.   
 
An LPA, unless restricted, gives an attorney a right to refuse treatment that has been 
recommended in the patient’s best interests by a medical professional.  This is an 
important function of any attorney when the law’s requirement for consent resides in the 
right to be maintained inviolate.  Yet an attorney might not accurately reflect the patient’s 
wishes for any number of reasons including those discussed earlier in this chapter under 
‘predicting preferences’.  The possibility that a conflict of interests will arise cannot be 
dismissed out of hand either.  In this regard Richard Jones reports that this problem is not 
common but neither is it rare and illustrates how such a conflict can arise, the following 
example was given in evidence to the Joint Committee for the Mental Capacity Bill by 
Baroness Finlay:185   
 
                                                 
182
 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s.9(4)(b) 
183
 Jones, Richard, Mental Capacity Act Manual, 2008, Third Edition, Sweet and Maxwell, p.55, para.1-114 
184
 Ibid, p.56, para.1-119 
185
 Ibid, p.53, para.1-105 
 164
“A lady aged 59 was very ill.  Her family appeared to be very concerned about her 
pain and constantly asked for her diamorphine to be increased.  However, we 
remained unconvinced that her pain was really that severe.  In fact, the patient 
declined increasing doses of diamorphine. Her 60th birthday arrived and was 
passed with minimal celebration, after which the family visited very little.  She 
became depressed and spoke to one of the night nurses, explaining that the problem 
was that on her 60th birthday, her fixed-term life insurance policy expired.  The 
family would not now inherit what they thought they would if she had died, and if 
her drugs had been duly increased”.186 
 
The reality that one’s attention is being drawn towards is that an attorney has the power 
to refuse a treatment or procedure on behalf of the patient, although an attorney has no 
right to refuse life-sustaining treatment unless specifically authorised in the LPA.187  
Therefore, a non-medical donee can override a doctor’s clinical judgment as to what 
treatment the patient should receive.188  And it might be perfectly possible for a donee to 
maintain, with some justification, that what has been decided has been decided in the best 
interests of the patient it is just that the doctor who is a medical expert might not think it a 
fair and reasonable view of best interests.189  You might recall that it is accepted that 
well-being is not solely defined by good health although that is an important part of it, 
because poor health imposes restriction rather than freedom of choice.  However, if a 
doctor wishes to challenge a decision made by the donee not to consent to treatment the 
doctor can make an application to the Court of Protection for a ruling or decision that will 
override that of the donee’s on the ground that they are not acting in the best interests of 
the patient.190 
 
The question highlighted by some is whether doctors will have the time, energy and 
motivation to ask a court to override a donee whose determination of best interests 
appears to them to be defective or questionable.191  You see it has been argued that a 
doctor who has no previous experience of the patient and who is confronted by a donee 
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who articulates their views plausibly and forcefully might not have the strength of 
purpose and the degree of self-belief to refer the matter to the Court. 192 
 
Exceptions 
Most obviously an attorney has no right to insist that a particular form of treatment be 
provided to the patient.  The question of what treatment should the patient receive in their 
best medical interests remains a matter for the doctor to decide in accordance with what 
is acceptable medical193 and professional ethical practice.194  In addition an attorney has 
no automatic right to consent to non-therapeutic interventions or treatments such as an 
organ donation or to refuse basic care, including artificial nutrition and hydration and 
grooming because such treatment would always be in the best interests of the patient.195   
 
One final point of some note is that medical professionals who administer treatment 
despite the existence of an LPA, which provides for an attorney to make the decision in 
question, is protected from liability unless they are satisfied, at that time, that such an 
LPA exists.196  A similar exception exists in relation to urgent treatment, i.e. treatment 
that is life-sustaining or that is intended to prevent serious deterioration in a patient’s 
condition.197  So if there is no time to contact the donee, the healthcare professional may 
treat the patient in their best interests and report the matter to the donee later. 198  This 
could be an avenue of hope that a medical professional might use to their advantage in 
any dispute with an attorney about what is in the patient’s best interests. 
 
The Jurisdiction of the Courts 
Does the court have power to consent on behalf of an adult incompetent patient?  The 
new Court of Protection has no power to consent to treatment on behalf of a mentally 
incapacitated patient though the court has power, to decide whether a person has capacity 
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to make a particular decision, i.e. a questions must be real rather than merely 
hypothetical,199 and to make declarations on financial or welfare matters affecting people 
who lack capacity to decide,200 based on what is in the best interests of the patient.201  
The Court of Protection’s jurisdiction to make declarations is founded on the inherent 
jurisdiction of the High Court which may be used in appropriate cases to meet 
circumstances unmet by the scope of legislation.202  That jurisdiction was not displaced 
by the MCA.203   This is consistent with the common law position that was established in 
Re F.204  In that case the House of Lords determined that the court had no statutory power 
to consent to treatment because its common law power had been revoked but that it 
remained open to the court to use its inherent jurisdiction for the protection of vulnerable 
adults who lack decision-making capacity to make a declaration that a medical treatment 
or procedure was in a patient’s best interests.205   
 
Prerogative Power: The Parens Patriae Jurisdiction  
The parens patriae jurisdiction emanates from an ancient prerogative206 power of the 
sovereign to care for the welfare and other affairs of persons of unsound mind.207     
 
Power was conferred by Royal Warrant under the Sign Manual208 and subsequent 
Warrants extended that jurisdiction to the Lord Chancellor and eventually to other 
judicial officers.209  However, in Re F all members of the Court of Appeal and House of 
Lords agreed that their power to exercise the jurisdiction ended on the 1st November 1960 
as section 1 of the Mental Health Act 1959 swept away previous legislative provisions 
dealing with incapable adults and at the same time revoked the Warrant under the Sign 
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Manual removing the jurisdiction from the common law completely.210  Only Neill LJ 
was inclined to think that the power remained but had fallen into a state of abeyance so 
that it was incapable of being exercised adding that ‘it would require clear statutory 
words to remove from the Crown a prerogative power which has vested in the Crown 
since at least 1325’.211  
 
The Significance of the Jurisdiction: To Benefit an Incompetent   
The importance of the jurisdiction is that it permitted a court to consent or to refuse 
consent to medical treatment on behalf of an incapable patient.212  Indeed case law dating 
back to 1603 confirms that the jurisdiction had never been limited by definition and 
therefore those who exercised power under it had an inherent right to do whatever was 
for the benefit of an incompetent. 213  In this regard the jurisdiction is interesting in 
distinguishing between formerly and never competent persons, adopting a fiduciary 
decision-making standard in respect of the former though not the latter. 214  This reflected 
the need to maximise the interests of the beneficiaries and ensured that those charged 
with exercising the power could in the future be held to account for their decisions and 
actions.  
 
The Jurisdiction Distinguished between Formerly and Never Competents 
As previously indicated the prerogative was originally exercised by the monarch, as the 
parent of the country, to care for persons of unsound mind.  The jurisdiction therefore 
came into effect when it was found that a person was in need of protection and it had 
been determined that they were no longer capable of acting on their own behalf.215  
However, in accordance with the statute De Prerogativa Regis 1324 an important 
distinction was made between lunatics and natural fools or idiots. 
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Consequently once the jurisdiction had been invoked different administrative 
arrangements were created for persons who were similarly situated.  The King took 
jurisdiction over natural idiots as a guardian and lunatics as a trustee.216  Lunatics were 
presumed to be temporarily incompetent adults who previously had the capacity for 
self-determination and therefore a life that would be characterised by the conventions 
of the day.  This would include engaging in transactions, managing things and people, 
and making and enforcing promises.217     As a response the statute provided an 
administrator who was responsible to him.  Moreover, the lunatic was given a right to 
an accounting which he would be able to enforce upon his recovery.  All of the legal 
obligations owed by the King and the administrators were duties owed to the lunatic 
and to his household as an extension of himself.218  Whereas the section governing 
idiots states explicitly that its purpose is to prevent the disinheritance of the idiot’s 
heirs.219   
 
Right to an Accounting regarding Property and Affairs: Fiduciary Decision-Making 
Standard Implied  
A fiduciary standard is implied in the use of this prerogative power in relation to 
previously competent persons.220  This is based on the fact that decision-makers must 
adopt an attitude of respectful friendship toward the incompetent person, just as though 
they were to be accountable to the person himself, were he to recover his faculties and 
become competent once more.221  Consequently, decision-makers were required to 
maximise the interests of the beneficiaries and to exercise loyalty and good faith in the 
performance of their duties.222  There is therefore an underlying concern with the agent’s 
state of mind or more precisely with preventing them from taking advantage of their 
position and this is achieved by introducing the notion of an accounting which is intended 
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to promote honesty, transparency, fairness and an absence of intent to do harm when 
acting on behalf of an otherwise vulnerable person.223   
 
The State meanwhile must not impose policies or advance interests of its own in the 
supervision of the affairs of an incompetent, apart from interests arising legitimately out 
of the state’s institutional interest in providing competent administration for the benefit of 
the incompetents themselves.224  As a surrogate decision-maker could be required to give 
an account of decisions made and action taken on behalf of a complete stranger, State 
responsibility would appear to reside in the provision of a comprehensive decision-
making framework that would assist surrogate decision-makers to carry out their more 
specific duties.  The framework for decision would set out which criteria are relevant to 
consider and put forward a method for deciding the weight that should be given to the 
individual factors under consideration.  This should narrow the scope for paternalistic 
tendencies to emerge, would prevent arbitrary and other misuses of executive powers and 
lead to certainty and confidence in surrogate decision-making processes.   
 
State Administration 
Initially the office of Lord Chancellor was awarded to men of the cloth who were 
required to exercise judgment in accordance with what their conscience told them was the 
morally correct thing to do.  This created the problem that decision-making was to an 
extent arbitrary reflecting the values and influences of the decision-maker.  Eventually, 
the role of Lord Chancellor was given over to a member of the judiciary and decision-
making processes were governed by legal principles and rules.   
 
However, as the keeper of the King’s conscience in the exercise of so widely drawn 
power, the Lord Chancellor required a flexible system of principles, rules and remedies 
that could be adapted to meet the needs and circumstances of a particular case.  
Accordingly, the Chancellor exercised the power to decide by giving effect to the court’s 
equitable jurisdiction.  Common law rules, principles and remedies were deemed to be 
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too inflexible to be of any use to decision-makers in deciding how to benefit an assisted 
person. 
 
Equitable remedies225 proved popular and came to rival and conflict with those of the 
common law as people generally seemed interested in the court ordering someone to do 
something or prohibiting some act as opposed to claiming damages for detriments 
suffered.  The effect of this was to bring the separate jurisdictions of equity and the 
common law into dispute.  But it was settled that in the event of a conflict between equity 
and the common law, equity would prevail.226   
 
Much later it was decided that the public should be able to rely on certainty in the legal 
system and so the courts of the common law and equity were merged to produce one 
unified court system in which both systems of law could be applied by the same courts.227  
This led to a simplified administrative system of law and greater judicial accountability 
for judgments due to the loss of the independent status previously enjoyed by Chancery 
Court judges.  Thus producing a legal system based on precedents that were relied upon 
to introduce conformity where previously there was none. 
 
Summary 
The parens patriae jurisdiction enabled the court to consent or to refuse medical treatment 
on behalf of an incompetent patient.  However, the effect of the revocation of the Sign 
Manual was to remove the jurisdiction from the common law.228  Accordingly, the courts 
no longer have power to consent or to refuse to consent to medical treatment on behalf of 
a mentally incapacitated adult patient which falls outside of the scope of Mental Health 
legislation.229   
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Court Appointed Deputies 
As previously indicated the Court of Protection can make declarations,230 decisions, or 
orders on health and welfare matters affecting those who lack capacity to make their own 
decisions.231  However, in circumstances where the need to make decisions is ongoing , 
such as might happen when a person suffers a brain injury or has dementia, the court can 
decide to appoint a deputy in a situation where there is no LPA.232  In deciding whether it 
is in someone’s best interests to appoint a deputy the court must apply the Acts 
principles, the best interests checklist233 and have regard for two further principles that 
provide guidance about the practice of conferring discretionary decision-making 
powers.234  The first counsels the court to make the decision itself 235 but if a deputy 
needs to be appointed the second determines that their powers should be as limited in 
scope and duration as befits the circumstances of the case.236   
 
Having decided to appoint a deputy the court will go on to decide who to appoint.  That 
decision will be based on whether the person is likely to be a reliable and trustworthy 
agent of the incompetent.  In this regard they must consider whether the person has the 
requisite level of skill and competence to fulfil the responsibilities of that office and to 
carry out the task they have been given.237  Often the person that is appointed will be a 
member of the incompetent’s family or someone else who knows them well, accepting of 
course that the patient did not care to make them an LPA.  This is not always going to be 
the case because some people do not have an extended family, i.e. brothers and sisters or 
children of their own, their parents might be dead or quite elderly and they might also be 
divorced or separated - a lot of ifs, I know, but it is not so uncommon nowadays.  Also, 
bear in mind the reason for the court’s involvement as this will principally be due to 
disputes between family members or family members and medical professionals about 
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what is in the patient’s best interests.  In these circumstances the court might decide that 
actually the patient’s interests would be better served by someone who is independent of 
the family.238  Of course the deputy is then more likely to be influenced by whatever form 
of treatment the doctor recommends is in the patient’s best medical interests simply 
because they do not know or feel able to rely on information, imparted by family and/or 
friends, about the patient’s former autonomous values, beliefs and preferences to weigh 
in the balance.  Although this does not appear to be what is intended because the deputy’s 
powers to consent or to refuse a medical treatment or procedure are only limited so far as 
refusing life-sustaining treatment which must be taken on behalf of the patient by the 
court.239 
 
In all other important respects the discussion about LPA’s will apply to a court appointed 
deputy.  Consequently, a deputy has a general legal duty to make only those decisions 
that fall within the scope of their authority or as outlined by the Court.240  They must also 
follow the statutory principles241 and have regard to the guidance contained in the Code 
of Practice when making decisions in the patient’s best interests.242  Indeed the court can 
revoke the appointment of a deputy or vary the powers conferred on them if they act,243 
or propose to act,244 in a way that contravenes that authority or is not in the best interests 
of the patient.  The court may as well require a deputy to submit reports to the Public 
Guardian at various intervals.245   
 
Lastly, and most importantly in the context of this thesis, the MCA confirms that a 
deputy is to be treated as ‘the agent’ of the incapacitated patient when they make 
decisions and act on their behalf.246  This means that the deputy, like an LPA, has legal 
duties arising from the law of agency to the person they represent so that in addition to 
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the ordinary duty to act with due care and skill in the performance of their duties a deputy 
is made a fiduciary to the patient and must not therefore take advantage of their position 
but should instead seek to maximise the interests of the patient whilst avoiding possible 
conflicts of interest.247  Consequently, a deputy must act in good faith in carrying out 
their legal duties, which means that they must act with honesty and integrity at all times 
in determining what should happen in the patient’s best interests.248  In this regard the 
Code of Practice explains that a deputy must try to make sure that their decisions do not 
go against a decision the person made while they still had capacity unless it would be in 
their best interests to do so!249     
 
Medical Professionals 
If the medical welfare of all other adult patients who suffer loss of decision-making 
capacity was not to suffer some other lawful authority was needed to justify a decision to 
administer treatment in the absence of patient consent.  
 
The Defence of Necessity: An Exception to the Need for Consent 
In this regard the MCA establishes that a doctor who administers a treatment or 
procedure in the absence of consent may still not be liable for a battery where they can 
raise the defence of necessity.250  The defence could be raised where it would be 
unreasonable as opposed to inconvenient to delay medical intervention251 and where it 
could be shown that the doctor acted in the best interests of the patient252 and there is no 
known objection to treatment, for example, a prior decision of the patient to refuse the 
proposed treatment.253 
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What Aspects of a Person’s Treatment and Care does the Doctrine of Necessity 
Govern? 
In appropriate circumstances the MCA determines that the necessity principle should 
displace respect for the fundamental principle of bodily inviolability.  Remember that the 
right to bodily inviolability is derivative of the right to self-determination and that the 
law’s requirement for consent resides in the right to be maintained inviolate thus 
emphasising the importance of the right to refuse necessary and appropriate medical 
treatment.  If, therefore, we are not to downgrade the status of mentally incompetents it is 
equally important that necessity should not be a defence that applies indiscriminately.  In 
particular, it seems reasonable that medical professionals should be required to 
distinguish between those who are likely to regain competency and those who have been 
rendered permanently or semi-permanently incompetent.     
 
Temporarily Incompetent Patient – Emergency Cases 
In respect of patients rendered temporarily incompetent, perhaps as a result of an 
accident, Lord Goff determined, in the case of Re F, that physicians should do no more 
than is reasonably required, in the best interests of the patient.  This would enable 
patients who are expected to both re-gain consciousness and the requisite decision-
making capacity to be consulted about the prospect of further treatment.254 
 
Permanently Incompetent Patients 
In circumstances where incapacity is of a permanent or semi-permanent nature the 
defence can be raised to justify a wider range of treatment and care.  About this Lord 
Goff has previously stated that: 
 
“Where the state of affairs is permanent or semi-permanent, as may be so in the 
case of a mentally disordered person, there is no point in waiting to obtain the 
patient’s consent.  The need to care for him is obvious, and the doctor must then act 
in the best interests of the patient, just as if he had received his patient’s consent to 
                                                                                                                                                 
Law, 2004, Second Edition, Oxford University Press, para. 3.55; Stauch, Marc, Wheat, Kay, Tingle John, 
2002, Second Edition, Sourcebook on Medical Law, Cavendish Publishing, p.169 
254
 Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1 HL, page 77 
 175
do so.  Were this not so, much useful treatment and care could be denied to the 
unfortunate.”255 
 
The (Ir)Relevance of an Emergency 
As the principle can be used to meet the needs of permanently incompetent patients, who 
are likely to require ongoing care of a fairly basic nature, it is established that the 
principle is one of necessity and not emergency.256  Consequently, the doctrine is not tied 
to purely medical interventions and this means that the defence could be relied on by 
carers, relatives and friends, who were also involved in looking after the patient.257   
 
No Requirement for a Pre-Existing or Continuing Relationship 
If the necessity itself provided the justification for intervention taken on behalf of the 
assisted person it was inevitable that there should be no requirement for a pre-existing or 
continuing relationship between the patient and carer.258  This is to an extent a practical 
matter since physicians may move to another hospital, auxiliary staff may change jobs 
and relationships between the permanently incompetent person and their family and 
friends may change over time.   
 
A further consequence of this inherent flexibility is that the interventions of both 
professional and non-professional persons can be justified by the principle.  The actions 
of physicians are determined, inter alia, by their professional body, Hippocratic 
traditions, ethics committees and by professional Codes of Practice that may have been 
issued by a regulatory body such as the General Medical Council or the National Institute 
for Clinical Excellence.  Medical professionals are also subjected to external supervision, 
most notably by way of laws that are intended to regulate the activities of physicians.  
Therefore, there is reason to suppose that the actions of a professional person should of 
necessity accord with the action that a reasonable person would take when acting in the 
best interests of the assisted person.  Unfortunately, non-professionals are not similarly 
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regulated and yet these people will play a significant role in the treatment and care of the 
permanently incompetent patient. 
 
Possible Limitations on the Defence of Necessity – Unforeseen Treatment 
What should happen in respect of treatment that is necessary to preserve the health and 
well-being of the patient but yet is unconnected to the source of the urgency that impels 
immediate action?  The House of Lords confronted the problem in Re F but provided no 
answer to it preferring instead to leave the matter open until it became a real rather than a 
hypothetical issue.   
 
The law of consent upholds the principle of bodily inviolability and establishes the 
patient’s right of self-determination through which the moral principle of autonomy is 
upheld.  A competent patient therefore has the right to consent to, or to refuse to consent 
to, medical intervention in accordance with their own values, beliefs and preferences.  
Since this places the patient in a position of being able to choose a course that others 
think unwise, one might have expected their Lordships to determine that in such 
circumstances the doctor must wait until it is possible to obtain the patient’s consent.  
Accordingly, a physician who discovered a small, malignant growth that was 
unconnected to the immediate surgical goal and which presented no immediate threat to 
the health or well-being of the assisted person should postpone a decision to remove it 
until such time as the patient could be consulted and their consent obtained.  If the patient 
was not immediately expected to regain consciousness and/or competency it is likely that 
a decision to treat need not be postponed as the patient would appear to fall within the 
scope of the term ‘semi-permanently incompetent’.  But how should the matter be 
decided in circumstances where the patient was expected to regain competency following 
surgery but suffered from a heart complaint that did not respond well to anaesthesia? 
 
It is perhaps fair to conclude that their Lordships would have dealt a significant blow to 
the fundamental principle of bodily inviolability had they sanctioned such intervention in 
the absence of an actual set of facts which were capable of justifying an extension to the 
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principle of necessity.  On the other hand, judicial reticence upon the matter placed 
physicians in an unenviable position and patients an uncertain one. 
 
Necessity: The General Principles 
Necessity should not be treated as a blanket defence that can be raised in respect of any 
acts taken on behalf of a mentally incompetent person, particularly one who is expected 
to recover capacity to decide.  Physicians cannot therefore take advantage of 
unconsciousness to perform procedures which are not essential for the patient’s 
immediate survival or well-being.259  Indeed the treatment undertaken must not be more 
extensive than is required by the exigencies of the situation.260  In such a case physicians 
must consider whether the person will be able to make the decision in the reasonably 
foreseeable future and if so whether the purpose for which intervention is required can be 
achieved by some other less intrusive means.261  On the other hand a doctor is justified by 
necessity in proceeding without the patient’s consent if a condition is discovered in an 
unconscious patient for which treatment is necessary in the sense that it would be, in the 
circumstances, unreasonable to postpone the operation to a later date.  Postponement of 
treatment is, however, to be preferred if it is possible to wait until the patient is in a 
position to give consent.262  Moreover, necessity acts as a general legal authority for 
carers to intervene and act reasonably in a patient’s best interests relating to general day 
to day matters of care, such as giving medication, providing help with feeding or other 
matters of personal management.263  Consequently, the distinction between necessity and 
convenience is often delicately balanced. 264 
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Best Interests  
Those who raise the defence of necessity must also show that the action taken by them 
was the action that a reasonable person would take when acting in another’s best 
interests.265  Taking into consideration the legally protected interests of all patients on 
what basis does any surrogate decide what should happen in another’s best interests?   
Remember that the primacy of the moral principle of autonomy has been established in 
relation to a competent patient, which prioritises the patient’s own viewpoint of what is in 
their medical and other welfare interests, simply because a beneficent doctor cannot 
ordinarily be expected to know what will benefit them when welfare is construed more 
broadly?266  This brings us to the crux of the matter for if a mentally incapacitated patient 
is to enjoy a similar right to medical treatment or to the withholding or withdrawing of 
necessary and appropriate medical treatment as do competent patients, to consent to, or, 
to refuse to consent to, medical treatment then it is essential that the best interests test 
should comprise of something more than a purely professional appraisal of a person’s 
medical welfare.267  To confine the test in this way would, as Lord Goff suggested in the 
case of Bland, ‘downgrade the status of the incompetent person by placing a lesser value 
on his intrinsic worth and vitality’.268 
 
Test Criteria: The Development of the Test of Best Interests 
The aim here is to examine what the test of best interests focuses on and we start with its 
invocation at common law.  In Re F the House of Lords determined that a person’s best 
interests would be satisfied whenever a doctor administered curative or prophylactic 
treatment which they believed was appropriate to the patient’s existing condition of 
disease, injury or bodily malfunction or susceptibility to such a condition in the future.269   
The effect of the court’s decision was to leave the matter of what was in a patient’s best 
interests to members of the medical profession who were required to decide what should 
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be done, in accordance with the Bolam principle.270   As Bolam merely requires a doctor 
to conform to a practice accepted as proper by a responsible body of doctors the Re F 
formulation of best interests was deemed unduly paternalistic in focusing entirely upon 
professional appraisal of what was in a person’s medical welfare interests.  In the absence 
of any other factors to weigh in the balance against the Bolam principle it is unsurprising 
that this formulation of best interests was susceptible to the criticism that what was in a 
person’s best interests was equivalent to what was in their medical best interests.  And as 
non-consensual bodily violations were justified on the basis of Bolam a ‘prudent doctor’ 
standard governed best interests treatment decision-making processes. 
 
Subsequently, the test of best interests was revised to be more in keeping with the 
situation pertaining to competent patients, i.e. the doctor makes an offer of treatment and 
the patient has the right to choose whether to accept or reject the doctor’s offer in 
accordance with their own values, beliefs and preferences.271  A two-stage was 
introduced; at the first stage professional opinion was determinative of the treatment that 
the patient should receive, but at the second stage that decision should be considered in 
the light of a welfare appraisal that took into account a person’s ethical, social, moral and 
emotional viewpoint.272  Assessment of what was in another’s best interests required a 
doctor to consider, inter alia, the uncoerced past and present wishes and feelings of the 
patient, even when these have not been expressed in an advance directive, as well as any 
beliefs and values that might influence their decision one way or another and any other 
factors that the patient might have considered if they were able to. 273 
 
This common law test now has statutory status: to determine whether it is in someone’s 
best interests274 to administer, withhold or withdraw a particular medical treatment the 
MCA requires surrogate decision-makers to consider, so far as is reasonably 
ascertainable, the person’s past and present wishes and feelings and in particular any 
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relevant written statement made by them when they had capacity;275 the beliefs and 
values that would be likely to influence their decision if they had capacity276 and any 
other factors they would be likely to consider if able to do so.277 
 
The Personality of the Patient is Relevant to Best Interests278 
Medical paternalism that was once such an evident feature of best interests was being 
constrained by the act of requiring doctors to consider a wider range of factors when 
deciding questions about the welfare of the patient.  Thus the two-stage test helpfully 
distanced best interests from its former association with a ‘prudent doctor’ standard and 
focused attention instead on the personality of the particular patient.279   
 
Best Interests Ensures the Lawful and Ethical Treatment of an Incompetent Patient280 
The best interests test requires doctors to consider what is in the overall best interests of a 
particular patient.  And in accordance with the welfare appraisal doctors are required to 
engage in an evaluative process that takes into account a wide range of factors to 
determine what is, all things considered, in the patient’s best interests.281 
 
In other words particular concepts were introduced as a set of organizing principles for 
the initiation of inquiries.  However these fail to fully define the test and in the absence of 
a comprehensive account of the welfare appraisal or method for deciding decision-
makers had no guidance about which particular features of the morally relevant factors 
under consideration were most relevant to the decision-making process.282  Therefore 
what is in a person’s best interests is to an extent unknowable.283  This has led to 
                                                 
275
 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s.4(6)(a) 
276
 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s.4(6)(b) 
277
 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s.4(6)(c) 
278
 Mason, J.K., McCall Smith, R.A., Laurie, G.T., Law and Medical Ethics, 2002, Sixth Edition, 
Butterworths, para. 10.36 
279
 Grubb, A., Principles of Medical Law, 2004, Second Edition, Oxford University Press, para. 3.55 
280
 Mason, J.K., McCall Smith, R.A., Laurie, G.T., Law and Medical Ethics, 2002, Sixth Edition, 
Butterworths, para. 10.36 
281
 The welfare appraisal took into account a person’s ethical, social, moral and emotional viewpoint 
282
 Establishes the primacy of the principle of Beneficence  
283
 Establishes the primacy of the principle of Beneficence  
 181
criticism; that the test of best interests is a vague concept that permits a wide ranging 
discretion even when the test is tempered by factors to be taken into account.284 
 
Best Interests not Substituted Judgment285 
The test of best interests is objective thus the best interests of an incompetent patient are 
determined by asking what a reasonable person would decide in the position of the 
patient.  Any decisions that have been based upon it should therefore reflect the opinions 
and standards of ordinary people living in the community.  It is subjective only to the 
extent that decision-makers are required to consider what is in the best interests of an 
individual who suffers from a particular condition or handicap after taking into 
consideration the patient’s own wishes and feelings on the matter.286 
 
Best interests can therefore be distinguished from a substituted judgment decision-
making standard which prioritises the subjective decision-making standards of the patient 
and does for that reason generally involve a more detailed inquiry into what the patient 
would actually want done.287  Crucially, substituted judgment makes the patient’s own 
wishes and feelings determinative of what should happen rather than a factor that is 
merely taken into consideration.   Substituted judgment does however raise other 
important questions such as whether it is possible to look at the situation from the point 
of view of the patient and to make decisions on the basis of what they would have wanted 
regardless of what may be thought by others to be good for them? 
 
The Views of other Appropriate People are Relevant to Best Interests288 
Furthermore, the type of information that a doctor is required to consider does not fall 
within the boundaries of medical expertise and experience.  Consequently, doctors are 
encouraged to consult those closest to the patient in order to gain information that may be 
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relevant to a treatment decision where the interests of the patient would not be adversely 
affected by any subsequent delay.289   
 
Indeed contact with the next of kin has an added advantage in that it may reveal that the 
patient has made an anticipatory choice which if clearly established and applicable in the 
circumstances would bind the practitioner.290  However, Lord Donaldson has stated that: 
 
“Neither the personal circumstances of the patient nor a speculative answer to the 
question ‘what would the patient have chosen?’ can bind the practitioner in his 
choice of whether or not to treat or how to treat or justify him in acting contrary to 
a clearly established anticipatory refusal to accept treatment but they are factors to 
be taken into account by him in forming a clinical judgment as to what is in the best 
interests of the patient.  For example, if he learnt that the patient was a Jehovah’s 
Witness, but had no evidence of a refusal to accept blood transfusions, he would 
avoid or postpone any blood transfusion as long as possible”.291 
 
 
The Past and Present Uncoerced Wishes and Feelings of the Person are Relevant292 
The moral principle of autonomy emphasises the view that persons value being in control 
of their destiny and being able to decide how to live the good life.293  On this basis it has 
been said that if the beliefs and values of the patient, though incomprehensible to others, 
are of long standing and have formed the basis for all the patient’s decisions about his 
life, there is a strong argument to suggest that the doctor should respect and give affect to 
a patient’s decision based on them.294  To argue otherwise would effectively be to deny a 
patient the right to their own personality.295  It is therefore a clearly established principle 
of law that the autonomously held values, beliefs and preferences of a formerly 
competent person may become binding at some future time when that person is deemed 
to be no longer competent to register a view about them.296   
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Nevertheless, Lord Donaldson has stated that a doctor is not bound to accept such 
information at face value when it has been obtained through consultation with the 
incompetent’s friends and relatives, even when the information concerned is that 
pertaining to a person’s religious beliefs.297  Particular details of a patient’s life should 
not in other words be considered in isolation of other relevant facts and this is especially 
true when a person’s life is at stake.298  Therefore, a doctor may presume that a state of 
affairs continues until evidence suggests that a person’s expressed values, beliefs and 
preferences, no longer pertain.299  The relevant question regarding past wishes and in 
particular their validity is whether the patient has evinced a settled continuous intention 
with regard to them.300  In cases of doubt a persons present wishes and feelings may 
instead be a factor in any decision concerning what is in their best interests.  
 
The Need to Permit and Encourage the Person to Participate as fully as possible in 
Decision-Making301 
All adults are presumed to be competent and therefore to decide contemporaneously 
whether to accept or reject an offer of medical treatment.  Consequently, unless a patient 
is unconscious a doctor may, in appropriate circumstances, first seek to assist a person to 
make a treatment decision on the spot.  This is in keeping with the moral ideals 
emphasised by the moral principle of autonomy. 
 
Best Interests are not Limited to what is in a Person’s Best Medical Interests  
The welfare appraisal itself suggests that assessment of what is in another’s best interests 
should focus every bit as much on psychological health and well-being as on the person’s 
physical health when deciding how to treat a patient and in this respect relationships with 
others, financial interests and moral or social obligations may also be relevant to the 
appraisal.302  
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This is in keeping with the situation of a competent patient who is free to choose to 
accept or reject a particular form of medical treatment on the basis of a belief or a 
commitment to someone or something other than themselves.  A medical procedure may 
therefore be rejected on religious grounds303 such as when a Jehovah’s Witness refuses a 
blood transfusion. 
 
A Best Interests Treatment Decision must Confer an Advantage on the Patient304 
A widely drawn welfare appraisal that encompasses medical, emotional, moral, ethical 
and social welfare issues is intended to ensure that a patient’s best interests are not 
confined to best medical interests.305  Neither must the statutory test be interpreted in a 
way that would make the patient the means to the end of any other, it is the patient’s 
interests and not those of a third party that are paramount.   However, it has proved 
possible to justify a procedure which is not medically indicated, serves no therapeutic 
purpose, and may even be attended with some medical risk or disadvantage, on the basis 
of some non-medical benefit which on balance outweighs any concern about whatever 
medical risks or disadvantages there may be.306   
 
Test Criteria Support Decisions to Administer, Withhold or Withdraw Treatment or to 
Choose to Administer One Form of Treatment Instead of Another   
The revised test of best interests established another important principle of law; that a 
mentally incompetent patient should not be denied necessary and appropriate medical 
treatment but neither must it be assumed that an incompetent patient can only have an 
interest in receiving necessary and appropriate medical treatment and care.307 
 
This was a significant step forward for formerly competent patients who will have 
formed a world view and developed some sort of life plan that reflects their personally 
held values, beliefs and preferences.   
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A Doctor must not, in considering whether Treatment is in the Best Interests of the 
Person, be Motivated to bring about their Death  
Can a doctor legitimately withhold or withdraw life prolonging treatment and care in the 
best interests of a patient?  In Bland Lord Goff stated that: 
 
“I am of the opinion that there is … no absolute obligation upon the doctor who 
has the patient in his care to prolong his life, regardless of the circumstances.  
Indeed, it would be most startling and could lead to the most adverse and cruel 
effects upon the patient, if any such absolute rule were held to exist.  It is scarcely 
consistent with the primacy given to the principle of self-determination in those 
cases in which the patient of sound mind has declined to give his consent that the 
law should provide no means of enabling treatment to be withheld in appropriate 
circumstances where the patient is in no condition to indicate, if that was his wish, 
that he did not consent to it… 
 
I must however stress, at this point, that the law draws a crucial distinction 
between cases in which a doctor decides not to provide, or to continue to provide 
for his patient treatment or care which could or might prolong his life and those in 
which he decides, for example by administering a lethal drug, actively to bring his 
patient’s life to an end… The former may be lawful, either because the doctor is 
giving effect to his patient’s wishes by withholding the treatment and care, or even 
in certain circumstances in which the patient is incapacitated from stating whether 
or not he gives his consent.  But it is not lawful for a doctor to administer a drug to 
his patient to bring about his death, even though that course is prompted by a 
humanitarian desire to end his suffering, however great that suffering may be”.308 
 
The position in English law is that euthanasia is not lawful and Lord Goff believed that it 
could only be rendered lawful by legislation that expressed the ‘democratic will’ on the 
subject.309   However, the law is inconsistent is distinguishing between a deliberate act 
that is intended to kill (active euthanasia) from an omission to act which allows the 
patient to die (passive euthanasia) on the basis that a doctor does not cause or is not the 
agent of death. 310  Instead, death is attributed to the patient’s pre-existing condition or 
underlying disease which is merely allowed to take its course.311 
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In upholding the acts and omissions distinction the law distinguishes a deliberate act that 
is intended to kill312 from those where death is merely foreseen as an incidental outcome 
of a particular act.313  The distinction is justified on basis of an important difference 
between intention and foresight or aiming to produce a result and being aware that a 
result is a possible result of one’s actions.314  As such the law holds to its qualified 
sanctity of life position in relation to mentally incapacitated patient and this means that a 
doctor is not placed under an absolute duty to prolong life, by any means available, 
regardless of the patient’s quality of life.315  In other words a doctor’s duty to act in the 
best interests of the patient is similarly qualified.316 
 
Therefore, a doctor who discontinues life support and allows the patient to die does not 
act unlawfully where there is no breach of duty to the patient.317  And the courts have 
determined that a doctor will not be in breach of her duty to the patient where medical 
opinion determines that it is futile to continue with life support.318  This is because no 
actual advantage is conferred by a decision to continue with the treatment.  Similarly, a 
doctor is permitted, in accordance with the moral principle of double effect, to administer 
drugs intending to relieve intolerable pain even when death is foreseen as an incidental 
effect of treatment.319 
 
Consequently, a doctor must not, in considering whether treatment is in the best interests 
of the person, be motivated to bring about their death.320   
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The Best Interests Balancing Exercise 
The favoured method of approach in evaluating what action to take in another’s best 
interests is to draw up a balance sheet.  Those factors in favour of a particular course of 
action should be recorded alongside any dis-benefits or disadvantages of treatment for the 
patient.  A note should be made as to the viability of each such option and its likely effect 
on the patient and their enjoyment of life.  Any likely benefit of the treatment has to be 
balanced and considered in the light of any additional suffering such treatment might 
entail.  Only if the account is in relatively significant credit will it be safe for a doctor to 
conclude that treatment is likely to advance the best interests of the patient.321 
 
Treatment Information might be Assessed Subjectively by the Doctor 
The wishes and preferences of the patient are relevant to best interests decision-making 
processes.  On the assumption that these could reasonably be ascertained no indication is 
given about how the various factors that a doctor is being asked to consider should be 
weighted in order to determine which of them should assume priority.  Neither does the 
test explain how conflicting or competing interests should be balanced where, for 
example, a incompetent patient was required to act as donor for a sibling but the 
procedure could endanger their future health and well-being.  In the absence of such 
guidance it is possible for the decision-maker to assess information subjectively.  As such 
the test remains uncertain in promoting the ascertained beliefs, values and preferences of 
a mentally incapacitated patient. 
 
Estimating Benefits and Harms  
In medical law, a decision  to accord primacy to the moral principle of autonomy means 
that the views of a competent patient, rather than a beneficent doctor, is determinative of 
matters related to life, death and quality of life.  In this way the law can be seen to be 
neutral in the face of legitimate moral diversity amongst members of society which in the 
light of advances in medical science now extends to decisions concerning life prolonging 
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treatment.322  Competent patients therefore have freedom to decide whether treatment 
might benefit or be harmful to them and that decision will have been formed by a process 
in which treatment information is used or applied to their own set of values, beliefs and 
preferences.  It is therefore clear that people will differ in ranking the various harms that 
are to be avoided and benefits gained.   
 
Moreover, persons differ in terms of estimating harmful or beneficial consequences of 
their action and this is linked to their attitudes to risk and in this instance to the risks 
inherent in medical treatment.  As these are differences that cannot be settled on 
empirical grounds, for example, variation is more accurately accounted for by way of a 
person’s nature and ideology.  Consequently, a personal estimation of the risks and 
benefits associated with treatment and non-treatment might plausibly explain the decision 
of someone with freedom to choose an option that others might think unwise.323   
 
The fact that persons differ in prioritising harms and benefits and in estimating their 
propensity to arise in a given set of circumstances is beyond dispute.  It is therefore 
regrettable that there is no prescribed process or method, other than the unifying principle 
or concept of best interests itself, to guide surrogate decision-makers when making 
decisions for others.  This is because the process of estimating benefits and harms relies 
on human judgment and humans differ in their assessment of risks.  Accordingly, 
mentally incapacitated patients are reliant upon the subjective deliberations of others with 
regard to the perceived benefits and burdens of treatment and may as a consequence be 
subjected to unwarranted and intrusive medical intervention in a way that a competent 
patient is not.  This will be the case even when one can be confident that the values, 
beliefs and preferences of the patient have fully emerged because without a principled 
method for weighting the various factors that are being considered the task of ranking 
them is made virtually impossible which means that the values of the patient might be 
inadvertently overridden. 
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Best Interests no longer tied to Best Medical Interests: On what Basis is a Doctor 
Qualified to Decide  
The type of information that a doctor is required to consider does not fall within the 
boundaries of medical expertise and experience.  Doctors are instead encouraged to 
consult those closest to the patient in order to gain information that may be relevant to a 
decision to administer, withhold or withdraw treatment or to choose to administer one 
form of treatment instead of another.    
 
Best Interests: Trust in the Medical Profession 
In practical terms a doctor exerts considerable influence and control over best interests 
decision-making processes and in the absence of a definitive welfare checklist and 
method emphasis is placed on the moral integrity of medical professionals in deciding.  
This is particularly relevant when a doctor proposes to carry out non-therapeutic 
treatments or procedures as these do not naturally fit within an area of medical expertise 
which lies in exercising clinical judgment in accordance with the Bolam principle.  And 
circumstances have arisen where the treatment proposed was sterilisation to prevent 
pregnancy rather than to address problems associated with menstruation324 and where the 
incompetent patient was to act as a donor to save the life of a sibling.325 
 
The Grounds for Deciding: The Welfare of the Patient should be the Overriding 
Consideration 
An issue then in relation to a welfare appraisal that is cast in the widest possible terms is 
whether it is possible to justify treatment in the general public interest or based upon the 
interests of a third party.   Andrew Grubb, for instance, raises the view that the general 
public interest and the moral and civic obligations of the patient can legitimately be taken 
into account in determining whether or not what is proposed is in the best interests of the 
patient.   Of course as a matter of principle it is ultimately necessary to show some 
benefit or advantage to the patient from what is proposed.326  Likewise in relation to third 
party interests the best interests in question are those of the incompetent patient and not 
those of the third party. 327  However, Stauch et al point out that Bolam determines that a 
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doctor, who decides that what is proposed, is in the best interests of the incompetent 
patient, could if necessary find other doctors who were willing to endorse their view.328   
Although in this regard the courts and not medical professionals are the final arbiters of 
best interests.  And an advantage of court proceedings is that there is an opportunity to 
discover and make explicit the grounds on which a decision is being made and therefore 
to decide that a responsible body of physicians would not accept that what was proposed, 
in another’s best interests, was proper.329 
  
Court Involvement in Decisions based on Best Interests: Inherent Jurisdiction of the 
High Court 
In the absence of the parens patriae jurisdiction the courts have no power to consent or to 
refuse medical treatment on behalf of a mentally incapacitated patient.  However, the 
High Court may, in reliance on its inherent or discretionary jurisdiction,330 issue a 
declaration to approve or disapprove a proposed operation on an adult patient who is 
believed to lack the capacity to decide the matter themselves. 331  It is open to the court to 
exercise its discretion whenever a person raises a real and not a hypothetical question of 
law.332  The person raising the question must have a real interest in raising it such as 
would be the case if they were in dispute with another interested party who wished to 
oppose the declaration sought.333  In other words a declaration must be sought on the 
basis of a proper argument.  Consequently, a declaration when it is granted establishes, 
by judicial process, whether the proposed operation is in the best interests of the patient 
and therefore lawful.334   
 
A declaration does not however change anything.335  The court is merely being asked to 
declare that had a course of action been taken without resort to the court, it would have 
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been lawful anyway.336  In other words the courts declaratory jurisdiction does not permit 
inquiry into what is in the actual best interests of the patient. 
 
Another problem with the jurisdiction is that some incompetent patients may be without a 
true opposer to a proposed operation.   
 
Reliance on Medical Experts 
The court not the doctor is then the ultimate arbiter of what is in another’s best interests.  
Nevertheless, the expert opinion of medical professionals will be sought in relation to 
what treatment the patient should receive.  At the second stage, in best interests decision-
making processes, medical opinion will also be influential because an assessment of 
medical risks and benefits is also a matter of clinical judgment.  However, the judge must 
be satisfied that the body of medical opinion relied upon has a logical basis and that the 
experts have directed their minds to the question of comparative risks and benefits prior 
to forming a defensible conclusion on the matter.337  And although the court reserves the 
right to decide that medical opinion is not supported by a responsible body of 
physicians338 the court will not choose between different responsible bodies of opinion.339 
 
It follows that a number of different courses may be lawful in any given case although 
courts may intervene when appropriate and, by a process of balancing the benefits and 
burdens of treatment, will determine which course to follow in the best interests of a 
mentally incapacitated patient having taken the requirements of the welfare appraisal into 
consideration. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Everybody enjoys a legally protected right to bodily inviolability.  This fundamental right 
is however obtained through the right to self-determination.  Persons must therefore be 
competent to have their choice, whether to accept or reject a medical treatment, respected 
by others.  Earlier in this chapter I referred to the fact that autonomy allows persons to 
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protect their own sense of well-being or happiness and also therefore serves to counter 
medical paternalism.  A difficulty for legislators of the legal framework in respect of 
mentally incapacitated patients is in striking a balance between the need to protect the 
medical welfare of those who are unable to accept or reject a medical treatment on their 
own behalf with respecting their right to self-determination.  In this respect the MCA 
empowers medical professionals, amongst others, to interpret and then apply statutory 
and common law provisions which require them to give careful thought and detailed 
consideration to the patient’s capacity because if a person is not capable of making a 
decision the 2005 Act determines that a doctor is required to make decisions in their best 
interests.  Whilst all adults are presumed to have the requisite level of capacity to make 
decisions on their own behalf a capacity assessment may be sought in cases where there 
is reason to doubt the patient’s capacity to make a particular decision.  In this regard the 
MCA upholds a functional not outcome based test which means that part of the process 
of assessment is concerned with whether a patient can understand treatment information.  
Understanding is demonstrated when a patient can process or use information to arrive at 
a decision.  Essentially a patient must be able to apply relevant facts about treatment to 
their values or own situation.  However, the MCA cannot state what information will be 
relevant and so it becomes a matter that is left to the discretion of a doctor.  The problem 
is that unless a doctor has knowledge of the patient, including their values and 
personality, there is a danger that a doctor may fail to adequately respect their right to 
make decisions for themselves.   If the patient loses the right to make decisions about 
treatment a doctor is required to apply the inherently flexible best interests standard in 
relation to treatment decisions.   Whereupon we find that any earlier failings may be 
compounded by the fact that the personality of the patient is not determinative of what 
should happen to them in their own best interests rather it is a factor that must be 
considered by surrogate decision-makers when making decisions and acting on their 
behalf. 
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Chapter Five 
 
 
Advance Decisions 
 
The Mental Capacity Act 2005 upholds the common law position in relation to decisions 
concerning the health and welfare of a mentally incapacitated patient by according 
priority to an anticipatory choice of a formerly competent person.1  Thus the legally 
protected right of a competent person to accept or reject a medical treatment may be 
exercised in advance and in anticipation of a time when a loss of decision-making 
capacity prohibits them from choosing contemporaneously.2  An advance decision is, in 
other words, treated as though it had been issued contemporaneously which gives rises to 
two important and related features of the legal system.  First, in prioritising the 
anticipatory choice of a formerly competent patient an advance decision is regarded in 
law as an exception to the principle that a doctor should act in the best interests of a 
mentally incapacitated patient.  As a consequence of that the second important feature of 
the legal structure is that a doctor is deemed to be acting on the instructions of a 
competent patient. 
 
Nevertheless, the law clearly expects a person to be very competent when exercising the 
right to decide prospectively and in accordance with present values, beliefs and 
preferences.  This is because the advance decision of a competent patient will become 
binding at a time when they are deemed incompetent to express a view about their earlier 
choice.3  Thus, legal validity and applicability are very difficult standards to meet in 
seeming to require a doctor to be very certain when determining whether a person’s 
advance decision should be respected4 and if it should what was intended to happen.5   If 
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a doctor determines that an advance decision is not legally valid or applicable in the 
circumstances that have arisen, in accordance with the civil standard, i.e. a balance of 
probabilities, he will no longer be bound to respect the patient’s decision although it may 
be taken into consideration in determining what is in their best interests.  Then as before a 
doctor is merely required to have regard for the patient’s decision and it is entirely 
possible that the wishes of the patient will be overridden in their best interests. 
 
Indeed some consider the need to protect vulnerable persons and to care for them in their 
best interests should override their right to self-determination in these circumstances.6  
The situation of the incompetent patient has therefore fuelled an ethical debate about 
whether it is entirely consistent with the right of self-determination to respect advance 
decisions.  Philosophical and legal support for advance decisions is founded upon the 
individual right to bodily inviolability7 and the fact that this fundamental right is obtained 
through the right of self-determination places a high value on individual control over 
present and future health care decisions.8  So prior to examining the matter of whether an 
advance decision to refuse medical treatment will be treated as legally valid and 
applicable, and therefore binding on both doctors and patients, consideration will be 
given to some of the ethical arguments that arise when the right of self-determination is 
exercised prospectively. 
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Ethical Issues 
 
Is it appropriate to pay heed to an advance directive?9  What principal values or interests 
are at stake for the patient in whether they retain or lose this decisional authority?10   
 
Principle of Respect for Autonomy 
Kant intended persons to legislate according to values inherent in their own constitution.  
This means that each person is entitled to a life in which the subjectively held values, 
beliefs and preferences, of a particular individual, which do not infringe the interests of 
others, should be respected in matters related to personal welfare and for sustaining 
respect for more objective or universal moral laws that are concerned with protecting 
human welfare more generally.11 
 
John Stuart Mill has also argued for the moral importance of respecting people’s 
autonomy and similarly elaborated restrictions within this principle.12 
 
“The sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in 
interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection.  That 
is the only purpose for which power can rightfully be exercised over any member of 
a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.  His own good, 
either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant”.13 
 
Whereas Kant claimed that respect for the autonomy of others was a necessary feature of 
rational agency itself and thus of any rational agent Mill (subsequently) argued that 
respect for the autonomy of others was required to maximise overall human welfare 
provided such respect did not harm others.14   
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Autonomy and the Moral Right to Self-Determination 
Accordingly, a patient has a principal interest in autonomy and in exercising their moral 
right to self-determination to promote personal welfare interests as Jonathan Herring has 
explained: 
 
“Autonomy upholds the notion that people should be free to lead their lives as they 
wish and have control over their own bodies.  People’s decisions on how to live 
their lives deserve respect, even though other people might think them foolish.  A 
person’s decision is respected not because it is a good choice, but because it is 
their choice.  To deny a person the respect for their views is the ultimate denial of 
respect for that person.  Such respect is particularly important in relation to deeply 
personal or intimate issues such as when to die”.15 
 
Dan Brock has described the right in similar terms but adds that: 
 
“This is the interest of people in making significant decisions about their lives for 
themselves according to their own values or conception of a good life…  The 
general requirement of informed consent is based on large part on recognition of 
this interest in ordinary people in self-determination.  Sometimes the moral 
principle concerning self-determination is characterised as a right to self-
determination, but whether characterised as a moral right or an interest, it is not 
absolute in the sense that it always trumps all other rights or interests.  If it was, 
then in the context of consent to medical care, patients’ choices would always have 
to be respected, whether or not they were competent to make those choices”. 16 
 
Right to Self-Determination and Medical Treatment 
Consistent with the moral perspective we have observed that the law upholds the primacy 
of the principle of autonomy.  The patient is thereby treated as the ultimate arbiter of 
what is in their own best medical interests in the knowledge that they will have had a 
reasonable opportunity to discuss and consider various treatment options and to have 
assessed these subjectively prior to registering a choice.17  A competent patient therefore 
has the advantage of choosing, to consent or to refuse treatment, in the light of a welfare 
appraisal that has been specified in subjective terms to reflect the values, beliefs and 
preferences of the patient.  These will be weighted and then balanced according to 
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circumstance but will manifest the patient’s attitude to risks and to the benefits and 
burdens of medical treatment. 
 
The important point is that the subjective values and methods of a competent patient are 
prioritised by the law of consent.  Therefore, in view of the uncertainties inherent in the 
legal framework for mentally incapacitated patients, it is quite natural that a competent 
person might wish to seek to control events in the future when they are no longer 
competent to make a treatment decision contemporaneously.   
 
Is it Consistent with the Right to Self-Determination to Respect an Advance 
Directive? 
There are three main points to make. First, some claim that the person who makes an 
advance decision and the person who is subsequently incompetent are not the same 
person.18  We will deal with this point in chapter six.  Secondly, questions have been 
raised over whether it is possible for anybody to predict how they would like to be treated 
when incompetent. 19  Thirdly, it has been suggested that regardless of the weight to be 
given to the patient’s wishes the primary obligation to the incompetent patient is to show 
compassion by acting in their best interests.20 
 
Accurately Predicting Preferences 
The principle of self-determination is justified by the claim that people generally know 
better than anyone else what serves their best interests, thus, their own choices are the 
best evidence we have of the decision that would most protect their welfare.21  However, 
the evidentiary view of autonomy fails to provide support for that argument in 
determining that people are not the best judges of what their own best interests would be 
under circumstances they have never encountered and in which their preferences and 
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desires may drastically have changed.22  If, therefore, an advance decision is to be 
recognised as an exercise of their right to self-determination a person would have to 
predict their preferences accurately.23  An issue with precedent autonomy is then whether 
anyone can accurately predict how they would like to be treated if they became 
incompetent. 
 
Information 
Did the Patient have Sufficient Information to make a Choice?  Here we may question 
whether people reliably know enough about illnesses and treatments to make prospective 
life-or-death decisions about them?  On this Fagerlin and Schneider state that: 
 
“Conventional legal and ethical wisdom insists that candidates for even a flu shot 
give a consent where the standards of disclosure have increasingly been raised.  If 
we applied those standards to the information patients have before making the 
astonishing catalogue of momentous choices [advance directives]can embody, the 
conventional wisdom would be left shivering with indignation”.24   
 
The consent of a competent patient who is informed about the nature and purpose of 
treatment will be legally valid as a defence to a battery.25  A minimal amount of 
information is required to protect the patient’s right to be maintained inviolate.26  
However, patients are also entitled to be maintained free from bodily harms that they 
would not consent to.27  Therefore, doctors are required to obtain an informed consent. 28   
This means that a patient should be informed about the benefits and burdens, including 
information about the potential risks, of treatment as well as those related to any relevant 
alternative options including non-treatment. 29  About this Rebecca Dresser has 
commented that: 
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“The nature of advance treatment decision-making makes it difficult and often 
impossible to understand this information.  Unless the person making a directive 
has a relatively clear prognosis and limited treatment options, there are too many 
potential situations to address.  Most people simply cannot predict all the medical 
conditions that the future might bring, much less understand what would be the 
possible harms and benefits of interventions targeting those conditions”.30 
 
Unsurprisingly, empirical data suggests that people do not make informed decisions.31  
There is also evidence that some advance decisions will be based on misinformation.32  
Inconsistent statements tend to suggest that the patient was either misinformed or had 
failed to understand information relevant to their choice.  For instance, a patient may say 
that whilst they will accept blood transfusions they would reject diagnostic procedures. 33  
However, the patient’s condition may determine that it is not possible to disassociate the 
two interventions.34  The problem is that it is not altogether clear what circumstances 
were envisaged by the patient or indeed what they intended to happen.  Someone who 
wanted a speedy death would reject both interventions whilst someone who wanted to 
live would consent to both. 35 
 
Stability of Preferences  
Patient preferences must be reasonably stable in order for it to be a true expression of 
their will.36  However, studies tend to show only moderate stability in relation to 
anticipatory decisions.37  Moreover, when preferences had changed investigators found 
that decision-makers were often unaware and therefore unlikely to change their statement 
of wishes. 38  These findings are especially concerning in view of the fact that people 
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make anticipatory choices in respect of life-sustaining treatment.  One cancer patient is 
for instance quoted as saying that, ‘by the time it has tried to frighten you to death and 
threatened to take away your very existence, you’d be amazed at how little you’re willing 
to settle for’.39 
 
Changed preferences point to a further problem, which is that people do a poor job of 
predicting their preferences in situations they have never experienced.40  This view is 
supported by psychological research which indicates that in respect of choices among 
options that are important, complex, and unfamiliar preferences do not pre-exist but are 
constructed on the spot through a process that is heavily influenced by framing and 
contextual factors.41  For example, investigators found that the preferences of patients 
after hospitalisation were different from those expressed in their advance directives.  In 
general patient preference for life-sustaining treatment decreased amongst those who had 
recently been hospitalized although many re-affirmed their advance decisions to receive 
treatment after a few months presumably because they had adapted to life in hospital.42  
Therefore, it has been argued that people are unaware of the way they will respond to a 
future health situation and do not know what they will want until they actually experience 
the situation. 43 
 
Can People Articulate what they Want? 
The evidence suggests that when humans are asked to make a contemporary decision 
they often fail to gather all relevant information, possibly misunderstand and ignore what 
is gathered and lack well considered preferences to guide the decision-making process.44  
This leads to a situation where persons will make ill considered choices which are 
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inaccurately recorded.45  All of which indicates that it will be even more difficult for us to 
make an anticipatory choice for some unspecified future time which is attended with 
unidentifiable conditions with unpredictable treatments?46   
 
Specificity is perhaps the most significant challenge in communicating wishes.  Fagerlin 
and Schneider have commented that: 
 
“Writing complex instructions for the future is crushingly difficult.  Statutes read 
horribly because their authors are struggling to (1) work out exactly what rule they 
want, (2) imagine all the circumstances in which it might apply, and (3) find 
language to specify all those but only those circumstances.  Each task is ultimately 
impossible, which is why statutes explicitly or implicitly confide their enforcers 
with some discretion and why courts must interpret, rewrite?, statutes.  However, 
these skills and resources are not available to physicians or surrogates”. 47 
 
An advance treatment refusal that is too specific may force patients to address more 
questions than they can comprehend whilst one that is too general may be insufficiently 
specific and insufficiently considered to be binding.48    
 
Should Compassion be the Overriding Obligation? 
Advance decisions possibly work optimally for those patients who choose to refuse life-
preserving treatment after a long illness and close to the time of its implementation.  At 
least there is less reason, in these circumstances, to be hesitant about what is left to be 
achieved experientially and as the patient would not be under threat of a prolonged period 
of psychological disunity their critical interests should be accorded greater weight.  
Moreover, the patient’s decision is likely to be unambiguous and context specific and will 
not trigger concern, in any significant sense, that their welfare is under threat or may be 
compromised by any of the usual suspects, i.e. information, misinformation, stability of 
preferences and specification, as they will no doubt have had many conversations with 
carers and others prior to registering their choice. 
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However, it is also obvious that there will be situations where putting advance decisions 
into practice will not be easy for carers and others who have responsibility for 
maintaining patient welfare.  This is most likely to arise when life-preserving treatment 
has previously been competently refused but the patient is now demented and appears to 
enjoy their life.49  In these circumstances the patient’s prior preferences appear to be in 
conflict with what is in their current best interests.50  And in disagreeing with Dworkin, 
and others, Rebecca Dresser has argued that overriding the directive in such 
circumstances is the more defensible choice in furthering patient welfare.51  The question 
then is whether we should be led by the head or the heart in moral matters?   In relation to 
the former Dresser might be inclined to chide that humans are complex but not 
particularly omniscient beings therefore access to truths about the self and one’s motive 
in acting may be somewhat constrained or capable of being obscured from full view.   If, 
however, we defer to the dictates of the heart, we must keep in mind the fact that there is 
no fixed idea about what good is, which means that one person will be placed in position 
to choose another’s form of it in the absence of any meaningful feedback from them 
about whether what is being done makes a positive contribution to their life.    
 
Nevertheless, Dresser  questions whether people can grasp what life would be like with 
dementia52 and on this basis contends that there is a significant possibility that the 
advance refusal was either uninformed or an inaccurate account of the maker’s true 
preferences, either of which justify her view.53  If true, then of course the welfare of an 
incompetent patient may be at risk contrary to what was envisaged by theoretical 
strategists and policy makers who considered the patient was the best judge of what is in 
their own best interests.54  In making her claim Dresser acknowledges the high value that 
is placed on the right of an individual to make treatment decisions but draws on those 
ethical and legal principles, such as best interests, which support state intervention to 
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shield vulnerable individuals from harm.55  So, in cases where the capacity to appreciate 
critical interests is lost, experiential interests should take priority and the ethical and legal 
responsibilities to protect an incompetent patient ought not, on this account, to be 
suspended because someone has refused an intervention that now offers clear benefit.56  
Consequently, the decision to override would appear to depend on whether a surrogate 
decision-maker considers that a stay is warranted in the patient’s best interests on account 
of the amount,57 rather than quality,58 of pleasure they currently derive from their life. 
 
A substituted judgment standard is rejected on grounds that decision-makers are required 
to make the treatment choice the patient would make if capacity was momentarily 
restored so that they could perceive their condition and prognosis.59  The standard 
therefore focuses on the values of the patient when competent.  However, the standard 
has been criticised for being malleable enough to allow relatives and others to advance 
their own values and concerns in the guise of a decision that purports to be what the 
patient would want.60  When evidence of the patient’s past values, beliefs and preferences 
is ambiguous or nonexistent the best interests standard is deemed to be more appropriate 
as the decision will be taken in accord with a perceived societal consensus, or the 
perspective of a reasonable person, choosing as most people would choose for 
themselves.61  Therefore at the first stage a doctor is required to focus on the patient’s 
current condition when considering various treatment options.  At the second stage, the 
benefits and burdens of the proposed treatment are assessed in the light of community 
norms and attitudes towards what treatment would entail for a demented person, with 
similar handicaps and disabilities, having taken the patient’s wishes and feelings, both 
past and present, into consideration.  An objective, as opposed to subjective or 
individualistic, approach is embodied within best interests decision-making processes 
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concerning what should happen to the patient which has the potential to shift the focus 
back to the patient’s experience.62   
 
A problem still exists with denying the subjectivity or personhood of a patient with 
dementia as who can identify with their experiences.63  Lesley Fellows has stated that 
whatever the views of those around them the patient continues to experience the world 
they live in.64  A patient may therefore be obliged to submit to the burdens of an 
intervention without having had input into whether the expected benefits bear any 
relevance to their current experience of life.65   
 
Dresser approaches the problem by invoking an objective treatment standard whilst 
conceding that: 
 
“The best interest standard is controversial because it requires healthy individuals 
to make quality of life judgments for vulnerable, impaired patients.  Critics fear 
that social worth and economic considerations are too easily incorporated into best 
interests decision-making.  These fears lead most scholars and legal authorities to 
regard the best interests standard as morally suspect.  They see it as the least 
preferred treatment standard, the absolute last resort when no other standard will 
work. 
 
A desire to escape the dangers accompanying best interests judgments contributes 
to the general enthusiasm for advance directives.  If treatment decisions appear to 
come from patients themselves, there is less cause to worry about inappropriate 
quality of life evaluations.  At the same time, the dearth of advance directives and 
the shortcomings of the substituted judgment standard make the best interests 
standard central to most real cases.  Because they have been preoccupied with 
advance directives, however, scholars and policy officials have neglected the best 
interests standard.  As a result, the standard lacks precision and rigour”.66 
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In the light of these concerns Fellows emphasises the importance of restoring a sense of 
the subjectivity of the demented patient and suggests that the attitude and approach of 
medical professionals and carers towards the patient is key to exploring the patient’s 
perspective.67  This was recognised by those who exercised judgment on behalf of a 
formerly competent patient in accordance with the parens patriae doctrine. 
 
Should the Right to Self-Determination prevail over the Sanctity of Life Principle? 
The basic notion embedded in the principle of autonomy is that persons should be free to 
live as seems good to them or in accord with their own conception of a good life.68  
Consequently, the right to be maintained inviolate is an essential pre-requisite to 
exercising one’s autonomy or right to self-determine the shape of one’s life by reference 
to those values, beliefs, and preferences that are significant in informing it.   
 
However, the right to be self-governing is not absolute in that it will always trump all 
other rights or interests.  For instance, at stage one of a treatment decision-making 
process the right of self-determination is qualified by the need to respect the rights of 
others and in a democracy everyone has an equal right to health care and to have equal 
access to health care resources.69  Consequently, it is in the public interest that principles 
of justice should be required to harmonise the competing interests of all.  Patients 
therefore have no right to insist on a particular form of treatment.70  Instead, the 
obligations of physicians are limited to offering treatments that are consistent with 
professional standards of care.71     
 
The sanctity principle upholds the view that all human life is equally valuable and should 
not be intentionally destroyed.72  In medicine this means that a doctor cannot be required 
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to embark on a course of action that is intended to kill a patient.73  Whilst there is no right 
to die, in that a patient cannot consent to be killed, a competent patient may choose to 
refuse life-preserving treatment.74  In this way the sanctity of life principle is seen to yield 
to the patient’s right of self-determination which preserves an autonomous choice. 
 
Moreover, a doctor may withhold or withdraw life-preserving treatment from an 
incompetent patient by omission consistent with his or her obligation of non-
maleficence.75  Consequently the sanctity of life is not the sole guiding principle for 
medical professionals either.  Instead a presumption exists that continued existence is in 
the best interests of the patient but that presumption is displaced where a doctor 
determines that continued existence would be intolerable76 or that treatment would be 
futile.77   
 
An intolerable life is one that is full of pain and suffering and so experientially awful as 
to render life saving treatment inappropriate.78  Clearly intolerability is a threshold test 
that is applied when the patient is incompetent but sufficiently sentient to experience the 
burdens that treatment would impose.79  As a threshold test for medical intervention 
intolerability is contentious in requiring medical professionals to pass judgment on the 
quality of life of their patient.  Judgment will be exercised on behalf of the patient in 
accordance with what a reasonable person would decide taking into consideration the 
nature of the patient’s condition and degree of disability.  You will remember that 
Rebecca Dresser has questioned whether people can actually grasp things they have no 
experience of.  Is there any reason to suppose that the imagination of the doctor as 
decision-maker will be superior to that of any other, including the patient? 
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In contrast artificial nutrition and hydration has been withdrawn from a patient in a 
persistent vegetative state on the basis that it is futile to continue to provide life 
preserving treatment that cannot benefit an insentient patient.80  Treatment that has a 
physiological effect is categorised as futile when it serves no therapeutic purpose of any 
kind that the patient can, or ever will, appreciate.81   The fact that treatment would be 
futile, in that it could not fulfil its ultimate therapeutic purpose,82 suggests that continued 
medical intervention can no longer be justified as being in the patient’s best interests and 
this legitimises a doctor in withholding or withdrawing it.83        
 
Whilst we can say that the sanctity of life principle yields to the doctor’s obligation to act 
in the best interests of the patient the thresholds for futility and intolerability have 
purposefully been set quite high which tends to fuel support for arguments in favour of 
euthanasia based on a commitment to personal ideas about human dignity.  The question 
then is whether formerly competent patients should be permitted to pre-determine what 
happens to them at the end of life when incompetent and unable to decide the matter 
contemporaneously? 
 
According to Kant the importance we attach to human life can be traced to an 
autonomous will which is treated as the morally significant feature of persons.  Our sense 
of self is, according to Kant, derived from the human capacity to make use of reason to 
think critically or independently.  John Harris has stated that in making autonomy central 
to personhood Kant might most reasonably be interpreted as requiring that it is autonomy 
that is protected and not physical life.84   
 
Dworkin similarly attaches moral significance to human autonomy but is seemingly more 
interested in how the freedom to choose has informed the shape of a person’s life and in 
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discovering which interests are critically important to it.85   A person’s critical interests 
are what make life important to the individual whose life it is.86  About this Dworkin 
states that, ‘someone’s convictions about his own critical interests are opinions about 
what it means for his own human life to go well, and these convictions can therefore best 
be understood as a special application of his general commitment to the sanctity of 
life’.87  Thus a commitment to the integrity view of autonomy suggests that the interests 
that were critical to the shape of a person’s life, when viewed as a whole, should not be 
sacrificed later simply because the patient is incompetent and unable to express a view.88   
 
The relevant question according to Dworkin is not whether the sanctity of life should be 
required to yield to some other value, like humanity or compassion, but how life’s 
sanctity should be understood and respected.89  And on this opinions divide: 
 
“Not because some people have contempt for values that others cherish, but, on the 
contrary, because the values in question are at the centre of everyone’s lives, and 
no one can treat them as trivial enough to accept other people’s orders about what 
they mean.  Making someone die in a way that others approve, but he believes a 
horrifying contradiction of his life, is a devastating, odious form of tyranny”. 90 
 
Although Dworkin contends that the time and manner of a person’s death should be 
determined by a person’s critical interests Herring has an interesting postscript to add.  
He reports that not all supporters of autonomy are happy with Dworkin’s analysis as it 
appears to leave the door open for someone to say to a person, who wished to invoke 
their critical interests to refuse life-preserving treatment, I know that you that are now 
saying you want to die, but a better fit with your life story (your critical interests) would 
be for you to live longer’.91  
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The Legal Framework for Advance Decisions 
 
It is an established principle of law that a competent adult patient has a right to make 
their own health decisions.92  When the right to self-determination is exercised 
prospectively the MCA states that where the decision of the patient is both legally valid 
and applicable in the circumstances a doctor would be bound to act in accordance with 
the patient’s wishes.93  Advance directives or decisions therefore preserve the patient’s 
right to decide subjectively in accordance with their own values and methods whether the 
burdens or risks of treatment outweigh the benefits that it may bestow upon them.  
Consequently, a patient who outlines their wishes in advance retains control over their 
body as well as their life plan and gets round the problem that a doctor will weigh those 
interests objectively, in accordance with what a reasonable person would decide in the 
situation of the patient, with all its attendant uncertainties.   
 
The purpose of this part of the chapter is then to examine the requirements of the Mental 
Capacity Act 2005 in relation to advance decisions.   
 
General Requirements 
 
As an advance directive is treated as though the patient has issued a consent or refusal 
contemporaneously their advance decision must similarly satisfy the general legal 
requirements that apply to ordinary consent. 
 
Competent Choice  
It is a clear requirement of the Mental Capacity Act that adults must have decision-
making capacity at the time of making an advance decision to refuse medical treatment.94         
The MCA also establishes that the presumption in favour of capacity should continue to 
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operate in respect of advance decisions95 and in cases of doubt a functional approach to 
capacity endures which aims to safeguard persons against the repercussions of making a 
non-autonomous decision by placing emphasis on the way in which the decision was 
made rather than on the decision itself.96 
 
The question is how are doctors to arrive at a safe conclusion in relation to competency 
on the evidence of a written document or the oral testimony of a third party particularly in 
circumstances where the patient was previously unknown to them?  A patient may have 
been in severe pain, tired or fatigued, depressed or unduly stressed; they might also have 
been under the influence of drugs or alcohol which temporarily reduced their capacity at 
the time the decision was made to refuse a particular form of medical treatment.97  The 
patient’s ability to understand or retain information may not have been significantly 
impaired but the possibility that such circumstances impair judgment cannot be dismissed 
and this would bear upon the ability to process or weigh information.  By analogy this is 
the reason why the vehicles of long distance lorry drivers are fitted with a tachograph.  Its 
purpose is to enforce drivers to take regular breaks and thus to prevent them from 
becoming a hazard to themselves, pedestrians and other road users through the effects of 
tiredness or fatigue.  Alcohol is known to affect judgment consequently the public 
interest demands that a relatively low level of alcohol consumption is necessary to fail a 
breathalyser test.  Direct communication with the patient aids doctors in deciding whether 
their patient is fully competent to decide the matter under consideration but indications of 
incompetency might be altogether too subtle to detect in the case of an anticipatory 
refusal. 
 
It is perhaps for this reason that Lord Donaldson MR has previously stated that: 
 
Doctors faced with a refusal of consent have to give very careful and detailed 
consideration to the patient’s capacity to decide at the time when the decision was 
made.  It may not be the simple case of the patient having no capacity because, for 
example, at that time he had hallucinations.  It may be the more difficult case of a 
temporarily reduced capacity at the time when his decision was made.  What 
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matters is that the doctors should consider whether at that time he had a capacity 
which was commensurate with the gravity of the decision which he purported to 
make.  The more serious the decision, the greater the capacity required.98   
 
As the right to refuse medical treatment exists even where it may lead to the patient’s 
death what link there might be between capacity and the effects of a decision.99  Perhaps 
Lord Donaldson is claiming that a greater level of capacity is required to refuse medical 
treatment.  However, it has been suggested that the link is not made on the basis of the 
patient displaying greater reasoning powers but rather that they should be able to 
understand more information the more serious their decision and for that reason the 
decision-making process will be subject to greater scrutiny in such circumstances.100  
This reasoning is consistent with a functional test of capacity and indeed some of the 
difficulties associated with establishing capacity are ameliorated by the requirement that 
an advance directive should be both valid and applicable in the circumstances that have in 
fact arisen and to the special requirements that apply to decisions to refuse life-sustaining 
treatment.101  Therefore, we may question whether a functional test for capacity, which 
appears to be fitted towards contemporaneous decision-making, can always be as safely 
relied upon in relation to anticipatory treatment decisions since appearances suggest that 
the effects of a decision may be the only real reason there is to query the competency of 
the person in question, whatever other name we may choose to attach to it.102   
 
Free from Undue Influence  
The effects of undue influence or coercion invalidate a refusal of medical treatment.103  
This is because the will of the patient has been acted upon and thus the patient will not 
have exercised their right to self-determination.104  On the other hand persuasion of 
whatever force will not invalidate a refusal so long as the patient reached the decision to 
refuse independently.105  When applied to the case before them the court in Re T 
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concluded that a patient in a weakened medical condition, in pain and under the influence 
of drugs, that had been administered to assist her, had succumbed to pressure from her 
mother. In reaching their conclusion the courts were able to draw upon a catalogue of 
events that spanned a period of some two weeks whilst the patient was hospitalised.  How 
should a doctor determine whether or not a patient’s will has been overborne in relation 
to an advance decision?  Relevant background information may not always be available 
and when the influence of others may be subtle106 its presence may be relatively 
undetectable by those who are charged with ensuring the patients’ right of self-
determination. 
 
Was the Patient Adequately Informed about the effects of a Choice? 
What is required is that a patient knew in broad terms the nature and effect of the 
procedure to which their refusal is given.107  Whilst there is also a duty to appropriately 
inform the patient as to the likely risks, including any special risks, attaching to the 
proposed treatment108 in this instance treatment is being refused rather than consented to 
although a doctor must be satisfied that the patient was adequately informed about the 
risks of non-treatment.109   How should the goals of informed consent be interpreted to 
protect the bodily inviolability of patients who choose to register an anticipatory 
treatment refusal?  Case law suggests that a doctor should consider whether the patient 
may have been misinformed about the nature and effects of treatment, or whether such 
information had been withheld.110  Either way, the nature of the patient’s choice and the 
manner of its expression will in most instances be the only method by which a doctor 
may be alerted to the possibility that the patient’s choice was not adequately informed.111  
As to whether the patient was adequately informed about the risks of non-treatment112  a 
safety net exists as the decision of the patient is not applicable to life-sustaining treatment 
unless the patient specifies otherwise.113 
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Recognition of Advance Refusals 
An advance decision enables an adult while still capable to refuse specified medical 
treatment for a time in the future when they may lack the capacity to consent to or to 
refuse that treatment.114  This position was challenged by Mr Burke who suffered from a 
progressively degenerative brain condition that follows a similar course to multiple 
sclerosis.115  By reason of his condition the time would come when he would be entirely 
dependent on others for his care and indeed for his survival.116  He was concerned that a 
doctor might decide to withdraw treatment, in this case artificial nutrition and hydration 
because his life was no longer worth living even though death was not imminent.117 
 
The source of his anxiety can be traced to guidance of the General Medical Council 
which was to the effect that, ‘where death is not imminent, it usually will be appropriate 
to provide artificial nutrition or hydration.  However, circumstances may arise where you 
judge that a patient’s condition is so severe, the prognosis so poor, that providing 
artificial nutrition or hydration may cause suffering or to be too burdensome in relation 
to the possible benefits’. 118  In the case of Bland the House of Lords had determined that 
doctors should ordinarily seek a declaration from the court prior to withdrawing artificial 
nutrition and hydration from an insentient patient in a persistent vegetative state on the 
basis that treatment was futile.  Mr Burke anticipated the progression of his condition 
would result in an increase in his suffering and worried that artificial nutrition and 
hydration may be withdrawn without recourse to the courts as there was no obligation to 
seek a declaration, on the part of the doctor, in circumstances where a doctor determined 
that continued existence with treatment would be intolerable for a sentient patient.119 
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Mr Burke therefore commenced proceedings with a view to obtaining a ruling that the 
GMC’s advice was unlawful and that doctors would be required to comply with his 
competent request to receive treatment in the form of artificial nutrition and hydration.120 
 
The court ruled that: 
 
“Autonomy and the right of self-determination do not entitle the patient to insist on 
receiving a particular medical treatment regardless of the nature of the treatment.  
Insofar as a doctor has a legal obligation to provide treatment this cannot be 
founded simply upon the fact that the patient demands it.  The source of the duty 
lies elsewhere.121 
 
...  Once a patient is accepted into a hospital, the medical staff come under a 
positive duty at common law to care for the patient… A fundamental aspect of this 
positive duty of care is a duty to take such steps as are reasonable to keep the 
patient alive.  Where ANH is necessary to keep the patient alive, the duty of care 
will normally require the doctors to supply ANH...   Where the competent patient 
makes it plain that he or she wishes to be kept alive by ANH, this will not be the 
source of the duty to provide it.  The patient’s wish will merely underscore that 
duty. 122 
 
… where the patient is not competent and it is not considered to be in the best 
interests of the patient to be artificially kept alive.  …  The courts have accepted 
that where life involves an extreme degree of pain, discomfort or indignity to a 
patient, who is sentient but not competent and who has manifested no wish to be 
kept alive, these circumstances may absolve the doctors of the positive duty to keep 
the patient alive.  Equally, the courts have recognised that … the facts of the 
individual case may make it difficult to decide whether the duty to keep the patient 
alive persists”. 123 
 
Consequently the advice issued to doctors by the GMC was lawful.124  Notwithstanding 
that fact the court went on to observe125 that whilst an advance directive to refuse life-
preserving must be respected126 a patient who had expressed a wish to be kept alive 
would be taken into consideration by doctors when considering what is in the best 
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interests of the patient.127  Therefore the situation may be summarised thus.  An advance 
directive provides a competent patient with a right to refuse treatment after they have 
ceased to be competent.128  It cannot be used to request treatment that the patient might 
consider to be in their own best interests although a statement of wishes would be taken 
into consideration by doctors in determining what should be done in the patient’s best 
interests.129  As this principle extends to life-sustaining treatment there is no right to life.  
Nevertheless, there may be circumstances in which it would be possible for a patient to 
use an advanced directive to refuse all but the preferred method of treatment.130  However 
there are no guarantees that this would have the hoped for effect.  Moreover, the patient 
would be required to understand and process a considerable amount of information and 
even if this could be accomplished a doctor might still invoke the Bolam principle on the 
basis that the desired treatment is not treatment that a responsible doctor would 
administer in the circumstances. 
 
Requirements that are Specific to Advance Decisions 
 
Advance decisions are attractive because they allow people to plan ahead for a time in the 
future when they might suffer from a loss of decision-making capacity and are unable to 
make decisions for themselves.131   However, an advance decision to refuse treatment 
must be valid and applicable to the circumstances that have in fact arisen to have the 
same effect as a decision that is made by a person with capacity.132 
 
Validity 
An advance decision to refuse medical treatment will have legal effect only when the 
decision is, at the material time, valid.133  Inter alia134 an anticipatory decision is not valid 
if it has subsequently been revoked either because the patient has withdrawn the decision 
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at a time when they still had capacity to do so135 or else has done anything that is clearly 
inconsistent with the advance decision remaining his fixed decision.136   
 
Withdrawal 
As there are no formal requirements for a valid advance directive one may be made orally 
or be in writing.137  Consequently there are no formal requirements for the revocation of 
an advance directive so that one that is made in writing may be revoked orally.138  When 
the role of anticipatory decision-making is to further patient autonomy any clause or 
condition that seeks to fetter this underlying objective, including the right to change one’s 
mind, will be void in being contrary to public policy.139   
 
However, a previously expressed competent decision can only be revoked where the 
person retains decision-making capacity.140  Accordingly, when a previously competent 
adult patient loses both the capacity to decide whether or not to accept medical treatment 
and any ability to express his wishes and feelings then a previously valid advance 
directive that has not been revoked will in effect become and potentially remain 
irrevocable.141  The fact that ‘exceptionally difficult moral, ethical and legal questions’ 
may have to be addressed when a previously competent patient is in the twilight position 
of having lost their decision-making capacity but otherwise remains able to express their 
wishes and feelings has already been raised.142   
 
Inconsistent Acts 
The common law has determined that an anticipatory choice might not survive a 
subsequent, or even an impending, change of faith by the patient.143  For example, the 
daughter in the case of HE was born and brought up as a Muslim.144  Sometime later the 
                                                 
135
 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s.25(2)(a) 
136
 Ibid, s.25(2)© 
137
 HE v A Hospital NHS Trust 2003 WL 21729346, para.46  
138
 Ibid 
139
 Ibid 
140
 Ibid, para.38 
141
 Ibid 
142
 Ibid 
143
 Re T (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 649 CA; HE v A Hospital NHS Trust 2003 
WL 21729346 
144
 HE v A Hospital NHS Trust 2003 WL 21729346, para.2 
 217
parents separated and AE, the daughter, went to live with her mother.145  The mother 
became a Jehovah’s Witness and AE followed suit and from that time on was brought up 
as a Jehovah’s Witness.146  To this end, and despite the fact that she suffered from a 
congenital heart problem which might necessitate treatment in the future, AE had made 
an advance directive to refuse blood transfusions and blood products.  In it she had 
stipulated that the refusal should continue to apply even when such treatment was 
required to save or preserve her life.147   
 
When, a few years later, the earlier advance decision came to be applied her mother and 
brother remained adamant that AE would not wish to receive blood products. 148  This 
was contested by her father, grandmother and fiancé. 149  Her father in particular claimed 
that AE had said, in the presence of her brother and aunt, that she did not want to die.150  
However, when the case came to court the presiding judge ruled that the earlier 
anticipatory statement of AE should not be relied upon primarily because she had more 
recently become engaged to be married to a Turkish man and it was a condition of the 
marriage that AE should reject her faith and become a Muslim once more.151  Her 
intention in this regard was demonstrated by the fact that she had not and was not 
currently actively pursuing her faith as a Jehovah’s Witness.152 
 
Thus the issue of whether or not an advance decision continues to be valid or has been 
revoked is treated as a question of fact to be determined by the evidence.153  And in this 
case there was a real, rather than speculative, reason to doubt the continuing validity of 
an advance decision.  In this regard words said to have been spoken by the patient might 
warrant further investigation however too greater willingness to accede to this type of 
evidence could be detrimental to patient autonomy.  But on the basis that actions often 
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speak louder than words such evidence might more readily constitute a real reason to 
doubt the continuing validity of an advance directive,154 and when the entire substratum 
or the assumption on which the advance directive was based has been destroyed by 
subsequent events then the refusal will cease to be effective.155   
 
Clearly medical professionals will, for the most part, be charged with the task of 
separating out real reasons from those that are merely speculative. 
 
Applicability 
The issue here is whether an advance decision is applicable to the situation in question 
and in the current circumstances.156  An advance decision will not be applicable if at the 
material time a patient remains competent to express their current wishes with regard to 
treatment.157  Accordingly, an anticipatory decision will not be applicable if at the 
material time a person retains capacity to give or refuse consent to the treatment in 
question.158  Likewise, an anticipatory refusal is not applicable to the treatment if that 
treatment is not the treatment specified in the advance directive,159 or any circumstances 
specified in the advance directive are absent160 or there are reasonable grounds for 
believing that circumstances exist which were not anticipated at the time of the advance 
directive and which would have affected his decision had he anticipated them.161  Lastly, 
and most importantly, an advance directive is not applicable to life sustaining treatment 
unless it is specified to do so.162 
 
Retaining Capacity 
There is a presumption that all adults have capacity to consent to medical treatment.163 
Setting the barrier too high in relation to the level of capacity that is required for medical 
decision-making would preclude many from exercising their right of self-determination.  
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It is therefore an aspect of respect for personal autonomy that every effort is made to 
assist even borderline patients to overcome their difficulties in making a 
contemporaneous medical treatment decision.164    Essentially if the person has or gains 
capacity to make a medical treatment decision they can refuse the relevant treatment at 
the material time or may exercise their right to change their decision and consent to the 
treatment in question.  Consequently advance directives are inherently revocable.165  In 
an appropriate case a finding that a patient retains decision-making capacity opens the 
door for them to review their prior choice, which may have been expressed at a time 
when they were in full health, in the light of their current situation.  The issue of whether 
or not a person has capacity is treated as a question of fact to be determined by a doctor 
with responsibility for the patient.  My concern, in view of the evidence reviewed earlier 
in this chapter, is with the circumstances in which a patient may be found to retain 
decision-making capacity as it is difficult to eliminate the possibility of them feeling 
vulnerable as a result of their condition and afraid by what is entailed in their prior 
instructions and these are the very conditions which are known to engender a change of 
mind with a little persuasion.166   
 
Specifying Treatment 
Of course medical treatment may be of one type such as when a ventilator is used to 
compensate for the cardio-vascular system in keeping the patient alive.  On the other 
hand patients who are unconscious or are otherwise disabled from taking food and water 
orally may be given artificial nutrition and hydration by naso-gastric tube167 or by 
percutaneous gastrostomy tube.168  Therefore, it is a problem associated with specifying a 
form of treatment that a doctor may still treat their patient just as effectively with an 
alternative form of medical treatment.  Indeed it is possible that advances in medical 
science and technology may overtake the decision by creating a range of treatment 
options where some time has elapsed between the creation and use of an advance 
directive.  Moreover, consideration should be given to the fact that medicine promotes 
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divergent practices in any event.169  Accordingly, patients that have sought medical 
advice in the process of drafting their advance directive are less likely to find themselves 
overtaken by advances in medical science.170 
 
There is also the problem that in making an advance directive a patient may have used 
terms that cloud the issue of what treatment they are refusing.171  For example, a patient 
might simply state that they do not want to be placed on life support.172  However, kidney 
dialysis constitutes life support.173  It has therefore been suggested that advance directives 
might be more useful if rather than specifying the treatment a patient specified their 
expectations, i.e. what degree of illness or incapacity they were prepared to live with.174   
 
Absent Circumstances 
On the basis that a patient’s actions speak louder than words a material change of 
circumstances may decree an advance directive no longer applicable to the treatment in 
question.  Thus it may be alleged that the patient no longer professes the faith which 
underlay the advance directive, or it may be said that the patient executed the advance 
directive because they were suffering from an illness which has since been cured, medical 
science may have moved on, or it may be said that the patient, having since married or 
had children, now has more compelling reasons to choose to live even a severely 
disadvantaged life.175   
 
Unanticipated Circumstances 
Advances in medical science and the development of new medications or other forms of 
treatment or therapies might extend the treatment options that are available to doctors and 
if these were not foreseen by the patient their anticipatory decision to refuse treatment 
may not be applicable.  Equally there may have been changes in the patient’s personal 
life which were not anticipated at the time when they made an advance decision.  For 
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example, the patient may now be pregnant or might recently have had children and their 
hopes and expectations may have been modified by these events.  In these circumstances 
a doctor cannot conclude that if the patient still had the necessary capacity in the changed 
situation they would have reversed their decision but they can consider what was the true 
scope and basis of the patient’s decision, i.e. whether at the time the decision was made it 
was intended by the patient to apply in the changed situation.176      
 
In other words physicians must consider whether the refusal is unequivocal or of more 
limited scope.  It will be of limited scope where, for example, a patient refuses a blood 
transfusion in the belief that there is an effective alternative treatment.177  Consequently, 
if the factual situation falls outside the scope of the refusal or if the assumption on which 
it is based is falsified, the refusal ceases to be effective.178  All of which suggests that it is 
necessary to constantly review and update treatment refusals that have been expressed in 
an advance directive. 
 
Life Sustaining Treatment 
When a person intends that their anticipatory refusal should extend to life-sustaining 
treatment this must be explicitly stated in the advance directive.  Thus the true scope of 
their decision must be made explicit.   
 
Preliminary Summary 
In summary an advance decision is not applicable to the treatment a doctor proposes to 
administer in the patient’s best interests if the treatment is not the treatment specified in 
the advance decision or if any circumstances specified in the advance decision are absent 
or where there are reasonable grounds for believing that circumstances exist which the 
patient did not anticipate at the time of the advance decision and which would have 
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affected their decision had they been anticipated.179  Evidence, however, suggests that all 
persons frequently encounter problems in writing with such precision.180   
 
The Effect of an Advance Decision 
An advance decision that is legally valid and applicable has the same effect as a 
contemporaneous decision to refuse treatment.181  The result, according to Andrew 
Grubb, is that: 
 
“If a competent adult has expressed an unequivocal decision to refuse treatment, it 
is not for the doctor or the court to speculate as to the strength of the patient’s 
personal or religious convictions or as to his reasons for refusing consent.  Nor is it 
for the doctor or the court to speculate as to what the patient’s decision might have 
been if he had been alive to the current crisis, or if he had been more fully 
informed, or if he had had more forcibly brought home to him all the implications 
of his refusal.  If it is not possible to say what the patient’s decision would have 
been if he had been given more information, his expressed decision, if he was 
competent to make it, is decisive, even if it was not made in contemplation of life-
threatening circumstances”.182 
 
 
Determining what was the Scope and Basis of the Patient’s Decision? 
Even if a doctor considers that the patient had the capacity to decide and has exercised 
their right to do so, they still have to consider what is the true scope and basis of that 
decision.183  So although an unambiguous advance decision which is being applied in 
unambiguous circumstances will be treated in the same way as if the patient had 
expressed an unequivocal decision to refuse treatment contemporaneously184 a doctor 
may have reason to doubt that the decision remains operative or continues to be valid and 
applicable.185   
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For example, a doctor may be given conflicting accounts of the patient’s wishes or 
beliefs.186  And here we must bear in mind that as there are no formal requirements for a 
valid advance directive, in that an anticipatory decision need not be either in or evidenced 
by writing, there are similarly no formal requirements for the revocation of an 
anticipatory choice.187  Moreover, an advance directive is inherently revocable, perhaps 
unwittingly so.188  It may be words said to have been written or spoken by the patient.189  
It may be the patient’s actions, for sometimes actions speak louder than words.190  It may 
be some change in circumstances.191  Thus it may be alleged that the patient no longer 
professes the faith which underlay the advance directive; it may be said that the patient 
executed the advance directive because he was suffering from an illness which has since 
been cured; it may be said that medical science has now moved on; it may be said that the 
patient, having since married or had children, now finds himself with more compelling 
reasons to choose to live even a severely disadvantaged life.192  It may be suggested that 
the advance directive has been revoked, whether by express words or by conduct on the 
part of the patient inconsistent with its continued validity.193  It may be suggested that, 
even though not revoked, the advance directive has not survived some material change of 
circumstances.194  Anyone of these factors but most particularly the lack of a formal 
process for the creation and revocation of an anticipatory decision can work to the 
advantage of those who would seek to challenge its existence or continuing validity or 
applicability.195   
 
The issue of whether or not an advance decision exists and continues to be valid and 
applicable is treated as a question of fact to be determined, initially at least, by a doctor 
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who cannot simply deny the patient’s right of decision.196  Instead a doctor is required to 
have some reason to doubt that the anticipatory choice remains operative and where 
doubt exists the burden of proof, in each case, is on those who seek to establish the 
existence or continuing validity and applicability of an advance directive.197  
Commenting on the doctor’s position Justice Munby has stated that: 
 
“Whether there is some real reason to doubt, whether the doubt is a real or only 
some speculative or fanciful doubt, will inevitably depend on the circumstances.  
Holding the balance involves awesome responsibility.  Too ready a submission to 
speculative or merely fanciful doubts will rob advance directives of their utility and 
may condemn those who in truth do not want to be treated to what they would see 
as indignity or worse… Too sceptical a reaction to well-founded suggestions that 
circumstances have changed may turn an advance directive into a death warrant 
for a patient who in truth wants to be treated. 198 
 
At the end of the day, and however unhelpful for hard pressed doctors this seeming 
platitude may be, it must all depend on the facts.  All I would add is that the longer 
the time has elapsed since an advance directive was made, and the greater the 
apparent changes in the patient’s circumstances since then, the more doubt there is 
likely to be as to its continuing validity and applicability.  There will be cases in 
which there will need to be especially close, rigorous and anxious scrutiny”. 199 
 
 
In cases where life is at stake doctors are required to scrutinise the evidence with especial 
care to ensure that it is clear, convincing and inherently reliable and if there is reason to 
doubt that doubt falls to be resolved in favour of the preservation of life.200  Once it has 
been determined that an advance directive cannot be relied upon a doctor will be required 
to exercise judgment in accordance with a best interests treatment standard on behalf of 
the patient.201  Where the evidence relied upon by the doctor is contested an application 
to court can be made for a declaration as to the existence, validity or applicability of an 
advance decision.202  Consequently, the court is the ultimate arbiter of whether an 
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advance decision exists and is valid and applicable to a treatment.203  In the interim 
period a doctor may provide treatment to sustain life or to prevent a serious deterioration 
in the patient’s health.204  
 
Alerting Doctors to the Presence of an Advance Directive  
A doctor who wishes to avoid liability for a battery is required to obtain a legally valid 
and applicable consent from their competent patient prior to administering medical 
treatment.205  Medical professionals do not however incur liability for carrying out or 
continuing with treatment in their patient’s best interests unless, at the time, the physician 
is satisfied that an advance directive exists which is valid and applicable to the treatment 
in question.206   In other words, patients bear the responsibility for bringing their advance 
directive to the doctor’s attention.  An issue in this regard is that there is no central 
system of registration in England and Wales which is surprising in view of the legislative 
objectives which are to empower patients and to place them at the centre of decision-
making processes concerning them thus legislation authorises clinicians to follow the 
advance directives of their patients. 
 
On the other hand, the defence enables doctors to act in the patient’s best medical 
interests in an emergency.  In these situations the patient may be unknown and 
circumstances may dictate that the requirement to consult relatives cannot be fulfilled 
because one cannot reasonably be found in time.  Therefore, it is presumed that all 
patients would wish to receive medical treatment and care, including life preserving 
treatment; in cases of doubt that doubt falls to be resolved in favour of the preservation of 
life.207  So we can all rest assured that we will not be turned away from the accident and 
emergency department for want of a ‘request for treatment’ card.208 
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It is also apparent that treatment may be withheld or, more importantly in this context, 
subsequently withdrawn after it has been initiated, and a person does not incur liability 
for the consequences of doing so if at the time they reasonably believe that the patient has 
made an advance decision which is valid and applicable to the treatment in question.209  
This provision, in prioritising autonomy over beneficence, importantly restores moral 
neutrality in the law related to mentally incapacitated patients.  How likely is it then that 
an advance directive will reach the medical professionals who are responsible for the care 
of the incompetent patient?210  American research suggests that for a variety of reasons 
often they do not.211   The time span between the creation and use of an advance directive 
is often critical as the greater the time that has elapsed the more likely it is that the 
existence and location of the advance directive will have faded from the memory.212  
Secondly, because of potential difficulties in drafting an advance directive many people 
enlist the help of lawyers and unfortunately research shows that a majority213 of patients 
do not give their advance directive to their doctor.214  Another reason why advance 
directives do not come to the attention of physicians is that on admission to hospital 
patients are often too anxious to recall and mention their advance directive and that those 
dealing with the patient’s admission to hospital might be too busy, neglectful or just loath 
to ask awkward questions.215  It’s a little like a host asking his guests on arrival how long 
they intend to stay. 
 
It may therefore be argued that if advance directives are to have any utility at all some 
consideration should be given to developing a central registry.  Unconscious patients are 
at a particular disadvantage since the only people to alert doctors are friends or relatives 
and they may have an interest in not doing so if they disagree with its contents.  A central 
registry might also ensure that a patient is treated consistently with their advance 
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directive should they have an accident or fall ill outside of their own general locality.   
Crucially, a central system for registering advance directives is an essential facility if we 
seriously intend to respect the patients’ right to self-determine what shall happen to their 
body in a medical context. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The moral ideal of autonomy points to the fact that welfare promoting incentives are born 
out of self-interest.216  As the primacy of the principle of autonomy has been established 
by the law of consent a competent person is able to decide whether to consent to or refuse 
to consent to medical treatment by reference to their own values if they so choose.217  It is 
also an established principle of law that the former values, beliefs and preferences of a 
competent person can be binding on physicians if at some future date that person is a 
patient and is deemed to be mentally incompetent.218  Consistent with this principle the 
law makes provision for competent persons to record an advance decision to refuse a 
particular form of medical treatment in a living will or an advance directive.219  This is 
significant for patients who wish to maintain control over what shall happen to their body 
in the future when they are no longer competent to decide. 
 
An advance directive allows a patient to be pro-active in settling what should happen in 
the future in the same way that persons customarily make a will to determine what shall 
happen to their estate upon their demise.  The patient has time to consider things and to 
talk them over with family, friends and possibly medical professionals and/or carers as 
well as to consider the consequences of their decision.  Ultimately the patient 
communicates their decision to refuse a particular form of medical treatment through a 
living will, living because it takes effect whilst the patient is still alive.  To that extent the 
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patient has an opportunity to maximise decision-making capacity and to thereby protect 
an autonomous choice. 
 
In order for the decision to be binding the requirement is that it should be legally valid 
and applicable in the circumstances that have arisen.220  There is no defined form that an 
advance decision should take rather the law lays down criteria which a doctor is required 
to apply to the decision before them.  As advance decisions, consistent with the right of 
self-determination, are inherently revocable legal validity is particularly concerned with 
whether the decision may subsequently have been withdrawn either by word or by 
deed.221  Legal applicability is more directly concerned with what the true scope and 
basis of the patient’s decision is in focusing more particularly on the choice the patient 
has made and the way in which it has been articulated.  There are however, many 
practical problems and obstacles associated with making and drafting or articulating an 
anticipatory choice and as the law requires persons to be very clear about what they have 
decided specificity is one of the most difficult obstacles to overcome.  One may either 
have said too much or too little. Alternatively, terms may have used that have clouded the 
issue of what the patient intended to happen.  Additionally, there may have been a change 
in personal circumstances which may be reason enough to question the continuing 
applicability of a treatment decision. 
 
In summary, validity and applicability are difficult standards to meet in seeming to 
require a patient to be very competent and/or to record a decision close to the time that it 
will come into effect after having had an opportunity to consult their physician as doctors 
must be very certain about what the patient intended.  Consequently, there is a danger 
that in all other circumstances the values, beliefs and preferences that informed the 
treatment decision of the patient will be overridden in their best interests.   
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Chapter Six 
 
 
Patients’ Values and Value Systems 
 
This dissertation has been building to this point of seeking to determine whether it is 
possible to reliably determine the values and value system of a competent person which if 
disclosed in a living will could then be used by another, as a relevant written statement of 
the patient, to inform a best interests decision-making process in the knowledge that 
particular weight should be given to it.1   In theory, at least, it is entirely possible that a 
personal value system could be used in this way as competent patients customarily rely 
on their own values, beliefs and preferences when deciding whether to accept an offer of 
medical treatment, or to choose one treatment instead of another, or to reject all forms of 
medical treatment.   
 
So the idea of using a value system to inform a treatment decision-making process is that 
it should be in all relevant respects as if the patient had made their decision to consent or 
to refuse to consent to treatment contemporaneously.  In order to achieve this  it is 
essential that a value system should be capable of yielding the choice the patient would 
make if competent to decide, or, to at least point towards a choice that is most consistent 
with the values, beliefs and preferences that were disclosed.   And if a doctor could 
determine what should happen in someone’s actual best interests  there is some 
justification in saying that it should be possible to treat patients who suffer from a loss of 
decision-making capacity  compatibly with the wishes of their former competent self.    
 
Therefore, in this chapter we will analyse the concepts of ‘values’ and of a value system; 
consider whether patient values should be paramount in decision-making; propose how a 
personal value system can be articulated so that when one is disclosed in a living will it 
can inform an assessment of best interests as well as to show how one might be 
incorporated into an advance decision; and will explore the issue of whether there might 
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be certain values or value systems that would not be upheld by the courts on the ground 
that it is against public policy. 
 
A Personal Value System 
 
We live in an era where advances in medical science and technology have enabled 
medical professionals to increasingly satisfy their objectives which, in accordance with 
the goals of medicine, are to preserve the life, health and well-being of patients.  The 
successes of medical science and technology means that it is commonplace to find 
alternative forms of treatment that are available to treat the various conditions that afflict 
mankind.  These innovations enable doctors to prevent death and to prolong life in non-
natural ways.   
 
A professional ethical code ensures that medicine is practiced so as to benefit patients.  
Nevertheless effective medical treatments also carry with them certain inherent risks.  
Prescribed medicines, even more benign over the counter preparations, typically come 
with a long list of possible risks, side-effects and instances of when to seek urgent 
medical attention.  Risk is then an inherent feature of most medical treatments.  The 
problem is that no one can predict with any degree of certainty whether, and if so in what 
circumstances, a particular risk will materialise.2  Instead one is required to balance the 
benefits of treatment against the burdens of it, including inherent risks. 3 
 
The decision whether to favour one form of treatment rather than another, or to simply 
reject treatment, which at the end of life might involve withholding or withdrawing life 
prolonging treatment, engages self-interest in a way that such decisions ordinarily reside 
with the patient. 4  All patients enjoy the right to be maintained inviolate and the 
administration of a medical treatment not only interferes with the bodily integrity of the 
patient but also exposes them to the risk of harmful consequences materialising.  
Consequently, the choice whether to accept or reject treatment or to choose one treatment 
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3
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 Chatterton v Gerson [1981] QB 432; Chester v Afshar 2004 WL 2289136 
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in preference to another engages quality of life considerations and competent patients are 
entitled to draw on their own philosophical ideas about what a good life is for them, not 
in a moral or ethical sense but in terms of the type of activities they enjoy as well as those 
that are critically important in shaping their life.5  
 
Ethically and legally it has been decided that generalisations about human kind and 
human nature are an insufficient guide to what will be of interest and value to all 
individuals.  For we have no clue about what makes a person’s life good, i.e. what is 
valuable to them as an individual.  The capacity to be rational, which is fundamental to 
the freedom we enjoy and take for granted, has not served to make humans entirely 
predictable when exercising their personal freedom.  A measure of predictability arises 
out of the fact that the purpose of all living things is to survive and reproduce and most 
rational persons do have a naturally strong desire for life and for their continued survival.  
Those who unexpectedly brush shoulders with death will tell you of this and they will tell 
you that in these circumstances the desire to survive is very powerful.  One has only to 
consider what has been done in the name of survival to appreciate the potency of its 
force, for it has inclined one person to eat another when faced with hostile conditions, 
inadequate food supplies and an uncertain prospect of recovery, for it seems that hunger 
alone could not have been the motivation when the starving populations of Africa refrain 
from such acts of cannibalism.  The desire to reproduce can similarly be attributed to this 
base instinct as it is through this process that our genetic make-up is passed on and if 
strong enough will form part of the gene pool of the next generation and as part of the 
genetic heritage of mankind.    
 
Consequently, we can say, if not assume, that the will to live is an instinctive feature of 
our nature and explains why most rational individuals would rank death, in representing 
the ultimate human harm, as a harm that they would most wish to avoid.  Persons are then 
predictable in that sense.  But we cannot go further and say that persons only have an 
interest in their continued survival, as that is to misunderstand what complex beings we 
are.  The desire to flourish or to lead a good life is equally pervasive and there are 
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circumstances in which some individuals might consider that continued life is no longer a 
benefit to them.  Poor physical health is inclined to invoke sentiments of this kind since 
poor health imposes restriction not choice.  It is the fight against preventable forms of 
restraint that may explain why there is a greater tendency for people of all ages to take 
regular exercise and to eat healthful foods.  Government departments, advertising 
campaigns and health gurus also advise us to lose weight, to stop smoking and to reduce 
stress by improving our work-life balance.  In other words we are being invited to look at 
and reconsider our life-style choices from a variety of sources in order to remind us of the 
need to look after our health and to inform us of the consequences of not doing so. 
 
It is not however possible to define good health in terms that are solely related to good 
physical health.  A person’s mental health status is equally important to their ability to 
survive and thrive, if not more so.  For although an arthritic hip or knee joint might 
prevent the sports enthusiast from participating in sporting activities that they enjoy the 
person remains in contact with their own free will which will eventually succeed in 
pointing them towards other ways of pursuing a good life.  In contrast, a person who 
suffers an injury to, or impairment in the functioning of, their brain will often have to 
contend with a more diverse range of issues in relation to the continued pursuit of what 
was formerly valuable to them.  And when good mental health has been unduly or 
irretrievably compromised, as a result of an accident or disease, the values and interests 
that previously contributed to their good may not be of any further concern to the person 
that remains.  So it is at this point tempting to say that a good life is one of conscious 
awareness as we can then pursue those things that are valuable to us.    
 
Perhaps that is right, but harmful physiological processes that are adverse to or destroy 
our vitality can also detrimentally impact upon the natural desire for continued life.  A 
cancer patient who is terminally ill might be willing to relinquish whatever life is left in 
them in order to be free of continuous and intolerable pain.  Similarly, patients who suffer 
from debilitating illnesses such as Motor Neurone Disease and Multiple Sclerosis, who 
often experience a gradual but nevertheless relentless physical decline, may eventually be 
overwhelmed by the indignities they must endure and would prefer to be spared them on 
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grounds of mental intolerability.  So whilst the desire to survive is a potent force within 
most rational persons when good physical and/or mental health has been irretrievably and 
detrimentally compromised, it may not, on every occasion, be entirely irrational for some 
people to view an earlier death as being preferable to a continued life of intolerable 
mental or physical pain, indignity and restricted freedom.  Now we see that a good life is 
one where persons have freedom to pursue whatever is of value to them. 
 
Persons are then generally predictable in the sense that they value life yet it is impossible 
to predict, with a similar degree of certainty, what a good life for them is or of how what 
is valuable might affect medical treatment decision-making processes.  For example, a 
sports enthusiast might, in a situation where a choice of treatments exist, prefer to 
experiment with more conservative approaches to treating discomfort in a joint if more 
radical treatment posed a small but nonetheless potentially potent threat to their ability to 
continue with an activity that at one extreme defines them and at another simply provides 
a considerable degree of pleasure.  Alternatively, quality of life considerations can also 
motivate some persons to pursue forms of treatment that carry with them known risks 
and/or at the very least unpleasant side-effects.  Consider women who must resort to IVF 
treatment in order to become pregnant.  These women must administer themselves with 
large doses of female hormone in order to stimulate egg production and must endure a 
surgical procedure for the recovery of those eggs.  However, doubts about the burdens of 
treatment, which include the risks associated with taking excessive doses of the female 
hormone oestrogen together with the general risks associated with any surgical 
procedure, to say nothing of the mental anguish that must form a part of an ordeal where 
the risk that the procedure will fail to yield any positive outcome is known at the outset to 
be quite high, are all offset by a potential benefit; the prospect of an enjoyable family life 
which includes having and raising a child of one’s own.  Quality of life considerations are 
not therefore simply negative expressions of the harms we wish to avoid but also foretell 
something about the values, beliefs, interests and preferences that inform our conception 
of what a good life is and of the type of things that make a positive contribution to our 
experience of life or that are intrinsically or critically valuable to it.   
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A personal value system should capture these values and organise them so that they can 
be understood by others to impart information that is the most relevant or fundamental to 
medical treatment decision-making processes that are concerned with the subjective value 
life has for the person whose life it is.6 
 
Gaining Insight into the Personal Value of One’s Own Life 
To assist others to understand our view of what is good and bad and therefore what is 
right and wrong conduct with regard to us a personal value system must not only disclose 
one’s values but must also facilitate decision-making that is taken consistently with the 
values, beliefs and preferences that previously assumed priority in life.  Consistent 
decision-making, in accordance with adopted values, relies upon the availability of 
statements concerning the practical application of those values in terms of which values 
were relevant, how they were weighted and so forth.  Other circumstantial evidence could 
be equally invaluable, particularly where it exposes differences in the ranking and 
balancing process in various and contrasting situations.  For example, a cautious person 
might prefer to reject medication for a skin complaint that poses a small risk to the health 
of their liver preferring instead to invest in over-the-counter topical preparations that are 
benign but also relatively ineffective.  However, if the way this person looks came to 
assume greater importance in their life then it is possible that a condition that was at one 
time tolerated could no longer be so that the small risk of incurring damage to their liver 
was diminished by the perceived advantages of having an unblemished skin. 
 
The links that are made possible by the disclosed value or values and by the information 
that is given in support of them should ensure that a value system can be relied on to 
provide adequate justification for others in deciding matters one way rather than another 
in the various circumstances and situations that might prevail in the future.  Clearly a 
value system that is limited to a single medical treatment refusal will be constrained by 
that factor.7  For example, one of the problems associated with advance decisions is that 
in the circumstances arising for decision there is likely to be more than one treatment 
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decision that needs to be made.  You might also recall from the previous chapter that 
legal applicability is a difficult standard to meet because doctors might be able to choose 
an alternative form of treatment that has not been refused or some difference in the 
prevailing circumstances suggest that the decision of the patient is not applicable.  An 
account of a single belief might on the other hand apply in a multitude of situations.  
Take for example, a Jehovah’s Witness who would in every situation refuse blood; 
changed circumstances would not elicit, from them, a different choice.  Maintaining that 
religious belief absolutely and without the advantage of a caveat is what is valued and is 
not outweighed by the benefits of receiving blood.  Consequently, a woman who had just 
given birth to a child that she desperately wanted and would otherwise be devoted to 
would refuse blood even when her life was at stake. 
 
A more developed or sophisticated value system might put forward an abstract principle 
that is to be applied to the many and varied situations and circumstances that could arise 
in the future.  Such a principle, in being suitably abstract, increases the likelihood that 
one can explain or justify a decision on the basis of its terms even when it might not 
always be obvious how the value system should be applied in practice.  For example, let 
us say that a person is disposed to be a little philosophic and adopts as fundamental the 
principle that they would seek never to harm the interests of third parties.  They were able 
to illustrate how fundamental this principle was to them and how it had informed their 
life by providing instances of where it had assumed priority over all other personal 
considerations including one’s own financial or professional interests.  However, 
occasion demanded that this principle should be considered in the context of medical 
treatment, for the person was in urgent need of a donor kidney and a sibling had stepped 
forward as a willing donor.  Is this a clear case where the donation would not go ahead or 
might someone reason that the value had not previously been applied in a situation where 
life was at stake and that these circumstances, where it could not be shown that the 
person exhibited a settled commitment to it, should be treated as an exception that proves 
the rule.  How might the situation be changed if the donated material was bone marrow or 
blood?  Moreover, what should happen in circumstances where access to treatment, such 
as dialysis, was limited because demand outstripped supply?     
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When several prima facie principles are presented for consideration, in a single value 
system, it may be assumed that the difficulties associated with application and adequacy 
of justification will increase proportionately; at least there is evidence to this effect.8 
 
Values 
 
Whilst all persons have values recognising what they are and identifying their true 
significance might require a little reflective thought.  We can use a company by way of 
analogy to help the process along because businesses like people wish to survive and 
prosper.  Moreover, companies, like people, do not exist in a vacuum isolated from all 
external contact rather a business must integrate its activities alongside other similar 
enterprises within a community.  So whereas people express themselves through speech 
and conduct one way in which a business finds expression in the outside world is through 
its products, services, mission statements, logos, branding, premises, advertisements, staff 
etc.  These activities enable commercial enterprises to raise awareness of their values and 
ends and gather support for their goods.  In general this is achieved by aligning their 
products or services with a particular consumer group.  This is done by correlating the 
values of the company, product or service with those of the individuals they are seeking 
to appeal to.  The process is successful when the messages that are projected are widely 
understood and are generally perceived to be true.  So if we think of Roll Royce we think 
of luxury cars that are driven by people who appreciate stateliness, quality and 
craftsmanship but if we think of Ferrari we are more likely to think of very fast cars 
driven by playboys and when we think of Ford we think of cars that are driven by a 
family man.   
 
As profit making organisations, companies are generally careful to maintain positive 
links with established values, particularly those that are fundamental or critically 
important to the way in which the business has evolved.  Consequently, anything 
inconsistent that has the potential to detrimentally impact upon those values in the minds 
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of the public is taken very seriously.  To illustrate the point, in 2006, we saw that Kate 
Moss lost modelling contracts and advertising campaigns with Chanel, Burberry and 
H&M following allegations in the press that she was taking drugs.  In other words these 
companies considered, at that time that the values expressed by this alleged form of 
conduct were incompatible with those expressed by their brand names and therefore so 
too of the particular market they were appealing to.   
 
People tend to think of personal values in similar ways particularly those that play a 
critical role in shaping that life.  Persons co-exist alongside one another and therefore 
harmonious co-existence relies upon some integration of values, e.g. bodily inviolability 
and respect for autonomy.  Otherwise persons have freedom to develop themselves and 
their skills and to promote those self-interests through a range of enterprising activities 
based on a partial account of what a good life is and on what is considered to be of value 
in human life.  In other words persons construct their lives around activities that they like, 
or that they are good at, or that challenge them and in doing so will either adopt 
principles that serve their purposes, based on instrumental reasoning, or that assume some 
importance in establishing how things must be done, i.e. I want to achieve great things 
but not at any price because how you get there is important.    
 
Essentially, persons determine what a good life is by selecting from the various forms of 
pleasures and pains that this world has to offer those which they will adopt as their own 
having noted how these affect personal well-being either positively or negatively and to 
what degree and by establishing rules for how a life will be lived, or to put the matter 
another way, those occasions when the will is freely exercised to intervene and triumph 
over the thoughts and activities of the inclination.   
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The Intrinsic Value of a Life being a Certain Way is reflected through Critical 
Values 
The circumstances and situations in which we impose our will give a more complete 
account of what we actually think is intrinsically good or bad.   Moreover, it is in 
observing whether, when, how and why we exercise our will in relation to our desires and 
inclinations that we gain insight into what is right and wrong conduct in relation to our 
goods, since we will have tapped into the beliefs and values that are critical in informing 
our life. 
 
Integrity view of Autonomy and Critical Values9 
Frequently we note the fickle nature of values.  The values of companies, institutions, 
professions and persons change, adapt or are relinquished in favour of others.  Reforms 
may be justified by the need to survive or to flourish in an ever changing world.   So 
under commercial pressure a company, whose mission statement places priority on the 
value of customer service will, in the interests of their cost/income ratio, make the move 
away from decentralised switchboard operations in favour of a call centre, which are 
perceived by many customers as being impersonal and inefficient. 
 
Conscious awareness of one’s values enable persons to find ways of managing change on 
terms that are conducive to them and if personal values withstand the various pressures 
for change that will inevitably be put upon them, even when recognising that one might 
be out of step with others, then it is more likely that these values are truly meaningful in 
determining what a good life, for them, is built upon.  And it might be particularly 
important to declare and make explicit values and beliefs that could on occasion be 
challenged because they appear to be in conflict with those of others that are more 
generally held, such as can happen when a practicing Jehovah’s Witness wishes to refuse 
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a particular form of medical treatment that could save their life as well as restore them to 
full health.10   
 
The Consequences of not informing a Decision with Personal Values 
The most obvious problem is that a decision that is not informed by personal values may 
stand out as being irrational, inconsistent or inauthentic when considered in the light of 
the overall shape of their life.11  A model, for example, will presumably consider that a 
good life is one that entails becoming a designer’s muse and will value striding 
decorously down a catwalk wearing that designer’s latest creations.  They will recognise 
that they must remain slim, toned and healthy if they desire to have and maintain a 
successful career.  Consequently, decisions to take drugs or to regularly consume vast 
quantities of alcohol, or food for that matter, are all incompatible with the values 
associated with being a model.   
 
A competent person also has freedom to change their mind.12  Autonomy does not entail 
the notion that persons should be enslaved or controlled by their values, beliefs and 
preferences.  If it were otherwise persons could never even contemplate changing their 
religious faith and yet many people adopt alternative religious convictions when they 
marry a person of a different faith.  Similarly, a person might find reason to question a 
settled commitment to an existing religious belief following a recent experience or 
perhaps even a trip abroad.  So values, beliefs and preferences of whatever kind and no 
matter how fundamental may be revised or relinquished in favour of new and presumably 
more important ones in the lifetime of a person.13  Rational reflection can assist a person 
to identify changes in attitude towards their beliefs and values and to discover whether 
the mind has moved in a different direction necessitating some revision of values to be 
made in conformity with it; alternatively this reflective process can also help to re-affirm 
values in their current format.  The point, however, is to emphasise the importance of 
keeping values under review and to make  any revision of critical values and beliefs 
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known so that in the future a decision may not be challenged because it appears to others 
to be inconsistent with former decisions and ideas.14 
 
Implications in Respect of Medical Treatment 
A decision to refuse medical treatment that would, as a consequence, lead to the patient’s 
death may appear to medical professionals to be inconsistent with common opinion about 
the value of human life particularly when treatment would not only prevent death but 
would also restore health.15  This type of situation is exemplified by a woman who has 
just given birth having lost a lot blood but who now refuses to consent to a blood 
transfusion that will save her life.  Arguably, a choice that would lead to this person’s 
death would appear to be similarly inconsistent with the decision to have a child which is 
essentially a pro-life choice for it speaks of optimism and hope and of promise for the 
future and of playing a role in nurturing the talents and interests of a person as a member 
of a future generation.  Crucially it is implicit in the decision to have a child that one 
accepts the responsibilities of that choice and all that it entails.  So a decision to have a 
child, who is dependent on the actions of its parents, indicates a willingness to accept 
obligations of selflessness and sacrifice rather than self-indulgence, at least until the child 
is of age.  Consequently, there are grounds to challenge, as irrational, a decision to refuse 
life-saving treatment.   That is unless it was also known that this person was a Jehovah’s 
Witness as then the decision to refuse such treatment would be rational, if not regrettable, 
in being consistent with their wider beliefs.   
 
The beliefs and values we adopt as our own are then an important source of information 
about us and when understood by others explain and justify forms of conduct that might 
otherwise be considered irrational, inconsistent or inauthentic.   As a consequence it is 
essential that a value system is maintained to accurately reflect current beliefs, values and 
preferences.   Otherwise the risk is that upon becoming mentally incapacitated a person 
will be treated inconsistently with them and the consequences may be irreversible when 
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life is at stake and treatment that would ordinarily save life is withheld.16  Similarly, 
where the values, beliefs and preferences of an incapacitated patient are unknown a 
treatment decision may be imposed with the values that persons are commonly assumed 
to hold or which reflect the values of the decision-maker.    
 
Voluntariness: Do Persons Willingly Accede to the Values of Others? 
Evidence suggests that persons are willing to fight for personal freedom in exercising 
their own free will.  This much we know from observing the conflicts in Ireland and now 
Iraq which have been attributed to differences in the beliefs and values of the people of 
these geographic communities.  Distrust feeds the conflict because one section of the 
community does not trust the other to protect their freedom to maintain beliefs and values 
that are one of the principal causes of the conflict.   Consequently, one faction seeks 
domination over another and the aggressor makes use of military and political tactics to 
steal an advantage in overbearing the will of those they seek to govern.    
 
So given the importance we appear to attach to autonomy it could be argued that it is 
against human nature to willingly accede to a situation in which the values, beliefs and 
preferences of others are imposed upon us particularly if we think that these are likely to 
be incompatible or conflict with our own.  Is this not why accomplices, accessories or 
those who aid, abet or procure crime are considered to be parties to the crime whilst those 
whose will was overborne can claim the defence of duress and walk free?17  Willing 
acceptance of the imposition of values can therefore also be made out to be a form of 
self-abuse as the practice denigrates one’s rational nature and signals the start of a very 
slippery slope.  When apathy or weakness of the will get a hold we are inclined to get 
washed along with the tide for we cannot resist the corruptive values of others as we are 
without means to critique what they have to say or do.  At the very least we are 
vulnerable to being manipulated into forms of conduct we might otherwise have the 
strength to resist when we have values and beliefs that we defend and are willing to fight 
for. 
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Alternatively, we could say that those who aid and abet crime are ill disciplined in the 
exercise of their free will.  For what is demonstrated is irresponsible use of one’s rational 
nature to incite those that are preyed upon to act in ways that are not conducive to their 
ends.  So, what appears to emerge from this discussion is that persons will fight for the 
right to live in accordance with their own beliefs and values but must at the same time 
respect others who may have different ideas about what a good life is.18  Therefore, 
harmonious co-existence would seem to rely on taking a disciplined approach to the 
exercise of our free will in order to temper the demands of the inclination, particularly in 
situations where the interests of others are engaged.19 
 
Is this pure idealism; how realistic is it to suppose that persons will always show 
sufficient strength of character to both empower and temper the will as occasion demands 
when history demonstrates humankinds susceptibility to weakness of the will when 
subjected to various external20 and internal21 pressures to do otherwise?  This surely 
explains why society is justified in creating a legal system with recourse to sanctions in 
respect of forms of conduct that fail to meet widely accepted standards of conduct.  Then 
the question is from what considerations do we derive our ideas about right and wrong 
human conduct, i.e. what should be the aim of a legal system and from what source 
should a legal system derive its authority?  Remember there is no universal agreement 
about what good is or of what a good life for humans should entail.  However, in 
common with Kant most people believe that adult humans are moral creatures who are 
capable of abstracting from personal differences in moral matters.   Indeed many22 go 
further and claim that our humanity is most vividly captured and expressed by those who 
evince a good will or see reason for why we should adopt an attitude of respectful 
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friendship toward others.  This capacity, to act in accordance with a reasoned set of 
principles or rules,23 rather than from instinct or inclination, can be traced to our rational 
nature.  Therefore  should our legal system seek to impose a particular view of what is the 
right way for humans to live or is it more important that it should remain neutral on the 
matter and if so how should this be achieved?  Should it be validated purely in facts of 
nature and human nature in particular because respect for moral laws will be implicit 
within it or should  scope also be given in a political democracy to social conventions, 
political discourse and in particular (objective) scientific facts, accepting that these may 
or may not have been correctly established, falsified or contested, particularly if some 
sort of moral approach can be formulated to these subjects that tells us whether a political 
order is just or unjust in its relationship to the people it governs.24  This latter point is 
important because there exists a hidden opportunity for influential others to impose their 
views about the form of the good others are due and to therefore influence our thoughts 
about what is right and wrong human conduct in respect of those goods. 
 
Can free will be directed and controlled in indirect ways by others that are ultimately 
counterproductive to personal interests and ends?  Persons generally dislike any attempt 
to restrict freedom of the mind or body which might explain why imprisonment is 
considered to be a punishment.  But do we always recognise when that freedom has been 
invaded?  As individuals we are generally secure in feeling that others will respect our 
physical integrity and that we will respect theirs.  This reciprocal arrangement is formed 
out of recognition for the fact that in life all persons exist in bodily form and 
consequently depend upon its safe passage for continued survival.  Moreover, we learn to 
recognise situations and circumstances that may lead to direct physical violations and we 
are therefore increasingly able to take steps to protect ourselves against them.  But is 
there such a thing as an indirect physical violation?  Consider the situation of all patients 
who do not share the knowledge of their general practitioner or physician and do not 
therefore possess the means to assess the factors considered in the decision-making 
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process or the way in which judgment was exercised in a particular case by these medical 
professionals.   
 
Take as an example, a person who consults their doctor about recurring medical 
problems.  The symptoms of these conditions are relatively minor and can be treated and 
managed as and when they arise but the patient is seeking to ascertain the underlying 
cause of the problems and to determine whether these, seemingly unrelated issues can be 
cured or prevented from returning.  Clearly this person relies on the doctor’s superior 
knowledge in these matters.  The doctor attributes the problems to life-style choices and 
explains that they are commonplace and that they are lucky not to be troubled more 
frequently by them in the way that many other patients are.  Much later on however, this 
person discovers that an alternative body of opinion holds that the problems are related 
and that they do have an underlying cause for which treatment exists only the costs 
associated with this measure are greater.  Could it be said of such a situation that the 
doctor steals an advantage, through his superior knowledge, in overbearing the will of the 
patient? 
 
Should Patient Values be Paramount in Decision-Making? 
 
The question is do persons have values that they live by or do they merely respond to 
events as they arise and make decisions accordingly which is what Dresser suggests.25  
Let us consider the position of infants who are brought into the world by loving parents.  
They accept the responsibilities of parenthood and as good parents wish that their child 
continues to survive and flourish, i.e. has a good life or at least one that they find 
satisfying.  Of course the parent is not a passive bystander waiting patiently for their 
child’s eighteenth birthday to arrive in the hope that everything will come together in 
accordance with their former wishes.  The ideal parent puts to one side any self-interested 
notions of raising a child with the least possible effort on their part or of raising a child in 
their own image or of seeking to frustrate the passage to independence by inculcating the 
impression that the primary obligation of a good son or daughter is to look after their 
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parents in old age.  Instead, their child is given space to develop its own personality and 
to form their own ideas about the world so that the transition to adulthood, when 
normatively one has freedom to pursue a personal life plan, is unremarkable.  The parent-
child relationship so construed appears to have been embraced in law since a child’s right 
to autonomy has frequently outweighed their parent’s right to determine what is in the 
best interests of their child.26  Consequently, the law is consistent in its approach to 
welfare issues of discouraging those who are involved in caring for someone from being 
overly restrictive or controlling. 
 
From What Source do Values Flow? 
What is interesting about this question, if we relate matters back to infants and to legal 
recognition of their growing autonomy, is that an infant has no concept of the world and 
therefore no concepts with which to understand the world, its people or what a good life 
for them should entail.  Imagine what sort of a world it would be if it were otherwise and 
there was a facility to automatically upload a programme that was both neutral and 
familiar to other users as the common platform on which the A-Z of knowledge and its 
various uses was built, stored and retrieved.  Instead it is in the nature of persons to be 
curious and to have the capacity to process and store acquired information so that it can 
be used later on to reason with as a prelude to arriving at a decision or judgment.  But 
persons are also unique and complex beings.  So what we have is a situation where the 
human intellect is augmented by knowledge of concepts which accumulate over time 
however initial impressions can become modified through various pathways, intellectual, 
sensory or perceptual, which similarly affect reasoning processes and ultimately 
judgments.   
 
However, the formative years of a child’s life are shaped primarily by its parents.  
Initially at least family members and friends of the parents will be contributing to the 
manner of the child’s development.  Though the likelihood is that their contributions will 
be in conformity with those of the parents on the basis that persons quite often choose to 
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mix with others who are like them or because anxious parents may wish to ensure that 
what others say and do conforms to their ideas about the type of experiences and 
information the child’s mind should be exposed to.      
 
The radius of influence increases markedly however when the child attends school and 
engages in other extra curricular or recreational pastimes and eventually has a social life 
of their own, attending birthday parties and so on.  Nevertheless all of this takes place 
under the watchful eye of parents who therefore continue to exert an ever present and 
powerful influence over the social conditions under which their child lives.  And this is 
entirely consistent with the notion that all parents have their child’s best interests at heart 
but it is also possible to argue that by exposing their child to particular social practices 
the parent seeks to influence their child’s evaluative experiences both in terms of what 
they value and the way it values those things.27  Nurturing through social practices is a 
way to instil particular values and in a sense substitutes for having a child that has been 
genetically engineered to have certain natural attributes, i.e. genetically modified to be a 
gifted ballet dancer, musician or mathematician, for instance. 
 
This is significant because the argument that social practices can shape our activities as 
valuers challenges the notion that nature, including above all human nature, determines 
that persons are the source of values.28  
 
Are People or Values the Sources of Normative Claims? 29    
When persons talk about values they are more generally referring to states of affairs, 
objects or activities that are valuable to them.  However it has been said that: 
 
“Many of the objects and activities that we esteem would not so much as exist in 
the absence of various contingent and historical conditions.  We could hardly be 
said to value philosophy, or romantic comedy, or textiles of the Art and Crafts 
movement, in a social world that did not contain the quite distinctive forms of 
human activity necessary to produce instances of these genres.  More generally, the 
ways in which we relate to valuable objects and undertakings, and the significance 
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they have for our lives, themselves depend crucially on the social conditions under 
which we live.  The beauty of a beautiful sunset may not depend on the contingent 
practices of human communities.  But our access to this form of value is shaped by 
our culture, including the conceptual resources it makes available for thinking 
about the aesthetic dimensions of the natural world.  Furthermore, the significance 
of natural beauty for human lives depends on its connection to a range of concrete 
cultural practices, such as those of romantic painting and poetry”.30 
 
It is against this background that Joseph Raz argues that most human values are socially 
dependent in one way or another because they can only come into being and exist if there 
are, or were in the past, social practices that sustained them.31  Most human values are 
accounted for on the basis that more general useful or instrumental values are put into 
practice through some more specific or intrinsic ones, i.e. what is objectively valuable 
such as creating the greatest good or amount of human happiness whilst also respecting 
principles of justice.32  And a sustaining practice is according to Raz a necessary 
condition for the existence of intrinsic values, i.e. that many people value a particular 
good or form of the good.33  This ensures that values are not explained on the basis of 
‘brute’ fact alone.34  Instead of which the social dependence of value can be explained in 
two ways.35  First, there may be a historical explanation for the emergence and fate of the 
sustaining practices.36  Alternatively, there will be a normative explanation of why a 
particular form of the good is a genuine form of it.37   
 
Raz justifies his theory that most human values are socially dependent on the basis that 
(1) it offers a promising route towards an explanation of the existence of values (2) it 
points to a ready explanation of how we can know about them (3) it accounts for the 
deeply entrenched common belief that there is no point to value without valuers and most 
importantly (4) it fits the basic structure of our evaluative thinking about questions of 
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value, choice and judgment which is an inherently reflective process.38  However, the 
fundamental thought is that values depend on valuers because the value of things is inert 
with no influence except through being recognised.39   
 
Whilst we can all recognise some truths in this account of value my concern is that it 
tends to portray persons as being led along their lives either by more influential others or 
by popular culture at the other extreme.  This is a situation that not even Mill 
countenanced.  A comment often passed about older horses that have spent many years in 
a riding school is that they exhibit little or no personality.  Their character or spirit 
seemingly crushed by a life spent conforming to the ideals and standards demanded of 
them by an external authority which in this case determines that their form of the good 
consists of a regime completing many circuits over many days, weeks and years 
following the horse in front into walk, trot and canter.  Indeed, a rider’s skills can be 
tested quite simply by asking the horse, using hands and legs, to circle away from the 
pack to complete a random series of movements on an inside track going anticlockwise or 
against the general flow of the traffic.   
 
A danger then in an account of values that undermines the independence of valuers is that 
the practice of certain other values might fall into decline or become redundant through 
unthinking adherence to a particular form of the good, or heteronomy in Kantian terms.  
Indeed Raz himself acknowledges that it is sometimes thought that social dependence is a 
normatively or ethically conservative thesis but insists that it is not.40  He states that: 
 
“The existence of a sustaining practice is merely a necessary, not a sufficient 
condition for the existence of some kinds of values.  The special thesis does not in 
any way privilege the point of view of any group or culture.  It allows one full 
recourse to the whole of one’s conceptual armoury, information, and powers of 
argumentation in reaching conclusions as to which practices sustain goods and 
which sustain evil, or worthless things, which are, perhaps, taken to be good by a 
population.  Of course, deficiency in our conceptual, informational, and 
argumentational powers may well make us blind to some goods, or lead us to 
                                                 
38
 Ibid, p.27 
39
 Ibid, p.27/9 
40
 Ibid, p.22 
 249
accept some evils.  But that must be true in any case.  The special dependence 
thesis would be to blame only if it denied that such limitations lead to mistakes, and 
privileged the concepts or information of some group or culture.  But that it does 
not do”.41  
 
That may be so but elsewhere Raz has stated that a value comes into being at a particular 
point in time, but that once a value exists it bears on everything without restriction.42  
Korsgaard has remarked that this does in some ways undercut the thesis that values are 
socially dependent.43  And we have observed that in relationships where an imbalance of 
power exists between the parties, i.e. parent and child or doctor and patient, how 
conceptual, informational and argumentational powers can uphold the values of those 
who hold a position of influence within the relationship should they have reason to wish 
to constrain, or fail to take into consideration, the values of the more vulnerable party.44 
 
However, Korsgaard, in contrast to Raz, argues that values are not the contingent 
products of historical events rather their existence more naturally depends on nature or 
more specifically human nature.45  Korsgaard accepts the structure of Raz’s basic idea, 
that a value comes into being at a particular time, but once it comes into existence it bears 
on everything, and recognises the truth of the claim but in relation to people.  So, once a 
person exists, and it is contingent which ones exist, they become the source of objective 
normative claims, the right to bodily inviolability for instance, which bear on everything 
without restriction.46  Consequently, persons normatively considered are bearers of rights 
and sources of reasons. 47  Values are then referable to human nature and ultimately to the 
nature of a particular person.  About this Korsgaard states that: 
 
“[O]ne of the most important attributes of humanity is our nearly bottomless 
capacity for finding sources of delight and interest in nearly anything, and so for 
conferring value on almost anything.  This very fact about human nature is part of 
what makes it so essential that our relations to one another – both moral and 
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political – should not be mediated by our values.  It is not because of our shared 
values that we should accord consideration to one another but because of our 
shared capacity for conferring value.  In other words, the fact about human nature 
is part of what makes liberal democratic forms of the state the right ones”. 48 
 
This, I think, is the point being made by Mill when he says that respect for autonomy is 
consistent with the creation of the greatest amount of good for the greatest number, i.e. in 
order to maximise human welfare.  All of which tends to focus attention on to the moral 
integrity of valuers who are involved in caring for vulnerable others.  Doctors, for 
example, are empowered professionally49 and legally50 to act in the best interests of their 
mentally incapacitated patients without also being required to make explicit the grounds 
on which those decisions are being made when it is known at the outset that a potential 
conflict with autonomy might arise and that not all person can be relied upon to conduct 
themselves appropriately towards others.   
 
Is it Consistent with the Right to Self-Determination for an Incompetent Person to 
be governed by the Values of their Former Competent Selves? 
 
The question is raised because Dresser has argued that the person who makes advance 
provisions and the person who is subsequently incompetent are not the same person.51  
Therefore, it is her opinion that regardless of the weight to be given to the patient’s 
wishes the primary obligation to the incompetent patient is to show compassion by acting 
in their best interests.52 
 
Precedent Autonomy and Identity 
Should our competent self have control over what happens to their incompetent self?  Is 
the person the same individual at the later time as the person who exercised authority 
sometime earlier?  Rebecca Dresser contends that personal identity theory provides 
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another basis for questioning the moral and legal authority of precedent autonomy.53  
According to personal identity theory substantial memory loss and other psychological 
changes, such as occur with Dementia, may produce a new person.54  The claim in these 
circumstances is that the incompetent person has no real connection with their former 
competent self due to these shortcomings.55  In effect there has been such a substantial 
change in personality and personhood that the competent person is no longer empowered 
to speak on behalf of the incompetent person.56  Dresser therefore argues that an 
incompetent patient’s current wishes and feelings, which are by their very nature 
experientially valid, should be morally and legally authoritative and challenges the view 
that we should always respect precedent autonomy on the basis that personhood does not 
always persist over time.57 
 
Dworkin, on the other hand, contends that our lives are guided by the desire to advance 
two kinds of interests; experiential58 and critical.59  In giving content and definition to 
these terms he has this to say: 
 
“Most of us have only ramshackle ideas, not philosophical theories, about what 
kinds of lives are good ones.  We almost all think material comfort well worth 
having.  Dedicated ascetics aside, and all else equal, we consider a life of pain or 
poverty much worse than a comfortable one, and many people’s picture of the most 
satisfactory life for them includes very great wealth.  But even for them, material 
comfort is only part of the story.  For many people, for example, achievement also 
plays an important part.  We want (as people often say) to do something with our 
lives, to leave the world a better place for our having been in it.  There are grand 
forms of that ambition: people aim to invent or discover something marvellous, 
write great music or poetry or philosophy, liberate a nation or make one just.  
There are less grand forms: many people want nothing more than to play their part 
in a cooperative enterprise like a family or a farm or a team, to have contributed to 
something important rather than to have done it all themselves.  Some people think 
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“experience” an important component in a good life: they want to have travelled, 
perhaps to exotic places, to have lived in different ways, to have tried everything.  
Others take pride in rootedness, in belonging to a place, and to national or ethnic 
or religious traditions into which they believe they have been born, traditions of 
faith or humour or food or culture.  Almost everyone thinks family and friends are 
an important part of a good life: that a life without special and intense concerns for 
particular people would lack something crucial. 
 
Most of these different ideas about a good life we hold intuitively and in the 
background; we do not re-examine them except in moments of special crisis or 
drama.  But these background ideas are always there, guiding decisions and 
choices that may seem to us automatic, and accounting for at least some part of the 
exhilaration or boredom or shame or sadness we find ourselves feeling, from time 
to time, about the way our lives are going.  It is absolutely crucial to notice, 
however, that these various opinions and convictions, however inarticulate or 
submerged, are critical in the sense that they concern what makes a life successful 
rather than unsuccessful – when someone has made something of his life, not just 
wasted it.  They are not, that is, opinions only about how to make life pleasant or 
enjoyable minute by minute, day by day. 
 
I want to capture that difference by pointing out a distinction between two kinds of 
reasons people have for wanting their lives to go one way rather than another.  
First, everyone has what I shall call experiential interests.  We all do things 
because we like the experience of doing them: playing softball, perhaps, or cooking 
or eating well, or watching football … or just working hard at something.  
Pleasures like these are essential to a good life – a life with nothing that is 
marvellous only because of how it feels would not be pure but preposterous.  But 
the value of these experiences, judged one by one, depends precisely on the fact 
that we do find them pleasurable or exciting as experiences...     
 
Of course, a great many things are bad as experiences, too: pain, nausea, and 
listening to most politicians.  We take pains to avoid these experiences, and 
sometimes we dread them…   
 
But most people think that they have what I shall call critical interests: interests 
that it does make their life genuinely better to satisfy, interests they would be 
mistaken, and genuinely worse off, if they did not recognise.  Convictions about 
what helps to make a life good on the whole are convictions about those more 
important interests.  They represent critical judgments rather than just experiential 
preferences.       
 
I do not mean that experiential interests are characteristically frivolous or critical 
interests inevitably profound… Nor am I trying to contrast supposedly elite, 
reflective, philosophical lives with more ordinary or mundane ones.  I mean to 
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identify what is elite, in the sense of aspirational, within most lives.  … even people 
whose lives feel unplanned are nevertheless often guided by a sense of the general 
style they think appropriate, of what choices strike them as not only good at the 
moment but in character for them.  
 
We need the distinction between experiential and critical interests to understand 
many of our convictions about how people should be treated.  We need it, for 
example, to explain why we think that mind-changing drugs or other forms of 
brainwashing that produce long-lasting pleasure and contentment are not in their 
victims’ interests; we mean they are not in their critical interests.  Understanding 
the difference between experiential and critical interests is also essential to 
understanding a certain kind of tragedy, in life as well as in fiction.  It is tragic 
when someone looks back on his life, near the end, and finds it wasted, empty of 
any real significance, with nothing in which he can take any pride at all.”60 
 
Experiential interests are those things we like to do for the pleasures they bring, such as 
eating our favourite foods, being pampered and spending time with those we like or feel 
affectionate towards.61   Consequently, experiential interests are something we have in 
common with all sentient creatures.62  A person’s critical interests are by contrast what 
make life important to the individual whose life it is.   These are the interests or ends we 
possess and seek to satisfy, such as having an enjoyable family life, achieving some 
success in one’s working life and/or projects.  They are critically important because 
these, do in addition, give our lives a sense of meaning and coherence.  Maslow would 
argue that these ends are significant because they reflect the human need for self-
actualisation or are intrinsic to our particular purpose in life, i.e. who we are and what we 
become.   Dworkin argues that a person’s critical interests form a narrative that reflects 
the way in which a person wants or has chosen to live.63      
 
Accordingly, certain, i.e. critical, interests of a competent person survive the problems 
posed by psychological disunity and even beyond that.  It is on this basis that he argues 
that even if there is some validity in the claim that the person has changed, since 
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developing Dementia for instance, their critical interests remain.64  This is because 
critical interests are those things that are fundamental to our life story and for this reason 
greater moral authority should be given to them.65   
 
Buchanan and Brock are sympathetic to this view.  They refer to ‘performative acts of 
will’ to distinguish commitments that are based upon deliberate choice, which are sturdy 
enough to survive becoming incompetent, dying or becoming a non-person, from mere 
preferences.66  In attempting to provide an account of identity that will accommodate the 
notion of surviving interests they point out that an incompetent patient will either be the 
same person who existed when competent, if a low threshold is set for psychological 
connectedness, or may not be considered a person at all because they fail to satisfy the 
normal criteria for personhood67, i.e. the ability to function cognitively.68  Thus any 
apparent conflict in the interests of a competent and incompetent self are eliminated as 
the conscious incompetent patient’s interests are not limited to those that are present and 
experiential in nature whilst the permanently unconscious patient is not a person at all, 
and therefore the former may legitimately exercise their authority to control events in 
respect of the latter on either count. 
 
Dworkin acknowledges that his view may be resisted by others, like Dresser, on the basis 
that persons would be fated to never be able to change their minds.  Their view is that the 
right to autonomy must be contemporary and that present wishes and feelings, where 
these can be expressed, should govern what happens to the patient.69 
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What then is the Force of Past Decisions?   
Dworkin differentiates between experiential and critical interests and makes the claim 
that greater moral authority should be attributed to the latter over the former which does 
appear to contrast with our understanding of the right to autonomy.   However, Dworkin 
illustrates his point by distinguishing between an evidentiary and integrity view of 
autonomy.  An evidentiary view of autonomy entails the notion that we should respect 
the wishes of a competent patient, even when their choice may be regarded by others as 
imprudent, simply because they know better than anyone else what is in their own best 
interests.70  This is a point that Mill made before about the value of autonomy: ‘the only 
purpose for which power can rightly be exercised over any member of a civilised society, 
against his will, is to prevent harm to others’.71  However, Dworkin goes on to explain 
that as persons act in ways that even they would agree is not in their own best interests 
the explanation of the right to autonomy cannot simply be that it promotes the welfare of 
people making an apparently imprudent decision.  This is what he has to say: 
 
“Though we often think that someone has made a mistake in judging what is in his 
own interests, experience teaches us that in most cases we are wrong to think this.  
So we do better, in the long run, to recognise a general right to autonomy, which 
we always respect, than by reserving the right to interfere with other people’s lives 
whenever we think they have made a mistake. 
 
If we accepted this evidentiary account of autonomy, we would not extend the right 
of autonomy to decisions made by the seriously demented, who, having altogether 
lost the power to appreciate and engage in reasoning and argument, cannot 
possibly know what is in their own best interests as well as trained specialists, like 
doctors, can.  In some cases, any presumption that demented people know their 
own interests best would be incoherent: when, for example, as is often the case, 
their wishes and decisions change radically from one bout of lucidity to another. 
 
But in fact the evidentiary view of autonomy is very far from compelling.  For 
autonomy requires us to allow someone to run his own life even when he behaves in 
a way that he himself would accept as not all in his interests.  This is sometimes a 
matter of what philosophers call ‘weakness of the will’.  Many people who smoke 
know that smoking, all things considered, is not in their best interests, but they 
smoke anyway.  If we believe, as we do, that respecting their autonomy means 
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allowing them to act in this way, we cannot accept that the point of autonomy is to 
protect an agent’s welfare.  And there are more admirable reasons for acting 
against what one believes to be in one’s own best interests.  Some people refuse 
needed medical treatment because they believe that other people, who would then 
have to go without it, need it more.  Such people act out of convictions we admire, 
even if we do not act the same way, and autonomy requires us to respect their 
decisions.  Once again, the supposed explanation of the right to autonomy – that it 
promotes the welfare of people making apparently imprudent decisions - fails to 
account for our convictions about when people have that right.  All this suggests 
that the point of autonomy must be, at least to some degree, independent of the 
claim that a person generally knows his own best interests better than anyone 
else”.72 
 
An integrity view of autonomy offers a more plausible account of the point of autonomy 
and of the right of a competent person to make decisions on behalf of their incompetent 
self.73  According to Dworkin autonomy encourages people to lead their lives in their 
own distinctive way and an integrity view of autonomy places emphasis on this rather 
than on the welfare of the choosing agent.74  He goes on to state that: 
 
“The value of autonomy, on this view, derives from the capacity it protects: the 
capacity to express one’s own character – values, commitments, convictions, and 
critical as well as experiential interests – in the life one leads.  Recognising an 
individual right of autonomy makes self-creation possible.  It allows each of us to 
be responsible for shaping our lives according to our own coherent or incoherent – 
but, in any case, distinctive – personality.  It allows us to lead our own lives rather 
than be led along them, so that each of us can be, to the extent a scheme of rights 
can make possible, what we have made of ourselves.  We allow someone to choose 
death over radical amputation or a blood transfusion, if that is his informed wish, 
because we acknowledge his right to a life structured by his own values. 
 
The integrity view of autonomy does not assume that competent people have 
consistent values or always make consistent choices, or that they always lead 
structured, reflective lives.  It recognises that people often make choices that reflect 
weakness, indecision, caprice or plain irrationality – that some people otherwise 
fanatical about their health continue to smoke, for example.  Any plausible 
integrity-based theory of autonomy must distinguish between the general point or 
value of autonomy and its consequences for a particular person on a particular 
occasion.  Autonomy encourages and protects people’s general capacity to lead 
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their lives out of a distinctive sense of their own character, a sense of what is 
important to and for them.  Perhaps one principal value of that capacity is realised 
only when a life does in fact display a general, overall integrity and authenticity.  
But the right to autonomy protects and encourages the capacity in any event, by 
allowing people who have it to choose how far and in what form they will seek to 
realise that aim”.75 
 
So Dworkin has argued that the evidentiary view of autonomy presents a weak case for 
respecting a person’s past wishes simply because people are not the best judges of what 
their own best interests would be under circumstances they have never encountered and 
in which their preferences and desires may drastically have changed.76  Whereas the 
integrity view of autonomy does by contrast support the conclusion that the past wishes 
of a patient must be respected.77  A competent person making a living will providing for 
his treatment if he becomes mentally incapacitated is making exactly the kind of 
judgment that autonomy, on the integrity view, most respects: a judgment about the 
overall shape of the kind of life the person wants to have led.78 
 
The integrity view of autonomy79 therefore supports a doctrine of precedent autonomy 
and this means that a patient’s past wishes should be respected even if they contradict 
their current experiential wishes and feelings about medical treatment.80  Here Dworkin 
argues that in relation to a person’s past and present wishes and feelings a decision to 
honour the latter over the former should be based entirely on whether the person is 
currently competent to make a decision.81  In recognising that a paternalistic82 response 
might be considered, particularly where the incompetent patient experiences distress by 
what is entailed in their former instructions, Dworkin maintains that to accede to the 
patient’s wishes in these circumstances would be to violate their autonomy.83   
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Death’s Meaning Attributed to Critical Interests 
Should the manner and timing of one’s death be determined by one’s critical interests?  
Consider for one moment how often persons have gone ahead with critically important 
projects, such as to sit an examination, turn up for an interview for a job or watched their 
child perform in the school play, when they might otherwise have preferred to be absent 
due to a current bout of ill health, for example.   Indeed most schools, colleges and 
universities recognise that persons commonly prioritise matters that are critically 
important from those that are currently experientially valid when determining what to do 
in their own best interests and will take steps in appropriate cases to mediate the effects 
of a poor performance at examination by rendering results as coherent as possible with a 
student’s previous work.   
 
It is on this basis that Dworkin claims that we cannot think about whether death is in 
someone’s best interests unless we understand their critical interests.84  He claims that it 
would be easy to decide what was in someone’s best interests if we were only concerned 
with a person’s experiential interests such as the principles of medical futility and 
intolerability tend to encourage.85  Dworkin cites the case of Bland and notes that several 
members of the House of Lords assumed that only experiential interests mattered.  He 
quotes Lord Mustill who considered and rejected the argument that it was against Bland’s 
interests that his body was full of tubes to no point or that his family’s happy 
recollections of him were being replaced by horrific ones or that his situation was causing 
them great misery; that cannot be so, Mustill said, because ‘he does not know what is 
happening to his body and cannot be affronted by it; he does not know of his family’s 
continuing sorrow.  The distressing truth which must not be shirked is that discontinuing 
life support is not in the best interests of Anthony Bland, for he has no best interests of 
any kind’.86  The comments of Lord Goff in that case should also be considered.  There 
he suggested that the best interests test should comprise of something more than purely 
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professional appraisal of a person’s medical welfare.87  To confine the test in this way, he 
said, would be inconsistent with the primacy given to the principle of self-determination 
and would ‘downgrade the status of the incompetent person by placing a lesser value on 
[their] intrinsic worth and vitality’.88  Similar arguments would seem to apply to 
confining best interests assessments to purely experiential interests.  Dworkin adds that: 
 
“If we accept this view that only experiential interests count, we can make no sense 
of the widespread, near universal, view I described; that decisions like those we 
have been reviewing are often personally problematic and racking.  We agonise 
about these decisions, for ourselves when we are contemplating living wills, or for 
relatives and friends, only or mainly because we take our and their critical interests 
into account.  We must therefore begin by asking: how does it matter to the critical 
success of our whole life how we die?  We should distinguish between two different 
ways that it might matter: because death is the far boundary of life, and every part 
of our life, including the very last, is important: and because death is special, a 
peculiarly significant event in the narrative of our lives, like the final scene of a 
play, with everything about it intensified, under a special spotlight.  In the first 
sense when we die is important because of what will happen to us if we die later, in 
the second, how we die matters because it is how we die. 
 
Let us begin with the first, less theatrical, of these ideas.  Sometimes people want to 
live on, even though in pain or dreadfully crippled, in order to do something they 
believe important to have done.  They want to finish a job, for example, or to learn 
something they have always wanted to know…   
 
On the other hand, people often think they have strong reasons of a comparable 
kind for not staying alive.  The badness of the experiences that lie ahead is one: 
terrible pain or constant nausea or the horror of intubation or the confusion of 
sedation… But people’s reasons for wanting to die include critical reasons as well; 
many people, as I said, think it undignified or bad in some other way to live under 
certain conditions, however they might feel if they feel at all.  Many people do not 
want to be remembered living in those circumstances; others think it degrading to 
be wholly dependent, or to be the object of continuing anguish.  These feelings … 
may be just as strong when the burden of physical care is imposed on professionals 
whose career is precisely in providing such care, and when the financial burdens 
fall on a public eager to bear it.  At least a part of what people fear about 
dependence is its impact not on those responsible for their care, but on their own 
dignity. 
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I must emphasise that this is not a belief that every kind of dependent life under 
severe handicaps is not worth living… It is however, plausible, and to many people 
compelling, that total dependence is in itself a very bad thing quite apart from the 
pain or discomfort it often but not invariably entails.  Total or near total 
dependence with nothing positive to redeem it may seem not only to add nothing to 
the overall quality of a life but to take something important from it. 
 
When patients remain conscious, their sense of integrity and of the coherence of 
their lives crucially affects their judgment about whether it is in their best interests 
to continue to live.  Athletes, or others whose physical activity was at the centre of 
their self-conception, are more likely to find a paraplegic’s life intolerable… for 
such people, a life without the power of motion is unacceptable, not for reasons 
explicable in experiential terms, but because it is stunningly inadequate to the 
conception of self around which their own lives have so far been constructed.  
Adding decades of immobility to a life formerly organised around action will for 
them leave a narrative wreck, with no structure or sense, a life worse than one that 
ends when its activity ends.89 
 
So people’s views about how to live colour their convictions about when to die, and 
the impact is intensified when it engages the second way in which people think 
death is important.  There is no doubt that most people treat the manner of their 
deaths as of special, symbolic importance: they want their deaths, if possible, to 
express and in that way vividly to confirm the values they believe most important to 
their lives. … The idea of a good (or less bad) death is not exhausted by how one 
dies – whether in battle or in bed – but includes timing as well.  It explains the 
premium people often put on living to ‘see’ some particular event, after which the 
idea of their own death seems less tragic to them”.90 
 
So being able to determine how the final chapter of our life is played out, if we become 
incompetent, is a critical interest and therefore, we should, through advance directives, be 
able to restrict how we are treated if incompetent. 91  Consequently, a person who wishes 
to live a life that is structured by their own values should seek to ascertain and express 
the values, interests and convictions that have played a critical role in shaping that life.92 
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However, if beneficence is not to override autonomy it is also necessary to consider how 
a value system, which is insufficiently determinate to meet the legal standard of 
applicability, might still be considered a sufficiently robust an expression of intent that it 
constitutes a valid advance decision.  In this regard statutory and common law provisions 
suggest that in order for priority to be accorded to a value system one would have to be 
clearly established and applicable93 in the circumstances arising for decision.94  
Moreover, the integrity with which personal decisions have been made to accord with 
one’s values, beliefs and preferences would seem to be an important factor in establishing 
that it is an inherently reliable and credible statement of intent, i.e. has the patient evinced 
a settled and continuing intention to honour the values, beliefs and preferences that were 
the source of previous decisions such that these factors may be regarded as being 
determinative of what should happen in their best interests in the future when they are no 
longer competent to express a view.95  The important point is that the values statement 
must constitute trustworthy evidence of the patient’s preferences in order for a limited 
objective best interests standard to be applied bringing best interests closer to the 
standards and practices of substituted judgment.  This is to safeguard patients from the 
consequences of erroneous applications and judgments by surrogates which was the focus 
in the USA case of Cruzan.96  Consequently, let us now look at ways in which someone 
can construct their value system to make it functional, coherent and an inherently clear, 
convincing and reliable source of information about the personal value of their own life. 
 
Constructing a Personal Value System 
 
Whilst some people might be horrified at the idea of disclosing their values because of 
the autobiographical nature of the enterprise many individuals do nevertheless write their 
life story.  And many others are interested to read them and make judgments as well as 
draw certain conclusions about the person and their life.  In that sense stories are just a 
long hand version of the application of values because values are implicit within the 
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story.  For others a compelling feature of a value system is that it may be looked upon as 
an autobiographical record of your life because it represents your account of why the 
values, beliefs and preferences of the past are relevant to your present good.97  Disclosing 
one’s value system can be considered autobiographical in another respect for it also 
presents an opportunity to set the record straight.98  To correct assumptions that people 
may have made about you, your conduct, and your ideas, what you said and what you 
chose not to say and about what you did and what you did not do and why. 99  A value 
system is therefore impressed with corrective powers that weigh against inferences that 
others may have drawn about you as a result of inadequate information.100  As a 
definitive source of information, a personal value system, explains personal conduct, 
speech and ideas and gives evidence in support of all of that by providing insight into the 
reasons for it by reference to the values contained within it.101 
 
A value system is then, in essence, a statement about the values that a person would use 
to inform a decision about whether to consent to an offer of medical treatment.  But in 
disclosing their values, in this formal sense, a person is seeking to explain the basis on 
which their decision would be made ahead of being told what treatment is on offer.  
Dresser has of course questioned whether all persons have values that they live by or 
whether they merely respond to events as they arise and make decisions accordingly.   
Her viewpoint is likely to meet with some general agreement as it is doubtful that the vast 
majority of persons will have a detailed life plan, and even those we would count as 
being organised, disciplined, ambitious and determined will probably have plans that 
exist only in some sort of vague sense.  And anyway life rarely turns out the way we 
planned it despite our best efforts.  Nevertheless, everyone has moral values if only 
because they have an interest in their own survival and self-interestedness will ensure that 
non-moral values take this factor into account.  Dworkin refers to ‘the dominating grip of 
the idea that human life has intrinsic as well as personal importance for human 
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beings’.102   So for example, some people might object to medications that are notoriously 
toxic because they believe the body will repair itself given the right form of help or 
assistance.  Likewise, self-knowledge informs our decisions about which types of 
environments, people and conditions are most likely to enable us to thrive or to lead a 
flourishing life.   
 
Identifying Personal Values 
The term ‘values’ is not here used in an exclusionary sense as the aim is to capture and 
classify as a value any relevant form of wish, feeling, belief, value, interest or preference 
that has informed a person’s life.  Consequently, a value system may be as simple as 
registering a wish to refuse a particular form of medical treatment.103  For example, a 
person who is very old and frail might wish to refuse any attempt to resuscitate them in 
the event that they should suffer from heart failure.  Similarly, persons who subscribe to a 
religious faith that prohibits them from accepting some forms of medical treatment would 
want their religious belief to be known to medical professionals.  As knowledge that a 
patient is a practicing Jehovah’s Witness would alert a medical professional to the fact 
that blood or blood products must not form a part of their treatment as the patient would 
refuse blood in all circumstances even when their life was a stake.   
 
More generally however, the idea is that a value system should be sufficiently 
comprehensive that it can speak on behalf of the patient in a variety of circumstances and 
situations.  Take a man who is married, has a young family, a career, is a committed 
member of the Territorial Army, likes to play golf with his friends on a Sunday and is 
passionate about art, both his own and that of others.  He is unfortunately involved in a 
car accident in which he sustains multiple injuries and upon arrival at hospital he remains 
in an unconscious state.  What should the doctor do?  It is possible that the doctor’s hands 
are tied due to the severity of the injuries.  On the other hand where a choice exists, it is 
clear that a doctor should choose to take that course of action that is least restrictive of 
the person’s future rights and freedom of action.104  But on what basis should the doctor 
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make such a decision if the patient is unconscious and without representation?  For there 
is no general agreement about what a good life is or about what is of value in life.105  This 
is where comprehensive knowledge of a patient’s values, interests and so on can usefully 
support the treatment decision-making process, enabling doctors to choose an option that 
least restricts the patient’s future choices or that would allow the patient the most 
freedom to pursue their former goals or ends.   
 
On the basis that persons wish to not only survive but to have a good or flourishing life it 
seems likely that their personal conception of what a good life is will have increasingly 
informed the pattern of that life so that particular objectives and/or principles will 
become apparent within it as time goes on.  So an idea worth pursuing in this regard is 
that of Ronald Dworkin who has claimed that persons have critical as well as experiential 
interests.   
 
The Core Features of a Value System: Critical and Experiential Interests 
In distinguishing between two types of interest Dworkin claims that experiential interests 
are those things that people like to do for the pleasures they bring but argues that a 
person’s critical interests are more relevant to the subjective value a life has for the 
person whose life it is, its personal value, because we judge that our life would be poorer 
without these things in it.106  Therefore, Dworkin concludes that what makes a good life 
can be ascertained from a process that seeks to differentiate between those experiences 
that create the greatest amount of personal pleasure or happiness from those that are more 
self-defining; things that form part of a person’s life because of the challenges they bring 
or just because they are deemed to be critically important to it as well as possibly 
pleasurable.  The project is significant in requiring persons to identify and set apart what 
is intrinsically valuable from the value of experience which is not deemed to be a source 
of intrinsic value.  We are invited, in other words, to set out what we feel and act out of a 
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sense of duty towards from those affairs that we show no settled commitment to,107 as 
well as from those things we do from pure inclination. 
  
Systematising Values: Is there a simple way of distinguishing between critical and 
experiential interests? 
Dworkin has commented that people think it important not just that their life contain a 
variety of the right experiences, achievements, and connections, but that it have a 
structure that expresses a coherent choice among these and puts forward the view that a 
person’s critical interests are what give their life a coherent narrative and in that sense 
differ from experiential interests which are more likely to fluctuate over time.108   It is 
probably true that our tastes or preferences can and do change.  So perhaps caramel 
flavoured ice-cream is now preferred to vanilla and Japanese sushi is chosen over more 
traditional lunchtime snacks.  Quite often natural and social circumstances are important 
precursors for changes of this sort.109  When we look at old photographs it is often in 
horror at our clothes and hair and this is because society has moved on and has taught us 
new ways to style ourselves so what was once considered de rigueur is now regarded as 
passé.   So we may say that societal change broadens our range of experience and can 
alter our perspectives about the things we value.110   The motivation for change is 
however less clear.   It is true that we live in a technological era which increasingly defers 
to the merits of computerisation by finding ever more sophisticated uses for technology 
that one can pre-programme.  Sciences provide insight, though not necessarily truths, 
about many features of life.  Last, but by no means least, commercialism has gained a 
considerable foothold in society and the practices associated with it, particularly that of 
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managing perceptions, appears to have been developed into an art form to such a degree 
that we often find out retrospectively that change has been advocated on an empty 
promise of something new, or improved and therefore better, and more exciting.   
 
So there is nodding agreement for the fact that experiential interests or preferences can 
and do change naturally but that we can be induced to introduce change to our lives also.  
Can the same be said about critical interests?  Let’s look at someone who values family 
life and the relationship they have with their children.  This person has a career, which is 
important to them, though priority is given to their family life.  Time passes by and the 
children, a boy and a girl, are now teenagers and like to spend time with their friends.  
However, this has become a source of conflict within the household because the girl is 
apt to be a little wayward in her choice of friends who are seen to be detrimentally 
influencing her attitudes and behaviour.  Relationships suffer and deteriorate further 
when communication becomes strained, difficult even.  Around this time the parent 
receives a boost at work when they are recommended for promotion.  The ego is 
bolstered further when at interview the MD appears to see virtue in their ability and talent 
for the undertaking.  They are subsequently drilled about commitment to the job and 
about the MD’s vision to expand operations into untapped markets.  Consequently, the 
role will involve a considerable amount of travel which means spending time away from 
home and working longer hours, perhaps even weekends.  Having a presence at corporate 
events and a willingness to wine and dine prestigious clients as and when the need arises 
also form part of the job description.   So what the parent chooses to do in these 
circumstances will reveal a great deal about their continued commitment to existing 
critical interests.  
 
There is no refuting the possibility that a person’s critical interests can and do change 
naturally, such as when a single person with an established career decides to marry and 
have a family in their late thirties.  But we can also be induced to make changes that will 
ultimately constrain our freedom to pursue our ideas about what a good life is and to seek 
out whatever else is thought valuable in life.  Consequently, there is some difficulty in 
maintaining a distinction between critical and experiential interests based on notions of a 
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coherent narrative alone.  A point that is taken up by Dresser who questions whether 
people actually think as Dworkin says they do.  She states that: 
 
“If I were to play psychologist, my guess would be that many people take life one 
day at a time.  The goal of establishing a coherent narrative may be a less common 
life theme than the simple effort to accept and adjust to the changing natural and 
social circumstances that characterise a person’s life”.111   
 
No Clear Means/Ends Distinction  
Dresser draws attention to the fact that it is not always possible to draw a sharp line 
between experiential and critical interests.  Her claim is that people often choose critical 
projects because of the rewarding experiences they provide and that at certain times in 
our lives experiential interests may be of greater value to us than critical projects.112  
Doubtless we all recognise the truth of the claim when person’s generally have a 
tendency to gravitate towards those things that give pleasure but are interesting to them as 
well.  For example, we would not expect to find that a person had successfully 
established themselves in a career that they did not also enjoy.  This is because boredom, 
dislike, disinterest, unhappiness and indifference are unlikely to drive an enduring will to 
succeed.  Relationships, which are another fundamental feature of life, similarly appear to 
succeed on the basis of pleasure and interest.       
 
Integrity of Personal Convictions relevant to Critical Interests   
However, Dworkin explains critical interests by reference to the integrity with which 
important self-defining decisions are made to accord with our more abstract ambition to 
lead a good life.113  He demonstrates his point by inviting us to face an important self-
defining decision.  Our example is a woman with a chance to begin a demanding career 
that intrigues her, but which would at the same time require her to sacrifice time with her 
children and states that: 
                                                 
111
  Dresser, Rebecca, Dworkin on Dementia: Elegant Theory, Questionable Policy, Hastings Center 
Report, 1995, November-December, 25, 6, page 36 
112
 Ibid 
113
 Dworkin, Ronald, Life’s Dominion: An argument about Abortion and Euthanasia, 1993, Harper Collins, 
Chapter 7, p.204/5 
 268
 
“People think it important not just that their life contain a variety of the right 
experiences, achievements, and connections, but that it have a structure that 
expresses a coherent choice among these – for some, that it display a steady, self-
defining commitment to a vision of character or achievement that the life as a 
whole, seen as an integral creative narrative, illustrates and expresses.  Of course, 
this ideal of integrity does not itself define a way to live: it presupposes substantive 
convictions’.114   
 
Integrity is here tied to our convictions about how life should be lived and to our future 
commitment to honour that chosen path.115  This suggests that there is a mark of duality 
in the notion of integrity for the convictions that were the causes of our past choices 
argue that they establish a precedent that should be maintained for the future.116  Rather 
like the tail wagging the dog only here power would reside in values that had been 
adopted on some previous occasion to dictate the terms of our future life.  Would this be 
inconsistent with our notion of persons as rational creatures who do, as a consequence, 
have freedom of the mind and body?    
 
Convictions, values, beliefs or critical interests, call them what you will in this context, 
can and do appear to have a constraining effect on personal freedom.  For example, the 
man or woman who values family life might choose not to pursue a career opportunity 
that required them to spend time away from the family.  It would also be entirely rational 
for a person who valued their family but demonstrated this through the fruits of their 
labour to consider the ways in which the terms and conditions of the job could be adapted 
to suit their ends.  Values are then capable of pervading all areas of a person’s life so that 
the life as a whole becomes one of recurring themes, i.e. once a value exists it bears on 
everything without exception.  So the man who values his family to the point of 
sacrificing his career prospects is perhaps more likely to devote the majority of his spare 
time to his family forsaking interests and activities that would exclude them.  Similarly 
the person who relies on material gain to demonstrate their affections is perhaps more 
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likely to be a willing accomplice to a money making undertaking that requires some 
sacrifice of their spare time.   
 
Dworkin’s point is then that an individual right to autonomy makes self-creation possible 
which allows each of us to live our lives in accordance with our own unique personality 
or out of a sense of what is important to us.117  As autonomy allows people who have it to 
choose how far and in what form they will seek to realise that aim an integrity based view 
of autonomy is essential to considerations about what the personal consequences of this 
are for the person concerned. 118   
 
Critical Interests and End of Life Treatment Decisions 
Persons who have substantive convictions about what a good life is for them may feel a 
great deal of concern about how they will be treated at the end of life when they may no 
longer be competent to decide what shall happen contemporaneously.119  They may fear 
that the underlying creative process that was entailed in building that life will be 
undermined or destroyed by decisions that fail to properly take into consideration the 
values, beliefs and preferences that were critically important in shaping it that way.120   
 
Such a person wants to be maintained in a condition where genuine self-respect is 
possible and that means that they want to be maintained in a manner that is befitting with 
what has gone before.121  Crucially they care about their own dignity and what is a 
dignified life for them is most vividly illustrated by the critical interests that have played 
a significant role in it.122   
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A Functional Value System 
As a person may in the future be bound by the contents of their value system the issue 
here is to identify a method of reasoning that will assist persons to reliably conclude, and 
perhaps also specify, which values, beliefs, preferences or interests are experiential and 
which should be considered critical to a treatment decision-making process.123   
 
Casuistry 
Casuistical reasoning involves concentrating on a particular case or event to see what 
account of values, beliefs, preferences and interests can be constructed from it.124  This 
paradigm or model case is then compared to other similar cases to see whether initial 
ideas withstand further scrutiny under different lights.  The reasoning process is therefore 
enhanced when comparative cases are sought out with a view to noting similarities and 
differences in the application of values.125  Casuistry is then a case based model of 
reasoning that relies on human intuition to interpret the relevant information and to 
formulate certain generalisations as well as more specific observations from it about what 
is the true source of a person’s experiential and critical interests.126 
 
Values and interests are therefore established within the context of a particular factual 
situation.127  Thus what can be known about them is potentially limited to the number of 
similar factual situations that have arisen in which a particular value was both relevant 
but also tested.  That a perceived value should have been subjected to a process of 
falsification aids confidence in a procedure that draws on a supposed inferior source for 
acquiring knowledge.  A car manufacturer, for example, that wishes to road test their 
latest concept car will not necessarily acquire meaningful data from a test run that is 
conducted at moderate speed on a deserted air strip.   
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Neither, it seems, can casuistry explain in a particular case why there is a discrepancy in 
the application of established values, unless the availability of other similar cases to it 
support a line of reasoning that would enable a person to specify their values with greater 
precision or in greater detail.128  
 
In summary casuists rely on case-comparison and analogies to draw conclusions about 
their beliefs, values and interests.129  As casuistry does not proceed from a position of 
pre-theoretical beliefs and norms, instead these are intuited or discovered in the data, this 
method of reasoning brings forward the problem that there may be insufficient 
meaningful data to support a statement that seeks to establish a settled commitment to 
one’s critical interests.130  For example, a person might more recently have turned to 
religion or changed their religion.  Moreover Beauchamp and Childress point out that 
reasoning by analogy suffers from the drawback that it never warrants a claim of truth, 
which is exactly what is illustrated by the game of Japanese Whispers.  They state that: 
 
“It is true enough that we reason by analogy every day, and we are often confident 
in our conclusions.  For example, if we feel better after using a certain medicine, 
then we feel comfortable in recommending it to other persons, in the expectation 
that they too will feel more comfortable.  A logical form is present in all analogy: If 
some person or thing has one property associated with a second property, and 
another person or thing also has the first property, we may feel justified in 
inferring that the second person or thing also has the second property.  However, 
such analogies often fail:  Our friends may not feel better after they take our 
favoured medicine.  Analogies never warrant a claim of truth, and we often do not 
know something by analogy that we think we know.  The method of casuistry leaves 
us in precisely this position:  No matter how many properties one case and another 
share, our inference to yet another property in the second case may mislead or 
produce false statements”. 131 
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The danger with a method that relies on analogies is that they may evolve in the wrong 
way.132  This could happen because relevant information was improperly analysed or 
processed at the outset and one cannot ignore the possibility that false beliefs, personal 
biases or prejudices may have infected individual judgments.133  These problems, i.e. the 
potential for distorting effects to arise and become manifest within a value system that 
distinguishes between experiential and critical interests, raise questions about its 
reliability and thus whether a person could ever be justified in placing their full trust in 
it.134   
 
Coherence Theory: Reflection 
Whilst a coherence theory of knowledge and justification has its detractors135 
supporters136 would argue that persons are at least presented with an opportunity to 
subject their beliefs about values to a form of reflective testing to see whether those 
beliefs cohere with what happens in reality.  Do the states of affairs, i.e. what happens on 
a day-to-day basis, provide evidence that is sufficiently strong to justify the claims that 
have been made?  The purpose of reflective testing is then to prevent personal biases and 
prejudices from infecting deliberative processes whilst seeking interpretive equilibrium 
between pre-analytic assumptions and what happens in reality.137  Coherence theory 
therefore accepts that humans operate under certain constraints when reasoning and in 
doing so aims to safeguard individuals against falling into arbitrariness.138   
 
According to coherence theory a person who wishes to develop a comprehensive theory 
about what a good life for them is and of what is critically important within it should start 
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by examining their considered or paradigm judgments on the subject.139  Our considered 
judgments are those that have acquired a rich history in experience. 140  Considered 
judgments are not therefore mere matters of individual intuition instead they are credible 
and trustworthy beliefs, norms or action guiding principles because time demonstrates a 
personal commitment to them.  This information, where it exists, is reliable because it 
exhibits the lowest level of personal bias about what our true ends are.141  Similarly, 
displays that signify a continued commitment to those convictions may be perceived as 
ones where our capacities were displayed without distortion.142 
 
For instance, a person might say that they have built their life around their family.  Let’s 
say that this person was a female with young children who were just about to go to 
school.  Once the children had settled into their new routines she planned to obtain part-
time work so that the family could have an annual holiday abroad as well as other treats 
and trips out that would broaden their horizons and perspectives about the world.  Her 
sole aim was to create a good life for the family but most particularly to ensure that the 
children had a secure and happy childhood in which they were given opportunities to 
develop as individuals and to form their own character.  To this end employment 
opportunities that are unlikely to conflict with her critical interest in having an enjoyable 
family life are sought.  Six months later she starts work as a receptionist at the local 
doctors’ surgery.  She gets on well with the other females she works alongside and goes 
to an exercise class with one of her co-workers one evening a week and once a month 
they all get together over lunch at a local pub.  Another year passes and the surgery is 
looking to recruit a new practice manager and whilst not in a position to make that sort of 
transition the job appeals to her.  Everyone at home is settled and reasonably contented 
and so she resolves to start a programme of re-education that will help her to acquire the 
sort of skills and qualifications that would enable her to apply for a job like that in the 
future.      
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Coherence theory invites this person, who wishes to articulate a personal value system, to 
subject their considered judgments to a form of reflective testing.143   This process raises 
the level of self-knowledge or conscious awareness about whether the end moral or non-
moral value is really what is valued when taking our conduct and reasoning into 
consideration which enables persons to not only construct a general account of what they 
value but also to specify their values more comprehensively.144  The requirement is by 
analogy rather like the job of the defence in a courtroom drama which is to gather witness 
accounts of events that converge or are consistent with the claims of the accused to give 
their story credibility and to engender the requisite level of trust in it by an independent 
jury. 145   And the reflective process continues indefinitely or for as long as a person 
remains committed to the goal of bringing their convictions about their experiential and 
critical interests into a state of coherence. 146   
 
However, the ethicists, Beauchamp and Childress, point out that the method is not 
entirely clear about how coherence can be achieved or how we can know when we have 
successfully completed the task.147  As a value system may later become binding one 
suggestion is that persons focus on ascertaining the truth about what is intrinsically 
valuable to them.  To be determined to locate their real rather than perceived interests 
which are identified through the process of rational reflection.  It is possible that this 
could be secured by acquiring the ability to suspend belief and delay judgment pending a 
review of the evidence.  Rather like a member of a jury who does not hold onto the desire 
for a particular outcome but remains open to what the evidence suggests.  And we should 
be particularly receptive to what we can learn from those occasions where free will has 
endorsed or intervened in the activities of the inclination since this sort of information 
would tend to lean towards that of a character reference in identifying what is in one’s 
experiential and critical interests.  Transparency regarding the factors that were 
considered as well as assumptions that were made will assist in establishing a credible 
personal account of what is critically valuable.  In personal matters the requisite level of 
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objectivity can be achieved when there is some distance between the time of an event and 
the onset of the reflective process which coherence theory tends to encourage.  
 
On the other hand, persons, as mere mortals, are not omniscient which places some limit 
on self-knowledge.  For instance, what can be known about external events in the outside 
world challenges our ability to get to the truth of anything but information that is 
withheld or that one has no access to could have the effect of changing events and of 
facilitating a different kind of history.148  In that respect perhaps Dresser is right because 
people can only respond to events as they perceive them to be.  So the woman in the 
example above may not embark on a career that interferes with family life because she 
believes that she has freedom to choose to wait until the children are a little older.   
 
How feasible is it that the process will ever be perfected?  Beauchamp and Childress 
emphasise the ideal, although not the Utopian, character of this procedure. 149  They state 
that: 
 
“We should assume that we face a never-ending search for incoherence, for 
counter-examples to our beliefs, and for novel situations that challenge our moral 
framework.  From this perspective, moral thinking is analogous to hypotheses in 
science that we test, modify, or reject through experience and experimental 
thinking”. 150 
 
A Value System Must Explain and Justify Treatment Decisions 
The lack of any formalities associated with an advance directive that is drafted 
conventionally, i.e. to refuse a particular treatment, tends to lull persons into a false sense 
of security.  They know what they mean when they say that if they were demented they 
would wish to refuse life-preserving treatment but do others?   A lack of formality tends 
to promote ideas about treatment at the end of life that might never have been fully aired 
and therefore the decision to refuse treatment suffers from the defect that it has not been 
subjected to more rigorous testing to ensure that it will withstand critical appraisal from 
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others.151  If a personal value system is intended to function reliably as a patient’s 
personal messenger in the future, it should not suffer from the same defect. 
 
Medical professionals are called upon to make treatment decisions on behalf of mentally 
incapacitated patients in a wide variety of situations and circumstances, not just those at 
the end of life.  The lives of patients who suffer from conditions such as Dementia, for 
example, extend long after the initial diagnosis.  So a value system must have the 
capacity to provide an explanation and justification for a wide variety of treatment 
decisions.152    
 
The issue then is whether the framework for decision can meet this requirement of it.  
Can an independent third party understand and use the value system to inform a treatment 
decision-making process in a manner that is consistent with what was intended?153  
Accordingly, there is a need to test any resultant action guide to see if it yields a result 
that is incoherent or inconsistent with one’s personal conception of what a good life is.154  
In this regard Beauchamp and Childress propose that the adequacy of any theory can be 
ascertained from eight conditions or benchmarks and these are clarity, coherence, 
completeness and comprehensiveness, simplicity, explanatory power, justificatory power, 
output power and practicability.155 
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Clarity  
The framework for decision must be set out clearly to reflect the values that should be 
used to inform a treatment decision-making process.  A little like following a recipe 
where the ingredients are listed separately from instructions about how to assemble the 
various components.  Indeed recent legislation follows a similar pattern.156  Therefore, 
any embellishments that add meaning to vague terms of reference should be placed 
within a separate ‘Code of Practice’ which should be given equal legal status.157   
 
Coherence 
In order to establish a value system that is both valid and reliable persons must engage in 
an interpretative exercise of sorts.  The idea is to set out ones values in a general way and 
to subject these to a form of reflective testing which aims to bring initial ideas about 
values into a state of equilibrium with concrete judgments.158  Values exist on many 
levels.  Some may be more fundamental and thus more enduring than others whilst others 
change with circumstances, i.e. the crucial difference between critical and experiential 
interests.  However, even when these have been identified and then specified as such a 
person’s values may not always be consistent with each other, for example someone may 
value being in good health and yet continue to smoke.  Alternatively, it may be 
impossible to draw a rational link between someone’s personal ideology or worldview, 
where identified and disclosed, or maybe their attitude to risk and their values.  A 
coherent value system then is one where conceptual inconsistencies and contradictory 
statements, which has been discussed above, have been eliminated.159  In cases of 
difficulty it may be necessary to establish an order of precedence between various values 
or else a rule or theory that could be used by a surrogate decision-maker to help them 
decide which value to accord priority to when weighing all of the various factors they are 
required to consider.  When a value system has been constructed in this way it is possible 
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to explain ones character and values more precisely.  It is also possible to embed within 
the value system truth conditions, and these may have been taken from a variety of 
sources including the practice of value, which supersede the pre-analytic assumptions of 
the individual whose value system it is.160 
 
Completeness and Comprehensiveness 
A comprehensive value system is one that gives a general as well as a more specific 
account of all moral and non-moral values that have informed the overall shape of a 
person’s life.  This information should be contained in a code of practice.  The 
completeness of the system would be assessed against its ability to explain and justify a 
range of treatment and non-treatment decisions, including a decision to withdraw or 
withhold treatment at the end of life.  Bear in mind that a doctor must be able to 
determine from a patient’s values whether the benefits of treatment would outweigh the 
burdens it would impose on them.  And as a decision would reside in a person’s critical 
interest in having a good life that maintains their personal sense of what a dignified life 
is, the seriousness of that intent being demonstrated through their values, some evaluation 
ought also to be made about how a particular patient’s attitude to risk would affect their 
decision to accept or reject medical treatment.  An assessment of this kind might be 
facilitated by the nature of the values themselves.  For example, a person whose 
experiential interests included paragliding might not be considered risk adverse.  
However, it should not be assumed to be the case so an alternative proposal is to require 
persons who wish to be treated in accordance with their values to list health as a critical 
interest which they are required to give both a general and more specific account of.  A 
person’s general attitude to risk as displayed on more specific occasions in relation to a 
medical treatment decision must also be made coherent with their other critical and 
experiential interests.  The idea is that previous treatment decisions and the factors that 
were considered would provide relevant insight, as would experimental thinking 
exercises, simply because one is required to bring interests into a state of coherence. 
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Simplicity 
Beauchamp and Childress state that: 
 
“If a theory with a few basic norms generates sufficient moral content, then that 
theory is preferable to a theory with more norms but no additional content.  A 
theory should have no more norms than are necessary, and no more than people 
can use without confusion.  However, morality is complicated and any 
comprehensive moral theory will be complex”.161    
 
What is necessary and sufficient for a system of values, beliefs and preferences to 
constitute a simple decision-making devise?    Act utilitarianism, for instance, takes a 
single unifying principle, the principle of utility, to create the greatest good for the 
greatest number.  The instruction is simple enough but disagreement exists about what 
good is and by what method we can arrive at judgments concerning what is good as well 
as about whose interests should rightfully be considered in any assessment where the 
primary concern is to benefit the greatest number.  Similarly, a single treatment decision 
is a simple expression of wishes that typically seeks to reflect the values of the patient 
which is intended to have limited application and yet specificity, the act of instituting a 
simple instruction, is proven, yet again, to be the formidable obstacle that one has to 
overcome.162 
 
According to Dworkin autonomy encourages people’s general capacity to lead their lives 
in their own distinctive way and an integrity view of autonomy places emphasis on this 
rather than on the welfare of the choosing agent.163  Consequently, a person who wishes 
to continue to live a life that is structured by their own values should seek to ascertain 
and express the values, interests and convictions that have played a critical role in 
shaping that life.164  The answer to the question of whether that sense of self can 
transcend the page through a series of simple statements is what is being facilitated by 
this process of testing particularly if one can gain input from an independent third party. 
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Explanatory Power 
You should at this stage recall Herrings comment from the previous chapter, that not all 
supporters of autonomy are happy with Dworkins analysis of how that principle should 
be understood when someone suffers a loss of decision-making capacity.  Their 
contention primarily arises out of the fact that human judgment cannot be eliminated 
from the decision-making process consequently there is scope for a decision-maker with 
knowledge of a person’s critical interests to use or weigh that information in a way that is 
inconsistent with what was intended.   With that in mind the aim here is to provide 
sufficient insight into the person, their life, reasoning processes and so on so as to 
facilitate the notion that someone else will continue on after them with a line of decisions 
that will leave that heritage undisturbed.165  It’s a little like training someone else to do 
your job except here the creative input has been pre-determined.  In this regard think of a 
dot-to-dot picture and then of actors who are required to interpret the words on the page.  
In regard to the former we join the dots to complete the picture as we were intended to 
do.  But an actor will typically set out to identify with the character they are intended to 
portray to give their performance integrity, credibility, authenticity call it what you will.  
What matters to them is that they should get the characterisation right and so many 
develop an intimate relationship with the nature of the individual characters they play on 
screen or stage to a point where they might consider that they know better than the writer, 
who was responsible for creating that individuality, what this person should say or do 
next.166   
 
Justificatory Power 
In creating a personal value system a person is seeking to stay in control of their body 
and life by laying down the foundations of their decision-making processes, i.e. they are 
disclosing their values to assist others to determine what ought to happen in the future 
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based on a personal account of what their good is.167  The project is given a foundation by 
Dworkin who claims that a person’s life is informed by two types of interests, 
experiential and critical.  However, the integrity view of autonomy holds that what 
persons have most reason to pursue is ultimately determined by their critical interests.  
This is because critical interests are explained by reference to the integrity with which 
important self-defining decisions are made to accord with our more abstract ambition to 
lead a good life.168  Thus a person’s critical interests have the power within them to 
provide greater insight into the personal disposition of the individual whose life it is.  The 
issue is whether imperatives to guide judgments on some future occasion can safely be 
derived, and later relied upon, from the facts of our individual decisions. 
 
Now it may be assumed that self-interest should be sufficient to validate personal 
judgments about which ends one has most reason to pursue.  However, there is a danger 
that persons might fail to be sufficiently objective about what is critically important in 
their life.  Take for example a young man whose family are ardent supporters of a 
particular football club.  As season ticket holders they regularly attend home matches and 
also endeavour to support their team when they play away.  The problem is that the 
young man has now been selected to go onto a trainee manager programme at work and 
following a short romance has recently become engaged to be married.  Quite naturally 
these developments place some additional pressure on his spare time but finds that the 
change in lifestyle suits him quite well.  Nevertheless he feels some pressure from his 
father to maintain existing family ties and traditions.  So this is a situation where 
someone might experience conflict about which values they are most committed to.      
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Therefore, some form of reasoning process is required to help persons to objectively 
validate their critical interests or those things that they feel obligated to do as this will 
prevent them from giving a merely descriptive account of what exists in their world and 
how it may be understood by others.  A value system will have justificatory power in this 
sense if, the person whose value system it is, gives grounds for justified belief which 
entails something more than merely reformulating the beliefs they already possess.169  
Accordingly, persons who develop a coherent narrative of their life story which is 
supported by evidence of a settled commitment to that particular end would go some way 
to satisfying this particular requirement.  This is because personal values will have been 
subjected to a form of empirical testing during which time a person may have had an 
opportunity to question and maybe even revise their values.  Consequently, a value 
system that can capture the essence of the person through moments of weakness or self-
doubt may have more credibility and inspire more confidence in it than one which 
portrays absolute and unyielding rigidity.  Empirical testing therefore renders self-
knowledge an inherently valid and reliable source of information for others who may be 
required to justify what should happen in the person’s best interests on some future 
occasion. 
 
Output Power 
A value system should not operate in the way that a decision to refuse a medical 
treatment does since in those instances a person is merely recording an instruction which 
they intend to take effect in a particular set of circumstances.  The idea is that a treatment 
refusal should be specific to engender trust and confidence that it represented a settled 
decision and not an off-hand comment.170  To have output power a personal value system 
must generate an explanation and justification in new and novel situations that may not 
have been contemplated or considered by the person whose value system it is.  Hopefully 
persons will have used experimental thinking exercises to test their beliefs and values in a 
medical context as a decision by the surrogate decision-maker must be rendered coherent 
with the prior considered judgments of the patient. 
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Practicality 
A doctor or carer would be required to have regard to the contents of a value system, 
where these were reasonably ascertainable.  This means that surrogates must be informed 
that a value system exists and that it should be made reasonably accessible to all 
concerned.  Equally, it would be unacceptable if a value system was of a length or was 
composed in such a style or amount of detail that information could not reasonably be 
understood by others in the time available. 
 
Personal Value Systems and Public Policy  
 
Coherence alone is not a sufficient justification for being treated in accordance with a 
personal value system.  Beauchamp and Childress have, for instance, previously 
commented that a body of principles that cohere could be morally unsatisfactory and for 
that very reason may not be upheld on grounds of public policy.171  So first of all how is 
public policy relevant to personal value systems when the primacy of autonomy is firmly 
established in law?  Well we know that life is not perfect and that we cannot always live 
life strictly in accordance with those principles and values we make our own.  Sometimes 
other people or factors deserve our consideration and in these circumstances we must 
compromise and work out what is the best that we can do.  Imagine, for example, that a 
friend wishes to consult you about a difference of opinion they are currently having with 
someone else that you also know very well.  They approach the subject tentatively at first 
aware of this fact but would nevertheless need little encouragement to unburden 
themselves of every glorious detail of the debacle they face.  How should you proceed 
when you value and respect each of the parties to the dispute?  Your normal rigid 
adherence to the principle that you don’t talk between folk might appear, to the friend 
who has reached the end of their tether, somewhat unfeeling, uncaring, unfriendly and is 
likely to be construed as taking sides with their current foe.   The truth is that on this 
occasion you feel torn by the complexity of the situation because your friend is clearly 
upset and has called upon you to support them, not just emotionally but in seeking actual 
guidance, but you do not wish to say or do anything that infers disloyalty elsewhere 
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knowing that good relationships are built upon principles of trust and that one day, in 
different circumstances, the friend may be only too pleased that they can also rely on this 
principle of action. 
 
Similar complexities can arise from a conflict or potential conflict in the interests of 
particular individuals and a member or members of the wider community within which 
they are situated.  In most instances laws if not morals regulate behaviour and on either 
count a principled way will be found to resolve the problem that arguably reflects the 
underlying policy considerations on the matter that were and still are vested in the 
democratic will.  Of course public opinion will reflect divergent viewpoints on most 
moral matters172 however laws are likely to be most effective when they are consistent 
with accepted societal norms and therefore reflect the common or collective morality of 
society.  In this regard it is possible to witness a move towards autonomy and therefore 
away from paternalism in medical law and this change has become more deeply 
entrenched within the legal system over time as confidence increases in the underlying 
policy considerations that gave way to it.173   
 
Judges are familiar with the problems presented by a conflict of interests and know that if 
they comply with one obligation in such situations, i.e. to respect an autonomous refusal 
of life preserving medical treatment, that another will or may be contravened, i.e. sanctity 
of life.  In these circumstances decision-makers have to determine which obligation is 
overriding.  However, in some contexts in matters that are of greatest concern to 
individuals, in this context those affecting the right of a competent patient to self-
determine what shall happen to their body in a medical context and therefore of how they 
should live and die, the exercise of that right might still be considered controversial when 
set against the values, beliefs and interests of the wider community.      
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In highlighting the complexity of issues that must be considered Beauchamp and 
Childress therefore claim that policy formation and criticism involve more complex 
forms of judgment than ethical principles and rules can handle on their own.174  This is 
what they have to say: 
 
“Public policy is often formulated in contexts that are marked by profound social 
disagreements, uncertainties, and different interpretations of history.  No body of 
abstract moral principles and rules can determine policy in such circumstances, 
because it cannot contain enough specific information or provide direct and 
discerning guidance.  The specification and implementation of moral principles 
and rules must take account of problems of feasibility, efficiency, cultural 
pluralism, political procedures, uncertainty about risk, non-compliance by patients 
and the like.  Principles and rules provide the moral background for policy 
evaluation, but a policy must also be shaped by empirical data and by information 
available in fields such as medicine, nursing, economics, law and psychology”.175     
 
The factors that create pressure for change, how these are perceptible and when it is 
appropriate to mark a change from one set of ideas to another are therefore embedded 
within the notion of public policy.  However, what is in the public interest may be 
unknowable, indeed hidden values and motivations may become manifest within it, 
because there are so many potential and competing factors to be considered.   
Furthermore, the fact that the law has to be practical as well as moral means that we 
cannot move with certainty from moral principles or rules to laws and to what is public 
policy in particular.176  In other words we cannot necessarily move from what is morally 
right or wrong to imply what should or should not be permitted in law.177  Consequently, 
it should not be automatically assumed that just because a person has disclosed their 
values and value system in a living will that those values ought on every occasion to 
inform decisions regarding what should be done in their medical welfare and other 
interests.    
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Public Policy Considerations 
On some occasions conflicting moral principles and rules may create dilemmas.  A most 
obvious example, within the context of this thesis, is that of autonomy and best interests 
where the only way to comply with one obligation is to contravene another.178  As clearly 
there will be some occasions, such as might occur when a patient has made an advance 
directive that discloses their wishes or values, where a doctor or judge will be required to 
decide which obligation is overriding.179   
 
Another example arises out of a situation where the patient expresses a preference for a 
particular form of treatment.180  In these circumstances it has been determined in law that 
the form of treatment that it is in the patient’s best interests to receive should be 
determined by a doctor, i.e. someone who is expert in medical matters and who is able to 
more fully appreciate the implications of that decision for the general medical welfare of 
all patients including, one assumes, potential patients.  
 
You might also remember from previous discussions that human life has intrinsic value 
and in upholding the sanctity principle it is a crime for any person to bring about the 
death of another.181  Hence, euthanasia is not lawful at common law.182  Despite that fact  
Lord Goff recognised that many responsible members of society thought that euthanasia 
should be legalised though he believed  that it could only be rendered lawful by an act of 
Parliament that expressed the ‘democratic will’ on the subject.183  However, we have also 
observed that in relation to treatment decisions at the end of life a distinction is 
maintained in law between acts and omissions and therefore between active and passive 
forms of euthanasia.  In holding to its qualified sanctity position the law seeks to draw a 
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distinction between deliberate acts that are intended to kill184 from one where death is 
merely foreseen as an incidental outcome of a particular act that is intended to benefit the 
patient.185  This means that although a patient cannot consent to be killed a doctor may, in 
accordance with the moral doctrine of double effect, for example, lawfully administer 
morphine for pain relief in the knowledge that this will advance the impending death of 
the patient.186  Similarly, a doctor, though not a relative or lay person, may flick the 
switch of a life-support machine knowing that this will hasten the person’s death, which 
will be attributed to their underlying condition, and in law the decision to withdraw 
medical treatment is in some circumstances regarded as an omission to treat.187   
 
Essentially, a doctor who discontinues life support and allows the patient to die does not 
act unlawfully where there is no breach of duty to the patient.188  And it has been 
determined that a doctor will not be in breach of her duty to the patient where medical 
opinion determines that it is futile189 to continue with life support.190  This is because no 
actual advantage is conferred by a decision to continue with the treatment in these 
circumstances.  Similarly, a doctor is permitted, in accordance with the moral principle of 
double effect, to administer drugs intending to relieve intolerable pain even when death is 
foreseen as an incidental effect of treatment.191  In sum therefore, a doctor must not, in 
considering whether treatment is in the best interests of the person, be motivated to bring 
about their death.192 
 
Some have argued that the law is morally inconsistent as a result of maintaining the acts 
and omissions distinction.193  The opposing argument is that the law maintains a qualified 
sanctity of life position which means that a doctor is not placed under an absolute duty to 
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prolong life, by any means available, regardless of the patient’s quality of life and 
dignity.194  In other words a doctor’s duty to act in the best interests of the patient is 
similarly qualified.195 
 
Recent clarification of the law of assisted suicide,196 which places emphasis on the 
motivation of culprits, leaves unaltered the basic principle in respect of patients who are 
not terminally ill, or though dying are not in pain, that doctors should refrain from 
engaging in activities that directly shorten life as this will be treated as an assisted suicide 
contrary to s.2 of the Suicide Act 1961. 
 
Within what Limits are Personal Values to be taken into Consideration?197 
Beauchamp and Childress have previously commented that a body of principles that 
cohere could be morally unsatisfactory and for that very reason may not be upheld on 
grounds of public policy.198  For instance, we have seen that in Nazi Germany during the 
Second World War doctors were willing to practice eugenics in support of Hitler’s vision 
of a world dominated by a master race or one that was racially pure.  So an easy point to 
make is that any patient who, for want of a better example, harboured the notion that not 
all lives were created equally which had been expressed either directly or indirectly in a 
value system should not expect to find that their values will be respected generally or 
more specifically in relation to treatment decisions concerning the use of donated tissue. 
 
However, does a value system have to be morally sound, e.g. are there some ingredients 
that all value systems should have regardless of the wishes of the person, for example, 
some form of other regarding principle?  Well a Kantian could be expected to voluntarily 
will that their imperative of action was capable of being applied without contradiction.    
For some Kant is a bit of an idealist who clearly lived at a time when society was morally 
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homogenous aided I suspect by the fact that persons would be more inclined to ‘know 
their place’ and to show respect for the ruling classes.    Nowadays, matters of public 
policy tend to arise where there is conflict between the role of autonomy and the interests 
of society more generally.  Perhaps following Mills’ maxim, ‘that the only purpose for 
which power can rightfully be exercised over any member of a civilised community, 
against his will, is to prevent harm to others’ it is not in the public interest that people 
should try to cause or should cause each other bodily harm for no good reason.199  
However, the view is that not all persons can be relied upon to conduct themselves 
appropriately towards others therefore social rules of conduct are formalised by laws that 
seek to preserve public order and decency, to protect the citizen from what is offensive or 
injurious, and to provide sufficient safeguards against exploitation and corruption of 
others, particularly those who are especially vulnerable because they are young, weak in 
body or mind, inexperienced, or in a state of special, physical, official or economic 
dependence.200   Therefore the law has to balance the role of autonomy against utilitarian 
considerations or the consequences of so doing.   In this way the law can be seen to take a 
paternalistic attitude towards what is good and bad for one in the interests of harmonious 
co-existence. 
 
Certainly case law suggests that in order for a value system to be respected due regard 
must be had for the sensibilities of others.  For example, the opinion of the majority in the 
case of R v Brown determined that there is a limit to the amount of harm that one can 
consent to.  Essentially a particular act or form of activity must in itself be lawful for 
consent to operate as a defence.201  Accordingly the scope for autonomous choice is 
limited by the need to ensure that a particular practice is not dangerous and injurious and 
that if allowed and extended would not be harmful to society generally in that it does not 
offend against the principle of maximising human welfare more specifically.  This must 
be born in mind when thinking about Dworkin’s argument about the point of autonomy, 
which he claims is not the maximisation of one’s own welfare necessarily but to be given 
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sufficient scope to develop one’s own character and personality and to live and die in a 
manner that is consistent with that creative legacy.   
 
Consequently, a person, let’s say a sadomasochist, whose values reflected a desire to 
remain alive for a prolonged period in a state of, what for most would be, intolerable pain 
could not expect their values to be respected for public policy reasons.202  Similarly, a 
person who is religious and a Catholic should not expect to be maintained in a pvs 
indefinitely simply on the basis of their faith.203  An anorexic who prefers to starve rather 
than eat could not expect to find that food and water would be withheld.204  Contrarily, 
Burke informs us that a person who is afraid that they may be starved to death cannot 
insist upon receiving basic care such as artificial food and water.205  Moreover, it is 
possible to infer from Bland that a tramp who values living rough cannot refuse basic 
care that might cover such things as basic hygiene.206   
 
What about someone who is a proud communitarian but who had made no provision to 
donate their organs for the benefit of others on their death.  If we take Re Y as an example 
we see that merely because a non-therapeutic treatment or procedure is not in the medical 
best interests of someone it should not be assumed that it cannot be in their welfare 
interests when welfare is more widely conceived.  A medical treatment or procedure must 
however confer some advantage and in this case a non-therapeutic procedure which was 
intended to benefit a third party, in this case a close relative, was held to be in the best 
interests of the patient because it could be presumed, from her conduct, that the 
undertaking would confer an emotional advantage on the patient.  This suggests that it 
might be presumed that someone who took their civic duties seriously would consent to 
donate body tissue and organs for the benefit of others generally, rather than specifically 
those within their own community, on the basis of their former values.   
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The question however was whether some sort of other regarding principle should be 
explicit within a value system.  We saw in chapter one that other than in limited 
circumstances persons have no general obligation to be beneficent; in general 
beneficence is supererogatory, nice to do but not wrong to omit.  If, for example, we 
examine the legal system there is no real expectation that people should report wrongs 
and bring cases against those that are perceived to have transgressed against the interests 
of others.  Negligence is a case in point where the difficulties associated with bringing a 
case to court and of succeeding with it are widely accepted, rape is perhaps another 
instance.  However, we seem unconcerned about the consequences of this for the 
individuals concerned as well as for the general welfare of citizens now and in the future.  
This is curious when we consider the comment made by Raz that once a value comes into 
existence it bears on everything without exception. 
 
Currently, we see the emergence of an Organ Donation (Presumed Consent) Bill that is 
working its way through the parliamentary system.   One assumes that if the Bill is 
passed and becomes legislation that the people would be in favour of such a principle and 
might be inclined to infer one when it is not present.  However, that would be a strange 
move which could signal the start of a very slippery slope – the incapacity of the patient 
should not be used, i.e. nothing left to lose, as an opportunity to advance the causes of 
medical research.  We must remember that mentally incapacitated patients play as big a 
role in advancing medical science and therefore the general welfare of the population as 
do most other members of society.  They will be given medicines, treatments and 
procedures when the occasion arises and can be monitored for side effects as well as for 
the efficacy of treatment and surgeons have an opportunity to perfect their skills when 
they are being operated on.  Moreover, if we examine the case of Simms in which highly 
experimental treatment based on research conducted in Japan was given to mentally 
incompetent patients suffering from variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease then incapacity in 
that case arguably justified a decision to administer a form of treatment that would 
advance medical knowledge about that condition and its prognosis which would benefit 
patients in the future.207  Herring reports on this case and states that: 
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“Butler-Sloss P. held that it was lawful to administer the treatment and that it 
would be in their best interests also.  This was because there was no responsible 
body of opinion which thought it irresponsible to provide the proposed treatment 
referring to the Bolam test.  Although there was a 5 per cent chance of 
haemorrhage as a result of this procedure, this was within the reasonable bounds 
of risk given the situation the patients were in.  The proposed treatment was of 
benefit to the patients even if there was no hope of recovery, and the hope was that 
the treatment would slow down deterioration or prolong life.  Even though the 
chance of improvement was slight it was a risk worth taking.  As she pointed out: 
 
The concept of ‘benefit’ to a patient suffering from v-CJD does encompass an 
improvement from the state of illness, or a continuation of the existing state of 
illness, without deterioration for a longer period than might otherwise have 
occurred. 
 
Here the condition was fatal and progressive; it was therefore reasonable to 
attempt experimental treatment with unknown risks and benefits.  She stated: 
 
A patient who is not able to consent to pioneering treatment ought not to be 
deprived of the chance in circumstances where he would have been likely to 
consent if he had been competent. 
 
When considering what was in the patients’ best interests their futures with and 
without treatment, as well as the views of their families should be taken into 
account.  The parents’ support of this proposed treatment was said to carry 
‘considerable weight’.208 
 
The case of Simms can be contrasted with that of R v Cambridge Health Authority, ex 
parte B.209  In that case a child aged ten was suffering from non-Hodgkins lymphoma 
with common acute lymphoblastic leukaemia and received chemotherapy and treatment 
which was initially successful.   Some time later the child developed acute myeloid 
leukaemia and was once again treated with a course of chemotherapy and underwent a 
course of total body irradiation which prepares the body for a bone marrow transplant or 
stem cell therapy but medical opinion was that this form of treatment should be 
undertaken only once.  It appeared once again that treatment had been successful.   
Unfortunately some months later B suffered a further relapse.   
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Everything possible had been done by the child’s family to secure the best possible 
treatment for her and up until that point no apparent disagreement existed between the 
family and the doctors who were responsible for treating B.  That was to change because 
medical judgment was now that the child had a very short period to live, perhaps six to 
eight weeks and doctors considered that she should be allowed to die as further treatment 
could not usefully be administered.  Treatment would involve a further course of 
chemotherapy which if successful would be followed by a second bone-marrow 
transplant operation.  A second opinion was sought which affirmed the opinion of the 
doctor who was treating B.   
 
At this point B’s father decided to seek out the opinion of doctors in America and was 
encouraged to find that certain doctors believed that there was a substantial chance of 
further treatment being successful.  As treatment was prohibitively expensive in America 
B’s father sought out an alternative body of medical opinion, i.e. someone in England 
who was sympathetic to the views expressed by the American doctors.  The father was 
successful in finding a notable expert in that particular field of medicine who was willing 
to recommend to the treating doctors that it was reasonable to compromise and to try a 
further course of chemotherapy with the hope of achieving a complete remission.   He 
also recommended the use of a particular drug that was less toxic with fewer side effects 
and if complete remission was achieved it might be possible to contemplate a second 
bone marrow transplant.  This doctor assessed the chances of success as being less than 
20 per cent and as the doctor’s so far responsible for B’s care were not keen to administer 
further treatment he suggested the name of another practitioner who would be willing to 
do so.     
 
An officer of the health authority that was required to fund the treatment contacted B’s 
father and explained that a decision not to fund further treatment had been taken on 
clinical not financial grounds.  As treatment was at variance with majority medical 
opinion it could be categorised as experimental rather than therapeutic treatment.  The 
cost of treatment had been estimated to be £15000 for chemotherapy and a possible 
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£60,000 for a bone marrow transplant which may or may not be necessary.  In his 
affidavit to the court the officer stated that: 
 
“Having considered all the medical opinions put before me I decided to accept the 
clinical judgment of … that a further course of intensive chemotherapy with a view 
to a second transplant operation was not in the best interests of B.  I have also been 
influenced in my decision by the consistent advice and directions of the Department 
of Health with regard to the funding of treatments which have not been proven to 
be of benefit.  The ethical use of resources demands that new and expensive 
treatments are evaluated before they are transferred to the NHS for service 
funding.  The doctors to whom I spoke were consistent in their advice that the 
proposed treatment was neither standard nor had been formally evaluated.  I also 
considered that the substantial expenditure on treatment with such small prospect 
of success would not be an effective use of resources.  The amount of funds 
available for health care are not limitless.  The authority has a responsibility to 
ensure that sufficient funds are available from their limited resources for the 
provision of treatment for other patients which is likely to be effective”. 
 
Clearly the officer showed scant regard for the wishes of the family which seemed to play 
a considerable role in the decision reached by Butler-Sloss P. in Simms.  Moreover, the 
track record of the treatment appears to have been an overriding factor in his decision 
which of course in Simms had not even been established.  Speaking on behalf of the 
Appeal Court, Sir Thomas Bingham MR, reiterated that our society is one in which a 
very high value is placed on human life and that although decisions affecting human life 
should be regarded with great seriousness, the courts are not arbiters as to the merits of 
cases of this kind in which judgments about the effectiveness of a medical treatment are 
necessary.  The constitutional role of the court is to rule upon the lawfulness of decisions.   
 
At first instance the judge had said that the Health Authority ‘must do more than toll the 
bell of tight resources … they must explain the priorities that have led them to decline to 
fund the treatment’.  On this matter Sir Thomas Bingham MR, stated that: 
 
“I have no doubt that in a perfect world any treatment which a patient, or a 
patient’s family, sought would be provided if doctors were willing to give it, no 
matter how much it cost, particularly when a life was potentially at stake.  It would 
however, in my view, be shutting one’s eyes to the real world if the court were to 
proceed on the basis that we do live in such a world.  It is common knowledge that 
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health authorities of all kinds are constantly pressed to make ends meet… Difficult 
and agonising judgments have to be made as to how a limited budget is best 
allocated to the maximum advantage of the maximum number of patients.  That is 
not a judgment which the court can make.  In my judgment, it is not something that 
a health authority can be fairly criticised for not advancing before the court”. 
 
Accordingly, the court extended sympathy to B and her family but ultimately determined 
that this was not a matter in which it was possible to make any decision in their favour. 
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Chapter Seven 
 
 
How useful is the MCA in Promoting Autonomy through Advance 
Decision-Making and Decisions made in Patient’s Best Interests? 
 
In the case of Bland it was suggested by Lord Goff that the best interests test should 
comprise of something more than purely professional appraisal of a person’s medical 
welfare.1  To confine the test in this way, he said, would be inconsistent with the primacy 
given to the principle of self-determination and would ‘downgrade the status of the 
incompetent person by placing a lesser value on [their] intrinsic worth and vitality’.2   
Approximately twelve years later in the foreword to the Mental Capacity Act 2005 Lord 
Falconer has stated that: 
 
“The Mental Capacity Act 2005 is a vitally important piece of legislation, and one 
that will make a real difference to the lives of people who may lack mental 
capacity.  It will empower people to make decisions for themselves wherever 
possible, and protect people who lack capacity by providing a flexible framework 
that places individuals at the very heart of the decision-making process.  It will 
ensure that they participate as much as possible in any decisions made on their 
behalf, and that these are made in their best interests.  It also allows people to plan 
ahead for a time in the future when they might lack the capacity, for any number of 
reasons, to make decisions for themselves”.3 
 
 
The primary purpose of the 2005 Act is to determine who, in the doctor-patient 
relationship, should decide and what criteria and standards are relevant to decision-
making processes concerning mentally incompetent patients.  And as a contemporary 
piece of legislation the Mental Capacity Act enshrines current thinking about the role that 
patient autonomy and medical paternalism should play in relation to this patient group.   
 
What is interesting is that enactment of the 2005 Act took place at a time when the 
common law had established that the primacy accorded to the moral principle of 
autonomy was derivative of the patient’s fundamental right to bodily inviolability.  As a 
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consequence a doctor had a legal obligation to obtain patient consent prior to 
administering a medical treatment.  Moreover, the law had also determined that in order 
for a patient consent to be legally valid it must be informed also to safeguard patient 
welfare and autonomy.4  Accordingly, a competent patient must be placed in a position to 
make an informed decision about whether to accept or reject an offer of medical 
treatment and be maintained inviolate.5   As personal autonomy means being one’s own 
person without constraints being imposed by another’s action a doctor’s legal obligations 
have increasingly been tailored to meet the needs of patients which has left little scope to 
invoke professional privilege to justify what the patient was or was not told.6   Neither are 
a doctor’s legal obligations mediated by any psychological or physical limitations of their 
patients.7 
 
It is perhaps unsurprising that it has also been determined that it is entirely consistent 
with respect for the moral principle of autonomy that the scope of the patient’s right to 
self-determination in law should be extended to include an advance treatment decision of 
a competent patient.  These, as a matter of principle the common law determines, must be 
respected in the same way as if the decision of the patient had been made 
contemporaneously.8   As this common law doctrine has been incorporated into the 
Mental Capacity Act there is now statutory recognition of the primacy that should be 
accorded to the moral principle of autonomy in decisions concerning formerly competent 
patients.9  In law, at least, the incompetent person is deemed to retain psychological 
continuity with their former competent self.  This amounts to legal recognition of the idea 
that a person’s values and method for arriving at judgments of value when they are 
competent are the best indication of what should happen in the future when they are 
incompetent, i.e. that the values that had informed their earlier life should continue to 
play a determinative role in decisions, in this context medical treatment decisions, that 
will affect the patient.  Consequently, respect for the principle of autonomy in medical 
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law can more generally be understood to mean that a doctor’s primary obligation is to 
ascertain and respond to the values of the patient, howsoever expressed, in deciding 
whether to administer a medical treatment.  So, when autonomy is respected persons, 
competent and incompetent alike, not only have dominion over their life plan but also 
over their bodies and lifespans. 
 
A value system when it is disclosed in a living will similarly promotes patient autonomy 
because it confirms which values were most important in the life of a particular 
individual or person.10  However, its format, as discussed in chapter six, would mean that 
it did not amount to an advance decision where the values of the patient are merely 
implicit in their choice.  As a prior written statement of the patient it would instead be 
considered,11 alongside other factors as part of a process that seeks to determine what 
should be done in their best interests, by a surrogate decision-maker, who will most often 
be a member of the medical profession.12  As ultimately the decision-maker in a ‘patient 
centred’ best interests standard is someone other than the patient the possibility exists that 
any decision affecting them may not entirely coincide with what they would themselves 
have decided primarily because the values that had informed their life need not 
necessarily be made determinative of what should happen by a third party decision-
maker. 
 
As a consequence the ‘patient-centred’ best interests standard that is being upheld by the 
Mental Capacity Act continues to provide considerable scope for patient autonomy to be 
undermined, even when the values and value system of the patient have been disclosed in 
a living will.  This is in part due to the uncertain nature of the medical treatment decision-
making standard itself.   The fact that the test has not been fully defined perhaps because 
it is incapable of being fully defined consigns it to a reputation of indeterminacy.  
Though, the lack of a decision-making process is possibly of greatest significance in this 
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context.13  Either way medical professional values, non-maleficence and beneficence, 
will ultimately be relied upon to fill the gaps left vacant by the legal test of best interests 
and to thereby decide our fate.  A situation which the law has on various occasions 
sought to avoid not only in relation to competent patients14 but also in respect of those 
who were formerly competent through, for example, the use of advance decisions.15   
 
Nonetheless guidance within the Code of Practice claims that this legislation is intended 
to be enabling and supportive of people who lack capacity, not restricting or controlling 
of their lives.16  Accordingly, this chapter is focused on suggesting ways in which the 
sentiment underlying the Act might reasonably be made a reality.  At least for those who 
are competent to disclose their value system in a living will and who clearly wish to have 
what happens to them as an incompetent patient determined by an appropriate application 
of their former personal values. 
 
Consequently, the purpose of this final chapter is to determine whether, and if so how, the 
values of a competent person, when they are understood by others, can play a role in 
medical treatment decision-making under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 at a time when 
that person is no longer capable of making their own decisions. 
 
This chapter will now divide into four parts.  The first section will focus on whether the 
idea proposed in the previous chapter will be effective in upholding patient autonomy 
when assessed in the light of the MCA, i.e. whether a value system that had been 
disclosed in a living will could play a key role in decision-making.  On the basis that the 
legal test of best interests accords no particular weight to the prior values of a former 
competent person in the second part of the chapter we will go on to explore the issue of 
how respect for values could fit in with the doctor’s ethical obligations of non-
maleficence and beneficence.  Next we move on to consider what practical problems 
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might still arise if respect for patient autonomy, i.e. for their values, beliefs and 
preferences, was incorporated within the ethical framework of the medical profession.  In 
particular there is a need to explore the possibility that a doctor may override a patient’s 
value system, not wilfully perhaps, but, due to the subconscious imposition of the 
doctor’s value system and to identify possible grounds for doing so.17  The fourth and 
final section will consider whether reform of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 will be 
necessary to uphold patient values. 
 
Patient Values and the MCA 
 
In chapter four we discovered that the Mental Capacity Act 2005 provides a flexible 
framework for decision-making on behalf of persons who are no longer capable of 
making their own decisions.  This ensures that its provisions can be applied flexibly to 
meet a wide variety of situations and circumstances including those arising from the 
potentially different demands of never competent and formerly competent patients which 
this thesis is so obviously concerned with.   
 
The MCA, unlike the statute De Prerogativa Regis, does in other words attempt to be all 
things to all people who are mentally incompetent.  However, its inherent flexibility 
places doctors as surrogate decision-makers in a position of having to determine whether 
the source of authority or legal justification for beneficent intervention, or acting in 
another’s best interests, is protection, in which case medical welfare might be the 
paramount consideration, or whether it should instead be respect for precedent 
autonomy.18 
 
It was also clear from our discussions in the previous chapter that public policy has a role 
to play in determining what health behaviours to encourage.  In Bland, for example, Lord 
Goff appeared to be saying that the right to beneficence should not be in conflict with the 
right to autonomy but what can be gleaned from the 2005 Act in that regard?  Well the 
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tone is set by Lord Falconer, the former Lord Chancellor, in the foreword to the MCA.  
There he speaks in positive terms about the Act and proudly boasts that this legislation 
has been constructed to empower people to make their own decisions wherever possible 
but also to protect those who lack capacity by providing a flexible framework that places 
individuals at the heart of a best interests decision-making process.19  He goes on to state 
that it also allows people to plan ahead for a time in the future when they might lack the 
capacity, for any number of reasons, to make decision for themselves. 
 
As we will be talking about the authority of precedent autonomy we must keep in mind 
the distinction between experiential and critical interests on the basis that the latter should 
assume greater moral authority because of the integrity with which important self-
defining decisions are made to accord with them.  Clearly, a previous statement of a 
competent patient that has been written with this distinction in mind may be of particular 
significance in safeguarding precedent autonomy.  The question then is whether the MCA 
will support an integrity,20 not evidentiary,21 view of autonomy in circumstances where a 
person has chosen to disclose their value system in a living will rather than attempt to 
make an advance treatment decision.   
 
Does the MCA Support the use of a Statement of Values? 
The claim made by Lord Falconer that the MCA allows people to plan ahead for a time in 
the future when they might lack the capacity, for any number of reasons, to make 
decisions themselves would seem to be a direct reference to advance decisions which the 
Act supports.22  An advance decision that is not legally valid and/or applicable might still 
be regarded as an expression of the person’s wishes and must therefore be considered by 
doctors when working out their best interests.23  In addition any relevant written 
statement made by the patient when they had capacity is one of the factors to be 
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considered in any best interests determination.24  However, it is somewhat less obvious 
that the person who discloses their values has a critical interest in ensuring that their 
future is governed by them including in situations where a doctor seeks to ascertain 
whether they have or might lack capacity to make a treatment decision 
contemporaneously.  
 
Living Wills 
Advance decisions have their appeal in the fact that they by-pass the application of best 
interests criterion, in which the past and present wishes of a formerly competent patient 
may be given equal consideration by a surrogate decision-maker, and instead absolute 
priority is accorded to precedent autonomy.  Thus the patient retains control over what 
shall happen to their body in a medical context.25  Crucially a legally valid and applicable 
advance decision takes effect in the same way as if the patient had contemporaneously 
refused to consent to a treatment or procedure that a doctor proposed to administer in 
their (medical) best interests.26  Consequently, a failure to respect a valid and applicable 
advance directive can result in a claim for battery being made against the treating 
clinician.27  This is because a doctor is not acting for or on behalf of someone who lacks 
capacity but on the instructions of a capacitated individual.28 
 
The question then is whether a statement of values contains relevant and clear 
instructions so that it might reasonably constitute an advance decision to refuse a medical 
treatment or procedure.  Given the fact that an advance decision may not only be made in 
writing but orally as well one might have more reason to regard a values statement that 
was capable of yielding the choice the patient would make if competent to decide as an 
advance decision than an oral advance decision.  Richard Jones has, for instance, written 
about how difficult it can be for a treating doctor to have confidence in an oral advance 
directive bearing in mind that it will not be the patient but a third party who will be 
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making the case on behalf of the patient that an advance directive exists that is both valid 
and applicable in the circumstances arising for decision.29  Very briefly it is possible that 
the person may have held similar conversations with others over a considerable period of 
time and their mood on various occasions may have elicited a different response or 
approach to the subject.  Doubts might arise about the competency of the patient at the 
time the alleged decision was made i.e. was this a situation where open conversation had 
led to a particular statement being made that represented their fixed view on the matter or 
had the conversation taken place against the backdrop of an unsettled period during 
which spirits had been wrought low?  Perhaps the decision to refuse a particular form of 
treatment was a response to something they had witnessed that had happened to someone 
else and had not been informed by recent advances in medical science.  Had the person 
been coerced or unduly influenced into making their decision?  Finally, a doctor might be 
inclined to question whether the purported advance decision is applicable to the proposed 
treatment and was intended to apply in the circumstances that have arisen.30  It must 
surely be unusual for someone other than a medical professional to hold a casual 
conversation with an acquaintance, friend or relative which was sufficiently specific in 
every detail.  Furthermore, it must be equally questionable that anyone should be able to 
recall those details with complete accuracy.  Isn’t this why those who witness a crime are 
required to make a statement before leaving the crime scene and prior to talking to others, 
including other witnesses who were at the scene, about what had taken place.  
Accordingly, Richard Jones considers that few oral statements made by patients to lay 
people that are said to constitute advance decisions would survive such scrutiny, 
especially if the statements were made a considerable time ago.31   
 
Isn’t the more likely scenario, in relation to oral advance decisions, that the discussion 
was one about values,  e.g. I value my freedom far too much to enjoy a life being 
dependent on others and it’s not living to be hooked up to a machine.   Aren’t these the 
type of things that people typically say?  Consequently, if we genuinely believe that 
persons do not exist apart, or can be isolated, from their values, and provisions of the 
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MCA are supportive of that view, then there would appear to be fewer reasons to be 
concerned about those background conditions of whether a patient was competent when 
deciding, whether their decision was informed and whether it was entered into voluntarily 
when a doctor is invited to make a treatment decision that is coherent with a patient’s 
experiential and critical values as well as with previous decisions, which is so crucial to 
preserving the integrity of the patient’s creative legacy.  As to whether confidence in a 
statement of values may be misplaced Eric Cassell has written that: 
 
“A person’s values, both negative and positive, are apparent in the things that are 
important to them: Their interests, concerns, what they respond to, and the relative 
weights they apply in making choices.  Since people constantly make choices, live 
in a world shaped by their choices, act on their interests and concerns with varying 
degrees of intensity, and cannot, in fact, be totally neutral to their world for even a 
moment, it follows that people constantly display their values in every facet of their 
existence.  But are these their ‘true’ values?  It could not be otherwise, since even a 
consciously fabricated set of values must bear some relation to the person’s values 
– otherwise why the choice of one set of counterfeit values over another?  
Furthermore, since values are displayed in every moment of existence, it is 
inconceivable that they could all be under conscious control.  It is the case, 
however, that persons’ values may not always be consistent with each other, that 
values exist on many levels, that some are more enduring than others, and that they 
may change with circumstances. 
 
These realities, that values can be so changeable and may be inconsistent give rise 
to the belief that information about values is of limited utility.  In clinical medicine 
this issue surfaces when patients express a desire not to be resuscitated in the event 
of a cardiac arrest.  Should such patients later lose consciousness or be otherwise 
unable to express their wishes, doctors often believe they should be resuscitated 
despite their earlier wish, ‘in case they changed their mind’.  It is true that there 
are things about which we change our minds – tastes change.  And it’s also true 
that when illness is severe, people often discover what is really important to them – 
another way of saying that values change or change in priority.  Because of this it 
would be foolhardy to believe that because one knows a person’s values, the 
knowledge is eternal and unchanging.  Since the body also changes, physicians 
understand the importance of keeping abreast of the changes with up-to-date test 
results and repeated examinations.  Yet most people do not think of the changes in 
the body as transitory in the same way that values are believed to vary.  There are 
surface phenomena, such as skin temperature, and physiologic parameters, such as 
blood pressure, which change from minute to minute or day to day, but there are 
other bodily features, such as bone structure, which change very slowly.  The same 
with values: some superficial likes and dislikes are as changeable as the wind, 
while basic personality, expressed by values, is remarkably constant. 
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People, in their presentation to the world, do display their values for others to see 
and know.  Furthermore, information about values should be considered in the 
same light as information about the body.  Some of it is rock solid, some inconstant, 
but none of it is merely random variation unrelated to the person as a whole or the 
entire spectrum of the person’s values.  Here, as in all our other dimensions, we 
are of a piece”.32 
 
Legal validity and applicability are though tough tests to surmount in requiring those who 
must implement the patient’s instructions to be in no doubt about what was intended to 
happen.  As you will remember the former is concerned with revocation and the latter 
specificity.33  In relation to legal validity it is arguable that in disclosing a value system in 
a living will a person has made a decision, when they had capacity to do so, to set out the 
values that are critically important to their treatment preferences, those values being 
perfectly capable of assessment for legal validity, i.e. has the person withdrawn their 
decision to disclose those values;34 have they, since declaring their values conferred 
authority on an LPA to give or refuse consent in accordance with them35 or have they 
done anything that is clearly inconsistent with the notion of that or those values 
remaining critically important in shaping their life.36    
 
Unfortunately, it is less easy to argue that a value system that had been disclosed in a 
living will should pass the test for legal applicability.  Essentially, the Act requires 
persons to specify the treatment they would wish to refuse37 and for the removal of doubt 
they are invited to specify the circumstances under which that treatment would be 
refused,38 i.e. I would not want to be given antibiotics if I was in a persistent vegetative 
state.  This is to avoid the situation where a generally written decision was applied in 
unintended circumstances.39  The Act does not therefore seem to anticipate the situation 
where someone would wish another to interpret and then apply their values to see 
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whether a particular form of treatment would be refused in the circumstances arising for 
decision.  Although there is some scope to argue in the alternative, not just in relation to 
oral advance decisions but also, because doctors are invited to consider whether there are 
reasonable grounds for believing that circumstances exist which their patient had not 
anticipated at the time of making their advance decision and which would have affected 
their decision.40   
 
Might a particular or individual critical value constitute an advance decision?  Bear in 
mind that, with the exception of life-sustaining treatment,41 the Act does not establish any 
procedures or formalities that must be followed for an advance decision to be made.42  
Moreover, it anticipates that decisions will have been made by persons who are not 
medical professionals with the consequence that lay language and terminology may have 
been used to express a decision which must be interpreted and then applied to the facts of 
the situation.43  In taking these factors into account the MCA foresees the problem that 
designated persons are likely to place different interpretations on the information they 
receive and therefore in cases of doubt the court has jurisdiction to make a declaration as 
to whether an advance decision exists44 and if it does whether it is also either or both 
valid45 and applicable.46  So now consider a person who claims to have a critical interest 
in departing from this world with the same limbs and organs they were born with.  Their 
statement was evidenced by a previous medical decision in which they refused to consent 
to have their gangrenous foot amputated against medical advice preferring instead to 
continue with more conventional forms of therapy which was in fact successful.  Is it 
reasonable to conclude from this statement and the evidence given in support of it that 
this person has made an advance decision to refuse to consent at any time in the future to 
receive a donor kidney, for example?  Certainly, case law suggests that the use of lay 
terms is permissible provided it does not lead to any ambiguity about the identity of the 
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treatment that is being refused.47  Consequently, the court has held that if a patient makes 
a valid advance directive stating that they are not to be resuscitated if they are found in an 
unconscious state following an attempt to commit suicide then the directive must be 
respected.48  By contrast a suicide note written by a capable person that does not specify a 
treatment that should not be given in the event of a suicide attempt cannot be an advance 
decision.  Although more recently a doctor who believed that his patient, Kerrie 
Wolltorton, had made a valid and applicable advance decision to be allowed to die, i.e. no 
intervention, refused to take any action to save her life and therefore respected her 
decision to commit suicide.49  This was despite the fact that after having taken a noxious 
substance she rang the emergency services for assistance.50  But let us take this example a 
step further and say that legislation has been passed, in accordance with the democratic 
will, to the effect that all persons should be presumed to consent to donate their organs on 
their death.  Is it clear that their critical interest in being maintained as nature intended 
would constitute an advance decision to register their intention to opt out of the proposed 
scheme?    
 
Alternatively, a person might take great pride in being a member of their local 
community and this is demonstrated by generously donating their time and energy to 
helping out the old folk with shopping, transporting them to the local hospital for 
appointments whenever the need arises and then organising events at the local 
community centre that will appeal to the aged and that they hope will make their lives 
more pleasant and enjoyable.  So there is ample evidence to suggest that this person is a 
strong communitarian who takes their civic duties very seriously, particularly with regard 
to the elderly.  Now whilst it is clear that persons cannot use advance directives to request 
treatment in their own best interests51 could this critical interest be construed as an 
                                                 
47
 W Healthcare NHS Trust v H [2004] EWCA Civ 1324; Jones, Richard, Mental Capacity Act Manual, 
2008, Third Edition, Sweet and Maxwell, p.96, para.1-217 
48
 Ibid; Ibid, p.90, para.1-211;  
49
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/England/Norfolk/8284728.stm     
50
 Ibid    
51
 R (On the Application of Oliver Leslie Burke) v The General Medical Council [2005] EWCA Civ 1003 
CA; Jones, Richard, Mental Capacity Act Manual, 2008, Third Edition, Sweet and Maxwell, p.95, para.1-
216 
 308
advance decision, on the part of the patient, to consent to taking part in a clinical trial, for 
example, for a new drug for Alzheimer’s disease?52 
 
However, the more likely response is that neither a value system nor any of its individual 
component parts would be regarded as an advance decision.  This is because a value 
system provides evidence of a patient’s wishes but its form means that the evidence is 
unclear or indecisive of them.  The strict standards imposed by legal validity and 
applicability appear to be aimed at avoiding the problem of an advance decision being 
applied in unintended circumstances.53     
 
Best Interests 
Could a value system be used by a medical professional to determine what should happen 
in the actual best interests of a patient when they are no longer capable of deciding the 
matter contemporaneously?54  Now a person who discloses their values in a living will 
has a right to inviolability and displays a critical interest in doctors prioritising precedent 
autonomy over their current wishes when making decisions and acting in their best 
interests.  Let us now focus on the weight a doctor is legally required to give such a 
statement in determining what is in a patient’s best interests. 
 
Best Interests takes Subjective Factors into Consideration   
Only one course of action can be in the best interests of a mentally incapacitated 
patient.55  At stage one of any treatment decision a doctor is given responsibility and 
authority to decide what form of treatment is necessary and appropriate to a patient’s 
condition.56  What though should doctors have in mind when exercising their 
discretionary powers to make a judgment on behalf of an incompetent patient?  Well in 
recent years there has been a general improvement in the education of the public through 
a media who disseminate information about advances in medicine as well as the ethical 
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and legal dilemmas those advances produce.57  As a result the public are aware that the 
decisions doctors make in the use of medical knowledge can make a vast difference to 
their lives and that those decisions increasingly involve value choices.58  So a doctor 
should be thinking about how the unprecedented expansion of medical technological 
capability has expanded enormously the range and complexity of clinical and policy 
decisions in health care.59  Therefore, it would seem relevant for a health professional to 
think carefully about the entry of economic considerations as primary forces in individual 
and policy decisions regarding health and medical care.60  Only here we must bear in 
mind that the incompetent have no opportunity to research their own health problems or 
to obtain a second opinion or just to place themselves in a position to ask their medical 
adviser informed questions about their health and future prospects as well as about 
alternative forms of treatment (Bolam) or of making a comparison between treatments 
and their respective advantages and disadvantages.61 
 
Consequently, if the shift in the locus of decision-making from paternalism to autonomy 
is to be recognised in relation to formerly competent patients then the test of best interests 
must be capable of taking into consideration and giving appropriate weight to those 
subjective factors the patient would themselves have considered when a doctor sets out to 
determine whether the treatment they propose to administer is in the actual best interests 
of the patient.62  This level of consideration is necessary if we are to establish equality in 
the interests of competent and formerly competent patients alike to refuse medical 
intervention because they would prefer instead to be maintained inviolate, if only for the 
period that was necessary to obtain a second opinion.63   
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Best interests should therefore invite a doctor to consider whether the treatment they 
propose to administer is in the medical best interests of the patient as well as in the actual 
rather than the overall best interests of the patient all things considered. 
 
Best Interests not Substituted Judgment 
The substituted judgment principle applies in situations where no advance directive exists 
with clear and convincing instructions about the decision at hand but a surrogate 
decision-maker has sufficient relevant knowledge of the patient and/or of their values to 
attempt to make a judgment about what the patient would have wanted in the 
circumstances if competent to decide.64   Therefore, a values statement brings forward the 
possibility that a doctor could make a substituted judgment on behalf of the patient and 
therefore autonomy not paternalism would be the prevailing ethical consideration.   
 
However, in accordance with the common law the propriety of a medical treatment or 
procedure to be administered to an incompetent adult was to be judged by reference to 
what is in the patient’s best interests and not therefore by the application of a substituted 
judgment.65  In the case of Re T Lord Donaldson M.R. commented that whilst next of kin 
have no legal right to consent or to refuse to consent to a medical treatment it is a 
desirable practice for doctors to consult them when practicable.  This was because: 
 
“[C]ontact with the next of kind may reveal that the patient has made an 
anticipatory choice which, if clearly established and applicable in the 
circumstances – two major ifs – would bind the practitioner.  Consultation with the 
next of kin has a further advantage in that it may reveal information as to the 
personal circumstances of the patient and as to the choice which the patient might 
have made, if he or she had been in a position to make it.  Neither the personal 
circumstances of the patient nor a speculative answer to the question “what would 
the patient have chosen?” can bind the practitioner in his choice of whether or not 
to treat or how to treat or justify him in acting contrary to a clearly established 
anticipatory refusal to accept treatment but they are factors to be taken into 
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account by him in forming a clinical judgment as to what is in the best interests of 
the patient”.66 
 
In Bland Lord Goff made the following comments in relation to the test of substituted 
judgment: 
 
“I do not consider that any such test forms part of English law in relation to 
incompetent adults, on whose behalf nobody has power to give consent to medical 
treatment… Of course, consistent with the best interests test, anything relevant to 
the application of the test may be taken into account; and, if the personality of the 
patient is relevant to the application of the test (as it may be in cases where the 
various relevant factors have to be weighed), it may be taken into account”.67 
 
Today the Mental Capacity Act 2005 is the primary source of law governing the 
treatment of mentally incapacitated patients and it is clear from its provisions that the law 
continues to adopt the test of best interests in relation to incompetent adults who have not 
made an advance decision, ‘one of the key principles of the Act is that any act done, or 
any decision made on behalf of a person who lacks capacity must be done, or made, in 
that person’s best interests’.68  Acting in another’s best interests requires decision-makers 
to take into account all relevant factors that it would be reasonable for them to consider 
and not just those they think are important.  You may remember this was raised as a 
contention in relation to those appointed to accept or reject a medical treatment on behalf 
of an incompetent by way of a Lasting Power of Attorney.  Since the motivation to 
appoint someone in that capacity must surely be related to the ability of an Attorney to 
apply and when necessary prioritise knowledge attributable to the personality and 
character of the patient, i.e. to former values, beliefs and preferences, when making 
decisions on their behalf.    
 
Objective Best Interests 
As a surrogate decision-maker is not required to attempt to make the decision the 
incompetent patient would make, if they were competent to decide, the test of best 
interests is objective and therefore guides decision-makers to make the decision that a 
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reasonable person would make in the circumstances.69  A difficulty with an objective 
standard is in knowing how to access such knowledge.  This is important because we 
need to know or be assured about whether the required standard has been met.  A move 
away from traditional beliefs about God and God’s judgment towards a culture in which 
rights have a more significant role to play tends to encourage each one of us to believe 
that our values, beliefs and preferences are as reasonable as those of anybody else.  
However, the imbalance in knowledge between doctors and lay persons when coupled 
with the sort of professionalism engendered by Hippocrates, i.e. use your skill and 
judgment for the benefit of your patients, would also tend to encourage the notion that 
doctors are in a better position to know what is reasonable in the circumstances than 
anyone else.   
 
Therefore, it seems reasonable to question whether an objective test leads to decision-
makers infecting the decision-making process with their own values.  In Bland, for 
instance, Lord Goff referred to the possibility that a doctor may well be influenced by his 
own attitudes and values in reaching a decision about whether to withhold life-preserving 
medical treatment.70  However, in that case Lord Goff thought the possibility was more 
theoretical than real suspecting that it was unlikely to arise in practice ‘if only because the 
solution could be found in a change of medical practitioner’ whilst adding that it is 
enough to state that the best interests test is broad and flexible in the sense that room 
must be allowed for the exercise of judgment by the doctor …71  Of course it is open to 
question whether Lord Goff had in mind the fact that this inherent flexibility means that 
no two doctors need necessarily come to the same conclusion as to what is in someone’s 
best interests.  
 
Has the MCA improved upon the common law in this regard bearing in mind the 
particular personality of the patient is a factor that can be taken into account in deciding 
what is in someone’s best interests?  The problem is that best interests has not been fully 
                                                 
69
 Mental Capacity Act 2005 s.4; Code of Practice, Chapter Five, para.5.13; Grubb, A., Principles of 
Medical Law, 2004, Second Edition, Oxford University Press, para. 4.150; Brock, Dan W., Medical Ethics, 
2007, Blackwell Publishing, Chapter 7, p.138 
70
 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] 1 All ER 821 
71
 Ibid 
 313
defined in the Act simply because of the wide variation in the circumstances of people 
similarly situated, including never competent patients.72  Section four of the MCA 
therefore contains a checklist of common factors that must always be considered by a 
surrogate decision-maker when trying to work out what is in another’s best interests.73  
Decision-makers are in addition required to consider any other factors the patient would 
be likely to consider if they were able to do so.74  Furthermore, the Code of Practice 
appears anxious to dispel the notion that gaps in the legislative test provide some scope 
for decision-makers to allow their own particular biases or prejudices to dominate the 
decision-making process.  It confirms that decision-makers must take into account all 
relevant factors not just those that they think are important and in particular they must not 
act or make a decision based on what they would want to do if they were the person who 
lacked capacity.75 
 
Consequently, surrogates are concerned with the question, what is in the best interests of 
this particular patient but they are required to consider the matter objectively which 
means that they must consider information not from the point of view of an ordinary or 
normal fit person but from the assumed point of view of a person suffering the handicaps 
of a particular patient.76  As a value system should provide actual knowledge of the 
patient’s point of view about what a good life for them is based upon would best interests 
be subjectively appraised or objectively assessed in relation to such a patient?77 
 
Best Interests and the Past and Present Wishes and Feelings of the Patient 
I have previously argued that persons are the source of human values and therefore 
autonomy requires us to respect people as particular individuals whose identity is bound 
up with particular projects and traditions as a constraint against paternalism.78  The 
question then is whether special emphasis would be placed on a prior written statement of 
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a formerly competent patient. i.e. would it be treated as an indispensable source of 
information about the values, beliefs and preferences that should be used to inform a 
treatment decision based on the patient’s right to inviolability which they share with 
others. 
 
Well it is entirely feasible that section 4 of the MCA can accommodate a values based 
approach to decision-making if the practical effect of sub-section 6 is to ascertain 
whether a treatment that a doctor proposes to administer in an incompetent patient’s 
medical best interests is also in their actual best interests, after taking into consideration 
various critical and experiential interests.  Of course, then one might expect that 
particular weight should be accorded to the past wishes of a formerly competent patient.79     
 
Indeed first impressions suggest that the preferences of a former competent patient are 
taken very seriously as even when a patient has requested a specific treatment, which is 
generally thought to be relevant at stage one of a treatment decision, decision-maker’s are 
urged to give serious consideration to such requests.80  This requirement is however 
qualified by the fact that a doctor would not be bound to follow such a request if they 
considered that the specific treatment would be clinically unnecessary or was not 
appropriate to their condition and so could not be in their best interests.81  Consequently, 
the right of a medical professional to determine, in accordance with the Bolam principle, 
what form of treatment is in the best interests of any particular patient is preserved.82   
 
In determining whether what is proposed is in the actual best interests of the patient 
decision-makers are reminded that everybody’s values and beliefs influence the decisions 
they make and may become especially important later on in their lives when progressive 
illness, such as dementia, denies them the chance to make decisions in accordance with 
them due to a lack of decision-making capacity.  With that thought in mind the Code of 
Practice acknowledges that some people will choose to set out their values while they still 
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have capacity to do so.83  Decision-makers are therefore advised to consider written 
statements carefully84 out of recognition for the fact that persons may have held strong 
views in the past that are relevant to their future care.85 
 
However, the prospects of a formerly competent patient continuing to exert influence 
over their bodies and life plans through a values statement are, to coin Lord Goff’s 
phrase, more theoretical than real.  As although the character and personality of the 
patient, which is expressed through their wishes and feeling, is made a very relevant 
factor in ascertaining best interests,86 the Act fails to adequately distinguish between the 
force of a person’s past and present wishes and therefore to the weight that should be 
accorded to each.87      
 
Accordingly, the current wishes and feelings or emotional responses of an incompetent 
but conscious patient, i.e. someone with dementia, which are experientially though not 
critically valid, may properly be regarded by a decision-maker as being objectively 
relevant, perhaps more so because they are the current wishes of the patient, to a best 
interests decision-making process.  In which case priority will have been accorded to 
protecting the patient’s current preferences and interests even though these may be 
uninformed as well as unstable and beneficence will be in conflict with autonomy.   
Should precedent autonomy be an illusory concept in relation to incompetent but 
conscious patients?  This is what Ronald Dworkin has to say: 
 
“Suppose a patient is incompetent in the general, overall sense but that years ago, 
when perfectly competent, he executed a living will providing for what he plainly 
does not want now.  Suppose, for example, that years ago, when fully competent, 
[the patient] had executed a formal document directing that if [they] should 
develop Alzheimer’s disease, [they] should not receive treatment for any other 
serious, life-threatening disease [they] might contract.  Or even that in that event 
[they] should be killed as soon and as painlessly as possible.  If [they] had 
expressed any of those wishes when [they were]  competent, would autonomy then 
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require that they be respected now by those in charge of [their] care, even though 
[they] seem perfectly happy …?  
 
If we had accepted the evidentiary view of autonomy, we would find the case for 
respecting [their] past directions very weak.  People are not the best judges of what 
their own best interests would be under circumstances they have never encountered 
and in which their preferences and desires may drastically have changed.  But if we 
accept the integrity view, we will be drawn to the view that [their] past wishes must 
be respected.  A competent person making a living will providing for his treatment 
if he becomes demented is making exactly the kind of judgment that autonomy, on 
the integrity view, most respects:  a judgment about the overall shape of the kind of 
life he wants to have led.  
 
This conclusion is troubling, however, even shocking, and someone might want to 
resist it by insisting that the right to autonomy is necessarily contemporary: that a 
person’s right to autonomy is only a right that his present decisions, not past ones 
that he has since disowned, be respected.  Certainly this is the normal force of 
recognising autonomy.   Suppose that a Jehovah’s Witness has signed a formal 
document stipulating that he is not to receive blood transfusions even if out of 
weakness of will he requests one when he would otherwise die.  He wants, like 
Ulysses, to be tied to the mast of his faith.  But when the moment comes, and he 
needs a transfusion, he pleads for it.  We would not think ourselves required out of 
respect for his autonomy, to disregard his contemporary plea.  
 
We can interpret that example in different ways, though, and the difference is 
crucial for our present problem.  We might say, first, that the Witness’s later plea 
countermanded his original decision because it expressed a more contemporary 
desire.  That presumes that it is only right to defer to past decisions when we have 
reason to believe that the agent still wishes what he wanted then.  On that view, 
precedent autonomy is an illusion: we treat a person’s past decision as important 
only because it is normally evidence of his present wishes, and we disregard it 
entirely when we know that it is not.  On the other hand, we might say that the 
Witness’s later plea countermanded his original decision because it was a fresh 
exercise of his autonomy, and that disregarding it would be treating him as no 
longer in charge of his own life.  The difference between these two views about the 
force of precedent autonomy is crucial when someone changes his mind after he 
has become incompetent, that is, when the conditions of autonomy no longer hold.  
Suppose that the same accident that made a transfusion medically necessary for the 
Witness also deranged him, and that while still plainly deranged he demands the 
transfusion.  On the first view, we would not violate his autonomy by administering 
it, but on the second we would.  
 
Which of the two views about the force of past decisions is more persuasive?  
Suppose we were confident that the deranged Witness, were he to receive the 
transfusion and live, would become competent again and be appalled at having had 
a treatment he believed worse for him than dying.  In those circumstances, I 
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believe, we would violate his autonomy by giving him the transfusion.  That argues 
for the second view about the force of past decisions, the view that endorses 
precedent autonomy as genuine.  We refuse to give the deranged Witness a 
transfusion not because we think he really continues to want what he wanted 
before, this is not like a case in which someone who objects to a given treatment is 
unconscious when he needs it, but because he lacks the necessary capacity for a 
fresh exercise of autonomy.  His former decision remains in force because no new 
decision by a person capable of autonomy has annulled it. 
 
What makes the difference, when we are deciding whether to honour someone’s 
plea even though it contradicts his past deep convictions, is whether he is now 
competent to make a decision of that character, not whether he will regret making 
it later. 
 
The argument has very troubling consequences however…  Should we really deny a 
person [who is happy] … routine medical care needed to keep [them] alive?  Could 
we ever conceivably kill [them]?  We might consider it morally unforgivable not to 
try to save the life of someone who plainly enjoys [their] life, no matter how 
demented [they are], and we might think it beyond imagining that we should 
actually kill [them].  We might hate living in a community whose officials might 
make or license either of those decisions.  We might have other good reasons for 
treating [a patient as they now wish], rather than as, [they once asked].  But still, 
that violates rather than respects [their] autonomy”.88 
 
Must we uphold the distinction between critical and experiential interests to understand 
our convictions about how people should be treated at the end of life?   A commitment to 
the integrity view of autonomy suggests that the patient’s loss of decision-making 
capacity should not be used as an excuse for overriding what is an essential element of 
the right to autonomy, i.e. to refuse a medical treatment or procedure that a doctor 
considers is in their best medical interests, even when that treatment is life preserving.89   
 
However, Dworkin has noted that in the case of Bland several members of the House of 
Lords assumed that only experiential interests mattered in this context.90  His view is that 
it would be easy to decide what was in someone’s best interests if we were only 
concerned with a person’s experiential interests such as the principles of medical futility 
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and intolerability tend to encourage.91  On the other hand when the case was considered 
by the Court of Appeal Lord Justice Hoffmann, who was influenced by the thoughts of 
Dworkin, considered that as dignity92 is an aspect of autonomy priority should be 
accorded to a person’s critical interests instead.   
 
Consequently, Hoffmann LJ was of the mind that persons should be able to determine 
how the final chapter of their life is played out and would presumably condone the use of 
a values statement to restrict how we are treated if incompetent.93  By contrast Lord Goff 
acknowledged why it is important that the test of best interests should comprise of 
something more than purely professional appraisal of a person’s medical welfare, as to 
confine the test in this way, he said, ‘would be inconsistent with the primacy that is 
accorded to the principle of self-determination and would ‘downgrade the status of the 
incompetent person by placing a lesser value on [their] intrinsic worth and vitality’ but 
then failed to be tied to the mast of his own convictions.94 
 
So if the interests that were critical to the shape of a person’s life, when viewed as a 
whole, should not be sacrificed later, simply because the patient is incompetent and 
unable to express a view, does the MCA improve upon the focus of the common law in 
relation to decisions about withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment.95 
 
First things first and the MCA maintains respect for the sanctity of life principle as the 
fundamental rule is that anyone who is deciding whether or not life-sustaining treatment 
is in the best interests of someone who lacks capacity to consent or to refuse such 
treatment must not be motivated by a desire to bring about the person’s death.96  Whether 
a treatment is in fact life-sustaining depends not only on the type of treatment that is 
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being considered but also on the particular circumstances in which it is being 
prescribed.97  So whereas antibiotics can be used to treat non life-threatening conditions 
in some circumstances, such as when someone is in PVS or has MRSA, administering 
antibiotics may be life-sustaining.98  So clearly at the first stage of a best interests 
decision-making process medical professional opinion, formed in accordance with the 
standard proposed in Bolam, will  inform a decision as to whether a particular  treatment 
is life-sustaining taking the circumstances into consideration.99 
 
As that same rule cannot be interpreted to mean that doctors are under an obligation to 
provide, or to continue to provide, life-sustaining treatment where that treatment is not in 
the best interests of the person, even where the person’s death is foreseen, the MCA can 
be seen to uphold the acts and omissions doctrine thus maintaining a qualified sanctity 
position.  Consequently, the MCA incorporates the decisions in Bland and Burke.100  As I 
mentioned earlier on in this chapter legislators were aware that persons might be tempted 
to exercise their autonomy by making a written statement requesting a specific form of 
treatment.  However, such a statement will merely be taken into account in deciding what 
is in a person’s best interests as a doctor must consider all relevant circumstances prior to 
exercising judgment.101  The prior written statement of a patient requesting a specific 
form of treatment will therefore be considered alongside all other relevant factors in 
deciding whether to provide or to continue to provide life-sustaining treatment.102 
 
At the second stage of a treatment decision the presumption in favour of life has been 
maintained as all reasonable steps which are in the person’s best interests should be taken 
to prolong their life.  Clearly a doctor’s obligation of non-maleficence is upheld by the 
MCA.  So on what basis can the presumption be rebutted?  Well according to the 2005 
Act the person making a best interests determination must consider and weigh in the 
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balance all those relevant circumstances103 of which they are aware104 and which it would 
be reasonable to regard as relevant.105  In this regard a doctor must consider those factors 
in the welfare checklist, including the past and present wishes and feelings of the patient 
and in particular any relevant written statement that was made by them when they had 
capacity.106  These provisions serve to remind surrogate decision-makers that the 
character and personality of the patient should be regarded by them as being relevant to a 
best interests determination.  The problem, as previously stated, is that the MCA fails to 
provide relevant insight as to why a person’s past wishes may be relevant to their present 
situation and therefore omits to state which particular characteristics decision-makers 
should attribute the greatest amount of significance to in deciding.  Essentially the Act 
fails to distinguish adequately enough between the different considerations that might 
apply in respect of formerly and never competent persons.  It is also possible that 
legislators, through the concept of advance decisions, have attempted to influence the 
activities and evaluative experience of valuers who subscribe to the integrity view of 
autonomy and therefore wish to have what happens to them at the end of life determined 
by their critical interests.   However, in the absence of a legally valid and applicable 
advance decision the best interests principle will apply and the Act enshrines a privilege 
that doctors exercise to decide which of the various circumstances they are aware of it 
would be most reasonable to regard as relevant.  If we think back to the last chapter and 
to the benchmarks Beauchamp and Childress proposed to check the adequacy of any 
theory it is possible to observe that the MCA might score quite highly in respect of 
practicability and output power.  However, the conditions that would tend to provide 
coherence, clarity and certainty in the law relating to formerly competent patients are 
absent.  Thus there is a danger that doctors, albeit somewhat understandably, will be 
more likely to protect their patients medical welfare rather than their right to self-
determination and in this regard the Code of Practice states that: 
 
“There will be a limited number of cases where treatment is futile, overly 
burdensome to the patient or where there is no prospect of recovery.  In 
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circumstances such as these, it may be that an assessment of best interests leads to 
the conclusion that it would be in the best interests of the patient to withdraw or 
withhold life-sustaining treatment, even if this may result in the person’s death.  
The decision-maker must make a decision based on the best interests of the person 
who lacks capacity.  They must not be motivated by a desire to bring about the 
person’s death for whatever reason, even if this is from a sense of compassion”.107 
 
Consequently, the MCA, like the House of Lords in Bland, assumes that only experiential 
interests matter which leads me to conclude that in relation to an advance statement of 
values, as opposed to an advance treatment decision, there is reason to suppose that 
beneficence can be in conflict with autonomy when a doctor seeks to determine whether 
life-sustaining treatment should be withheld or withdrawn in the patient’s best interests. 
 
Assessing Capacity 
The right to self-determination flows from legal capacity and so the best interests 
principle will not apply to someone who has sufficient capacity to make a treatment 
decision for themselves.108  Capacity assessments are therefore important events because 
a patient either retains or loses the right to make decisions about treatment for themselves 
and in accordance with their own values, beliefs and preferences or critical and 
experiential interests.    
 
As the primacy of autonomy has been established in law it is therefore reasonable to 
suggest that a patient’s values and value system should be most relevant to this evaluative 
process.  Moreover, the potential conflict between capacity and values suggests the need 
to underpin capacity assessments with coherence theory.  However, the MCA does not 
establish a formal procedure for the assessment of capacity and no statutory form 
confirming incapacity needs to be completed.  Furthermore, the person who is required to 
assess another’s capacity will be a member of the medical profession upon whom the 
MCA also confers authority to make decisions and act in the best interests of their 
mentally incapacitated patients.  This state of affairs does lead to the obvious concern that 
a doctor may say that a patient is competent to give consent to treatment when the patient 
is compliant with medical expert opinion and conversely to claim that the patient is not 
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competent to decide if they raise objections or refuse a necessary and appropriate 
treatment or procedure.  In this regard the Act requires decision-makers to take 
reasonable steps to determine whether a person lacks capacity to decide109 but provided 
an assessor reasonably believes110 the person lacks capacity to make the decision in 
question,111 and they act in their best interests,112 they will not incur liability in relation to 
that act.113  Decision-makers may however be held to account for their decisions.   
Guidance contained within the Code of Practice confirms that anyone who believes that a 
person lacks capacity should be able to prove their case114 by giving reasons and 
providing objective evidence in support of their belief.115  Therefore a decision to restrict 
autonomy requires a clear and convincing assessment that a patient’s decision regarding 
care was non-autonomous and could result in unintended, irreparable harm to them.116 
 
Harm is difficult to define in this context because what is deemed harmful varies from 
one person and set of circumstances to another.  Persons also differ in estimating the 
likely harm that will ensue from their decisions and actions.  However, if autonomy not 
harm is the dominant consideration then it is important that potential decision-makers 
should have at the forefront of their mind the patient’s right to refuse necessary and 
appropriate treatment, including life-preserving treatment.  Contrarily, if harm were the 
dominant principle then what is in one’s medical best interests would become the 
overriding consideration which an outcome based test for capacity would capture.  
 
As the MCA adopts a functional test for capacity117 assessors will be more concerned 
with whether an impairment or disturbance of the mind or brain does in fact prevent a 
patient from making a decision.118  A person is unable to make a decision for themselves 
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if they are unable to understand the information that is relevant to a treatment decision;119 
to retain it;120 to use it or weigh it as part of the process of making the decision;121 or to 
communicate their decision.122  Accordingly, someone can be deemed non-autonomous 
when an impairment of the mind or brain leads to a problem with mental functioning. 
What information is relevant and must be understood by the patient so that they can apply 
it to their situation prior to registering a choice?  The law of consent determines that 
doctors are required to inform patients as to the nature and purpose of a medical 
treatment or procedure so that they know what will happen to them if the treatment is 
provided and of what the likely consequences will be if treatment is not provided in order 
to escape liability for a battery.123  To avoid liability in negligence a doctor must also 
inform their patient of the inherent risks and side effects of a treatment.124  Accordingly, 
the distinction between battery and negligence is somewhat artificial when information 
about risks will be relevant to the way in which a patient exercises their right to decide 
whether to accept or reject a medical treatment and be maintained inviolate.  This 
possibly explains why the House of Lords have more recently determined that no gap 
should exist between beneficence and autonomy when disclosing information about the 
risks of treatment, i.e. what is custom and practice within the medical profession should 
no longer be used to justify what the patient should be told.125  The scope of the doctor’s 
duty should instead be more closely equated with the patient’s need for information and 
the right to decide upon its materiality.126  Consequently, knowledge of the patient and 
their values should mark the designated starting point for a discussion on capacity if we 
genuinely believe that the right to bodily inviolability is so fundamental that a decision to 
restrict autonomy requires a clear and convincing assessment that a decision was non-
autonomous and could result in them suffering unintended, irreparable harm.  This is 
because an absence of such knowledge might leave doctors unsure of which goal, 
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autonomy or protection, to pursue when assessing whether the patient is competent to 
decide.  Moreover, different doctors might come to different conclusions about the 
patient’s ability to decide. 
 
Therefore, assessing capacity in relation to subjective rather than objective factors, i.e. in 
accordance with a values statement, has the potential to introduce coherence in an area of 
law where currently there is none.  The result should be that a doctor may no longer be 
free to say that a patient is competent to give consent to treatment merely because the 
patient is compliant with medical expert opinion and conversely to claim that the patient 
is not competent to decide if they raise objections or refuse a necessary and appropriate 
treatment or procedure.  Moreover, the practicable steps that are taken to help someone to 
make a decision would be governed by the subjective standards set by the patient rather 
than their doctor.127 
 
So will the provisions of the MCA safeguard patients against an incorrect assessment 
of decision-making capacity when someone has made their wishes known in a living 
will?  Is it possible for decision-making capacity to be assessed in accordance with a 
person’s value system? Does a value system present an assessor with an open invitation 
to make a finding of incompetence? 
Clearly the person who has compiled and then disclosed their value system wishes to 
ensure that future decisions are rendered coherent with the values, beliefs and preferences 
that were responsible for their past choices.  So on the assumption that a patient would 
wish to share this information with a medical professional when consulting with them a 
value system would appear to have two obvious functions; it would act as an aide-
memoire for the patient and it would provide the treating doctor with an opportunity to 
consider how best to respect the patient’s right to self-determination. 
 
Might a person’s value system trigger an assessment for decision-making capacity or 
provide grounds for a doctor to reasonably believe that the person does lack capacity to 
make the decision in hand?  The evidence is to an extent equivocal.  Consider the case of 
an elderly chronic schizophrenic who was resident at the Broadmoor high security 
hospital.  He had a gangrenous foot and medical professional opinion was that without 
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amputation he may die and the risk of this was estimated to be in the region of eighty five 
per cent.128  The fact that he might die without an amputation was accepted the problem 
was that he refused to accept medical opinion that his foot should be amputated because 
he held certain beliefs.  These were that God did not want him to have an amputation and 
that he was a great and gifted doctor with an ability to cure damaged limbs hence he  
preferred to accept a more conventional form of medical treatment, i.e. antibiotics.129  
Therefore, this person has a critical interest in departing from this world with the same 
limbs and organs that he was born with.  Is there a danger, in these circumstances, that a 
doctor might be inclined or tempted to work backwards and assume from a person’s 
somewhat irrational beliefs that they have an impairment or disturbance of the mind or 
brain and that this prevents them from exercising their autonomy when making a 
decision?      
 
The synopsis above is taken from the case of Re C and in that case the court determined 
that C was competent to refuse to have an amputation.130  This case gave rise to an 
important principle of incapacity law; that even when a patient is suffering from a mental 
disorder or disability there is still a presumption of competence.131  The position at 
common law is that a competent patient has a right to accept or reject a medical treatment 
based upon reasons that are rational, irrational, unknown or even non-existent.132  
Provisions of the MCA are compatible with this view; it is a principle of the MCA that a 
person must be assumed to have capacity unless it is established that they lack 
capacity.133  It is also a principle of that Act that a person should not be treated as unable 
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to make a decision merely because they make an unwise decision.134  The sole reason for 
restricting autonomy is that an impairment or disturbance in the patient’s mental 
functioning prevents them from being able to understand, retain and weigh or use 
treatment information to make a decision which they can communicate.135  Assessment of 
legal capacity to consent or to refuse treatment cannot therefore rest on or be established 
merely upon a person’s age136 or status137 or an aspect of their behaviour which might 
lead others to make unjustified assumptions about their capacity to decide.138  And as the 
Code of Practice contains several references to the effect that decision-makers should be 
aware that everybody has their own values, beliefs, preferences and attitudes139 one might 
expect that an assessor should not make unjustified assumptions about a person’s 
capacity to decide based on the contents of their value system also even though it does 
not stipulate this as such.   
 
Thus a religious belief that would lead a patient to refuse life preserving medical 
treatment that would restore them to full health does not indicate that they lack the 
capacity to make that decision however irrational their decision may appear to others.140  
In relation to the law’s position on religious beliefs Andrew Grubb explains that: 
 
“There are two explanations of the law’s position here.  First, the law defers to 
religiously based decisions made by adults, though not those made by children, as 
a matter of social tolerance.  Providing the person understands what is entailed in 
their decision, there is no reason for the law to deprive the individual of decision-
making power.  It would be an act of unjustified state interference to override 
decisions made on religious grounds.  Secondly, and perhaps of more general 
importance for medical law, such decisions do not stem from any mental disability 
or mental malfunctioning on the part of the patient.  Apart from situations where 
the patient is unable to communicate his decision, a necessary condition for 
depriving an individual of decision-making power, and justifying state intervention 
in his ‘best interests’, is that the patient is suffering from a mental malfunctioning 
having a pathological or psychological etiology.  It is the impairment or 
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disturbance in the patient’s mental ability to understand which potentially renders 
him, in law, incompetent”.141 
 
Consequently, an irrational belief, value or preference which would affect or influence a 
patient’s judgment about medical treatment can lead to a finding of incompetence if it is 
also possible to infer from it that the patient is suffering from a mental disability.142  And 
there have been circumstances in which the irrationality of the patient’s decision has led 
to the conclusion that a patient lacks the capacity to make that particular treatment 
decision.143  In this context the case of Re MB is instructive.  The case concerned a young 
pregnant woman who was advised to have a Caesarean operation for the safe delivery of 
her child.144  This was because the baby was in a breech position and there was a risk that 
the baby, though not herself, would be seriously injured, a fifty per cent likelihood, if 
delivered conventionally.145  She consented to the operation but because of a needle 
phobia she refused to consent to the anaesthesia.146  Initially she agreed to inhalation 
anaesthesia but subsequently withdrew her consent when she saw the mask.147  The 
hospital therefore sought a declaration from the court that it would be lawful to 
operate.148  At first instance the declaration was granted on the basis that the needle 
phobia had rendered the patient temporarily incompetent to decide but MB appealed 
against the decision.149  This was dismissed in the Court of Appeal and the decision of the 
first instance judge was upheld.   
 
Lady Justice Butler-Sloss said that a person who has capacity to decide can, for rational 
or irrational reasons or for no reason at all, choose to refuse medical intervention even 
where to do so will lead to their death or that of their child.150  She defined an irrational 
decision in that case as one that is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or accepted moral 
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standards that no sensible person who had applied their mind to the question to be 
decided could have arrived at it. 151 
 
Must decisions or values be moral and rational?  To respect a person as an autonomous 
being is to regard them as forming part of the moral community in which members 
typically do not intend, by their decisions and actions, to cause harm to fellow members 
of that community.  Consequently, in cases where the interests of an individual clash or  
conflict with those of the society in which they are situated the law has to balance the 
point or role of autonomy against the utility152  or its consequences for the wider 
community.   In this way the law can be seen to take a paternalistic attitude towards what 
is good and bad for one in the interests of maintaining social harmony.  Thus a value 
system should have some sort of moral integrity in order for it to command respect from 
others as a matter of public policy.  If we relate these ideas to the judgments in Re C and 
Re MB it is apparent that in each case there was no apparent conflict between the role of 
autonomy and the interests of any other legally recognised person; hence a pregnant 
woman can refuse a treatment that might lead to the death of their child.   
 
To respect a person as an autonomous being means that it is also reasonable to presume 
that they can reason and be rational always accepting that each person is a unique 
individual, on the basis that created co-creators are all made to be just that little bit 
different, with a life that has personal value.153  When these ethical considerations are 
translated into laws we see that a presumption operates in favour of decision-making 
capacity154 that should not be undermined by the fact that someone makes an unwise 
decision.155  It is consistent with that notion that a test for decision-making capacity 
should focus on whether or not a person suffers from some form of cognitive impairment 
or disturbance that prevents them from being able to reason and to be rational because 
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this might affect their ability to make a decision in conformity with or that is expressive 
of their own personality or constitution.156   
 
Accordingly, a skewed and indefensible view of the world is not sufficient to render 
someone incompetent in law to make a decision unless it results from mental 
malfunctioning.157   So even if an irrational decision or value triggers an assessment of 
decision-making capacity the law requires an assessor to consider whether it is 
attributable to the personality and character of the patient or to something pathological, 
i.e. a mental illness, or psychological, i.e. a fear or phobia, that acted on the mind so as to 
paralyse the will and thus destroy the capacity to make a decision.158 
 
So it would not be proper to find someone incompetent merely because their decision or 
values appear irrational to others unless it results from an inference that the patient is also 
suffering from a mental disability.159  Consequently, if the seeds of the decision or value 
are the product of distorted or deluded perceptions that resulted from some sort of organic 
mental malfunctioning, i.e. were based on a misperception of reality or resulted from 
compulsive or driven behaviour or was induced by an external factor, i.e. pain, shock, 
medication, fatigue or general confusion, there may be reason to question whether these 
factors have affected someone’ ability to understand, retain and to use and weigh 
information that is relevant to making a fully autonomous decision or choice.160   
 
The difficulty for an assessor lies in determining whether an irrational value or decision 
results from any such inability.  Thus it is essential for a person who wishes to be nailed 
to the mast of their own convictions to make sure that their value system functions in this 
way; that their considered judgments have been subjected to a form of reflective testing 
so that the end moral and non-moral values have been rendered coherent with what is 
valued having taken into consideration past conduct and reasoning.  In this way it should 
be possible for decision-making capacity to be assessed in accordance with the degree to 
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which a person’s wishes or preferences are coterminous with or are expressive of the 
particular personality or constitution of the individual valuer and decision-maker. 
 
Let us now return to the main event.  Will that value system safeguard the patient against 
an incorrect finding of incapacity?  What matters in this regard is that the patient’s ability 
to carry out the processes involved in making a decision should be assessed in the light of 
their own values and subjective standard of decision-making, i.e. is the patient able to 
understand, retain and use or weigh relevant treatment information to make a decision 
that is consistent with the facts and values of this case.    
 
Careful scrutiny of the Code of Practice leads me to believe that a statement of values 
could be used in this sense.  The obvious reason is that anyone assessing capacity must 
not assume that someone lacks capacity because they have a particular condition161 but 
must have proof that the condition affects their ability to make a decision when it needs 
to be made.162  Furthermore, assessors are advised to take certain practical steps when 
assessing capacity.163  There are a few of these that need not concern us now but it is 
particularly relevant that an assessor should be encouraged to make sure that they 
understand the nature and effect of the decision to be made themselves and in this regard 
the Code stipulates that they may need access to relevant documents and background 
information.164  Has the principle established in Chester v Afshar that the patient’s right 
to bodily inviolability determines that no gap should exist between beneficence and 
autonomy in relation to decisions concerning the life, health and welfare of patients 
become enshrined within the Act? 
 
In view of that consideration perhaps we should first consider whether at stage one of a 
treatment decision-making process a patient with a value system can be said to have pre-
empted the right of a medical professional to determine what constitutes necessary and 
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appropriate treatment given the patient’s medical condition.165  For instance, the Code of 
Practice states that providing relevant information is essential in all decision-making.  
Thereafter, it reads, ‘to make a choice about what they want for breakfast, people need to 
know what food is available’.166  In this context you may recall those references above to 
the dissemination of information by the media about medical advances which has led to a 
general improvement in public awareness of the ‘can do’ of medicine and correlatively 
that the decisions doctors make in the use of medical knowledge can make a vast 
difference to their lives and that those decisions increasingly involve value choices.167  It 
is also relevant to consider dictum in the case of Chester v Afshar which alludes to the 
doctor’s duty to not only inform patients about risks but to answer their questions 
candidly and to respect their rights, including (where they so choose) to postpone medical 
procedures and to go elsewhere for treatment.168  These considerations are relevant when 
a patient has disclosed their value system in a living will as even if a doctor is not 
committed, as a matter of policy, by the patient’s wishes about treatment, he or she is 
being invited and has the necessary means at their disposal to consider and make 
transparent the various options for treatment that exist and which should be 
recommended in the patient’s medical best interests having reflected more specifically on 
the reasons that support their choice. 
 
However, it is part of a doctor’s duty to determine what necessary and appropriate 
medical treatment is and to offer to treat a patient in their medical best interests in the 
knowledge that patients have a legal right to accept or reject a medical treatment in 
accordance with their own values, beliefs and preferences.  So in relation to making an 
assessment of decision-making capacity the concern at the second stage of a treatment 
decision-making process is the degree to which the information the patient is required to 
understand would be driven by the value system of the patient.169  And in this context it 
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would seem to be of the utmost importance to the patient that their capacity to decide, 
about whether to accept or to refuse treatment, and to thereby maintain bodily integrity, 
should be measured against their ability to make decisions in accordance with their pre-
existing values, beliefs and preferences.    
 
In this regard a problem for the law generally but in particular that related to incapacity is 
that if respect for self-determination not protection is the primary consideration then its 
requirements for decision-making capacity should not be sufficiently onerous as to 
exclude a majority of persons from the right to exercise their own free will about whether 
to accept or reject an offer of medical treatment.  However, the patient who has chosen to 
disclose their value system wishes to continue to live a life that is structured by their pre-
existing values.  So it is important for a patient with a values statement to be able to 
understand, retain and manipulate relevant treatment information in accordance with their 
former values.  In particular, this person does not want whatever seems experientially 
valid170at the time the decision needs to be made, induced perhaps by fear, uncertainty or 
happiness, to undermine the integrity with which self-defining decisions are made to 
accord with their critical interests as that would violate their autonomy.  Consequently, an 
assessor who focuses on the patient’s capacity to decide in conformity with their critical 
interests will be respecting their autonomy as well as making decisions and acting in their 
welfare interests. 
 
What Information must the Patient Understand? 
In this context it is important to note that the MCA is primarily concerned with whether 
someone is unable to make a treatment decision rather than with informed consent.171  
Naturally there will be overlapping considerations because the consent of a patient who 
has the capacity to decide must be real or informed.172  However, in cases where there is 
reason to doubt a doctor will, at least initially, be guided by statutory not common law 
provisions.    
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So in accordance with the provisions of the MCA a person is unable to make a decision 
themselves if they are unable to understand the information that is relevant to the decision 
they need to make.173  Relevant information includes that pertaining to the nature of the 
decision, the reason why the decision is needed, i.e. the nature and purpose of the medical 
treatment, and the reasonably foreseeable consequences of deciding one way or 
another174 or of making no decision at all, i.e. the inherent risks of treatment and of non-
treatment.175  That information should be repeated to cover each treatment in cases where 
various treatment options are open to be considered. 
 
Supplementary guidance within the Code of Practice confirms that whilst the Act cannot 
state exactly what information will be relevant in each case it is important that a person 
has access to all the information they need to make an informed decision.176  Where a 
choice of treatments exist information about each of them should be presented in a 
balanced way and it is appreciated that there will be instances in which the patient may 
need access to independent or specialist advice to help them to make a decision.177  It is 
equally important that persons are not given more information than they need as this 
might confuse them and so in some cases a simple broad explanation will be enough.178   
 
Of course imparting information regarding the nature and purpose of a medical treatment 
in broad terms takes into consideration the ability of the ordinary lay person to be able to 
compute more technical and detailed scientific data and/or knowledge.  Imagine the 
amount of detail that a doctor would have to convey in respect of chemotherapy, for 
example, if it were otherwise?  So as autonomy is the primary value in medical law it is 
practical to work backwards and to require medical professionals to disclose information 
pertaining to the risks and/or side-effects of a treatment or procedure.  As in theory once 
a patient is in possession of this information they are in a position to not only apply those 
facts about the risks of treatment to their values but to also personally evaluate or 
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estimate the likelihood of those risks arising in their particular case which is a factor that 
is likely to influence the way in which they exercise their choice.179   
 
In respect of the amount of information the patient should be given the MCA merely 
requires doctors to disclose information about those risks that are reasonably foreseeable.  
As the Act cannot state what information will be relevant to the patient’s decision it 
appears that doctors will instead determine what the patient should be told in accordance 
with the prudent doctor standard180 proposed in Sidaway.181  An objective standard is 
potentially problematic because the privilege to decide on the relevance or materiality of 
treatment information would be that of the doctor whereas the principal reason for 
imposing the higher prudent patient standard in Chester v Afshar was to promote the 
patient’s decision-making autonomy.182  Therefore, first appearances are that the MCA 
will fail to safeguard a patient who has disclosed their value system in a living will 
against an incorrect finding of incapacity.   
 
Nonetheless, Chester v Afshar alludes to the doctor’s duty to not only inform patients 
about risks, i.e. the information a doctor is required to voluntarily disclose by law, but to 
answer their questions candidly and to respect their rights, including (where they so 
choose) to postpone medical procedures and to go elsewhere for treatment.183  A similar 
point was made in Sidaway by Lord Diplock who stated that: 
 
“It may be that most patients, though not necessarily all, have a vague knowledge 
that there may be some risk in any form of medical treatment: but it is flying in the 
face of reality to assume that all patients from the highest to the lowest standard of 
education or intelligence are aware of the extent and nature of the risks which, 
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notwithstanding, the exercise of skill and care in carrying out the treatment, are 
inevitably involved in medical treatment of whatever kind it be but particularly 
surgical… 
 
But when if comes to warning about risks, the kind of training and experience that 
a judge will have undergone at the Bar makes it natural for him to say (correctly) it 
is my right to decide whether any particular thing is done to my body, and I want to 
be fully informed of any risks there may be involved of which I am not already 
aware from my general knowledge as a highly educated man of experience, so that 
I may form my own judgment as to whether to refuse the advised treatment or not. 
 
No doubt if the patient in fact manifested this attitude by means of questioning, the 
doctor would tell him whatever it was the patient wanted to know: but we are 
concerned here with volunteering unsought information about risks of the proposed 
treatment…”184 
 
Could a patient with a value system be said to have manifested such an attitude? 
 
Functional not Outcome Based Test 
A patient with a value system wishes to make decisions that are broadly coherent with 
their pre-existing values and choices.  Taking into consideration the standard for 
disclosure of risks is the right to autonomy necessarily contemporary in the sense that an 
assessor will be more concerned with present not past decisions? 
 
Perhaps the first point to make about a functional approach to capacity is the underlying 
expectation that a competent patient should be able to understand and retain treatment 
information so that it can be applied to their own situation, in particular its significance 
and potential effects with regard to their existing values, beliefs and preferences, in order 
that their decisions are (roughly)185 coherent186 with their pre-existing values and thus 
with their previous choices and convictions or to at least appreciate that their decision 
entails a departure from them.  Crucially a patient must demonstrate their continued 
ability to bring values and decisions into a state of coherence.  Therefore, it is essential 
that a value system is functional in this sense in that it must explain and justify treatment 
decisions, i.e. an independent third party must be able to understand and use the value 
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system in order to be able to ascertain whether the decision of the patient is consistent 
with the facts and values of the case as well as with their previous decisions.187 
 
As a doctor will determine whether or not a decision is autonomous it is especially 
important to the person who has disclosed their value system that the assessment should 
not rely on the subjectivity of the assessor, i.e. their impressions, intuitions or 
standards.188  Andrew Grubb explains why: 
 
“[C]aution must be exercised in applying the third stage of the … test [for 
capacity].  It is potentially an open invitation to make a finding of incompetence 
because the doctor (or court) finds the patient’s decision difficult to understand.  
This is not what the courts intend.  That a patient must have the ability to ‘weigh’ 
information does not mean that every incongruous decision is an incompetent one.  
The court is not entitled simply to re-weigh the factors relevant to the patient’s 
decision and because it would come to a different decision, treat the patient as 
incompetent.  It is the patient’s ability to weigh, rather than the actual weight given 
to particular factors, which is at the core of the third stage of the test.  A patient 
may have the ability to weigh the information but, for reasons particular to him, 
reach a decision that the doctor (or court) would not.  That is the patient’s choice 
and the decision may be based upon the patient’s own perception of the world or 
values providing it is not the product of distorted or deluded perceptions stemming 
from mental malfunctioning, in particular the very mental disorder for which 
treatment is needed.  To do otherwise, would be to introduce a test of 
unreasonableness or irrationality which the courts have rejected”.189 
 
A functional based test for capacity is then less concerned with the outcome of the 
deliberative process and thus with whether the patient has made a wise or actually 
competent choice.190  From this I conclude that a functional approach to decision-making 
capacity is somewhat deceptive because it suggests that as patients are not expected to 
demonstrate their ability to arrive at a choice that is actually wise or competent, when 
assessed in the light of their values, beliefs and preferences, that an assessor, who is in 
possession of their patient’s value system, should not be unduly concerned with the 
outcome of a deliberative process and therefore with whether the patient has actually 
understood treatment information.   However, the fact that patients must demonstrate 
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understanding through an ability to apply facts to values and to make a decision that is in 
some way coherent with their past decisions and choices means that patients must 
actually be able to understand, retain and use or weigh the information that is relevant to 
their decision.191   
 
There is then a difference between unwise decisions which a person has the right to 
make,192 which is so obviously important to preserving the patient’s right to make a 
decision that goes against expert medical opinion,193 and decisions based on a lack of 
understanding of risks or inability to weigh up the information about a decision.194  
Accordingly, information about decisions the person has made based on a lack of 
understanding of risks or inability to weigh up the information can form part of a capacity 
assessment particularly if someone repeatedly makes unwise decisions that put them at 
risk or result in harm to them or someone else195 or makes a particular decision that is 
obviously irrational or out of character for them.196  It is therefore somewhat ironic that it 
might be possible for a doctor to determine the information that is material to a decision 
independently of the patient’s value system which may in turn be used to make the claim 
that their decision is so obviously irrational or out of character for them, when considered 
in the light of their past decisions and choices, that they may be treated as incompetent. 
 
On the other hand it is also a principle of the MCA that a person is not to be treated as 
unable to make a decision unless all practicable steps to help him to do so have been 
taken without success.197  As autonomy is the primary value in medical law then it is 
consistent with respect for that principle that a doctor should seek to restore patient 
autonomy by developing their capacity to make a decision in accordance with personally 
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held values with the aim of preventing unnecessary intervention in the lives of their 
patients.198  However, in this regard Pellegrino and Thomasma have stated that: 
 
“[O]ne cannot assume that autonomy is fully restorable or preservable in cases of 
serious illness.  Patricia Bradley formulates a telling objection to the position of 
Robert Veatch, one of the most prominent ethicists arguing for the patient 
autonomy model.  According to Bradley, 
 
‘Veatch argues that the relationship between doctor and patient is an equal one, 
ignoring the fact of illness which places the patient in a potentially vulnerable 
relationship with his physician.  Based as it is on a wrong assumption, this model 
must be rejected when applied to the traditional doctor-patient relationship’. 
 
Even the briefest experience with illness shows that ill persons often can become so 
anxious, guilty, angry, fearful or hostile that they make judgments they may not 
make in calmer times.  Patients become preoccupied with their diseases and their 
bodies.  The patient may see his body as an object that failed him.  Patients are 
forced to reassess their values and goals.  These primary characteristics of illness 
alter personal wholeness to a profound degree.  They change some of our 
assumptions about the operation of personal autonomy in the one who is ill”. 
 
The fact that one cannot assume that autonomy is fully restorable or preservable in cases 
of serious illness underscores the importance of coherence theory when helping someone 
to make decisions.  In this regard some emphasis is placed on the importance of 
explaining information using the most effective form of communication for that person in 
order to help them to remember important facts.199  Since the idea is to get decision-
makers to connect with patients more effectively and to help people to remember 
important facts a value system would appear to have an obvious advantage over most 
other forms of communication.  This is because a doctor will have access to information 
that enables him or her to meet the needs and circumstances of the patient who broadly 
speaking wants to be helped to make an informed treatment decision the corollary of 
which is that they want a doctor to safeguard them against the effects of making a non-
autonomous decision when judged in relation to subjective rather than objective factors.  
In this regard a doctor will be in a better position to determine how to treat the patient in 
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their medical best interests and to determine what treatment information it is relevant to 
disclose and which the patient must understand, retain and use or weigh.   
 
For patients a value system does in a sense act as a memory stick or at least it has the 
capacity to act as such if it enables them to make a decision in conformity with their 
existing values or to appreciate that their current decision entails a departure from them.  
In other cases it might act as little more than a prompt.  I say this because a person will 
have become engaged intellectually and emotionally when constructing their value 
system and because of that it is possible that details of it will reside in the mind thereafter 
at various levels of consciousness, i.e. intellectual and emotional, therefore it might be 
possible for a doctor to access the mind in various ways in order to elicit a decision from 
them.200  Otherwise it provides the framework upon which the patient must demonstrate 
their ability to use or weigh treatment information and to arrive at a decision that does at 
the very least keep faith with their critical interests.  As the value system becomes the 
focus for discussion and decision it should also safeguard patients against the effects of 
undue influence when deliberating and making decisions, i.e. the decision is the actual 
decision of the patient.  These factors taken together would tend to diminish the concern 
that a doctor may say a patient is competent to consent to treatment when they are 
compliant with medical opinion and conversely to claim that the patient is not competent 
to decide if they raise objections or refuse a necessary and appropriate treatment or 
procedure.   
 
It is therefore unfortunate that in relation to information about risks doctors are merely 
advised to describe any foreseeable consequences of making the decision and of not 
making any decision at all.201  In this respect it is important to note that information must 
be tailored to an individual’s needs, circumstances202 and abilities.203  So whilst it is 
important that a person has access to treatment information that information can 
presumably be presented in broad or simple terms to aid their understanding of it 
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whereupon there is a danger that its true meaning and significance might get lost in 
translation.204  This of course means that if the patient fails to understand the true 
significance of the information they are given then they will also be unable to apply it 
meaningfully to their own situation.205 
 
So is the right to autonomy contemporary?  Yes and no.  Yes, because a doctor is 
concerned with whether someone has capacity to make a particular decision, i.e. the 
decision in hand.  No, because in order to demonstrate their ability to make a decision a 
person must be able to understand, retain and use or weigh the relevant information and 
to make a decision that is coherent or broadly consistent with their past decisions and 
choices.   
 
In this regard you may remember that the general legal framework that applies to 
decisions concerning a medical treatment in respect of a competent patient incorporates 
two standards.  A physician will escape liability for a battery whenever a patient is 
informed about the broad nature and purpose of a medical treatment or procedure so that 
they know what would happen to them if the treatment is provided, as well as the likely 
consequences to the patient if treatment is not provided.206  Disclosures in relation to 
risks inherent in medical treatment, which may or may not materialise, are dealt with 
under the law of negligence in spite of the fact that the harms envisaged may be material 
to the way in which a patient chooses to exercise their right to self-determination.  An 
issue of particular relevance in this context is that non-disclosure of such risks would 
effectively deny patients the opportunity to refuse medical treatment and to exercise their 
right to maintain bodily integrity.   
 
To summarise, the duty to obtain a patient’s consent is protected by the tort of battery, 
however the duty to ensure that a patient has been given enough information (whatever 
that might mean) is part of the doctor’s ordinary duty of care to act in the best interests of 
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their patients, meaning that a failure to offer sufficient information might ground an 
action in negligence.207  In relation to this latter point the House of Lords, the case of 
Chester v Afshar, have more recently determined that no gap should exist between 
beneficence and autonomy, i.e. custom and practice within the medical profession should 
no longer be used to inform the law about what the patient should be told.208  Instead the 
scope of the doctor’s duty has been more closely equated with the patient’s need for 
information and the right to decide upon its materiality.  In that case Miss Chester 
claimed that: 
 
“She told Mr Afshar that she had heard a lot of horror stories about surgery and 
that she wanted to know about the risks, but that none of this was explained to her.  
She did not mention paralysis specifically as one of the risks that she wanted to be 
told about, and this was not mentioned as a risk of surgery by Mr Afshar.  The rely 
she got from him as a throw away line, was that he had not crippled anybody yet.  
She agreed to the surgery because he made it all sound so simple”…209 
 
Accordingly, Lord Hope accepted the trial judge’s findings and said that: 
 
“As has been recognised in many cases (including Sidaway…) it is often a difficult 
and delicate matter for a consultant to advise a patient about what he regards as 
comparatively minor risks, particularly when that patient is already suffering from 
stress, pain and anxiety.  He will naturally be anxious to avoid alarming or 
confusing the patient unnecessarily.  In the present case, as the defendant indicated 
in his evidence, he clearly thought that the risk of damage to the claimant was 
extremely small.  Furthermore, he knew that he personally had never caused any 
nerve damage in the many hundreds of operations he had carried out over 20 to 25 
years.  It may well be that he considered the claimant to be over-anxious or over-
preoccupied with ‘horror stories’ and the possibility of being crippled.  In these 
circumstances I do not find it improbable that, in an attempt to reassure, he 
deflected her inquiries by answering them in the light hearted terms which she has 
described – and which he accepts that he may have used at some stage.  However 
understandable such a response may have been in psychological terms, it was not 
an adequate response in legal terms, as Lord Templeman indicated in Sidaway...210 
 
Thus the right to make the final decision and the duty of the doctor to inform the 
patient if the treatment may have special disadvantages or dangers go hand in 
hand.  In this case there is no dispute that Mr Afshar owed a duty to Miss Chester 
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to inform her of the risks that were inherent in the proposed surgery, including the 
risk of paralysis.  The duty was owed to her so that she could make her own 
decision as to whether or not she should undergo the particular course of surgery 
which he was proposing to carry out.  That was the scope of the duty, the existence 
of which gave effect to her right to be informed before she consented to it.  It was 
unaffected in its scope by the response which Miss Chester would have given had 
she been told of these risks”. 211 
 
Here it is relevant to reflect on the fact that the law follows morality in determining that 
people rather than social customs and practices are the sources of values.  Consequently, 
people are the sources of their own rights to bodily inviolability from which the right to 
self-determination is derived and because these interests are so fundamental in human 
life, indeed to the future prosperity of humankind, they are made the source of any 
normative claims that we may have on others.   
 
Significantly, a legal standard of disclosure has now been established that is unaffected in 
its scope by a professional privilege to withhold information that might alarm a patient.212  
Indeed taking into consideration the circumstances of the case213 one could be forgiven 
for thinking that Lord Hope had given effect to the court’s equitable jurisdiction in order 
to resolve a dispute in favour of the patient that was related to the doctor’s failure to 
disclose relevant treatment information.214  Consequently, the law of negligence in this 
case seemed closer to that of battery. 
 
Having set the scene let us once again consider the protestations of both Lord Goff in 
Bland and Lord Falconer in the Foreword to the MCA because the rights and interests of 
persons who lack capacity are considered in accordance with one standard not two; the 
standard proposed by the ordinary law of negligence or the reasonable person standard 
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which is an objective standard.215  Consequently, a doctor who acts in someone’s best 
interests and exercises care and skill in the performance of their duty does not incur 
liability for doing the act which a competent patient must consent to if they reasonably 
believe that their patient lacks capacity to make that particular decision.216  In relation to 
a patient with borderline or fluctuating capacity a doctor must follow the steps to 
establish whether a person has capacity in order to form a reasonable belief that the 
patient does lack capacity in relation to the matter.217  The problem is that the MCA 
upholds the standard proposed in Sidaway, the prudent doctor standard.  It therefore 
appears that a professional privilege to withhold treatment information has been 
maintained in respect of those to whom this legislation applies.   
 
For this reason it is somewhat disingenuous of the current law to fail to more effectively 
recognise the different considerations that should apply to formerly competent patients, 
and in particular those who might choose to disclose their value system in a living will, 
and others or never competent patients as the statute De Prerogativa Regis 1324 did, in 
terms of applying the higher prudent patient standard in respect of the former patient 
group though perhaps not the latter.  As otherwise the right to autonomy is indeed 
contemporary and because the MCA would fail to fully safeguard the patient who has 
disclosed their value system against an incorrect finding of incapacity a doctor is free to 
say that a patient is competent to give consent to treatment when the patient is compliant 
with medical expert opinion and conversely to claim that the patient is not competent to 
decide if they raise objections or refuse a necessary and appropriate treatment or 
procedure. 
 
So far we have considered the situation in relation to patients where doubt exists about 
someone’s capacity to make decisions and act autonomously.  What about patients who 
have disclosed their value system in a living will but are in urgent need of treatment or 
are unconscious and in need of emergency treatment?  Does the medical welfare of these 
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patients assume priority over respect for the patient’s right to self-determination in these 
circumstances?  In this regard the Code of Practice states that: 
 
“[I]n emergency medical situations (for example, where a person collapses with a 
heart attack or for some unknown reason and is brought unconscious into a 
hospital), urgent decisions will have to be made and immediate action taken in the 
person’s best interests.  In these situations, it may not be practical or appropriate 
to delay the treatment while trying to help the person to make their own decisions, 
or to consult with any known attorneys or deputies.  However, even in emergency 
situations, healthcare staff should try to continue to communicate with the person 
and keep them informed of what is happening”.218 
 
Whilst it may not be practical or appropriate to delay treatment in these circumstances the 
principle of finding the least restrictive alternative appears to have considerable bite, i.e. 
before an act is done, or the decision is made, regard must be had to whether the purpose 
for which it is needed can be as effectively achieved in a way that is less restrictive of the 
person’s rights and freedom of action.219  As autonomy allows each of us to develop a life 
in conformity with our own character and personality this principle suggests that the 
values, beliefs and preferences of formerly competent patients, where these are known 
and understood by others, should be relevant to best interests.  In this regard guidance 
within the Code of Practice confirms that finding the least restrictive option includes 
considering whether there is a need to act or make a decision at all and goes on to state 
that: 
 
“Where there is more than one option, it is important to explore ways that would be 
less restrictive or allow the most freedom for a person who lacks capacity to make 
the decision in question.  However, the final decision must always allow the 
original purpose of the decision or act to be achieved. 
 
Any decision or action must still be in the best interests of the person who lacks 
capacity.  So sometimes it may be necessary to choose an option that is not the least 
restrictive alternative if that option is in the person’s best interests.  In practice, the 
process of choosing a less restrictive option and deciding what is in the person’s 
best interests will be combined.  But both principles must be applied each time a 
decision or action may be taken on behalf of a person who lacks capacity to make 
the relevant decision”.220 
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The principle attempts to reduce the potential for conflict to exist between beneficence 
and autonomy when a doctor sets out to determine what is in someone’s best interests.  
However, the underlying aim of this principle can only be achieved in an emergency 
situation when a doctor has access to the patient’s value system.  Although even in these 
circumstances it should be noted that this principle does at the same time retain a doctor’s 
right to make decisions and act in another’s best medical interests, as only ‘regard’ must 
be had to this principle so an option that is not the least restrictive option can still be in a 
person’s best interests.221  Accordingly, the principle merely serves to constrain the worst 
effects of medical paternalism, i.e. to prevent doctors from overriding the patient’s value 
system, when it is known and can be understood by others, in order to protect their 
medical welfare.  In other words the principle serves to remind doctors that what is in 
someone’s medical best interests, as they judge them to be, may not also be in their 
overall or actual best interests all things considered.   
 
This principle, like so much else about the MCA tantalises – it promises something, 
transformation if you will, but that potential is frustrated rather than fulfilled possibly 
because the Act fails to adequately distinguish between the circumstances of people 
similarly situated as the statute De Prerogativa Regis 1324 did or maybe just fails to be 
tied to the mast of its own convictions.  In any event as with many of its other provisions 
the scope to be something different in this respect remains. 
 
Making the case for a form of Autonomous Decision-Making 
 
In general a commitment to the fundamental principle of bodily inviolability as well as to 
a patient interest in exercising their right to self-determination seldom allows scope for 
paternalism to emerge in the doctor-patient relationship as was illustrated by the case of 
Chester v Afshar.  So we can say that doctors are both morally, professionally and legally 
required to assist their patients to maximise their autonomy and act immorally, 
unprofessionally and illegally whenever they deprive patients of their autonomy.222  
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Beneficence cannot override autonomy.223  The value of autonomy does in other words 
carry far greater weight than the value of beneficence does.   Sometimes however, people 
suffer a loss of decision-making capacity and are then incompetent to exercise autonomy.  
In these circumstances, when one person is entrusted into the care of another they have a 
right to beneficence, i.e. a right that the latter make decisions and act in the former’s best 
interests.224 
 
An issue in respect of incapacity is that the best interests of the patient might override the 
choices of a formerly competent patient.  This is due in no small part to the selection and 
subsequent application of a test for evaluating decision-making capacity and best 
interests which permits physicians to exercise their discretion to limit a patient’s right to 
autonomy to reflect the physician’s primary commitment to the patient’s physical 
welfare.  Consequently, there is a need to identify a physician-patient model that can 
remove the conflict between beneficence and autonomy.  This way there is no advantage 
in a doctor saying that a patient is competent to give consent to treatment merely because 
the patient is compliant with medical expert opinion and conversely to claim that the 
patient is not competent to decide if they raise objections or refuse a necessary and 
appropriate treatment or procedure because the doctor would in any event be bound to 
make decisions and act in conformity with the values, beliefs and preferences of the 
patient where these could be known and understood.  In this part of the chapter we will 
therefore be exploring the issue of how respect for values could fit in with the doctor’s 
ethical obligations of non-maleficence and beneficence. 
 
Re-examining the Nature of the Doctor-Patient Relationship 
The doctor-patient relationship has been characterised in various ways and this is 
achieved by emphasising a particular characteristic of that relationship which may or may 
not hold true when considered in different contexts.  An issue of some magnitude in this 
context is how that relationship should be defined to be compatible with our notions of 
inviolability and respect for persons, i.e. that persons have moral worth and dignity. 
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The Paternalistic Model 
The paternalistic model sought justification in a doctor’s professionalism.  A doctor is 
someone who has knowledge and expertise in medical matters and is also bound to act 
ethically in accordance with the principles of non-maleficence and beneficence.  These 
factors suggest that physicians should be trusted to be in control of the relationship and to 
decide what is best for their patients.225 
 
This model is however limited in various respects in seeming to suggest that a physician 
is both omnipotent as well as omniscient.  The former is a fallacy as the profession itself 
recognises, i.e. that various practices may be considered proper, which takes due account 
of the fact that medicine is a science but its practice is an art.  Consequently, only the 
crudest of practitioners will treat medical data as sacrosanct.  Other medical concepts like 
differential diagnosis also point out the limitations of a doctor’s expert powers as there 
may be many explanations for a malady and it is a question of working through things by 
a process of elimination or the most likely to the least likely cause.226  Let us not also 
forget that no doctor has the ability to accurately work out what benefits and harms will 
result from a medical treatment or procedure in a particular case.227  There is also the 
point that in a democracy society defines what benefits its citizens should be given and 
which medical benefits may be offered. 228  Finally, unless the physician is also 
omniscient the model tends to demand too much or too little according to your view of 
things.  A doctor cannot determine what a good life for their patient is and what is in 
someone’s welfare interests cannot be fully encapsulated by the goals of medicine.  So in 
either of these respects there is an ever present risk of an affront to human dignity.  
Pellegrino and Thomasma put things in these terms: 
 
“[A] physician often cannot heal a person just by curing a disease, especially if the 
physician systematically ignores or disregards the patient’s view… 
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Strong paternalism is objectionable because it violates the humanity of the patient.  
The obligation is owed rational beings to be free to decide about the conduct of 
their own lives.  Indeed, such decisions are peculiarly human.  To infringe on such 
a fundamental right clearly demands special justification.  Medical paternalism 
fails because it overrides an essential element in deontological ethics, at the core of 
medicine, i.e. respect for persons.  To violate the patient’s autonomy is to deprive 
him of one essential component of his own good, and thus to violate medicine’s 
promise to act for the good of the patient. 
 
Many physicians hold that the patient’s rights to autonomy should not get in the 
way of their medical needs, i.e. medical “indications” should dominate clinical 
decisions.  But as we shall argue the case, the hierarchy of patient goods may not 
always place medical needs in the highest place.  Lack of respect for such a 
hierarchy of values is a major cause of patient complaints about physician 
paternalism. 
 
Like the autonomy model, medical paternalism can fail to distinguish contexts and 
their role in medical and ethical decision-making.  As a consequence, medical 
paternalism tends to universalise a stance valid in one context but not necessarily 
in another.  Generalisation of one experience, like “saving” one patient through 
paternalism, into a universal moral posture, is not valid. 
 
Perhaps the biggest failure of medical paternalism is its assumption that medical 
values or medical good is the highest good, and that it has an absolute quality 
which overrides other values.  Or, even less justifiably, a particular physician’s 
preferences for one treatment among several may become an absolute.  Some 
surgeons prefer radical mastectomy while others prefer limited resection and 
radiation for cancer of the breast.  Some cardiologists prefer medical over surgical 
management in certain types of angina pectoris.  Alternative procedures may lead 
to similar outcomes but with different risks and quality of life.  Selection of one 
procedure over others depends as much on the patient’s and the physician’s values 
as on the scientific data.  The patient, for reasons of great importance to him, may 
reject even the scientifically preferred therapy for one of lesser effectiveness. 
 
Medical paternalism asserts that the physician unequivocally knows better than the 
patient what is “good” for him.  It also subsumes all the patient’s good under only 
one good – medical good.  Other dimensions of the good of the patient must also be 
considered.  One of these is surely the preservation of the fundamental human good 
of making one’s own decisions about the kind of life one wants to lead, or the risks 
one wants to take”.229 
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Autonomy Model 
When autonomy is respected persons have dominion over their life path and also their 
bodies and life-spans.  Consequently, the autonomy model preserves the patient’s right to 
make a decision in accordance with their own character and personality to reject a 
beneficial medical treatment or procedure because they prefer instead to be maintained 
inviolate.  In this way the autonomy model may be contrasted with the former, 
paternalistic model. 
 
Whilst respect for autonomy is a normative condition of medical treatment decision-
making an individual’s interest in or right to autonomy can only be exercised by those 
who have decision-making capacity to make decisions in accordance with their own 
values, beliefs and preferences.  Yet it might not be possible to preserve230 or to restore 
autonomy in every case due to the nature or severity of illness.231  This fact has led 
Pellegrino and Thomasma to comment that: 
 
“The effects of illness and disease on personal autonomy limit self-determination to 
variable degrees.  That is why so many physicians report that patients really want 
them to make the decisions.  On this view, autonomy ought not, therefore, be taken 
as a starting point or absolute overriding principle in medicine.  Rather it should 
be seen as part of the goal of treatment, one of the goods of the patient, to be 
promoted but not to the total exclusion of all other goods. 
 
If we take the impact of illness and disease seriously, we must modify the autonomy 
model.  That model has four features: self-direction, establishing a life plan, 
deliberating about applying a life plan (reasoning and information), and acting on 
the basis of such deliberations. 
 
Becoming “sick” can modify each of these features.  To “be” sick is to be subject 
to the patho-physiological effects of illness, pain, fear, and to the special 
professional and institutional environment in which decisions occur.  Self-direction 
is marred by the way disease may disrupt the unity of the self, ego and the body.  
Life plans are threatened by the finitude of human life revealed in illness.  
Deliberation and application are impeded by the distractions of pain and fear, or 
by the process of institutionalisation.  The extent to which the operations of 
autonomy can be impeded by being, and becoming, a patient is impressive. 
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Of course the autonomy of most patients is only mildly incapacitated by disease.  
We must not, therefore, use the autonomy limitation as an excuse for all sorts of 
paternalism.  On the whole, patient’s choices can, and should, be accepted.  On the 
other hand, people who are incapacitated by disease or trauma should not be 
abandoned to their autonomy, but merely given the “facts” and asked to make a 
decision.  This is a form of moral abandonment… 
 
One might argue that we are merely talking about varying degrees of competence, 
and that the problem is one of determining competence.  On this view the autonomy 
model would remain intact since incompetent patients could be treated 
paternalistically without violating the principles of autonomy.  Such an 
interpretation would, however, offend those for whom autonomy has become an 
absolute principle of medical ethics”.232  
 
An obvious problem with this right is then that incompetent patients who have not left a 
legally valid and applicable advance decision will in the future have medical treatment 
decisions made for them by a surrogate decision-maker who will in normal circumstances 
be the patient’s doctor.  Now whilst we might reflect on certain facts, that the law 
recognises that competent233 and incompetent234 persons have an interest in refusing 
necessary and appropriate medical treatment, that there is also recognition that treatment 
refusals need not be motivated by particular medical facts such as that of being terminally 
ill or in an advanced stage of sickness,235 there is an issue surrounding the uncertainty of 
the legal standards applicable to an incompetent patient who, in the context of this thesis, 
has disclosed their value system in a living will.  As a consequence physicians may 
override the values of the patient, not wilfully perhaps but, in order to preserve their life, 
health or well-being.   
 
Moral Conflict 
Doctors are aware, through their medical training, that the purpose of all living things is 
to survive and reproduce.  Personal experience, perhaps supplemented by training in 
medical ethics, should equally inform them that persons also desire to live a good life and 
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do not therefore always pursue life to the point where it is empty of any real content.  So 
whilst it is important that patients should be informed about the benefits and harms of 
medical treatments and procedures to assist them to make a choice that is right for them 
because the physician is a person of knowledge and skill in medical matters beneficence 
cannot be subverted by autonomy during this process.  Consequently, patients need to be 
able to trust in the goodwill of their doctor and in more ways than one. 
 
In any case that contains elements of at least two competing values conflict will exist, i.e. 
beneficence when construed as paternalism versus autonomy.  Yet if we reflect on the 
fact that not a lot that is good in life is ever achieved by requiring one party to bow to the 
unreasonable needs or demands of another we will recognise that extreme positions of 
any kind tend to achieve very little in the end. Good relationships are by contrast 
sustained on the basis of give and take or mutual respect and understanding.  
Consequently, there is a need to think about the importance of maintaining standards that 
are for the benefit of all of us. 
 
In this regard any apparent tension that is created between the principles of beneficence 
and autonomy is released by asserting that the doctor-patient relationship is of a fiduciary 
nature.  When a doctor acts as a fiduciary he or she is placed under an obligation to 
respect the wishes of the patient as autonomy is made an essential element of beneficence 
and a doctor is trusted to at least prioritise the dignity interests of the patient ahead of 
their own inclinations.  So should autonomy be a more important value in healthcare than 
trust in one’s physician taking into consideration the facts of incompetency? 
 
Beneficence in Trust: A Fiduciary Model for Medical Decisions 
What is the connection between trust and beneficence?  Beneficence means to act on 
behalf of another and in relation to medical professionals beneficence translates into 
devotion, well a commitment at least, to the welfare of others.236  As the patient is sick 
and does not have knowledge or expertise in the practice of medical science they must 
trust their doctor to apply that specialised body of information in a way that is most 
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conducive to promoting their personal welfare and sense of well-being.237  Therefore, 
beneficence is implied each time a doctor acts or takes up the responsibility to care for a 
patient based on the patient’s trust.238  It is also clear that to act on behalf of another in 
medicine no longer means to act only on behalf of the other’s body or medical welfare. 239  
About this Cassell writes that: 
 
“The changes in the notions of person, of patienthood, and of the doctor-patient 
relationship that have occurred over these last decades emphasise that when the 
doctor acts for patients the action is meant to work towards the goals that the 
patients would choose if they could act on their own.  What patients believe to be in 
their own best interests may well require the active participation of the physician to 
discover but can almost never be known without the patient’s knowledgeable 
participation.  [Beneficence] in medicine requires more than knowledge of medical 
science; it also requires understanding illness – its causes, course, and outcome – 
from the patient’s viewpoint, and then acting on the knowledge.  Above all, it 
requires knowing about sick persons”. 240 
 
Therefore it is implicit in this model that beneficence is the prime requirement for 
medicine and as a patient places their body and health in trust with the physician the 
patient’s problems and needs become the physician’s primary concern taking precedence 
over all other concerns.241  In other words the physician must consider the wishes of the 
patient although ultimately it is they who must take responsibility for making treatment 
decisions.242  So autonomy and paternalism are superseded by the prior obligation to act 
beneficently and the decision to foster autonomy or to act paternalistically should be 
based on what will benefit the patient most and not the personal idiosyncrasies or values 
                                                 
237
 Ibid, p.71/2; Pellegrino, Edmund D., Thomasma, David C., The Conflict between Autonomy and 
Beneficence in Medical Ethics: Proposal for a Resolution, 1987, Journal of Contemporary Health Law and 
Policy, Volume 3, p.23-46, p.38-45; Rhodes, Rosamond, The Professional Responsibilities of Medicine, 
The Blackwell Guide to Medical Ethics, (2007, Blackwell Publishing); Hui, E.C., Doctors as Fiduciaries: a 
legal construct of the patient-physician relationship; 2005, Hong Kong Medical Journal, Vol. 11, No.6, 
pp.527-29; Beauchamp, Tom L., Childress, James F., Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 2001, Fifth Edition, 
Oxford University Press, p.64 
238
 Cassell, Eric J., The Nature of Suffering and the Goals of Medicine, Second Edition, 2004, Oxford 
University Press, p.73 
239
 Ibid; Chester v Afshar 2004 WL 2289136; Mental Capacity Act 2005, s.4 
240
 Cassell, Eric J., The Nature of Suffering and the Goals of Medicine, Second Edition, 2004, Oxford 
University Press, p.73 
241
 Pellegrino, Edmund D., Thomasma, David C., The Conflict between Autonomy and Beneficence in 
Medical Ethics: Proposal for a Resolution, 1987, Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy, Volume 
3, p.23-46, p.41; Maclean, Alasdair, Briefcase on Medical Law, 2004, Second Edition, Cavendish 
Publishing, p.12 
242
 Ibid 
 353
and impulses of the medical professional.243  The fact that there is no automatic ranking 
of values benefits the patient because each patient will be treated as an individual as 
Pellegrino and Thomasma now explain: 
 
“Both the patient’s autonomy and medical paternalism models emphasise single 
values which are always to be preferred.  For example, the patient’s right to 
autonomy is always to be preferred over other values in the patient’s autonomy 
model.  In the paternalism model, each patient must be treated as if he or she did 
not know what is best.  By contrast, in the beneficent model, no such “automatic” 
ranking of values takes place.  The elements of the beneficence model are not 
ranked in any pre-set hierarchy.  Each patient must be handled individually not 
only for the medical but also for the moral implications.  No ethical stance, other 
than acting for the patient’s best interests, is applied beforehand.  This model 
requires that patients and physicians become able to identify, rank, discuss, and 
negotiate values, and to define the particular good of a particular patient.  This is 
not to say that general ethical axioms applied to more than one patient are 
invalid”.244 
 
Core Features of a Fiduciary Relationship 
How does this interpretation of beneficence differ to the one proposed by the MCA, for 
example, of acting on the principle of the least restrictive option?  When the doctor-
patient relationship is defined as a fiduciary relationship there is a distinct shift in 
emphasis away from the controlling influences of the paternalistic and autonomous 
models, i.e. either the physician makes the decision or the patient does, towards one in 
which a doctor’s professionalism in carrying out his or her professional obligations is 
assessed in relation to the level of fidelity shown toward the patient.245   
 
Fidelity is intrinsic to the doctor-patient relationship if we think, as Hippocrates 
apparently did, that the practice of medicine should be distinguished from ordinary 
business practices and that medical professionals should continue to be held to higher 
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standards of morality than those traditionally found to exist in the market place and 
elsewhere.  If it were otherwise there might be a need to consider placing a government 
health warning at the entrance to the doctor’s surgery or maybe a ‘buyer beware’ notice 
according to whether one used private or public services.  Instead of which the physician 
necessarily acts as trustee for the patient’s medical welfare, which must surely have been 
what Hippocrates intended.246 
 
If fidelity is the fundamental ethical principle regulating the medical profession how 
should it, fidelity, be defined when used in this context?247  Well the paradigmatic 
fiduciary relationship is the one that exists between a trustee and beneficiary where the 
purpose of the relationship and the role and reason of one party is to promote the interests 
of the other.248  In order to fulfil their role obligation and to act altruistically a trustee is 
required in law to relinquish their own self-interests and administer the trust in the sole 
interests of the beneficiary.249  So ultimately, the relationship exists for the exclusive 
benefit of one party although of course the doctor is financially compensated for their 
services.250     
 
A fiduciary is also someone who has power, i.e. specialised knowledge and skill, and/or 
property, i.e. has access to medicines, procedures and specialist practitioners, which may 
all be used for the benefit of their patient.251  In the case of a paradigmatic relationship 
between trustee and beneficiary the beneficiary delegates discretionary power to the 
trustee in respect of the property of the trust and holds them to the highest, fiduciary, 
standard of conduct in the use of it. 252  By process of analogy, in relation to the doctor-
patient relationship, a doctor has a delegated discretionary power in matters of health 
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care, i.e. prescribing medicines and ordering tests etc, which is directly conferred on them 
by the individual patients they attend to, and indirectly by society as a whole, legitimately 
expecting that this knowledge will be used for the benefit of particular individuals and 
society.253   
 
In this regard it is important to understand the social role of medicine and its ethics and to 
therefore recognise that the medical profession is a social artefact, or socially constructed 
body that was created to serve all of humankind.254  Society in other words gave control 
over a set of knowledge, skills, powers and privileges, which in the wrong hands could do 
considerable harm, to a select few who are entrusted to provide their services for the good 
of those who are in need of them.255  So the point is that this knowledge is not 
individually owned, and therefore ought not to be used primarily for personal gain, 
prestige or power, rather medical professionals hold this knowledge in trust for the good 
of the sick.256 
 
Let us not forget that in the course of treating ‘a’ patient ‘a’ doctor may expose their body 
as well as obtain information from them that they might otherwise choose to keep 
private.257  So in this situation the patient chooses to forego privacy out of deference to 
the physician’s medical knowledge in order to facilitate their health care. 258  Thus the 
aim of medicine is beneficent however, the knowledge of the physician, the knowledge 
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and care that the patient seeks, is not proprietary by which I mean that it is not 
individually owned.259  On this matter Pellegrino and Thomasma state that: 
 
“Medicine as a human activity is of necessity a form of beneficence.  It is a 
response to the need and plea of a sick person for help, without which the patient 
might die, or suffer unnecessary pain, or disability.  The obligation to help the sick 
is a general one involving humans, even those who are not professed healers.  It is 
grounded in the claim that comes from the vulnerability and suffering of a fellow 
human.  One is impelled, even by the lesser degrees of beneficence [non-
maleficence], not to harm, and even, to ease suffering. 
 
When one is a professed healer one possesses knowledge and skill society has 
permitted one to acquire precisely because it can benefit others.  One also promises 
to help and to act on behalf of the good of the patient when one offers oneself to 
another as a healer.  Further, without the special knowledge [pharmacology, for 
example] the healer has acquired others would suffer so that, in a sense, all the 
sick have some claim on all healers”.260 
 
Patients trust doctors on the basis of that understanding and not simply on the strength 
that their information will be kept confidential.261  A problem is that doctors have 
acquired powers which put them at an advantage in the doctor-patient relationship.  The 
relationship is, in other words, built on an inequality of influence and knowledge and 
these conditions provide doctors with an opportunity to exercise the power of discretion 
to the detriment of the patient.262  Therefore, it is inherent in this relationship that a doctor 
might be susceptible to misusing or abusing the entrusted power and position either to 
promote his own interests or to undermine those of the patient, which may ultimately 
cause them harm.263  Accordingly, fiduciary standards and safeguards are necessary to 
prevent such abuses.264 
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While fiduciaries have specialised knowledge or expertise, that information has to be 
applied to the particular person and set of circumstances confronting them and so they 
must exercise judgment and discretion in order to fulfil their obligations.265  
Consequently, the more vulnerable party has no option other than to place their trust and 
confidence in that other person.266  This is of course true of the doctor-patient relationship 
as patients are made more vulnerable by their conditions which brings forward the point 
as to whether dependence and vulnerability267 or trust and loyalty are the real basis for 
treating a doctor as a fiduciary.268    
 
Should Doctors be Regarded as Fiduciaries? 
The ethics of medicine has traditionally been based on the ordinary moral standards that 
people generally endorse.  These universal standards of conduct apply to non-
professionals as well as to persons in their private life.  The question then is whether the 
doctor-patient relationship is sufficiently distinctive to justify us in marking it out for 
special consideration in terms of requiring medical professionals to conform to any 
higher standard of conduct than that commonly found to exist in the market place.     
 
When we put things this way we are automatically drawn into examining a doctor’s 
professional responsibilities.  In medicine doctors and other health professionals are 
supposed to care about the general welfare of the population and we can observe this in 
terms of research that is carried out into all sorts of horrible diseases and conditions that 
pose a threat to human life or to someone’s ability to live a good life.  Public welfare also 
relies upon the ability of the medical profession to combat external agents that are the 
cause of sickness and disease and this may be through the implementation of policies that 
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aim to preserve or improve standards of personal and public hygiene or through the 
development of drugs such as antibiotics to kill infections when these arise.  Important 
immunisation programmes are also aimed at improving public health.  This is what might 
be termed arms length medicine in that no particular relationship need come into being to 
know that these sorts of things are a common enemy of humankind and their ability to 
thrive.      
 
Medical professionals also have a positive duty to beneficently respond to the needs of 
each patient and consequently to actively promote their good.  However, we cannot 
ignore the fact that members of society also value the principle of inviolability which 
means that people are not only concerned about their susceptibility to disease but to 
injury also.269  So it seems reasonable to suggest that with respect to their medical needs 
people want attention from skilled and knowledgeable practitioners who could cure 
disease, alleviate symptoms, restore function and ease suffering.270  The problem is that 
there is no general conception of what good is or of what a good life entails.  As there is 
no prior ordering of goods that a doctor can implement on behalf of the patient we arrive 
at the situation where beneficence must be defined in terms of those conditions that 
enable this particular patient to flourish.  We also know that whatever is the source of our 
good will also be the source of our suffering.  So when we talk about the possible 
advantages and risks of a medical treatment it is important to bear in mind the situation of 
the patient.  They typically know very little about medical science, of the possible causes 
of illnesses, how these can be treated and where a choice of treatments exists of the 
comparisons that can be made between them.  As patients must accept the advice of their 
physician on these matters they need to be able to place their full trust in doctors.  Their 
reliance and medicine’s monopoly271 over medical practice explains the importance of 
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trust and of why medical professionals should be held to higher standards than those 
commonly found to exist in the market place.272 
 
How Useful is it to regard Doctors as Fiduciaries? 
This question is primarily concerned with the patient’s ability to make any assessment of 
whether or not they have been treated beneficently.  Patients know very little about 
medical science and so they are also in a poor position to monitor physicians, to second 
guess their judgment or to discover and sanction breaches of trust.273  Therefore, is the 
intervention of the court a proper safeguard for the interests of incompetent patients?  
Here we must bear in mind that an interested party must come forward to ask the court to 
become involved in the affairs of an incompetent adult.274 Were that to happen the courts 
powers are to an extent constrained, in respect of this patient group, by the loss of its 
parens patriae jurisdiction.  An interested party may however make an application for a 
declaration as to whether a person has or lacks capacity to make a decision.  They may 
also question whether a treatment or procedure that has been or is proposed to be carried 
out is lawful and therefore in the best interests of an incompetent patient.275   
 
Speaking in the case of Bland, where an application was made to the court by the hospital 
regarding the lawfulness of withholding or withdrawing life-preserving medical treatment 
from a patient in a permanent vegetative state, Lord Lowry expressed his opinion that: 
 
“[T]he parens patriae jurisdiction over adults who are for whatever reason 
mentally incompetent was abolished by statute.  I have never heard a rational, or 
indeed any, explanation for this step, which has placed under a further 
disadvantage a class of adults who are already handicapped… I sincerely hope that 
the parens patriae jurisdiction will soon be restored.  The corresponding 
jurisdiction in wardship has continued to prove its value and it is most unfortunate 
that the court’s armoury in relation to adults remains thus depleted.  The prospect 
of restoration of this lost power is not controversial, since it does not conjure up 
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the spectre of euthanasia; the decisions which can be made by the courts on behalf 
of incompetent persons would, as in wardship cases, be confined within lawful 
bounds. 
 
Procedurally I can see no present alternative to an application to the court…  This 
view is reinforced for me when I reflect, against the background of your Lordship’s 
conclusions of law, that, in the absence of an application, the doctor who proposes 
the cessation of life-supporting care and treatment on the ground that their 
continuance would not be in the patient’s best interests will have reached that 
conclusion himself and will be judge in his own cause unless and until his chosen 
course of action is challenged in criminal or civil proceedings.  A practical 
alternative may, however be evolved … possibly [by] parliament through 
legislation, it will of course be understood that the court has no power to render 
lawful something which without the court’s sanction would have been unlawful.  
When I take into account that the case now before your Lordships could not be 
clearer on its facts, I have to say that I am left with the feeling that the general 
position is not very satisfactory”276 
 
Of course some healthcare decisions are so serious277 that the court must be asked to 
make a declaration and in these cases the NHS trust or other organisation responsible for 
the patient’s care will usually make the application.278  Other cases that may be referred 
to the court are those that present an ethical dilemma, perhaps because treatment is 
innovative and untested.279  Beyond that the circumstances precipitating referral are likely 
to involve irresolvable conflicts between healthcare staff and family members or where it 
is unclear that a proposed serious and invasive treatment is likely to be in the best 
interests of the patient.280   
 
Essentially, the court may only become involved in a case, other than in situations where 
the court must be asked to make a declaration, because someone opposes what a doctor 
proposes to do and feels sufficiently strongly about the matter to petition the court.281  
The problem is that not everyone will have someone they can depend upon to act in this 
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way on their behalf.  Consider that the person who has disclosed their value system in a 
living will did not create an LPA for a reason.    
 
The better solution then is to base the doctor-patient relationship on principles of trust as 
once a fiduciary relationship is established fiduciary obligations are due and the patient as 
beneficiary is entitled to expect that the doctor will act in all good faith when carrying out 
their duties in respect of them.  Acting in good faith means acting with honesty and 
integrity282 and guidance, contained within the Mental Capacity Act’s Code of Practice, 
for LPA’s states that this generally means that a fiduciary must try to make sure that their 
decisions do not go against a decision the patient made while they still had capacity 
unless it is in their best interests to do so.283   
 
Who Decides that a Relationship is a Fiduciary One, and on what Basis? 
Whilst trust or dependence is necessary implied in many different types of relationship, 
for example, trustee and beneficiary, solicitor and client, parent and child, doctor and 
patient, tutor and student, not all are fiduciary relationships.284  The issue of whether a 
relationship should be recognised in this way is determined by courts and by legislation 
rather than by the individual parties themselves.285  Consequently, a decision to recognise 
the fiduciary nature of a relationship is a social and policy choice as well as a legal 
one.286   
 
In this regard inspection of the MCA reveals that LPA’s287 and court-appointed 
deputies288 act as the chosen agent of the patient under the law of agency and acquire 
fiduciary obligations but that doctors do not.  As a court-appointed deputy is as much a 
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stranger to the patient as is a doctor it appears that the law of incapacity emphasises that 
fidelity and loyalty, the absence of a conflict of interests, is the fundamental feature of a 
fiduciary relationship, not the dependence and vulnerability of the patient. 
 
Doctors as Fiduciaries: Equitable Regulation of the Doctor-Patient Relationship - 
Revisited 
Although doctors perform fiduciary like roles and claim to be fiduciaries in their ethical 
codes the law fails to recognise the fiduciary like status of the relationship. This 
presumably is attributable to the divided loyalties of doctors in the practice of modern 
medicine.  The needs of other patients have to be considered.  Then there are the 
institutional interests of the hospital as well as the interests of third parties in various 
contexts, and the impossibility of a doctor being able to serve each of them 
simultaneously.289   
 
Should divided loyalties, conflict of interests be reason enough to question whether 
doctors can act as fiduciaries?  The status of fidelity within the doctor-patient relationship 
is contested because it requires medical professionals to put their patient’s interests ahead 
of all others including their own.290  Yet it is arguable that trust in one’s physician matters 
more in these circumstances not less.  However, Rodwin observes that: 
 
“Strains on the fiduciary metaphor may cause the law to adopt other metaphors 
through which to view physicians.  There is already a growing scholarship which 
advocates dispensing with fiduciary obligations in favour of letting individuals 
determine their respective obligations by contract.  Courts and other legal 
institutions may cease to consider physicians as fiduciaries or at least let 
individuals contract out of traditional fiduciary obligations the law imposes as 
default rules, provided that doctors have properly disclosed relevant information to 
patients.  What are the prospects of this occurring? 
 
It seems unlikely that society will quickly abandon the fiduciary metaphor for 
physicians for a simple reason.  Public policy and Market forces are creating 
pressures for greater physician and provider accountability.  And accountability is 
the core of the fiduciary ideal. 
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How else, besides abandonment, might the law respond to strains on the fiduciary 
metaphor?  Courts and legislatures may work out ways to resolve the competing 
demands on physicians within a fiduciary framework.  Fiduciaries, by definition, 
owe loyalty to the parties they serve, but the law can define precisely the limits of a 
fiduciary obligation or specify the interests of different parties for which the 
fiduciary works.  Such definitions of the scope of fiduciary relationships and 
specification of how to balance interests the fiduciary must serve can provide a 
means to resolve or at least ease the strains fiduciaries experience. 
 
There is ample precedent for balancing competing interests within a fiduciary 
framework.  To be sure, the simplest fiduciary relation is one of undivided loyalty 
to an individual.  Many fiduciaries, however, have to balance the interests of 
competing individuals or groups.  Corporate officers must serve the interest of 
different groups of stockholders.  The trustee must serve the interests of the trust 
beneficiary and remainderman.  Lawyers are expected to be zealous advocates for 
their clients while they serve as officers of the court and protect the integrity of the 
judicial system. 
 
Therefore, the fact that physicians have obligations to third parties does not mean 
that they cannot be fiduciaries for patients.  Obligations to third parties may merely 
limit the scope of fiduciary obligation or indicate that physicians are fiduciaries for 
more than one party.  It is only when performing as a fiduciary for one party and 
working for another that creates too great a conflict and there are no adequate 
ways to resolve these conflicts that the law says performing both roles is 
incompatible with fiduciary obligations.   
 
In short, the law may hold doctors to fiduciary standards yet also expect physicians 
to take adequate account of the interests of many patients or even parties other 
than patients. The law could hold doctors accountable to patients for specific goals 
while holding doctors accountable to other parties for other goals.  As a result, 
physicians would be subject to greater oversight and more stringent standards of 
conduct.  It is likely that both private and public sector controls will be used to 
oversee the conduct of physicians, and with institutional mechanics that are not 
traditionally used to supervise fiduciaries”.291 
 
In this respect it is interesting to note that the law distinguishes between status based and 
fact based fiduciary obligations.292  With regard to the latter a significant change in the 
law has taken place regarding a physician’s obligation to disclose relevant treatment 
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information that may be useful to us now.293  For example, in the case of Sidaway, the 
patient claimed that the doctor had failed to advise her about a small but potentially very 
serious inherent risk of neurosurgery that materialised in the course of the operation and 
that caused her injury.294  Therefore, she claimed that in failing to disclose this 
information the doctor had acted in breach of his duty of care. 295   The House of Lords 
disagreed holding that what the patient should be told was a matter for a doctor to 
determine in accordance with the Bolam standard, i.e. a practice accepted as proper by a 
responsible body of medical opinion.   Nevertheless their Lordships concluded that where 
the proposed treatment involved a substantial risk of harm  a patient’s right to be 
informed of it when deciding  whether to consent was so obvious that no reasonably 
prudent doctor could fail to mention it save in an emergency or for some other sound 
clinical reason.296  Crucially, the law did not disturb the doctor’s professional privilege to 
withhold treatment information that might alarm the patient and thus prevent them from 
consenting to a treatment or procedure that was on balance more likely to do good than to 
cause harm.  
 
In the course of argument counsel for the appellant first attempted to persuade their 
Lordships that the patient had a right to be informed of the risks inherent in the medical 
treatment that was proposed by the doctor by invoking the doctrine of informed 
consent.297  This was rejected because ‘it would be deplorable to base the law in medical 
cases of this kind on the torts of assault and battery’.298  The second line of attack was to 
claim that the relationship between doctor and patient is of a fiduciary nature and to claim 
that the doctor had not been scrupulously honest with the patient.299  That attempt also 
failed as ‘there is no comparison to be made between the relationship of doctor and 
patient with that of solicitor and client, trustee [and beneficiary] or the other 
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relationships treated in equity as of a fiduciary character’.300  Nevertheless, added Lord 
Scarman, ‘the relationship of doctor and patient is a very special one, the patient putting 
his health and his life in the doctor’s hands’.301 
 
So the time was not yet right to eliminate the potential for conflict to exist between 
autonomy and beneficence in terms of what the patient must be told in order for their 
consent to be regarded, in law at least, as real.  But Lord Scarman held out a beacon of 
hope because he said that: 
 
“[T]he circumstances that this House is now called upon to explore new ground is 
no reason why a rule of informed consent should not be recognised and developed 
by our courts.  The common law is adaptable: it would not otherwise have survived 
over the centuries of its existence.  The concept of negligence itself is a 
development of the law by the judges over the last hundred years or so.  The legal 
ancestry of the tort of negligence is to be found in the use made by the judges of the 
action on the case.  Damage is the gist of the action.  The action on the case was 
sufficiently flexible to enable the judges to extend it to cover situations where 
damage was suffered in circumstances which they judged to call for a remedy.  It 
would be irony indeed if a judicial development for which the opportunity was the 
presence in the law of a flexible remedy should result now in rigidly confining the 
law’s remedy to situations and relationships already ruled upon by the judges”.302 
 
And so it came to pass as the more recent case of Chester v Afshar demonstrates that 
doctors should be held accountable to patients in respect of the specific goal of making an 
informed choice about whether to consent or to refuse to consent to a medical treatment 
or procedure. 303   This case was unusual because a causal connection could not be 
established, between the doctor’s failure to warn the patient of a small but nonetheless 
serious inherent risk of surgery that materialised resulting in injury, using the usual causal 
principle or ‘but for’ test. 304   So the usual causal principle or ‘but for’ test was in this 
case overridden on policy grounds in order that the defendant doctor would bear the risk 
of the harm that the defendant did not cause;305 ‘did the doctor’s breach of duty cause the 
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patient’s injury?  It would appear that this question can only be answered in the negative.  
He did nothing which increased the risk to the patient, or even altered it.  It was a risk to 
which she was exposed anyway.  It was the same risk, irrespective of when or at whose 
hands she had the operation’.306 
 
What may be concluded from this case?  Well it seems reasonable to conclude that the 
court did not intend to fundamentally alter the nature of the doctor-patient relationship 
however if tortious relationships require the application of fiduciary principles, then the 
courts will impose them in informed consent cases as a means of protecting patient 
autonomy where such principles ensure a greater level of protection and a more 
satisfactory outcome in the event of a breach.307   
 
Where does this leave us in respect of an incompetent patient who has disclosed their 
value system in a living will?  In the absence of fully defined test or method for deciding 
what is in the incompetent’s best interests there is a need to regulate a doctor’s approach 
to decision-making on behalf of a formerly competent patient where their actual wishes 
can be known and readily understood.  In this respect the principle of the least restrictive 
option embraces many of the ideals of beneficence in trust if the MCA did at the same 
time distinguish between the circumstances of people similarly situated as the statute De 
Prerogativa Regis 1324 did by employing fiduciary obligations consistently with those 
proposed by Chester v Afshar to this fact based situation.  As autonomy is made an 
essential element of beneficence a doctor is required to at least prioritise the dignity 
interests of the patient ahead of their own inclination to act paternalistically.  Essentially 
a doctor is made the agent of an incompetent patient in this limited respect as a matter of 
necessity.   
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The Potential for Conflict between Professional and Patient Values 
 
The advantage of casting the doctor-patient relationship in fiduciary terms is that 
beneficence in trust entails respect for autonomy which allows us to oust the paternalism-
autonomy divide and to emphasise the point that medical professionals have an ethical 
and legal duty to act in the actual best interests of their patients.  When beneficence is no 
longer in conflict with autonomy the only ethical requirement is that each patient must be 
handled and treated as an individual whose life has intrinsic and personal value.308  This 
is why the fiduciary model might be particularly well suited to the situation of an 
incompetent patient who has disclosed their value system in a living will.309  
 
Does a fiduciary model keep faith with the Kantian notion that persons are the sources of 
values?310  In this regard Pellegrino and Thomasma have stated that both doctor and 
patient must be free to make informed decisions and to act fully as moral agents.311  The 
values of both doctor and patient must be respected since each is a person deserving of 
respect as such. 312  Value consensus results only if each can, without coercion or 
deception, express their own values meaning that neither party should impose their values 
on the other just as they may not make use of the other for selfish ends and equally each 
must be free to withdraw from the relationship if value conflicts cannot be resolved 
satisfactorily.313 
 
Respect for autonomy requires doctors to treat their patients as persons with interests of 
their own which preserves, rather than compromises, the integrity of the patient.  Clearly, 
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the integrity of the patient is compromised whenever they are required to follow the 
values of others.  Moreover, performance of any action that is inconsistent with their 
critical values threatens their unified identity and thus the notion of integrity.  Therefore, 
respect for autonomy presupposes respect for humanity generally and for each person as 
an individual and moral equal who has freedom to create a life of their own choosing.  In 
respecting autonomy a fiduciary must respect the inherent value of that life and the 
choices that have informed it or have shaped it that way and in so doing will seek to 
maintain the authenticity of that creative legacy as something that is to be valued for its 
own sake rather like a skilled or sympathetic restorer of a architecturally significant 
building would, retaining its lines, dimensions, artefacts or period features recognising 
that these were significant in its construction and should remain the significant feature of 
it. 
 
Doctors must also be respected fully as moral agents with values and beliefs of their own.  
It could not be otherwise as it can hardly be credible to argue why something that is 
fundamental to humanity should be true of only one party to a relationship.  However, we 
must also be sufficiently realistic to take account of the facts of human nature and to 
recognise that an imbalance of power in a relationship means that the more powerful 
party may abuse their position of power in respect of the weaker one.  The idea that 
doctors should act as fiduciaries for their patients goes some way to addressing this 
particular problem.    
 
Nevertheless, a doctor’s values and beliefs are also likely to be the source of their own 
particular idiosyncrasies or biases and prejudices which may or may not be problematic 
according to the degree to which they are allowed to affect or infect the way in which an 
individual doctor might approach their decision-making responsibilities in respect of an 
incompetent patient.  In particular there is a need to examine the potential for decision-
makers to override the values of the patient, not wilfully perhaps, but due to the 
subconscious imposition of the decision-makers own values.314 
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For instance, what is the place of personal morality or individual conscience when 
medicine is accounted for in fiduciary terms?  This is what Rosamond Rhodes has to say 
on the subject:   
 
“A frequently overlooked issue [in the practice of medicine] is the place of 
personal morality or individual conscience.  Again the problem is not unique to the 
medical profession.  In the military, soldiers owe obedience to the chain of 
command.  Those in the military are not free to make their own judgments about 
which military actions are justified and how much force is appropriate.  Instead 
they are obliged to follow the orders of higher ranking officers, who, in turn, must 
follow the direction of their political authorities.  Similarly, lawyers and judges are 
not free to make decisions based on their own values and personal conscience.  
They are committed to following the rule of law even when their personal values 
dictate a different conclusion.  Whereas the fact that professional responsibility 
overrides personal values is well accepted in other fields, those who write about the 
ethics of medicine typically ignore this element in their discussions, while some 
who consider the matter offer no justification but champion personal conscience 
over professional responsibility…  The account of the ethics of medicine based on 
fiduciary responsibility and trust, leads, however, to the opposite conclusion. 
 
… [D]octors are primarily trusted because of their role.  Patients and society 
expect doctors to act in accordance with the Ethical Standard of Care, and they 
rely upon them to meet that shared standard in all that they do…    This means that 
medical practice is not a matter of private judgment.  Rather, medical decisions 
should be the ones that any competent physician facing a comparable clinical 
situation would endorse as a matter of professional judgment. 
 
Just as disagreements over treatment decisions have to be resolved by turning to 
the available evidence and the standard of care, conflicts between principles of 
medical ethics that arise in individual cases have to be resolved in terms of 
principle related reasons that other medical professionals would also find 
compelling.  Deviations from the Ethical Standard of Care have to be justified to 
peers in terms of principles of medical ethics or by special considerations about the 
patient’s anatomy or values that colleagues from the profession would endorse as 
relevant reasons for a departure given the particular circumstances.  In other 
words, we expect physicians to consult the clinical and ethical standards of care, 
rather than their individual heart or hearts in making medical decisions… 
 
 In other words, personal priorities and personal assessment of risk have no place 
in the response of the medical professional.  Individuals who have committed 
themselves to uphold the professional responsibilities of medicine, have, in essence, 
endorsed the Ethical Standard of Care, rather than personal conscience as their 
principles for making medical decisions… 
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When a physician chooses to act on his own values instead of honouring his 
patient’s, the physician puts his own interest in ease of conscience above the 
fiduciary responsibility that is the defining feature of the ethics of medicine.  The 
doctor who chooses to avoid personal psychic distress, declares his willingness to 
impose burdens of time, inconvenience, financial costs, and rebuke on his patients 
so that he might feel pure.  Someone who places his own interests above his 
patients’ departs from medicine’s standard of promoting the patient’s good and 
violates a crucial tenet of medical ethics that every physician is duty bound to 
observe”.315 
 
The foregoing clearly emphasises the priority of professional ethics over personal 
morality.  Though the extent to which this may safeguard the interests of incompetent 
patients against the vagaries of medical professional decision-making is to an extent 
unknown.  This is because medical professionals have also entered into both a knowledge 
based and values based profession and whilst empiricism is emphasised in medical 
doctrine it is still possible for medical knowledge to be interpreted and explained in 
different ways.316  We acknowledge this by requiring physicians to be professionally 
competent in the performance of their duties.  So doctors must make decisions and act in 
accordance with their profession’s rules and standards but these too are sufficiently 
flexible to support the various interpretations that may be placed on medical knowledge.   
 
So it may be no less difficult for medical professionals to carry out their fiduciary 
obligations in practice at either stage one or two of the medical treatment decision-
making process.  Here, as has been mentioned in other contexts, human judgment cannot 
be eliminated from treatment decision-making processes and so the mentally 
incapacitated patient is still reliant upon the subjective deliberations of a medical 
professional.  In this regard Pellegrino and Thomasma have remarked that physicians 
must be persons of personal moral integrity.  They go on to state that: 
 
“The physician must have the capacity to make prudential judgments that factor in 
the particulars of each case, the general features of the disease and general moral 
principles.  Ultimately, the good of the patient depends as much on the physician’s 
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character as his capacity to make these judgments.  Furthermore, it depends on the 
extent to which he can be trusted to keep the good of the patient as his primary aim.  
In a morally pluralistic society, there is a tendency to downplay moral character in 
the education of the physician.  However, there are qualities of moral judgment that 
should apply to all physicians and for this they will need to be educated.  As 
Aristotle noted, “it is impossible, or not easy, to do noble acts without the proper 
equipment”.  Yet skills without moral integrity, will not suffice in those moments 
when no one is there to watch, thus the good of the patient hangs on the moral 
integrity of the physician”.317 
 
How realistic is it then to suppose that medical professionals will act any differently from 
any other persons in always showing sufficient strength of character to both empower and 
temper the will as occasion demands when history demonstrates mankind’s susceptibility 
to weakness of the will when subjected to various external and internal pressures to do 
otherwise?  Remember the ascendancy of any party in a relationship can mean that the 
ascendant’s class interests are maintained at the expense of the other who is vulnerable to 
the former’s exploitation and manipulation.  How do we know, for example, whether a 
doctor has been negligent or has acted from morally indifferent or objectionable motives 
in deciding what ought to happen in their patient’s best interests?  Shouldn’t we be as 
equally interested in a doctor’s capacity to make decisions that are moral and rational at 
both stages of the treatment decision-making process? 
 
Stage One of a Treatment Decision-making Process 
The law upholds a professional’s right to clinical freedom in determining what form of 
treatment is in the best interests of an individual patient.318  A spiralling healthcare 
budget means that health policy now focuses on the population rather than individual 
patients.319  Whilst on the one hand economic considerations are attributable to the 
success of modern medicine they have on the other hand given rise to a potential conflict 
which is as between individual and general well-being.  So at the first stage of a treatment 
decision there is a continuing expectation that physicians should be just in their use of a 
valuable resource, i.e. medicines and so on.  Hence the fact that the decisions doctors 
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make can make a vast difference to the lives of patients and that those decisions often 
involve value choices.  In other words a doctor will most often take account of resource 
issues when using his or her medical knowledge.   
 
Clearly there is a need to be practical when funds are finite but a doctor’s dual role in 
serving patients and also guarding NHS resources provides scope for hidden values to 
become manifest in clinical decisions concerning individual patients.  As they cannot 
detach themselves from economic matters what interpretation should be given to 
beneficence in trust at stage one of a treatment decision-making process?  Dworkin has 
explained that the right to beneficence is a right that doctors make decisions in their 
patients best interests but that they, like a trustee, must work with what they have.  It is 
not a right that particular resources be put at the disposal of the fiduciary.  This means 
that the right only governs the use of whatever resources are in fact available for the 
beneficiary’s care.320  So should patients have a right to informed denial of care, for 
example?  In this regard Newdick asks how should law and ethics respond? 
 
Informed Denial of Care 
“A strong pragmatic case can be made that there should be a duty to disclose the 
reasons for rationing treatment.  Patients refused access to care on economic 
grounds for whom treatment could provide valuable medical benefit, ought to be 
able to consider arranging their finances so that it could be provided privately.  
They may be denied that opportunity unless the reasons for the decision not to treat 
are made clear.  The patient might wish to modify the way in which the system of 
priorities has been set, organise a petition, or raise money through charity, or write 
to his or her MP. 
 
Some patients may have their own resources for obtaining medical care.  Others 
may choose to invest their energies in trying to change rationing policies rather 
than passively accepting them.  In any event, many patients may have personal or 
professional priorities and commitments that would change in the light of full, 
truthful information about their medical conditions and treatment options.  To deny 
such patients such information is to compromise the exercise of personal autonomy, 
the raison d’etre of the informed consent doctrine. 
 
Also, as a matter of principle, the law of disclosure is intended to promote the 
relationship of trust and confidence between doctor and patient, based on a 
collaboration where “decisions are made through frank discussion, in which the 
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doctor’s clinical expertise and the patient’s individual needs and preferences are 
shared, to select the best option”.  There is a risk that, unless medical decisions 
based on economic considerations are also disclosed to the patient, the relationship 
will be eroded”.321 
 
A Duty to Disclose 
Bearing in mind that clinicians have specialised knowledge and skill and access to 
medicines, procedures or specialist advice they are in the best position to understand both 
the clinical merits of medical treatments and procedures and the needs of their patients so 
do doctors have a duty to disclose information of this nature?322  Well the law of 
informed consent has developed out of the law of battery and it is concerned with the 
unlawful touching of another’s body and no touching would arise in this instance.323  The 
better alternative then is to stress the importance of trust and confidence in the doctor-
patient relationship and to state that one of the purposes of this trust and confidence is to 
enable patients, to understand the choices and to make informed decisions for 
themselves.324  This of course is entirely consistent with recent developments in the 
common law which has stripped away a doctor’s professional privilege to withhold 
relevant treatment information that might alarm the patient.325  Crucially what is custom 
and practice within the medical profession has to give way to the need to vindicate the 
moral rights of patients.  As the law clearly respects that we are masters over our bodies 
with the right to determine what should happen to us it is a logical extension of that 
principle to argue that the right is not properly recognised if we are denied information 
we would wish to know to protect our health and well-being.326 
 
Moreover, none of this need displace a doctor’s clinical freedom as Newdick explains: 
 
“Trust will never thrive if patients suspect there is a hidden rationing agenda 
dominating the doctor’s decision-making process.  So far as possible, decisions of 
this nature should not be taken covertly, at the bedside, by the doctor who happens 
to be on duty at the time, depending on his or her own perceptions and prejudices.  
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They should be taken within a clear, consistent, and cogent priorities framework to 
which patients have free access.  Thus, doctors’ responsible clinical freedom 
should remain intact unless the proposed treatment is subject to guidance within 
the ethical framework.  In this way, doctors can retain the trust of the patient and 
be open about the funding constraints imposed upon them.  Such an approach is 
surely desirable in principle for supporting the doctor-patient relationship.   
 
Doctors obliged to make resource-sensitive decisions should be able to say to the 
patient: 
 
(1) I will always act in your best interests. 
(2) Sometimes, for reasons of NHS policy, treatment may be available only in 
limited circumstances.  I will inform you of that policy. 
(3) If you have experienced need for treatment which is not generally available I 
will inform you about it. 
(4) In such a case I will, if you wish, advise the health authority of your special 
need and request that you be treated as an exceptional case. 
 
In this way, in an environment which recognises the need for hard choices, patients 
could be reassured of the doctor’s commitment to their best interests and of his or 
her willingness to act as their advocate in favour of exceptional care.  Given the 
institutional constraints that may be imposed upon them, the commitment may fall 
short of a guarantee of treatment.  Instead, it is to promote patients’ best interests 
within the confines imposed by the system as a whole.  A failure to commit to this 
principle and, instead, to encourage the mistaken belief that care will always be 
provided on the basis of patient need alone will surely hasten the erosion of 
patients’ trust in doctors” …327 
 
It is a fact of life that demand outstrips supply and that we cannot always have things that 
we want or would like due to the equal claims of others.  However, doctors do act as 
gatekeepers to what is a valuable resource which we the public have genuine claims to as 
each person makes a contribution in support of a welfare state.  So what is important to 
the patient is that doctors should be open and transparent regarding the facts of their 
decision and any assumptions they may have made unless duty is to be a chimerical 
concept.  Higher standards ought reasonably to be imposed to reflect the significance of 
the subject of their decision-making.  Well at least it should if we are serious when we 
say that human life has intrinsic and personal value to the person whose life it is, and we 
must be otherwise what justifies IVF treatment and gene therapy for example.  This 
engenders trust because the doctor is seem to maintain his independence and integrity as 
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a member of the medical profession and the public understand more about what that 
entails.  None of this should be seen as an affront to the dignity of doctors.  If we think 
about state welfare benefits, for example, it is apparent that the state will seek to claw 
back what a person would otherwise be entitled to if they obtain an income from 
elsewhere.  Those receiving benefits have a legal duty to report this otherwise they face a 
penalty, including possible imprisonment, for defrauding the welfare office if they fail to 
comply.  So the morality of not informing patients about cost issues, i.e. factors 
considered and dismissed, raises moral concerns that would have to be justified if the 
practice is to continue.  Of course we don’t want doctors reduced to reading out the sort 
of disclaimers made by those institutions that are regulated by the Financial Services 
Authority, the majority of which are fairly meaningless to most persons anyway, rather 
something of the ilk that Newdick proposes should serve us well enough.   Though I 
would just add that perhaps the doctor should also ask him or herself the rhetorical 
question would I in these circumstances accept my advice; do I prescribe medications 
that I would not take myself or would I take alternative measures to protect my own life 
and well-being. 
 
What I am getting at is that we need transparency as regards decisions (accounting) so 
that this feeds itself into the democratic process and people can then decide whether a 
practice is right or wrong based on its implications or their experiences of them.  This 
should be more just in bringing about greater equality in decision-making processes, 
justified by the patient’s right to bodily inviolability, because a doctors practice, 
particularly considerations at stage one of the decision, would actually be regulated by 
this process.  Remember bankers got drawn into taking ever greater risks as a 
consequence of the bonus culture and this has wide ranging implications for the rest of 
the population and the world economy and will continue to do so for years to come. 
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Stage Two of a Treatment Decision-making Process 
Earlier on in this section I mentioned that a fiduciary model has the potential within it to 
remove the paternalism-autonomy divide and for that reason may be particularly well 
suited to the medical care of an incompetent patient who has disclosed their value system 
in a living will.  A doctor’s ethical duty is to act in a patient’s best interests taking into 
consideration their values, beliefs and preferences or critical and experiential interests.  
The problem is that a patient and doctor may take a different view of the former’s best 
interests.  Consequently, the right of beneficence differs from the right to autonomy and 
may in some circumstances be in conflict with it, when for example, a demented patient’s 
current best interests are at odds with their precedent autonomy when competent.  Is that 
conflict genuine or which obligation is overriding?   
 
Beneficence vs Precedent Autonomy 
On this matter Dworkin has stated that: 
 
“If it is then a person’s present right to beneficence when demented, would be a 
reason to ignore their precedent autonomy, to make them happy now is spite of 
whatever the patient had directed before. 
 
There is no reason to doubt that a demented person has a right to beneficence, but 
we face an obvious problem in considering the consequences of that right.  What 
are the best interests of someone seriously and permanently demented?  Previously 
I emphasised the distinction between what I called experiential and critical 
interests and that distinction is indispensable now. 
 
Even a seriously demented person (unlike someone in a persistent vegetative state) 
has experiential interests.    But by the time the dementia has become advanced, 
Alzheimer’s victims have lost the capacity to think about how to make their lives 
more successful as a whole.  They are ignorant of self, because they have no sense 
of a whole life, a past joined to a future, that could be the object of any evaluation 
or concern as a whole.  They cannot have projects or plans of the kind that leading 
a critical life requires.  They therefore have no contemporary opinion about their 
own critical interests.  
 
Nevertheless they continue to have such interests.    [such as] when we consider 
how the fate of a demented person can affect the character of his life, we consider 
the patient’s whole life, not just its sad final stages, and we consider his future in 
terms of how it affects the character of the whole.  
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In many respects the demented person is in the same position as an unconscious, 
persistently vegetative patient.  But there is an important difference.  if I am 
convinced that it would spoil my life to be kept alive for years as a vegetable, I can 
act on the conviction with no prospect of conflict, by signing a living will directing 
that I be allowed to die.   But I know that if I become demented, I will probably 
want to go on living, and that I may then still be capable of primitive experiential 
pleasures…  Would it be in my best interests to go on living like that, or to die as 
soon as possible?  
 
People disagree sharply about that excruciating question.  Roughly half are 
repelled by the idea of living demented, totally dependent lives, speaking gibberish, 
incapable of understanding that there is a world beyond them, let alone of 
following its course.    They do not think that the possible childish pleasures of 
dementia would redeem its curse; some think the capacity to enjoy such pleasures 
would be part of that curse.  They would prefer not to live on.  But half take the 
other view.  They do not think that a demented life is worse than no life at all, and 
for them the meagre childish pleasures are better than nothing.  
 
People in the first group may consider signing living wills stipulating that if they 
become permanently and seriously demented, and then develop a serious disease, 
they should not be given medical treatment except to avoid pain.  Respect for their 
autonomy would be a reason for doing what they ask.  But I raised the question 
whether there might be a conflict between respecting their autonomy and serving 
their best interests.  Is there a conflict between respecting precedent autonomy if a 
living will has been signed and doing what would later be in her best interests?  Is 
this like the case in which we have to choose between respecting a Jehovah’s 
Witness’s autonomy and giving him a lifesaving transfusion after he falls 
unconscious?  
 
Of course there is a conflict between precedent autonomy and a person’s 
contemporary experiential interests if that person is still enjoying their life, but 
there is no conflict with her critical interests as that person would themselves 
conceive them when competent or if competency could temporarily be restored.  If I 
decide when I was competent that it would be best for me not to remain alive in a 
seriously and permanently demented state, then a fiduciary could contradict me 
only by exercising an unacceptable form of moral paternalism.    Once we rule out 
that form of paternalism, once we accept that we must judge a person’s critical 
interests as she did when competent to do so, then the conflict between autonomy 
and beneficence seems to disappear.   If a person has asked not to be given medical 
care for life-threatening illnesses contracted after they had become demented, 
neither their right to autonomy nor their right to beneficence would give grounds 
for denying that request, even if the demented person is enjoying their life.  We 
cannot say that we would be showing compassion for them if we refused to do what 
they wanted when they were competent, because that would not be compassionate 
toward the whole person, the person who tragically became demented.  We might 
have other reasons for refusing to endorse the living will, we might find ourselves 
 378
unable to deny medical help to anyone who is conscious and does not reject it, but 
we cannot claim to be acing for their sake. 
 
It would be a mistake to resist this conclusion on the ground that letting them die in 
these circumstances would be irrevocable.  After all both choices, to honour or not 
to honour a past request are irrevocable.  But consider a different objection: that in 
the circumstances of dementia, critical interests become less important and 
experiential interests more so, so that fiduciaries may rightly ignore the former and 
concentrate on the latter.  It is true, I said, that demented people have no sense of 
their own critical interests, but before that, when they were competent, they did, 
and we cannot disregard this or think it no longer matters.  Persistently vegetative 
patients have no sense of their own critical interests, but that is not a good reason 
for ignoring their fate, and it is not a good reason for ignoring the demented 
either”. 328 
 
Consequently, it is important that surrogate decision-makers are able to comprehend and 
appreciate the importance of the distinction between critical and experiential interests in 
order for them to understand which obligation is overriding and thus how people must be 
treated at the end of life.  Indeed Dworkin uses this distinction to explain why a patient’s 
right to dignity,329 which is an essential element of autonomy, is thought to be more 
fundamental even than their right to beneficence.330  Do the demented have a right to 
dignity?   
 
Dignity vs Beneficence 
“Self-respect like autonomy requires a degree of general competence and, 
especially, a sense of self-identity over time, which seriously demented people have 
lost. 331 
 
So on the experiential account of dignity, it seems dubious that the demented have 
any general right to dignity, and concern for their self-respect does seem only 
expensive sentimentality, like providing hairdressers for the comatose.  Of course 
we may still think it important to maintain the demented in circumstances of dignity 
out of respect for the sensibilities of their relatives or others who might otherwise 
suffer outrage and guilt.  But if the patient himself suffers no distinctive distress of 
indignity, his relatives might be led to see that their own indignation and guilt are 
misplaced.  In any case, respect for the feelings of others does not require us to 
recognise a right of dignity for demented patients who have no relatives or friends.  
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This experiential account of indignity is unpersuasive, however, because it does not 
explain central features of our convictions about dignity… 
 
What other account of the right to dignity can explain all this?  Why is indignity a 
special kind of harm, whether self-inflicted or inflicted by others, and why does it 
seem worse when the indignity is not recognised by its victims?  I have been 
arguing that we not only have in common with all sensate creatures, experiential 
interests in the quality of our future experiences but also critical interests in the 
character and value of our lives as a whole.   These critical interests are connected 
to our convictions about the intrinsic value, the sanctity or inviolability of our own 
lives.  A person worries about his critical interests because he thinks it important 
what kind of a life he has led, important for its own sake and not simply for the 
experiential pleasure that leading a valuable life (or believing it valuable) might or 
might not have given him.  A person’s right to be treated with dignity, is the right 
that others acknowledge his genuine critical interests; that they acknowledge that 
he is the kind of creature, and has the moral standing, such that it is intrinsically, 
objectively important how his life goes.  Dignity is a central aspect of the value we 
have in the intrinsic importance of human life.  
 
Putting it this way explains how and why the right to dignity is different from the 
right to beneficence.  We can acknowledge that it is important how someone’s life 
goes without accepting any general positive obligation to make it go better.  The 
distinction is necessary to explain the pervasiveness of our concern with dignity, 
why we insist, on the dignity even of prisoners.  When we jail someone convicted of 
a crime in order to deter others, we do not treat him with beneficence, on the 
contrary we act against his interests for the general benefit.  But we insist that he 
be treated with dignity in accordance with our understanding of what that requires, 
that he not be tortured, or humiliated, for example because we continue to regard 
him as a full human being, as someone whose fate we continue to treat as a matter 
of concern.  Requiring his custodians to respect his dignity shows, among other 
things, that we appreciate the gravity of what we are doing; that we understand we 
are jailing a human being whose life matters, that our reasons for doing so are 
reasons we believe both require and justify this terrible injury, that we are not 
entitled to treat him as a mere object at the full disposal of our convenience, as if 
all that mattered was the usefulness, for the rest of us, of locking him up. 332  
(Understanding that dignity means recognising a person’s critical interests, as 
distinct from advancing those interests, provides a useful reading of the Kantian 
principle that people should be treated as ends and never merely as means.  That 
principle so understood does not require that people never be put at a disadvantage 
for the advantage of others, but rather that people never be treated in a way that 
denies the distinct importance of their own lives.) … 
 
This general account of the meaning of dignity explains our sense that people care 
or should care for their own dignity.  Someone who compromises his own dignity 
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denies, in whatever language his community provides, a sense of himself as 
someone with critical interests, the value of whose life is important for its own sake.  
That is self-betrayal.  And our account also explains why indignity is most serious 
when its victim no longer suffers from the indignity.  For a person who accepts 
indignity accepts the classification implicit in it, and accepting that one’s life lacks 
the critical importance of other lives, that it is less intrinsically important how it 
goes, is a great and sad defeat... 
 
Does a seriously demented person have a right to dignity in their custodial care?  
Yes.  A person who has become demented retains his critical interests because what 
happens to him then affects the value or success of his life as a whole.  That he 
remains a person, and that the overall value of his life continues to be intrinsically 
important, are decisive truths in favour of his right to dignity.  Now we may 
complete the argument.  We mark his continued moral standing and we affirm the 
importance of the life he has lived, by insisting that nothing be done to or for him 
that, in our community’s vocabulary of respect, denies him dignity.  Though dignity 
is different from beneficence it would be inconsistent to deny dignity while 
recognising the critical interests that it confirms.  So here is yet more proof of the 
dominating grip of the idea that human life has intrinsic as well as personal 
importance for human beings, the complex but inescapable idea that it is, 
sacred”.333  
 
Modelling the doctor-patient relationship along fiduciary lines keeps faith with the 
Kantian ideal of respect for persons, i.e. that persons have moral worth and dignity.  
Therefore, it is imperative in the moral life that persons should always be treated as an 
end and never solely as the means to the end of any other.  Consequently, doctors who 
fail to recognise and act on the distinction between a person’s experiential and critical 
interests would cause harm to the patient and be in breach of their obligation to be non-
maleficent.   
 
Finally, can we rely on the judgment of others?  Bear in mind that substituted judgment 
does not form part of our law because it is a fallacy to suppose that anybody can think 
and act as the patient would.  We saw evidence of this in relation to the ability to predict 
the preferences of those we are close to which will come as no surprise to those who are 
familiar with the game show Mr and Mrs.  So we must return to Kant for guidance 
because although a doctor cannot think like the patient he or she can reason and make 
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decisions that cohere with rules, laws etc.334  Still that does not necessarily address the 
problem of decision-makers infecting a decision-making process with their own biases 
and prejudices.  In this regard Kant thought that persons who can by definition reason 
should be equally capable of abstracting from personal differences when acting under 
various constraints as a legislator in a kingdom of ends.335  All gloriously theoretical, I 
know, but doctors are already doing this as they are morally and legally required to be 
appropriately beneficent, not paternalistic.  Nevertheless, human judgment cannot be 
eliminated from the decision-making process and Kant determined that a person’s 
attitude was critical to the way in which they interpreted their responsibilities to others.  
According to Kant only someone who has a good will336 has the capacity to make 
decisions that are both moral and logical.   
 
Kantian Good Will 
Before we get to Kant let us return for a moment to Maslow’s hierarchy of needs because 
he recognised that values differ in kind and in suggesting that there is a spiritual 
dimension to self-actualisation he clearly did not think that all values are commensurable 
or could be accounted for in terms of a single standard of measurement as Bentham had 
suggested.  Human life, according to Maslow, should not be all about deciding what you 
want to become and then doing whatever you can to realise your goals.  He claims that in 
order for each individual to become the best that they are capable of or to realise their 
true potential they must also have the capacity to transcend their sense of self and to 
instead think of others and their needs.   By which he means that persons should seek to 
be more objective or to look beyond personal biases and prejudices, which simple 
toleration might preserve, in any situation where the interests of others are engaged.  So 
we are on the road to enlightenment when we are willing to respect others and to regard 
their interests as equal to our own.   Furthermore, in depicting a hierarchy of needs 
Maslow is suggesting that the individual decisions and activities of persons, though they 
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may not recognise it as such, have an ultimate end that can be explained in rational terms 
on the basis of human psychology.337  Thus it is rational for persons to see that we all 
have similar needs that we will seek to satisfy in our various ways and so the rules of life 
that apply to them apply equally to others.338  When a person is disposed to think in these 
terms they will also be motivated to act well toward others.339   This, I think, is what Kant 
is trying to get at when he says that a person who does the right thing for the right reason 
evinces a good will and a good will is the only thing to which we should attribute 
unconditional worth.340  A good will is good through its willing which means that it is 
only through actions that are expressive of it that we see this special value realised.341   
Thus according to Kant a good will has intrinsic value because it is something that is 
good for its own sake, i.e. it is completely independent of its relations to other things, 
which it therefore has in all circumstances, and which cannot be undercut by external 
conditions.   
 
So according to Kant, the moral worth of an action consists not in the consequences that 
flow from it, but in the intention from which the act is done.  What matters is the motive, 
and the motive must be of a certain kind.  What matters is doing the right thing because 
it’s right, not for some ulterior motive.342     Therefore what gives a morally good action 
its special value is the motivation behind it and if we can discover the principle on which 
it was chosen or in Kantian terms willed we will have knowledge of what principle a 
genuinely beneficent person such as a rescuer has acted upon and what makes them 
morally good.343   
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We must have a certain conception of the motives from which the person acted if we 
wish to attribute unconditional value to an action. 344 Although you may remember from 
chapter one that Jonathan Glover was there concerned about discovering the real facts 
through re-descriptions of acts and he thought that this made moral evaluation that much 
more difficult.    
 
Kant was however more concerned with determining which actions are morally good as a 
means to discover what the moral law tells us to do.345  As if to get around Glover’s point 
Kant focuses on a particular class of morally good actions, those that are done from duty: 
duty because persons who perform their duty will do so under ‘certain subjective 
limitations and hindrances, i.e. they have other motives which, in the absence of duty 
might have led them to avoid the action.346  The point is that when a person acts on the 
principle of duty before self, not otherwise wanting to, we know that the thought of duty 
alone has produced the action rather than something that can be traced to some direct or 
indirect self-interested principle of action, such as inclination or desire.347  Hence actions 
that are derived from self-interest lack moral worth because the action, however morally 
commendable, pleases them.  Whereas the person who acts from duty makes it their 
maxim to help because they conceive that helping others is something that is required of 
them.  In this way the person who acts from duty thinks that the needs of others make a 
claim on them that one has an obligation to respond to.348   
 
Thus Korsgaard writes that: 
 
“Kant thinks that performing an action because you regard the action or its end as 
one that is required of you is equivalent to being moved by the thought of the 
maxim of the action as a kind of law.  The dutiful person takes the maxim of helping 
others to express or embody a requirement, just as a law does.  In Kant’s 
terminology, she sees the maxim of helping others as having the form of a law.  
When we think that a certain maxim expresses a requirement, or has the form of a 
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law, that thought itself is an incentive to perform the action.  Kant calls this 
incentive ‘respect for law’. 
 
We now know what gives actions done from duty their special moral worth.  They 
get their moral worth from the fact that the person who does them acts from respect 
for law.  A good person is moved by the thought that his or her maxim has the form 
of a law.  The principle of a good will, therefore, is to do only those actions whose 
maxims can be conceived as having the form of a law.  If there is such a thing as 
moral obligation, if, as Kant himself says, ‘duty is not to be everywhere an empty 
delusion and a chimerical concept’, then we must establish that our wills are 
governed by this principle: “I ought never to act except in such a way that I could 
also will that my maxim should become a universal law”. 349 
 
Therefore the Kantian view, like the consequentialist one, does not give rational priority 
to self-interest or satisfaction of one’s own preferences.350  Hill adds that: 
 
“There is, as it were, a common rational source for both self-regarding and other-
regarding requirements.  Thus, on the Kantian view, though the question arises 
why is it really rational to follow the (self-regarding and other regarding) norms 
we call moral, the task of answering this question is not equated with showing that 
what is obviously rational (self-interest or preference satisfaction maximisation), 
despite appearances, really supports what was dubiously rational (moral regard 
for others).  Whether the issue concerns one’s own life or the life of another, the 
question to ask is whether reasonable, autonomous legislators, under the various 
Kantian constraints, can justify to each other the treatment that is proposed.  In 
effect the Kantian idea of reasonable deliberation (like common sense) has built 
into it concern for the voice of every reasonable person.351 
 
 
Will Reform of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 be Necessary? 
 
Based on the premise that the concept of a moral obligation was formed from the 
viewpoint that persons are essentially self-interested and are thus inclined to act on the 
basis of their own moral and non-moral intuitions, or sense of what is right or wrong and 
good or bad there is a need to make a doctor the agent of a patient who has disclosed their 
value system in a living will and to displace the reasonable person or objective decision-
making standard in favour of an approach that seeks to preserve the subjective standard 
of a formerly competent patient.  This way there will be no advantage in maintaining that 
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a patient is competent to make a decision when they are compliant with medical opinion 
and conversely to claim that the patient is incompetent to decide when they raise 
objections to it because a doctor will be required to make a decision that is consistent 
with the values, beliefs and preferences of the patient. 
 
How does a Doctor Differ from an LPA? 
A fiduciary standard requires decision-makers to maximise the interests of the 
beneficiary and to exercise loyalty352 and good faith in the performance of their duties.353  
As Sallyanne Payton suggested354 there is an underlying concern with the agent’s state of 
mind and a fiduciary standard requires the decision-maker to adopt an attitude of 
respectful friendship toward the incompetent person, just as though they were to be 
accountable to the person where they to recover their faculties and become competent 
once more.355  In view of the potential for a conflict of interests to arise the notion of an 
accounting, which the MCA preserves,356 is intended to promote honesty, transparency, 
fairness and an absence of intent to do harm when acting on behalf of an otherwise 
vulnerable person.357  As a doctor could be required to give an account of decisions made 
and action taken this should narrow the scope for paternalistic tendencies to emerge, 
would prevent arbitrary and other misuse of executive powers and lead to certainty and 
confidence in surrogate decision-making processes. 
 
The Need of a Central Registry 
In common with the situation of those who make advance decisions those who disclose 
their value system in a living will currently have no way of knowing that their decisions 
or values will be respected in the future as we have no facility with which to register and 
place these documents.  Interestingly, this is not the fate of those who wish to appoint an 
LPA to manage their affairs when they are no longer competent to do so themselves as 
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their documents must be registered at the office of the Public Guardian.358  Perhaps this 
principle could be extended to include the situation of persons who have disclosed their 
value system in a living will.  Alternatively, the NHS is currently undertaking to 
computerise health records and consequently it might be possible to register a value 
system that way. 
 
What Implications flow from requiring Doctors to uphold a Fiduciary Standard of 
Care? 
Earlier on in this chapter I made reference to the fact that a doctor who fails to respect a 
valid and applicable advance directive can be found liable for a battery and that this was 
because they are not acting for or on behalf of someone who lacks capacity but on the 
instructions of a capacitated individual.359  If dignity is an aspect of autonomy and a 
person cares about the inherent value of their own life that person will want to live in 
conditions in which genuine self-respect is possible360 which means in a manner that is 
befitting with what has gone before.361  Consequently, what is a dignified life for them 
will be most vividly illustrated by those critical interests that were significant in it.362  As 
a person’s critical interests are connected to our convictions about the intrinsic value, i.e. 
the sanctity or inviolability of our own life, then a person’s right to be treated with 
dignity, Dworkin suggests, is the right that others acknowledge their genuine critical 
interests: that they acknowledge that they are the kind of creature, and has the moral 
standing, such that it is intrinsically important how their life goes.363 
 
Therefore, my view is that a failure to respect a value system disclosed in a living will 
should result in a claim for battery being made against the clinician.  The doctor would in 
other words have acted in breach of a fundamental moral and legal duty in human life; 
respect for the bodily inviolability of others.   Liability for failing to disclose relevant 
treatment information is judged by reference to the tort of negligence, but if a prudent 
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patient standard is adopted the standard imposed on physicians can be more closely 
equated to that of the tort of battery which looks to the validity of the patient’s consent to 
treatment.   I have previously stated that maintaining a distinction between battery and 
negligence is somewhat artificial when the right to bodily inviolability is derived through 
the right to self-determination.  The problem is that humans are imperfect and even when 
acting with the best of intentions it is possible that they might end up causing harm to 
others.  As a non-intentional tort negligence accepts this view of humanity but says that 
each of us must refrain from acting in ways that one could reasonably foresee might 
cause harm to others.  My view therefore is that the principle established in Chester 
should apply to the amount of information a doctor is required to disclose when deciding 
how best to respect the patient’s autonomy.  However, because it is possible for 
individual decision-makers to weigh or use information differently even when attempting 
to bring values into a state of coherence an incorrect or contested application of values 
should continue to be assessed, at least for the time being, in accordance with a prudent 
doctor or a limited objective standard.  Bearing in mind that we are interested in the 
application of facts to values we are interested in determining whether someone who 
holds themselves out as having specialist knowledge and a good will toward others could 
reasonably have arrived at the decision they claimed to make on behalf of the patient, as 
judged by the Bolam standard.  Hopefully trust in the medical profession in this respect 
will not be misplaced. 
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Postscript 
 
Taking into consideration the fundamental values of persons, i.e. the sanctity and 
inviolability of human life from which the right to autonomy is derived, are the changes 
proposed by this thesis necessary and appropriate to uphold them?  Well one way to 
consider this question is to understand what may be the consequences for particular 
individuals of failing to consider reforms of this nature.  Consider, for example, this story 
about the great evolutionist Charles Darwin who left London to live with his family at 
Down House in Downe a pretty Kent village.  It was during his time there that he was 
inspired to write his theory of evolution; ‘The Origin of Species’, which challenged 
traditional religious beliefs about God and creation.  Darwin had for a time held back 
from committing his ideas to paper.  This was partly because he knew that once the genie 
had been let out of the bottle there would be no turning back and he was wary about the 
conflict that would ensue between traditional and scientific values and beliefs.  He was 
also aware that his wife was deeply religious and he did not wish to offend her or cause 
her any distress.  However, he was eventually persuaded to commit his ideas to paper by 
those who, like him, believed that all earthly phenomenon could be explained in natural 
rather than non-natural terms. 
 
It would nonetheless be a falsehood to try to define Darwin solely in terms of his 
contribution to natural science because he was also a committed family man who had 
several children, in whom he took great interest.  Unfortunately two died in infancy and 
another, Annie, died during childhood.  Her death devastated Darwin.  The children were 
buried at the family plot in St Mary’s churchyard in Downe, where Darwin’s brother was 
also buried.  When Darwin himself died, suddenly on the 19th April 1882, the family 
made arrangements for him to be buried, alongside his children at the family plot in St 
Mary’s churchyard.  However, William Spottiswoode, who was president of the Royal 
Society, which is this country’s national academy for science, petitioned the Dean of 
Westminster Abbey to have his body buried there.  His thinking, no doubt, was that if the 
church honoured Darwin this would help to popularise Darwinism leading to the 
introduction of an alternative set of concepts through which to view the world and its 
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people and eventually to a sea-change in the activities and evaluative experiences of 
valuers.  As his request was honoured Darwin’s family reluctantly sent his body to be 
buried there.364   
 
I rest my case.  
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis is concerned with the circumstances under which the Mental Capacity Act 
2005 authorises the administration of a medical treatment in respect of formerly 
competent patients; to show why the law might fail to deliver what it promises in respect 
of this patient group and to suggest ways for how the law might be made to work better. 
 
The significance we attach to the human body and life is underpinned by the principle of 
bodily inviolability.  Thus all persons enjoy a right to bodily inviolability.  However, this 
fundamental right is derived through another, the right to self-determination.  As 
autonomy is the primary principle of law this establishes that persons value being in 
control of their own person, life and life plan.  Moreover, autonomy serves to counter 
medical paternalism. 
 
An obvious difficulty arises when someone suffers a loss of decision-making capacity as 
another person must make decisions and take action for and on behalf of the mentally 
incapacitated patient.  The legislative problem, if we are not to downgrade the status of 
mentally incapacitated patients, is in determining whether, and, if so, how decisions 
concerning their medical welfare should be made to accord with their autonomously held 
wishes.   
 
A decision to respect autonomy, not beneficence, in these circumstances must be to 
ensure that its underlying purposes are fulfilled not frustrated, i.e. to ensure that a 
decision to administer, withdraw or withhold a medical treatment is informed by the 
patient’s prior right to make decisions concerning their welfare and other liberty interests 
in accordance with their own values, beliefs and preferences.   This way the right to self-
determination transcends the advent of mentally incapacity and formerly competent 
patients retain control over their body, life and life plan.   
 
In this regard the legislative framework aims to promote and respect patient autonomy in 
respect of capacity assessments and advance decisions.  And whilst the concept of 
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precedent autonomy is embedded within the legislative framework, thereafter, the MCA 
adopts a patient-centred approach to decision-making in approving a best interests, not 
substituted judgment, decision-making standard.  Essentially, the welfare appraisal makes 
the character and personality of the patient a very relevant factor that is to be considered, 
though this need not be made determinative of what should happen, by surrogate 
decision-makers.    
 
The, not insubstantial, underlying concern of legislators is that in a civil society a 
vulnerable person should not be denied medical treatment merely because they cannot 
consent to it.  With this in mind our legislature has determined that the patient’s right to 
self-determination should be positively recognised through the concept of advance 
decisions.  The idea is that a patient when competent seeks to maximise decision-making 
capacity by recording an anticipatory treatment decision in a living will.  Crucially, a 
previous treatment decision of a competent patient must be respected in the way it would 
be if the patient had contemporaneously refused to consent to a treatment or procedure 
that a doctor proposed to administer in their (medical) best interests.  Thus a formerly 
competent patient retains control over what happens to their body in a medical context.   
 
As previously implied these are a device through which patient’s may seek to refuse a 
particular form of medical treatment, most often at the end of life.  However the 
evidential burden is on the patient to establish that an advance decision exists that is both 
legally valid and applicable in the circumstances arising for decision.  As these are very 
difficult standards to meet it seems reasonable to conclude that if the patient’s right to 
self-determination is to prevail over the State’s interest in the sanctity of human life that 
legislation requires them to be very competent indeed when making a decision to refuse 
treatment.  The justification for the legislative response is that patients often fail to gather 
information that is relevant to their decision and may even misunderstand the information 
they have gathered.  Moreover, evidence suggests that the values, beliefs and preferences 
that underpinned their decision may in fact be unstable.   
 
 392
Capacity assessments are important events because a patient either retains or loses the 
right to make decisions for themselves and in accordance with their own values, beliefs 
and preferences.  An aspect of respect for personal autonomy is that every effort should 
be made to assist even borderline patients to overcome their difficulties in making a 
contemporaneous medical treatment decision.  Essentially if the person has or gains 
capacity to make a medical treatment decision they can refuse the relevant treatment at 
the material time or may exercise their right to change their decision and consent to the 
treatment in question.   
 
In an appropriate case a finding that a patient retains decision-making capacity opens the 
door for them to review their prior choice, which may have been expressed at a time 
when they were in full health, in the light of their current situation.  The issue of whether 
or not a person has capacity is treated as a question of fact to be determined by a doctor 
with responsibility for the patient.  My concern is with the circumstances in which a 
patient may be found to retain decision-making capacity as it is difficult to eliminate the 
possibility of them feeling vulnerable as a result of their condition and afraid by what is 
entailed in their prior instructions and these are the very conditions which are known to 
engender a change of mind with a little persuasion. 
 
Doctors are thereby reminded that legislation requires them to adopt a functional not 
outcome based test for capacity, i.e. a competent patient can decide for reasons that are 
rational, irrational, unknown or even non-existent.  A two stage test is used to determine 
whether their patient has an impairment or disturbance that affects the way their mind or 
brain works and if they do they must then consider whether that means that they are 
unable to make the decision in question,1 i.e. it is the capacity to understand treatment 
information2 and retain it3 so that it can be used or applied to ones values4 to arrive at a 
                                                 
1
 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s.2(1) 
2
 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s.3(1)(a) 
3
 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s.3(1)(b) 
4
 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s.3(1)© 
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choice that can be communicated5 that is being appraised not whether what they decide is 
in their medical welfare interests.   
 
However, it has been noted that doctors rarely question whether the patient is competent 
to consent when they are compliant with medical expert opinion but conversely are more 
likely to claim that a patient is not competent to consent if they raise objections or refuse 
a necessary and appropriate medical treatment or procedure.  And in this respect the 
MCA determines that the relevant information that should be disclosed is that pertaining 
to the reasonably foreseeable consequences of a medical treatment6 which places 
emphasis on what a reasonably prudent doctor,7 not patient,8 decides is material for them 
to weigh in the balance in order to come to a decision. 
 
Yet, if autonomy is the primary principle of law and persons not values are sources of the 
normative claims we make on others, it is plain, in the context of medical treatment 
decision-making on behalf of formerly competent patients, that the value of autonomy 
may fall into decline or be subject to misuse absent an appropriate sustaining social 
practice to uphold its value at various critical points within the structure of the MCA and 
at various stages in the cycle of a medical treatment decision-making process.   
 
My proposal is an attempt to plug these various gaps in the legislative scheme to create 
space for autonomy to triumph over beneficence.  As an advance decision can be 
expression of values or of a value system the right to self-determination is being asserted 
through this particular construct.  Although in this instance one is being used to protect 
and to give authority to the values or value system of a competent person on the basis that 
their values, beliefs and preferences underpin their decisions.     
 
Even though a value system could not be interpreted as an actual advance decision one 
could be used in capacity assessments as well as to determine what should happen in the 
                                                 
5
 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s.3(1)(d) 
6
 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s.3(4) 
7
 The standard proposed in Sidaway v Board of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital and 
Others [1985] AC 871 
8
 The standard proposed in Chester v Afshar 2004 WL 2289136 
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actual best interests of the patient, i.e. in which case a limited objective, not substituted 
judgment, standard would apply, the term ‘limited’ is used since it may still be possible 
to weigh values differently to the patient and to come to a decision that is not the one the 
patient would make.  Nonetheless, when an appropriate welfare checklist, i.e. value 
system, is combined with an appropriate method for deciding, i.e. coherence theory, the 
problem is to an extent mitigated plus there is no actual advantage to doctors in stating 
that the patient is not competent merely because they refuse to consent to treatment as 
whatever is in their best interest must be rendered consistent with their prior disclosed 
values.  Coherence theory thus makes an important contribution in the quest to change 
the emphasis away from contemporary towards precedent autonomy when third parties 
try to determine what should happen in another’s best interests.   
 
The possibility of affecting change under the MCA is apparent the question then is 
whether the principle, established in Chester v Afshar, that the patient’s right to bodily 
inviolability determines that no gap should exist between beneficence and autonomy in 
relation to decisions concerning the life, health and welfare of patients, has become 
enshrined within the Act? 
 
In this regard it appears that a fiduciary standard would make decisions-makers more 
responsible for their decisions and actions.  This is achieved in two ways.  First, the 
standard removes the potential for conflict to arise in the interests of the relevant parties, 
i.e. between beneficence and autonomy.  Second, a fiduciary standard changes the rules 
of accountability by upholding the value of transparency, honesty and integrity in 
decision-making processes which would tend to induce the necessary sense of loyalty to 
the aims and intention of patients that is needed to ensure that surrogate decision-makers 
carry out their duties to others appropriately and responsibly.  The suggestion, in other 
words, is that a fiduciary standard encourages doctors to use their power beneficently in 
furthering the interests of the patient – i.e. it incorporates the moral principle do as you 
would be done by. 
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This is the only standard that acknowledges the special nature of the doctor of the doctor-
patient relationship whilst also recognising the imbalance of knowledge and power that 
exists between the respective parties.  Bearing in mind the interests that are at stake, i.e. 
human life has moral worth and dignity, and the facts of human nature there is every 
reason why this standard should be adopted in law. 
 
Practical Application 
The idea is given a foundation by Ronald Dworkin who argues that an individual right to 
autonomy makes self-creation possible which allows each of us to live our lives in 
accordance with our own unique personality or out of a sense of what is important to us.  
He proceeds to comment that people think it important not just that their life contain a 
variety of the right experiences, achievements, and connections, but that it have a 
structure that expresses a coherent choice among these and puts forward the view that a 
person’s critical interests are what give their life a coherent narrative and in that sense 
differ from experiential interests which are more likely to fluctuate over time.   
 
His analysis of autonomy demands that a person’s critical and experiential interests 
should be the core features of a value system.  Significantly the project requires persons 
to identify and set apart what is intrinsically valuable from the value of experience which 
is not deemed to be a source of intrinsic value.  We are invited, in other words, to set out 
what we feel and act out of a sense of duty towards from those affairs that we show no 
settled commitment to, as well as from those things we do from pure inclination. 
 
On this view autonomy allows people who have it to choose how far and in what form 
they will seek to realise that aim.  Therefore, an integrity based view of autonomy, which 
the concept of precedent autonomy adopted by the MCA appears to support, is essential 
to considerations about what the personal consequences of this are for the person 
concerned.  
 
However, if Rebecca Dresser is right, that establishing a coherent life theme is not the 
priority of most individuals, in that most often people respond to events as they arise, 
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then this proposal is likely to have limited appeal and no real practical application under 
the MCA.   
 
Suggestions for Further Research 
As I have conducted a book based theoretical study one obvious suggestion to make is 
that empirical research may be needed to see whether, in fact, people can identify and 
organise their values in the manner intended, i.e. to separate them into critical and 
experiential interests.  It would also be necessary to explore the issue of whether a third 
party decision-maker would be able to interpret and apply any resultant value system to 
achieve a result that is consistent with what the patient would decide, i.e. would they 
interpret and weigh values in the manner intended.  This is important to ascertain because 
the intention is that a surrogate should use the patient’s value system for capacity 
assessments as well as to determine whether a medical treatment should be administered, 
withheld or withdrawn.  The issue is that a value system, based on critical and 
experiential interests, may be hard to apply.  This is because the patient has determined 
what there good is but not how it should be pursued in every instance as a traditional 
advance decision would, i.e. it is non-specific and thus not a treatment decision.  
Critically, human judgment has not been eliminated from decision-making processes and 
therefore biases and prejudices may become manifest within the evaluative process 
leaving space for values to interpreted paternalistically.   
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